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Dalloz, Recueil hebdomadaire de jurispru-
dence (France). 
Digest of Reports of Cases (Malay States). 
II Digesto Italiano, 24 v. in 49; Torino, 
1884-1921. 
Il diritto marittimo. Revista bimestrale di 
dottrina, giurisprudenza, legislazione ita-
liana e straniera. 
Disposizioni preliminari ; disposiciones pre-
liminares; disposi~ao preliminar. 
Dominion Law Reports (Canada). 
International Conference for the Unification 
of the Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promis-
sory Notes and Cheques, 1930. Preparatory 
Documents, I 929 I. 28. League of N a-
tions Doc. No. c. 234· M. 83. 1929 II. 
Revista de derecho, legislacion y jurispru-
dencia del colegio de abogados de Puerto 
Rico, 1935-. 
Drewry, English Vice Chancellor's Reports, 
4 vols. 
East's King's Bench Reports, 16 vols. (Eng-
land). 
Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buch (Germany). 
] uristische Zeitschrift fiir Elsass-Lothringen. 
English Reports (Full reprint). 
Moak, English Reports (American reprint). 
Entscheidungen des koniglichen geheimen 
Obertribunals, 1837-1879 (Prussia). 
The English Reports, Full Reprint. 
The Exchequer Reports (England) 1847-
1856. 
Exchequer Court Reports (Canada). 
Fraser, Scotch Sessions Cases, 5th Series. 
XXVI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
F. (2d) 
Fed. 
Fed. Cas. 
Festschrift f. 
Fritzsche 
Festschrift f. Raape 
Festschrift f. Rabel 
Foreign Law Series 
no. 4 
Foro. Ital. 
Foro. Lomb. 
F. Supp. 
Ga. 
Ga. App. 
Gac. For. 
Gaz. Pal. 
Gaz. Trib. 
Gen. Conv. 
Geo. L. J. 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
Giur. Camp. D. 
Com. 
Giur. Camp. DIP. 
Giur. Comp. Dir. 
Civ. 
Giur. ltal. 
GI. U. 
Gray 
Federal Reporter, Second Series (United 
States). 
Federal Reporter (United States). 
Federal Cases (United States). 
Fragen des Verfahrens- und Kollisionsrechtes; 
Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Pro-
fessor Dr. Hans Fritzsche, Zurich, 1952. 
Festschrift fiir Leo Raape zu seinem Siebzig-
sten Geburtstag, 14 Juni 1948. Hrsg. von 
Hans Peter Ipsen. Hamburg, Rechts-und 
Staatswissenschaftlicher Verlag. 1948. 
Festschrift fiir Ernst Rabel, Tiibingen, 1954· 
Administration of estates with respect to as-
sets abroad in England, United States of 
America, France. Paris, Librairie du Re-
cueil Sirey; New York, 1935. 
II foro italiano. 
Foro della Lombardia. 
Federal Supplement (United States). 
Georgia Reports. 
Georgia Appeals Reports. 
Gaceta del Foro (Argentina). 
Gazette du Palais (France). 
Gazette des Tribunaux (France). 
Geneva Convention. 
Georgetown Law Journal (Wash., D. C.). 
George Washington Law Review. 
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto commer-
ciale, marittimo, aeronautico, industriale e 
d'autore. 
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto inter-
nazionale privata. 
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto civile. 
Giurisprudenza italiana. 
Sammlung von zivilrechtlichen Entscheidun-
gen des Obersten Gerichtshofes, begriindet 
von Glaser und Unger (Austria). 
Gray's Massachusetts Reports, vols. 67-82. 
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Gruchot's Beitriige 
Griinhut's Zschr. 
Hagg. Eccl. 
Handelsg. 
Hans. GZ. 
Hans. RGZ. 
Hare 
Harv. L. Rev. 
Haw. 
HBe. 
Hbl. 
H. Bl. 
H.D. 
Hem. & Mill. 
HGB. 
H.L.Cas. 
H.&N. 
Hopk. 
Houst. 
How. Pr. 
H.R. 
H.R.R. 
Humph. 
Ill. 
Ill. App. 
Ill. L. Rev. 
Ind. 
Int. Bar. Ass. 
Int. Civ. Law 
Beitriige zur Erliiuterung des deutschen 
Rechts, begriindet von Dr. J. A. Gruchot. 
Zeitschrift fiir das Privat-und Offentliche 
Recht der Gegenwart, herausgegeben von 
Dr. C. S. Griinhut (Austria). 
Haggard, English Ecclesiastical Reports, 4 
vols. 
Handelsgericht. 
Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung. (See also Hans. 
RGZ.). 
Hanseatische Rechts- und Gerichts-Zeitschrift. 
Hare, English Reports, I84I-I853· 
Harvard Law Review. 
Hawaiian Reports, I847/56. 
H amburgische Gerichts-] uristen. 
Haupt blatt. 
H. Blackstone, English Law Reports, I 788-
I796. 
Hogsta domstolen (Sweden). 
Hemming & Miller, English Law Reports, 
I862-I865. 
H andelsgesetzbuch (Germany). 
House of Lords Cases (Clark), I I vols. 
(England). 
H urlstone & Norman, English Exchequer Re-
ports, 7 vols. 
Hopkins New York Chancery Reports. 
Houston, Delaware Reports, vols. 6-14. 
Howard, New York Practice Reports, 67 
vols. 
Hooge Raad (the Nether lands). 
Hochstrichterliche Rechtsprechung ( Ger-
many). 
Humphrey's Tennessee Reports. 
Illinois Reports. 
Illinois Appeals Reports. 
Illinois Law Review. 
Indiana Reports. 
International Bar Association. 
International Civil Law. 
xxviii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Int. & Comp. L.Q. 
Interamer. Bar. Ass. 
Int. Priv. Law 
Introd. Law 
Iowa 
Iowa L. Rev. 
IPR. 
IPRspr. 
International and Comparative Law Qarterly, 
1952-. 
Interamerican Bar Association. 
International Private Law. 
Introductory Law. 
Iowa Reports. 
Iowa Law Review. 
Internationales Privatrecht. 
Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebie-
te des internationalen Privatrechts. Beilage 
der Zeitschrift fiir ausliindisches und inter-
nationales Privatrecht ( Z. ausl. PR.). 
I.R. Irish Law Reports. 
Ir. R. Eq. The Irish Reports, Equity Series, !857-1878. 
]. Air L. and Comm. Journal of air law and commerce, 193o-. 
Japan, Priv. Int. Law Law of June 15, 18g8. 
J. Bl. J uristische Blatter (Austria). 
]. Comp. L. Journal of Comparative Legislation and In-
]. C.P. 
]. d. Tr. 
Jh. Jb. 
]KG. 
Johns. 
]. Trib. 
Jur. Arg. 
]W. 
Kan. 
K.B. 
KG. 
K.&J. 
Ky. 
La. 
La. Ann. 
ternational Law, 53 vols., I897-1951. 
J uris-Classeurs ( Periodique), La Semaine 
Juridique. 
Journal des Tribunaux (Belgium). 
Jherings J ahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik des 
biirgerlichen Rechts (Germany). 
Jahrbuch fiir Entscheidungen des Kammerge-
richts (Germany). 
Johnson's New York Cases, 3 vols. 
Journal des Tribunaux, Bruxelles, 1882-. 
Revista de jurisprudencia argentina (Buenos 
Aires) ; doctrina- legislaci6n- j urispru-
dencia. 
Juristische Wochenschrift (Germany). 
Kansas Reports. 
English Law Reports, King's Bench. 
Kammergerich t (Germany) . 
Kay & Johnson, English Vice-Chancellors' 
Reports. 
Kentucky Reports. 
Louisiana Reports. 
Louisiana Annual Reports. 
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La. App. 
La. L. Rev. 
L. Ed. 
Leipz. Z. 
L.]. 
L. of Nat. Tr. S. 
L.Q.R. 
L.R.A. 
L.R.A. ( N .S.) 
L.R.Ch. 
L.R.Eq. 
L.R.I. 
L.R.P.&D. 
L.R.Q.B. 
Madd. 
Man. L.R. 
Mart ens Recueil 
Mart.(La.) 
Mart. N.S. 
Mass. 
McLean 
Md. 
Me. 
Metcalf 
Mich. 
Mich. L. Rev. 
Louisiana Appeals Reports. 
Louisiana Law Review. 
Lawyer's Edition, United States Supreme 
Court Reports. 
Leipziger Zeitschrift fiir Deutsches Recht. 
Law ] ournal Reports (England). 
League of Nations Treaty Series, 205 vols., 
1920-1946. 
Law Quarterly Review (England). 
Lawyer's Reports, Annotated (United States). 
Lawyer's Reports, Annotated, New Series 
(United States). 
English Law Reports, Chancery Appeal Cases, 
1866-1875. 
Law Reports, Equity Cases (England). 
The Law Reports (Ireland) 1878-1893. 
English Law Reports, Probate and Divorce, 
3 vols. 
Law Reports, Queen's Bench (England 
1891-). 
Maddock, Reports, English Chancery, 6 vols. 
Manitoba Law Review (Canada). 
Nouveau Recueil general des traites et 
autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit 
international. Publication de l'Institut de 
Droit Public Compare et de Droit des 
Gens a Berlin. 
Martin's Louisiana Reports, 12 vols. 
Martin's Louisiana Reports, New Series, 
1823-1830. 
Massachusetts Reports. 
McLean's United States Circuit Court Re-
ports. 
Maryland Reports. 
Maine Reports. 
Metcalf's Massachusetts Reports, vols. 42-54. 
Michigan Reports. 
Michigan Law Review. 
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McKinney's Cons. 
L. Ann. 
Minn. L. Rev. 
Misc. 
Miss. 
Mod. L. Rev. 
Mo. 
Mo. App. 
Monitore 
Mont. 
Moo. P.C.C. 
NAG. 
National Conference 
Handbook 
N.C. 
N.E. 
N.E. (2d) 
Neb. 
N.F. 
N.H. 
NIL 
N.J. 
NJA. 
N.J. Eq. 
N.J.L. 
N. Jur. Woch. 
North Car. L. Rev. 
Nouv. Revue 
William M. McKinney's The consolida~ed 
laws of New York, annotated, 1916. 
Minnesota Law Review. 
Miscellaneous Reports (New York). 
Mississippi Reports. 
Modern Law Review. 
Missouri Reports. 
Missouri Appeals Reports. 
Monitore dei Tribunali. Sometimes referred 
to as Mon. Trib. 
Montana Reports. 
Moore, English Privy Council Cases, 15 vols. 
(England). 
Bundesgesetz betreffend die zivilrechtlichen 
Verhaltnisse der Niedergelassenen und 
Aufenthalter (Switzerland). 
Handbook of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and 
Proceedings (United States). 
North Carolina Reports. 
Northeastern Reporter, National Reporter 
System (United States). 
Northeastern Reporter, National Reporter 
System, Second Series. 
Nebraska Reports. 
"Neue Folge," meaning new series, to indi-
cate the beginning of new numbering in 
periodicals, collections of court reports, 
et cetera in the German language. 
New Hampshire Reports. 
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (Unit-
ed States). 
N ederlandsche J urisprudentie. 
N ytt J uridiskt Arkiv (Sweden). 
New Jersey Equity Reports. 
New Jersey Law Reports. 
Neue J uristische W ochenschrift (Germany, 
1947-.). 
North Carolina Law Review. 
Nouvelle revue de droit international prive. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxxi 
N.S. 
N .S.Am. L. Reg. 
N.S.Wales St. Rep. 
N.W. 
N.W.(2d) 
N.Y. 
N.Y.L.J. 
N.Y.S. 
N.Y.S.(2d) 
N.Y. St. Rep. 
N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 
N.Z.L.R. 
N.Z.L.Rev. 
O.A.G. 
Oberapp. Ger. 
Ob. Trib. 
OGH. 
Ohio St. 
O.J.Z. 
Okla. 
OLG 
O.H.Ct. 
Ont. L.R. 
O.W.N. 
P. 
Pa. 
Pac. 
Pac. (2d) 
Paige 
New series, if added to court reports, periodi-
cals, et cetera. 
American Law Register, New Series. 
The State Reports of New South Wales 
(Australia) . 
Northwestern Reporter, National Reporter 
System (United States). 
Northwestern Reporter, National Reporter 
System, Second Series. 
New Y ark Court of Appeals Reports. 
New Y ark Law Journal. 
New Y ark Supplement Reports, National 
Reporter System (United States). 
New York Supplement, National Reporter 
System, Second Series. 
New York State Reporter. 
New Y ark University Law Quarterly Re-
view. 
New Zealand Law Reports. 
New Zealand Law Review. 
United States Opinions of the Attorneys Gen-
eral. 
0 berappellationsgericht. 
Obertribunal (Prussia). 
Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria). 
Ohio State Reports. 
Osterreichische J uristen-Zeitung (Austria). 
Oklahoma Reports. 
Oberlandesgericht (Germany and Austria). 
Ontario High Court of Justice (Canada). 
Ontario Law Reports (Canada). 
The Ontario Weekly Notes (Canada). 
English Law Reports, Probate Division. 
Pennsylvania Reports. 
Pacific Reporter, National Reporter System 
(United States). 
Pacific Reporter, National Reporter System, 
Second Series. 
Paige's Chancery Reports (New York), II 
vols., 1883. 
xxxu LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Pas. Belg. 
Pas. Lux. 
Pa. St. 
Pa. Super. Ct. 
P.D. 
Perm. Ct. Int. 
Justice Publ. 
Pet. 
Phil a. 
Pick. 
Poland, Priv. Int. 
Law 
Pr. A.L.R. 
Praxis 
Priv. Ges. 
Puchelts Z. franz. 
C.R. 
P. Wms. 
Q.B. 
Q.B.D. 
Que. Q.B. 
Rb. 
Rechtsk. WB. 
Recueil (des cours) 
Recueil Niboyet et 
Goule 
Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 
Repert. 
Rev. Arg. Der. Int. 
Pasicrisie beige. Recueil general de la juris-
prudence des cours et tribunaux de Bel-
gique. 
Pasicrisie Luxembourgeoise, Recueil de Ia 
jurisprudence luxembourgeoise en matiere 
civile, commerciale, criminelle, de droit pub-
lic, fiscal, administratif et notarial, 1881-. 
Pennsylvania State Reports. 
Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports. 
Probate Division, English Law Reports. 
Permanent court of International Justice 
Publications, Hague. 
Peter's United States Supreme Court Re-
ports, vols. 26-41. 
Philadelphia Reports, 20 vols. 
Pickering, Massachusetts Reports, vols. 18-41. 
Law of August 2, 1926. 
Preussisches Allgemeines Landrecht. 
Die Praxis des Bundesgerichts (Switzerland). 
Privatrechtliches Gesetzbuch (Zurich). 
Zeitschrift fiir franzosisches Civilrecht ( Pu-
chelt ed.). 
Williams ( Peere), English Chancery Re-
ports, 3 vols. 
Queen's Bench, English Law Reports, 1891-. 
English Law Reports, Queen's Bench Divi-
sion, 1876-1890. 
Queen's Bench Reports, Quebec. 
Rechtbank (the Netherlands). 
Rechtskundig Weekblad (Belgium). 
Recueil des cours de l'Academie de droit in-
ternational de la Haye. 
J. P. Niboyet et P. Goule, Recueil des textes 
usuels de droit international, 2 vols., 1929. 
Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux 
mixtes. 
Set. Bibliography. 
Revista argentina de derecho internacional. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XXXlll 
Rev. Autran 
Rev. Ciencias Jur. 
Santa Fe 
Rev. Crit. 
Rev. Der. Jur. y 
Ciencias 
Rev. Espan. D. Int. 
Rev. Fac. Der. 
Rev. frang. de droit 
aerien 
Rev. Hell. 
Rev. Jur. Un. P.R. 
Rev. St. 
Revue 
Revue Algerienne 
Revue Dor. 
Revue Dr. Int. 
( Bruxelles) 
Revue Dr. Int. 
Marit. 
Revue Trim. D. Civ. 
RG. 
RGZ. 
Rhein. Arch. 
Rhein Z. f. Zivil- u. 
Prozessrecht 
R.I. 
Riv. Dir. Com. 
Revue internationale du droit maritime. Fon-
dee et public par F.C. Autran. Paris, 
1885-. 
Revista de ciencias juridicas y sociales de la 
Universidad nacional del littoral ... Santa 
Fe, Republica Argentina, 1922. 
Revue critique de droit international. 
Revista de derecho y ciencias sociales. 
Revista espanola de derecho internacional, 
1948-. 
Revista, Facultad de Derecho (Mexico). 
Revue frangaise de droit aerien . . . Paris, 
Recueil Sirey, 1947. 
Revue Hellenique de Droit International 
(Greece). 
Revista J uridica de la U niversidad de Puerto 
Rico. 10 vols., San Juan, 1932-1941. 
Revised Statutes. 
Revue de droit international prive. Fondee 
par A. Darras. 
Revue Algerienne, Tunisienne et Marocaine 
de legislation et de jurisprudence, 1925-. 
Revue de droit maritime compare. Fondee 
par Leopold Dor. Paris, 1923. 
Revue de droit international et de legislation 
comparee. Fondee par Rolin Jacquemyns, 
Asser et Westlake. 
Revue internationale du droit maritime, Paris, 
1885-1922. (Usually cited as Revue Aut-
ran). 
Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (Paris). 
Reichsgericht (Germany). 
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivil-
sachen (Germany) . 
Rheinisches Archiv fiir Zivil- und Strafrecht. 
Rheinische Zeitschrift fiir Zivil- und Prozess-
recht des In- und Auslandes. 
Rhode Island Reports. 
Rivista di diritto commerciale. 
xxxiv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Riv. Dir. Proc. 
Rivista 
Rivista u. di G.D. 
Riv. Trim. dir. e 
proc. c1v. 
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 
ROHG. 
ROHGE. 
ROLG. 
R.P.N.B. 
R.R. 
Russ. 
s. 
Siichs. Ann. 
S.A.L. R. 
Sask. App. 
S. Car. 
Schweiz. 1 ahrb. I.R. 
Schweiz. 1 ur Zeit. 
Sc. L.T. 
Scot. 1. 
Scot. L. Rep. 
S.C.R. 
S. Ct. 
S.D. 
S.E. 
S.E.(2d) 
Segundo Congreso, 
Rep. Arg. 
Rivista di diritto processuale civile. 
Rivista di diritto internazionale. 
Rivista universal di Giurisprudenza e Dot-
trina. 
Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura 
civile. 
Rocky Mountain Law Review. 
Reichsoberhandelsgericht (Germany). 
Entscheidungen des Reichsoberhandelsgerich-
tes (Germany). 
Die Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte 
auf dem ·Gebiete des Zivilrechts ( Ger-
many). 
Revue Pratique du Notariat Belge, 1875-. 
Revised Reports ( England) . 
Russell, English Chancery Reports. 
Sirey, Recueil general des lois et des arrets 
(France). 
Annalen des siichsischen Oberlandesgerichts. 
South African Law Reports. 
Saskatchewan Appeals Reports (Canada). 
South Carolina Reports. 
Schweizerisches 1 ahrbuch fiir internationales 
Recht, Zurich, 1944-. 
Schweizeriche 1 uristenzeitung (Switzerland). 
Scots Law Times (Edinburgh). 
Scottish 1 urist, Edinburgh. 
Scottish Law Reporter. 
Supreme Court Reports (Canada). 
Supreme Court Reporter, National Reporter 
System (United States) ; Supreme Court; 
Suprema Corte. 
South Dakota Reports. 
Southeastern Reporter, National Reporter 
System (United States). 
Southeastern Reporter, National Reporter 
System, Second Series. 
Segundo Congreso Sudamericano de Derecho 
Internacional Privado, Montevideo 1939-
1940, ed. Republica Argentina, Ministerio 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS XXXV 
Sem. Int. de droit 
Sess. Cas. 
Seuff. Arch. 
S.H.T. 
Sim. 
SJZ 
So. 
So. (2d) 
Spinks Ecc. & Ad. 
Stat. 
St. Johns L. Rev. 
Striethorst 
s.w. 
S.W.(2d) 
Swabey 
Swiss C. Obi. 
Swiss Off. Coli. 
de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Buenos 
Aires 1940. 
Travaux de la Semaine internationale de 
droit, Paris, 1937· 
Sessions Cases (English King's Bench Re-
ports) ; Scotch Court of Session Cases. 
J. A. Seufferts Archiv fiir Entscheidungen 
der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen 
Staaten. 
S~-OG H andelsretstidende (Denmark). 
Simons, English Vice-Chancery Reports, I 7 
vols. 
Schweizerische Juristen Zeitung. 
Southern Reporter, National Reporter Sys-
tem (United States). 
Southern Reporter, National Reporter Sys-
tem, Second Series. 
Spinks, Ecclesiastical & Admiralty Reports, 
1853-1855· 
United States Statutes at Large. 
St. John's Law Review. 
Archiv fiir Rechtsfiille die zur Entscheidung 
des koniglichen Obertribunals gelangt sind, 
1851-1880. Herausgegeben von Striethorst 
(Prussia). 
Southwestern Reporter, National Reporter 
System (United States). 
Southwestern Reporter, National Reporter 
System, Second Series. 
Swabey, English Admiralty Reports. 
Das Obligationenrecht, Bundesgesetz betref-
fend die Ergiinzung des schweizerischen 
Zivilgesetzbuches March 30, 1911. 
Offizielle Sammlung der das schweizerische 
Staatsrecht betreffenden Aktenstiicke; Bun-
desgesetze, V ertriige, und Verordnungen, 
seit der Einfiihrung der neuen Bundesver-
fassung vom 12 Sept. 1848. II vols., Bern, 
1849-1874. 
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Sw. & Tr. 
sz. 
TAM 
Tenn. 
Tex. 
Tex. L. Rev. 
Tex. Sup. 
Thailand, Priv. Int. 
Law 
T.L.R. 
T.P.D. 
Trib. 
Trib. civ. 
Trib. com. 
T.S. 
T. sup. 
Tul. L. Rev. 
u.c.c. 
U.C.Q.B. 
U.F.R. 
U. of Ill. L. Forum. 
U.L.A. 
U.N.Publ. 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
u.s. 
U.S. Av. R. 
U.S.C.A. 
U.S. Treaty Ser. 
Utah 
Vanderbilt L. R. 
v. & B. 
Va. 
Va. L. Rev. 
Swabey & Tristram, English Probate and 
Divorce Reports. 
Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Oster-
reichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivil-
und J ustizverwaltungssachen. Veroffent-
licht von seinen Mitgliedern (Austria). 
Tribunal Arbitral Mixte. 
Tennessee Reports. 
Texas Reports. 
Texas Law Review. 
Texas Supplement to vol. 25, Texas Reports. 
Law of I939· 
Times Law Reports (England). 
Transvaal provincial division, South African 
Law Reports. 
Tribunal. 
Tribunal civil (France). 
Tribunal de commerce (France). 
Tribunal Supremo. 
Tribunal superieur (France). 
Tulane Law Review. 
Uniform Commercial Code (United States). 
Upper Canada, Queen's Bench Reports. 
U geskrift for Retsvaesen ( Denmark) . 
University of Illinois Law Forum, I949· 
Uniform Laws, Annotated (United States). 
United Nations Publication. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
United States Reports. 
United States Aviation Reports. 
Code of the Laws of the United States of 
America, Annotated. 
United States Treaty Series. 
Utah Reports. 
Vanderbilt Law Review. 
Vesey & Beames, English Law Reports, I 8 I 2-
I8I4. 
Virginia Reports. 
Virginia Law Review. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxxvii 
Ves. 
Ves. Jun. 
Viet. 
Viet. L. R. 
Vt. 
w. 
Wall. 
Warn. Rspr. 
Wash. 
Wend. 
Wheaton 
Wis. 
Wise. L. Rev. 
W.N. 
W.O. 
W.P.N.R. 
W.Va. 
W.W.R. 
W.W.R. ( N .S.) 
Wyo. 
Yale L. ]. 
Z. ausl. Pr. 
ZBJV 
Z. f. Rechtspflege B. 
Z. f. Ostrecht 
Z. Int. R. 
Z. osteurop. R. 
Vesey, Senior, English Chancery Reports, 2 
vols. 
Vesey, Junior, English Law Reports, 1789-
I8I5. 
The Victorian Statutes (Victoria, Australia). 
Victorian Law Reports (Australia). 
Vermont Reports. 
Weekblad van het Recht (the Netherlands). 
Wall ace, United States Supreme Court Re-
ports, vols. 68-go. 
Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts auf 
dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts, herausgegeben 
von 0. W arneyer (Germany). 
Washington State Reports. 
Wendell, New York Reports, 26 vols. 
Wheaton's United States Supreme Court Re-
ports. 
Wisconsin Reports. 
Wisconsin Law Review. 
English Law Reports, Weekly Notes. 
W echselordnung (Germany, Austria) . 
W eekblad voor Privaatrecht N otaris-ambt en 
Registratie, I 870-. 
West Virginia Reports. 
Western Weekly Reports (Canada). 
Western Weekly Reports, New Series. 
Wyoming Reports. 
Yale Law Journal. 
Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internatio-
nales Privatrecht. Begriindet von Ernst 
Rabel. 
Zeitschrift des bernischen Juristenvereins. 
Zeitschrift fur Rechtspflege in Bayern. 
Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht. (See also Z. Ost-
europ. R.). 
Niemeyer's Zeitschrift fiir internationales 
Recht. 
Zeitschrift fiir osteuropaisches Recht. (In 
1927 merged with Ostrecht into Zeitschrift 
xxxviii 
Z. Handelsr. 
ZPO. 
Z. Savigny Stift. 
Rom. Abt. 
Z. Schweiz. R. 
Z. Ziv. Proz. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
fiir Ostrecht. Continued since 1934 as 
Zeitschrift fiir osteuropiiisches Recht. See 
also Z. f. Ostrecht.) 
Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht und 
Konk:ursrecht. 
Zivilprozessordnung (Germany and Austria). 
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fiir Rechts-
geschichte, Romanistische Abteilung. 
Zeitschrift fiir schweizerisches Recht. 
Zeitschrift fiir deutschen Zivilprozess. 
PART ELEVEN 
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CHAPTER 54 
Tangible Property 
I. REAL RIGHTS 
I. Concept of Proprietary Rights 
F ROM time to time, the basic distinction between proprietary or real rights (jura in re) and relative, 
particularly obligatory, rights has been subjected to 
severe sociological, economical, or logical criticism.1 To 
name only a few of the distinguished iconoclasts in this 
topic, Adolf Wagner, 2 Vinding Kruse, 3 and Hohfeld 4 may 
be mentioned. These arguments, which have impressed 
1 I have treated this subject repeatedly; for a broad recent exposition, see 
HANS PETER, Wandlungen der Eigentumsordnung und der Eigentumslehre 
seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Aarau 1949). 
2 ADOLF WAGNER, 3 Grundlegung der politischen Okonomie ( 1894). 
3 FR. VINDING KRusE, The Right of Property ( 1929), translated from the 
Danish into German I (1931) 185, into English (1939) 131; UssiNG, "Le 
transfer de Ia propriete en droit danois," 4 Rev. Int. Dr. Comp. 
Most recently, the Scandinavian doctrines have been lucidly presented by 
GoTTHEINER, Eigentumsiibergang beim Kauf beweglicher Sachen, 18 Z. ausl. 
PR. ( 1953, published May, 1954) 356. With respect to the consequences in 
the conflicts field, the most challenging point lies in the rule, especially dis-
tinct in Denmark, that the creditors of the seller are barred from attaching 
or seizing in bankruptcy proceedings articles that have been sold without 
any formality of payment or delivery. While the authors deny a distinction 
between obligatory and proprietary rights, at least inter partes, it would 
seem under the usual categories that the obligation concluded between seller 
and buyer has an effect as to those persons deriving their rights from the 
seller, an effect of relative relationship in rem, i.e., diminishing the owner-
ship of the seller, a phenomenon that occurs not infrequently in other situa-
tions elsewhere. Should this effect be respected in another country to which, 
e.g., the sold object were removed without delivery or other new events? 
This offers an interesting problem which, however, needs fuller investigation 
than is possible here. 
4 HoHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions ( 1923) 74 ff. 
3 
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some of the writers on conflicts law,S should be examined 
in the light of comparative legal history as well as of 
technical needs. 
In both Roman and English legal history, a clear dis-
tinction has been made between actions in rem, claiming 
directly against a thing, and actions in personam, directed 
against a person. In the republican Roman procedure per 
legis actionem in rem, as has become certain beyond any 
doubt, the claimant seized the thing ( vindicatio), and only 
when another claimant raised opposition, thereby acquiring 
the role of defendant,6 did the law suit commence. In the 
classic Greek and early Germanic procedures, there were 
analogous configurations. All such primitive actions' were 
directed against an object rather than a subject; this "obli-
gatio" was literally the binding of a person with a rope, 
and agere in personam meant seizure of a man. All actions 
were originally tort actions; when the vindicatio of a slave 
or an ox was opposed by a contravindicatio, the issue was 
which claim was wrongful.T 
Thus, there was no fundamental difference in the think-
ing of Greece, republican Rome, and medieval Europe 
about the essence of real and obligatory rights, whenever 
they were distinguished from the corresponding actions. 
Real rights, in Germanic and English law, are correctly 
described as bundles of rights (or better, faculties) in 
various quantities, essentially connected with possession 
(seisin, Gewere) and, at least in the case of immovables, 
endowed with effect as against third persons only through 
11 Under the spell of Hohfeld, FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 527, speaks 
of the "misleading expression jus in rem," as suggesting an "untenable theory" 
or "futile" attempt to distinguish rights "in personam," and sums up: "All 
rights are personal" (index, 726). 
8 WLASSAK, "Der Gerichtsmagistrat im gesetzlichen Spruchverfahren," 25 
Z. Savigny Stift., Rom. Abt. ( 1904) 8t at 160. 
7 RABEL, "J1'X'l1 etovA7Jr und Verwandtes," 36 Z. Savigny Stift., Rom. 
Abt. ( I9IS) 340. 386. 
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additional publicity. These ancient ideas' permeated the 
feudal law; remainders are outstanding in the common 
law. Germanic concepts also have some bearing on the 
Scandinavian customary law. Right and possession were 
neatly separated by the Roman jurists, who crystallized a 
learned concept of dominium, which is a power over a phys-
ical thing, "absolute," i.e., effective against everyone, and 
unlimited in principle, but upon which public and private 
law have imposed more or less considerable restrictions. 
But once the common lawyers had disengaged tort and con-
tract as well as property and debt, the Roman concept was 
plainly helpful as a means of further clarification. 
In the broad European development of concepts, the dis-
tinction is fundamental. An action in personam, as the 
term denotes, is directed against one or several persons 
indicated in the source of the right claimed by the plaintiff. 
An action in rem opposes anyone who disputes the plaintiff's 
right; out of a real right, an indefinite number of claims 
may arise against persons as yet unascertained. Disregard 
of these simple phenomena necessarily creates difficulties in 
connection with such doctrines as limitation of actions, ad-
verse possession, or res judicata. 
Full ownership in a corporeal thing and lesser rights such 
as easements and encumbrances, jura in re aliena, are tools 
of our profession, indispensable for the technical language 
of an advanced jurisprudence. Conflicts law has to use such 
terms. They represent clear and practical concepts which do 
not prejudice the contents of the rules, domestic or inter-
national. 
2. Objects of Real Rights 
In all systems, ownership in a thing and the thing itself 
have long been designated by the same word, such as the 
Germanic tt eigen" and the English "property." The clivi-
6 PROPERTY 
sions made by Roman jurists, res mancipi and nee mancipi, 
res corporales and incorporales, species and genus, res in 
nostro patrimonio (or commercio) and extra patrimonium, 
for the most part are conceived as distinguishing legal rules 
rather than their objects. Why should our own terminology 
now be confined either to the things or the rights in them? 
Attacking the usual language, Cook has claimed that tangi-
ble physical objects should always be called land and chat-
tels, and as such be characterized as immovable or movable, 
while interests in them should be termed realty, real estate, 
or real property and personalty or personal property.8 Such 
strained language is unnecessary for lawyers who under-
stand the traditional ambiguity; it is misleading precisely 
in interpreting the legal rules distinguishing movables and 
immovables, which primarily refer to rights and not the 
objects of rights. 
The objects of true real rights, however, are mere tangi-
ble, physical things, whereas rights in real rights, in debts, 
in intangible goods such as industrial property, are con-
structions, as also are rights in aggregate units ( universi-
tates rerum). We confine our discussion in the present 
chapter strictly to the narrow class of real rights in indi-
vidual (isolated) tangible physical things. It does not seem 
important whether they are termed rights or interests. 9 
They include legal and beneficial ownership as conceived by 
the common law. Equitable interests are but somewhat 
weaker real rights, 10 in contrast to mere obligations such 
8 CooK, "Immovables and the Law of the Situs," 52 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1939) 
u46, uso ff., reprinted in Legal Bases, Ch. 10, followed by FALCONBRIDGE, 
Conflict of Laws 433, 436. 
9 Cf. Restatement, Introductory Note to §zo8. 
1° For a consequence of the distinction in conflicts law see Re Hole 
(Manitoba K.B.) [1948] 4 D.L.R. 419. The right to the purchase price, 
in the absence of a lien, was personal property, situated in Manitoba where 
the seller was domiciled, the document executed, and the price payable, 
although the sale concerned Saskatchewan land. 
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as the right of a buyer to whom neither title nor construc-
tive possession has passed.11 
Accordingly, we shall have to limit our main discussion to 
particular assignments of property, that is, individual trans-
fers inter vivos, excluding all general assignments. Only the 
problem of characterization will make it necessary to en-
large the outlook. 
II. THE STATUTIST DocTRINE 
The local situation of immovable property and the trans-
fer of its ownership has a very large significance, extend-
ing to taxation, jurisdiction, succession, administration of 
estates, social policy, and measures against enemy property. 
In this field, old concepts are deeply rooted. 
I. Lex Situs 
As historical research has shown, 12 the long life of the 
statutum reale, or in the modern version, lex rei sitae, lex 
situs, was prepared in the early middle ages by gradually 
increasing emphasis on territorial power, in opposition to 
the original principle that law is an order of personal 
groups, tribes, cities, and peoples. In the first development, 
reaching back into the Roman provincial organization, pos-
session f)f the soil became the subject of tributes and taxa-
tion. Thereafter, jurisdictional power and competency on 
territorial basis were strongly promoted by the feudal sys-
tem. From the thirteenth century, the territorial rule in-
11 Insofar as equitable interests are not effective against everyone, they 
resemble the category of relative real rights which has been developed in 
German theory. Furthermore, modern theory begins to study more profoundly 
the effects of obligations on third parties, cf. WILBURG, "Giliubigerordnung 
und Streitverfolgung," 71 Juristische Blatter ( 1949) 29-33. There is great 
need for comparative research concerning the problems respecting equitable 
interests as sketched in the literature collected by WoLFF, P.I.L. (ed. 2) 583. 
12 NEUMEYER, 2 Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 33 ff., 89 ff.; MEIJERS, 
Bijdrage 58 ff. 
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eluded land and increasingly also chattels. The result was 
the conception that the territorial law governs not only per-
sons (statuta personalia), but also things situated in the 
territory (statuta realia). 
2. Movables Follow the Person 
(a) Theoretical basis. The Italian, French, and Dutch 
commentators drew a fundamental distinction between im-
movable and movable assets :13 immovables are subject to 
the law of the place where they are situated, but mobilia 
personam sequuntur or mobilia ossibus inhaerent, that is, 
movables are governed by the law of the owner's domicil. 
The French coutumes adopted this rule instead of the feudal 
absolute lex situs. 
It is doubtful, however, whether the rule was a remainder 
of the ancient personality of law 14 or originated as a pre-
sumption that chattels are situated where their owner is 
(particularly used by Bartolus in the matter of seizure.) 15 
In the prime of the statutist doctrine and in French litera-
ture of the nineteenth century, the authors, though they 
agreed on the rule mobilia sequuntur personam, always re-
mained divided on its basis.16 It is true that most of them 
believed that movables have no situs-"personalty has no 
locality," it was said in England: one line of authority de-
duced the rule from the personal law of the owner or of 
the possessor ;17 another from the fiction that they are at the 
13 2 LAINE 228 ff. 
14 Thus MEIJERS, 49 Recueil (1934) III s88, 638. 
15 FREYRIA, La loi applicable aux successions mobilieres (These, Lille 
944) 48 ff. 
16 2 LAINE 233; WEISS, 4 Traite 169 ff., as of 1912. 
17 D'ARGENTRE, Comm. ad patrias Britonum leges (1621) art. 218 glossa 
6, no. 30: Sed de mobilibus alia censura est, quoniam per omnia ex conditione 
personarum legem accipiunt, et situm habere negantur, nisi affixa et co-
haerentia, nee loco contineri dicuntur, propter habilitationem motionis et trans-
lationis. Quare statutum de bonis mobilibus vere personale est et loco domicilii 
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place of his domicil.I8 The first, applying the statutum per-
sonate, which had the influential support of D'Argentre and 
Pothier, was used in France in modern times to support the 
proposition that succession to movables should be governed 
by the national law of the deceased, as supplanting the law 
of his domicil. The second view, including movable prop-
erty under the statuta realia, by fiction considered domicil 
as the territorial contact of property. This view finally 
prevailed in English and American law, and, since 1939, 
the traditional domiciliary law has also been definitely 
restored m the French conflicts system relating to 
inheritance. 
Some French writers insist on speaking of two territorial 
laws of succession, those of situs and of domicil. But the 
domiciliary law of succession also may well be conceived as 
an application of the personal law. 
(b) Scope of the rule respecting particular assets (uuti 
singuli"). The statutists also were not in accord whether 
the slogan umobilia personam sequuntur'' included individ-
ual transactions, such as sale, gift, or pledge of isolated 
chattels, so that in all cases immovables would be governed 
judicium sumit et quodcumque judex domicilii de eo statuit ubique locum 
obtinet; id. art. 447, glossa z; and I.r C. de Summa Trinitate, a.o. Among 
the authors following him were BURGUNDUS, (see WEISS I.e.; FREYRIA I.e. 
79 against LAINE), BOUHIER, POTHIER, and STORY §§ 3791f. Historical justi-
fications have been proposed by MEIJERS, 49 Recueil ( 1934) III 638; NIBOYE'l, 
S. 1940.1.49 j contra FREYRIA 109 If. 
18 DUMOULIN, Obs. sur !'art. 41 du ch. II titre XII de Ia couttime 
d' Auvergne: Fallit si habet bona alibi sita ubi potest amp !ius Iegare, quia 
reliquum capietur in bonis alibi sitis scilicet immobilibus: quia ex quo habet 
domicilium, mobilia censentur hie esse. This theory was perfected by RODEN-
BURG, De jure quod oritur ex statutorum diversitate, tit. I, cap. II, tit. II, 
. cap. II, no. 6, and particularly by JAN VOET, Commentarius ad Pandectas, 
liber I. tit IV, pars II (De Statutis) no. XI. Other adherents were BOUL-
LENOIS, MERLIN, FOELIX, and in Germany GAILL and HERTIUS. DUMOULIN'S 
approach has been considered of historic merit by LAINE, z Introd. 246; 
PILLET, r Traite 694; contra FREYRIA 103 If. 
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by the lex situs and movables by the law of the owner's 
domicil. The rule has been expressed in such generality in 
the Prussian and Austrian Codes and very distinctly hinted 
at in the French Code/9 It appeared later in other jurisdic-
tions, including Quebec.20 English decisions have accepted 
this principle since 1790.21 Lord Loughborough in 1791 
called it "a clear proposition, not only of the law of Eng-
land, but of every country in the world where the law has 
the semblance of science." 22 Story expressly defended the 
application of domiciliary law to all transfers inter vivos 
of personalty because of its general utility; this doctrine 
"could not fail to recommend itself to all nations by its sim-
plicity, its convenience, and its enlarged policy." 23 
A narrower theory, however, was favored by many sta-
tutists. Only for the purpose of succession and marital 
property was the necessity commonly felt that movables 
scattered in several jurisdictions should be subjected to a 
common regulation. In France, on the eve of the Civil 
Code, the writers applied the maxim merely to "universal" 
assignments, only if the assets were situated in the same 
state as the decedent. 24 Also in Germany this restricted 
19 Prussia: AUg. Landrecht, Einleitung §§ 28, 32, 36. 
Austria: AUg. BGB. § 300. 
France: C. C. art. 3 par. 2: "Les immeubles, meme ceux possedes par des 
etrangers, sont regis par Ia loi franr;aise." This provision, by its contrast to 
par. 3 and its clear history, expresses the old theory according to almost a11 
non-French observers. 
Similar: Bolivia C. C. art. 3· 
2 0 Quebec: C. C. ( I866) art. 6, par. 2. 
Puerto Rico: C.C. art. IO (referring to the national law of the owner). 
The Netherlands: Law of May IS, 1829, art. 7 (as the French). 
Spain: C. C. art. IO. 
Cuba: C.C. art. IO. 
Mexico: C.C. ( I 928) art. I4. 
21 Bruce v. Bruce ( I79o) 6 Bro. P.C. s66. 
22 Sill v. Worswick ( I79I) I H. Bl. 665, 69o; Somerville v. Somerville 
(I8oi) s Ves. jun. 750 ff.; Bayley, J. in In re Ewin (I83o) I Cr. & J. ISI, 
IS6. 
23 STORY § 379· 
24 DllLAUMI!, Les conftits de lois a Ia veille du Code Civil (Paris I947) I84. 
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theory appeared clearly in the eighteenth century, and later 
was given prominence by Savigny.25 
The interpreters of the Prussian, French, and Austrian 
Codes have given their legal texts forced constructions to 
comply with this reduction of the movable-rule to general 
assignments. 26 
The Italian Code of 1865 retained the national law of 
the owner to govern movables but only as a subsidiary 
device: "except for the contrary provisions of the law of 
the country where they are found." 27 The Italian litera-
ture prevailingly endeavored to minimize even the tenuous 
rule thus remaining. 28 But the section of the Field Code, 
adopted in four states in this country, has appropriated this 
formula, "really not the happiest one," 29 by stating that 
"Where the law of the place at which movables are situated 
does not provide otherwise, movables follow the person of 
the owner and are governed by the law of his domicil." 30 
Of the Spanish provision, it is recognized that, in copying 
the Italian text, it has omitted by error the essential restric-
tion just mentioned. In regard to movables situated in 
25 Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus civilis ( I756) I 2 § I7; SAVIGNY I76 
ff. § 366; Zurich: Priv. Ges. Art. 2; Greece: C.C. (I856) art. 5 par I. 
WACHTER, 24 Arch. civ. Pr. 293· 
26 Prussia: DERNBURG, I Preuss. Priv. R. § 38 II; FoRSTER-Eccrus, I Preuss. 
Priv. R. ed. 7 ( I896) 59 ff.; I BAR 6os. 
France: NIBOYET, Acquisition 38; 4 WEISS I95· 
Austria: I EHRENZWEIG I 97 § 26; WALKER in I Klang's Komm. 234; 
OGH. (Feb. 8, I928) Io SZ. 57 n. 26. 
On Quebec: see 3 JoHNSON 2I7 ff. 
27 Disp. pre!. art. 7 par. I. 
28 C/. I FIORE § 93; DIENA, 2 Principi 36 ff., 223 ff., and in Revue I9II, 
563; CAVAGLIERI I 59; App. Milano (March 30, I909) Clunet I9IO, I323. 
29 PACIFICI-MAZZONI, I Istituzioni di Dir. civ. Ita!. (ed. 5 by Venzi I925) 
47I n. (g). 
8° California: C.C. (I949) § 946. 
Idaho: Code ( I947) 67-IIOI. 
Montana: Rev. Codes (I935) § 6803. 
North Dakota: Revised Code of 1943 § 47-0701. 
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Spain, public policy corrects most of the effects, but there 
remain unfortunate possible consequences.31 
The same change of mind occurred in the Anglo-American 
doctrine during the last century. In England, it is true, the 
old doctrine 32 in its generalized variant applying the domi-
ciliary law to all transactions involving movables, has been 
tenacious, and some decisions, loosely formulated, created 
confusion between the three connecting factors: situs, actus, 
and domicil. This has given rise to three theories and con-
tinues to preoccupy the textbook writers who usually take 
pains to show how impractical the old doctrine is.38 Some 
recent authors even treat the matter at great length as an 
open problem.34 In the United States, similar discussions 
occur,85 but in the American courts the last decisions fol-
lowing Story's view were rendered half a century ago,86 and 
81 See TRIAS DEBES, Der. Int. Priv. 52 f.; AUDINET, Clunet I89I, IIISi 
NIBOYET, Acquisition 43· 
82 Sill v. Worswick ( I79I) I H. Bl. 665, 690, per Lord Loughborough; 
In re Ewin ( I83o) I Cr. & J. ISI, I 56 per Bayley, J. 
88 WESTLAKE I89 ff; DICEY (ed. 5) 6zo, rule I54 (ed. 6) 56I ff.; ScHMITT-
HOFF I8z; WoLFF, Priv. Int. L. § 490 ff.; MoRRIS, zz Brit. Yearbook Int. 
Law (I945) 232; WORTLEY, Recueil I947 II at 75· 
It seems sometimes also that a foreign title acquired by the lex situs to 
choses in possession is merely recognized in the form of a presumption of 
validity of title, such as the presumption of the correctness of foreign 
judgments. 
34 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 430 ff.; GRAVESON, The Conflict of Laws (ed. z) 
I99-ZI5. Cheshire and Wortley advocated the lex loci theory in a committee 
of the Seventh Hague Conference on Int. Priv. Law against a great majority. 
A new theory by Morris in DICEY, (ed. 6) 559 ff. and MORRIS, Cases (ed. z) 
277, z89, claiming the "lex actus" as proper law, seems practically to agree 
with lex situs, respecting tangible things with constant situs. 
However, the present doctrine has been evidently expressed by Lord 
Maugham, then judge in re An~iani [I930] I Ch. 407, 420, when he an-
nounced: 
"I do not think that anybody can doubt that with regard to the transfer 
of goods, the law applicable must be the law of the country where the mov-
able is situate. Business could not be carried on if that were not so." 
85 E.g., II Am. Jur. "Conflict of Laws" § 65. 
86 See for the decisions reaching to Crapo v. Kelly (I87z) I6 Wall. (83 
U.S.) 6Io, 6zz, and Whitney v. Dodge ( I894) IOS Cal. I9Z1 38 Pac. 636, 
STUMBERG (ed. I) 357 ff. In New York, the shift from the owner's domicil 
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the dominant opinion has been contrary for much longer.87 
At present, in transactions inter vivos, individual chattels 
are subjected in principle to the domiciliary law of the 
owner only by the above-mentioned sporadic provisions. 
Among them, the Spanish rule alone states that movables 
are generally governed by the personal, here the national, 
law of the owner; and this is regretted. The older Italian 
formulation of the domiciliary rule followed in the Field 
Code is practically devoid of meaning. 
(c) Exceptional function of the rule. Savigny, enouncing 
the control of tangible movables by the lex rei sitae, never-
theless left a place for the lex domicilii, in the case of 
movables, such as articles of personal use or chattels touch-
ing a territory merely temporarily, which have no perma-
nent situation.38 Under the influence of his authority, the 
Argentine Code recognizes the lex situs only as follows: 
"movables permanently situated and which are held with-
out the intention of removing them, are governed by the 
laws of the place where they are located; but movables 
which the owner always carries with him, or which are 
for his personal use, whether he be in his domicile or not, 
as well as those which are kept to be sold or carried to 
another place, are governed by the laws of the domicile 
of the owner." 89 
To illustrate a permanent location, Velez Freitas in his 
annotations mentions Savigny's example of a library in the 
owner's house. Decisions have added bank deposits,40 instru-
and the place of the transaction to the place where the movables are, seems 
to have occurred as late as I930, according to Restatement, New York Ann. 
V. I88, Introd. Note. 
87 I WHARTON 674 §§ 297 ff. The first decisions against the domiciliary 
law involved a ship and a cargo not to be found at the owner's domicil, 
as STUMBERG (ed. z) 39I notes. 
38 SAVIGNY I78 (trans!. I79) § 366, cf. below Ch. 57 n. I. 
3 9 Argentina: C.C. art. II. 
4° Cf., Cam. civ. za Cap. (June zz, I9Z5) 57 Gac. Foro 99, I6 Jur. Arg. I89. 
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ments payable to bearer, 41 and mortgage certificates, 42 while 
other decisions have declared the contrary.48 
The Brazilian law has been analogous;" the reform of 
1942 retains the law of the owner's domicil for 
"the movables which he carries or which are destined to 
be transported to other places." 45 
Modern theory, to be discussed later, recognizes some 
such cases not warranting the normal rule of lex situs, but 
does not apply the personallaw.46 
In the aftermath of all this, the C6digo Bustamante 
establishes a presumption that movables are normally situ-
ated at the residence of the owner or possessor147-an arbi-
trary fiction. 48 
(d) Obsolete remainders of the "mobilia maxim," thrown 
out of the law of property, are sometimes cited in special 
connections. In particular, this "misleading maxim" has 
41 Cam. civ. Ja Cap. (Feb. 6, I928) 27 Jur. Arg. 33· 
42 Cam. civ. 2a Cap. (Oct. Io, I930) 95 Gac. Foro 90. Cam. Civ. I Cap. 
(Dec. 30, I94I) W. Sanford v. E. Sanford, Ley t. 25 p. 372, except in Rev. 
Arg. Dir. Int. (I943) 385. For other cases see BAGUE 95 ff. 
4 3 WALDEYER, Sucesi6nes Argentino-Aleman de intestato, Jur. Arg. I9SI-I 
Doctrina 53 f. 
44 Brazil, former Introductory Law of I9I7, art. 10: 
"Property, movable or immovable, is subject to the law of the place where 
situated; those movables, however, that serve his personal use or which he 
has always with him, or which are intended for transportation to other places, 
remain under the personal law of the owner. 
"Unique Paragraph. Movables the situation of which changes during a 
real action concerning them, continue subject to the law of the place in which 
they were at the beginning of the suit." 
45 Introductory Law of 1942 to the C.C., art. 8 §I. Cf., Uruguay: C.C. 
art. 5 par. 2, extending the lex situs: "also to the movables which are perma-
nently in the Republic." On the difficulties which make the lex rei sitae almost 
always the most certain rule, see TENORIO § 548. 
46 Infra 33· 
4 7 C6digo Bustamante, art. 111, followed by Brazil: L. Intr. Art. 8 § 2. 
48 WOLFF, Priv. Int. L. (ed. 2) 510 n. 2; see the controversy on the mean-
ing between 2 SERPA LoPEZ § 229 and TENORIO § 373· 
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often been attributed to the law of insolvency, but has no 
standing there and appears now to be finally discredited. 49 
3· Characterization of Movables and Immovables 
The practical importance of distinguishing movables and 
immovables for conflicts purposes has been narrowed, since 
the conflicts rules of almost all countries have adopted the 
lex situs for individual movables and many systems have 
abandoned the distinction altogether, subjecting the whole 
estate to one rule of succession or marital property. Never-
theless, what law determines "movability," is a question 
preliminary to frequent issues of jurisdiction, enforcement, 
bankruptcy, taxation, and others. The problem also has 
retained considerable bearing on the general controversy 
about characterization. It may therefore be treated here at 
some length. 
The traditional principle that the lex situs determines 
whether a thing or interest is immovable, still prevails 50 but 
has been challenged by a recent and growing group of 
writers with their creed that the lex fori does everything. 
Moreover, the application of the principle by the English 
and American courts has produced certain peculiar points, 
introducing a scarcely noticed third theory. 
(a) The traditional characterization. The principle that 
the lex situs determines whether an interest is movable, still 
enjoys such world-wide prevalence that documentation is 
unnecessary. 51 The practical purpose of this auxiliary rule 
49 NADELMANN, "The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws," 
59 Harv. L. Rev. ( I946) IOZ9 ff.; RAEBURN, "Application of the Maxim 
Mobilia Sequuntur Personam to Bankruptcy in Private International Law," 
z6 Brit. Y.B. ( I949) I77, I89. 
50 In I93 I Gutzwiller named only Niboyet as opposed. 
5 1 Examples outside the common law: 
France: Cass. Civ. (April s, I887) S. I889 1. 387: "Ia question de savoir 
si certains biens sont meubles ou immeubles ne peut etre resolue que par 
Ia loi du pays ou ils se trouvent;" (Aug. 5, I887) D. I888 I. 65, BEALE, z 
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is obvious. It is still the Anglo-American conflicts law that 
a decedent leaves separate estates in the jurisdictions where 
they are situated and in addition an estate composed of the 
movables situated anywhere. Frictions in the application of 
this system can be avoided only if the question what is 
movable is answered in all jurisdictions by the same method, 
that is, in accord with the law of the place where the thing 
is situated. 
But to understand the historical idea of the entire institu-
tion, which is still so strong in so many countries, we have 
again 52 to go back to the meaning of the statuta realia, as 
it has slowly developed. A piece of land has a status as has 
an individual. The object of law is land or an individual; a 
statute is a statutum reale or personale, the objects of doubt-
ful classification being collected in the statuta mixta. The 
land is an individual object of rights, automatically-not by 
any reference from a foreign conflicts rule-subject to the 
power of the feudal superior and subject to donation, sale, 
acquisition of marital interest, legacy, or intestate succession. 
There is no tie between the lands of one man in several 
territories. Hence, every sovereign determines the legal 
rules exclusively governing the fate of the land, and quite 
naturally also which things situated in the same territory go 
with the land-such as serfs, herds, easements in neighbor-
ing lots, especially the objects affording continuous use as 
"heritage," i.e., investment-and which do not, such as 
Bouteiller enumerates as chatels or cateux: barns, stables, 
and trees not bearing fruit. 53 Moreover, owing to the Ger-
Cases 6 (Russian mining concessions) ; Cour Paris (Feb. 14, 1938) Nouv. 
Revue 1938, 380 (shares in an American mining royalty). 
Italy: Trib. Como, assigned by Cass. Roma, (Nov. 7, 1899) z Rivista di 
diritto internaz. e di legislaz. comp. (Napoli, 1899) 556, 559 f., cf., RENAULT 
I id. ( 1898) 97 (Russian circus concession). C6d. Bustamante, art. uz, II3· 
52 C/., supra Vol. I, 3z8, concerning marital property. 
53 BOUTEILLER, Somme rural, I, tit. 74 (ed. 1603 p. 4Z9)· 
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manic idea of property, various possessory rights may exist 
simultaneously: those of the king, the barons, and the lower 
vassals, or of the knight and the serfs. All these posses-
sions and the respective present or future rights are natur-
ally included in the concept of immovable right. 
On the other hand, in the opinion of Dumoulin and his 
followers, which has been adopted by the interpreters of the 
French Civil Code, the last domicil of the deceased governs 
the inheritance in all movables, not as the personal statute 
but as the fictitious situation of the things.54 This position 
again required the law at the true situation to determine 
what are movables; if the local statute classified a thing 
under the statute real, the domicil had nothing further to 
say. 
The old writers give sufficient illustrations. 55 Boullenois 
borrows from another author the case of a testator, domi-
ciled in Paris, who left a hereditament in Normandy. Fruits 
and grains were deemed to be movables under the Cou-
dimes of Normandy from the day of Saint-! ean, but under 
the Coutume of Paris only when they were cut. The right 
opinion looks to the situs to determine the rights not only 
of the legatees but also of the heirs among themselves: 
The domicil affords the rule of the distribution, and for 
this reason everything reputed to be movable at any place 
must be distributed according to the law of the domicil; but 
it does not regulate the nature and the quality of the prop-
erty. 56 Bouhier determines immobilization of movables 
serving an estate by the owner "under the Coutfrme where 
these estates are situated" and knows that all writers are of 
the same opinion.57 Conversely, the situs decides whether 
64 2 LAINE 233 If., 261, and for the last French doctrine before the Code, 
DELAUME, Les Conflits de Lois a Ia veille du Code Civil ( 1947) ISO, 3 I6. 
66 The following is taken from the admirable report by 2 LAINE 256 If. 
66 BOULLENOIS, I Personnalite et realite des lois 841, quoting Basnage 
against Beraut. 
67 BouHrER, Observations sur Ia coutume de Bourgogne, ch. 21 No. 173· 
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immovables in the natural meaning are assimilated to mova-
bles, as buildings ( cateux) in Artois, Lille, and Saint-Pol,s8 
and even, whether and to what extent the heir to whom 
they devolve must support the debts burdening the mova-
bles.59 
Very clearly all of this doctrine has been adopted by 
Story: 
"So that the question, in all these cases, is not so much 
what are or ought to be deemed, ex sua natura, movables 
or not, as what are deemed so by the law of the place 
where they are situated. If they are there deemed part of 
the land, or annexed (as the common law would say) to 
the soil or freehold, they must be so treated in every place 
in which any controversy shall arise respecting their nature 
and character. In other words, in order to ascertain what 
is immovable or real property, or not, we must resort to 
the lex loci rei sitae." 60 
This passage has been quoted time and again, but evi-
dently not always with perception of its full meaning. 
(b) The common-law rule. The Continental rule was 
applied in the first half of the nineteenth century in Eng-
land and the United States without difficulty.61 A problem 
arose when chattels real were to be subordinated to mova-
bles or immovables. Considering that terms of years 
had been kept outside the feudal system and were still 
ranked with movables in the "personalty," 62 that is, the 
58 z LAINE z58. 59 z LAINE Z59· 
60 STORY§ 447· 
61 England: A series of decisions dealing with the character of Scotch 
heritable bonds, immovable under Scotch Jaw: Johnstone v. Baker (Ch. 1817) 
4 Madd. 474 note; Jerningham v. Herbert (Ch. 18z8) 4 Russ. 388, 391; Allen 
v. Anderson (Ch. 1846) 5 Hare 163; cf. In re Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573; 
Train v. Train [1899] z Sess. Cas. 146. 
United States: Chapman v. Robertson (N.Y. 1837) 6 Paige 6z7, 31 Am. 
Dec. z64; McCollum v. Smith ( 1838) 19 Tenn. 34z, 33 Am. Dec. 147; 
Minor v. Cardwell ( 1866) 37 Mo. 350 
62 On the important reasons, see particularly z PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND 
570 ff.; cf., HoLDSWORTH, 3 Legal History 18z ff. Not much credence is 
due to a theory deriving the phenomenon from the undisputed fact that the 
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assets not included in the succession by the heir, it would 
have been possible to argue that leaseholds in English land 
of a French deceased would follow the law of the French 
domicil. But the English courts decided otherwise. In 
fact, the memory of Sir Edward Coke's statement was 
vivid: 
"Now goods or chattels are either personal or real ... 
Real, because they concern the realty, as terms for years 
of land or tenements, wardships, the interest of tenant by 
statute staple, by statute merchant, by elegit and such like." 63 
The courts, therefore, did not hesitate to classify a lease-
hold, though personalty in the view of English law, along 
with real property as immovable for the purpose of apply-
ing the international rule of characterization. The conse-
quence in the law of succession, however, until the reform 
of 1925-1926,64 was that the movables of a decedent domi-
ciled abroad formed one inheritance, while his lands and 
leaseholds in England constituted two further masses sub-
ject to different principles of transfer and liability for 
debts.65 
These decisions on leaseholds go back to I 873; 66 however, 
it is most interesting that New York and Maryland have 
original purpose of English "real actions" was to provide recovery in kind. 
This theory, by T. CYPR. WILLIAMS, "The Terms Real and Personal in English 
Law," 4 L.Q.R. ( 1888) 394, has been followed by HERBERT TIFFANY, I Real 
Property ( 1939, 3d ed. by Basil Jones) 5 § 3; but see 2 PoLLOCK AND 
MAITLAND 181. 
6 3 r Coke on Littleton u8b. 
64 The distinction has retained its significance, when realty and personalty is 
disposed of separately by will and for tax purposes. SNELL, Principles of 
Equity ( 1939, 22nd ed.) 267. 
65 See as to heritable bonds, Drummond v. Drummond, quoted by Sir 
William Grant, M.R. in Brodie v. Barry ( 1813) 2 V. & B. 127, 132. 
66 England: Freke v. Lord Carbery per Lord Chane. Selbourne (1873) 
L.R. 16 Eq. 461, 466; Duncan v. Lawson (1889) 41 L.R. Ch. D. 394; and 
others, see DICEY ( ed. 6) 52 5 n. 24. 
Ireland: In the Goods of Gentili ( 1875) Ir. R. 9 Eq. 541. DeFogassieras 
v. Duport (r88r) II LRI 123. 
United States: Restatement § 208, Special Note. 
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3ubordinated leaseholds as personalty to the decedent's 
domiciliary law.67 The most frequent cases concerning 
:hattels real have been testamentary trusts whereby land 
should be sold (equitable conversion) and the proceeds used 
in favor of certain persons. In municipal Anglo-American 
law, the equitable interest of the beneficiary so created is 
personalty. But for the purpose of conflicts law the courts 
have stressed the immovable nature of the land when not 
yet sold or reconverted at the death of the beneficiary, 68 and 
depending on construction of a British legal provision, even 
beyond this time limit. 69 
Mortgage. Another particularly important example, m 
addition to rent charges,70 is the right of a mortgagee m 
land. 
Mortgage as a "right in re" is naturally an immovable. 
This is recognized in all jurisdictions. The French Civil 
Code aroused doubts in this respect, since article 5 26 enu-
merating droits reels fails to mention the hypotheque; the 
corresponding characterization of the latter as movable by 
67 Despard v. Churchill (1873) 53 N.Y. 192 (Californian law for New 
York leasehold), cf., Restatement New York Ann. § 208; Craig v. Craig 
(1922) I40 Md. 322, II7 At!. 756. 
68 Following the lead of the Irish judge Andrews in Murray v. Cham-
pernowne (I90I) 2 I.R. 232; In re Berchtold (I923) I Ch. I92· 
Canada, Sask.: Re Burke [I928] I D.L.R. 3I8. 
United States: Clarke v. Clarke (I899) 178 U.S. I86; Ford v. Ford (1888) 
70 Wis. I9, 33 N.W. I88; Norris v. Loyd ( I9I8) I83 Iowa IOS6, 168 N.W. 
557; cf., Paul's Estate ( 193I) 303 Pa. 330, I 54 At!. 503. A wrong turn was 
taken in McCaughna v. Bilhorn (1935) IO Cal. App. (zd) 674, 52 Pac. 
( zd) 102 s, where, as a first step, the land was construed as personalty; see 
Note, so Harv. L. Rev. ( I937) at usz. 
69 See s. 22, ss. s, Settled Land Act, I882, 45 & 46 Viet., c. 38; In re Cutliffe's 
Will Trust [I940] I Ch. s6s, noted 54 Harv. L. Rev. ( I940) I34. criticized 
by FALCONBRIDGE, I8 Can. Bar Rev. ( I940) s68-s73 and Conflict of Laws 
SIS, but contra CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 425; and in particular Re A.S. Creek 
[I936] N.S. Wales St. Rep. I86. On a strange result see DICEY (ed. 6) 527, 
comment on In re Middleton's Settl. [I947] Ch. 583 (C.A.). 
7° Chatfield v. Berchteldt ( I872) L.R. 7 Ch. App. 192; In re Anziani 
[I930] I Ch. 407, 424. 
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older writers 71 has continuously misled German authors.72 
Yet the present French civil law writers declare article 526 
to he incomplete and "certainly susceptible of generaliza-
tion." 73 
The debt, secured by mortgage, in itself, is, of course, a 
movable, and its validity is governed by the international 
private law of obligations. 74 However, whenever the eco-
nomic value of a mortgage is involved,-and this counts 
decisively in the distribution of inheritance-a sane view 
will include the debt in the assets of the mortgagee, and 
subject both to the lex situs. Anglo-American courts have 
not doubted this conception/5 except in isolated Canadian 
cases and decisions of New Zealand and Australia, all of 
which mistakenly have applied precedents respecting taxa-
tion rather than conflicts law.76 A holographic will executed 
in Louisiana, therefore, cannot dispose of a mortgage inter-
est in Ontario. 77 
71 See, e.g., BouHIER, Obs. sur Ia coutume de Bourgogne, ch. 2 5 §§ 9, 19; 
29 § 36. 
72 KAHN, I Abhandl. 81 took this from LAURENT 7 Dr. Civ. 208 § IS2, 
followed by LEWALD 175; WoLFF, Priv. Int. L. § 482, ill. p. 512, and others. 
But Laurent emphasized nevertheless the Belgian contrary characterization 
and advocated the lex situs for determining whether a hypothec is im-
movable, or whether there is a chattel mortgage (449 § 385). 
73 COLIN ET CAPITANT I (ed. 11) 747 § 931; PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 
(ed. 2, 1952) § 93· 
14 This is also recognized in the United States, 2 BEALE 946 n. 2 s. 225.1; 
11 Am. J. 337 § 39· 
75 England: Johnstone v. Baker ( 1817) 4 Mad d. 474 n; and other old 
decisions, see CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 422; In re Hoyles [1911] I Ch. D. 179, as 
construed by Maugham, J., in In re Anziani ( 1930) 1 Ch. D. 407, 423. 
United States: It is true that Restatement§ 245 omits to repeat § 225. 
Australia: Re Donnelly (1927) 28 N. S. Wales St. Rep. 34· 
Canada: Re Gauthier [1944] 3 D.L.R. 401. 
Scotland: see ALEx. DoNALDSON, 4 Int. L. Q. (1951) 1oo-102. 
76 Canada: cases following Dalrymple Estate, Hogg v. Prev. Tax Com-
mission [1941] 3 W.W.R. 6os; [1941] 4 D.L.R.; so1 see FALCONBRIDGE, Con-
flicts of Laws 480 ff., 492 ff. 
New Zealand: Re O'Neill [1922] N.Z.L.R. 468. 
Australia: Re McClelland v. Trustees, Executors and Agency [1936] 55 
C.L.R. 483; Re Young [1942] Viet. L.R. 4; see DICEY (ed. 6) S25 n. 26. 
11 Re Landry and Steinhoff [1941] O.R. 67, [1941] 1 D.L.R. 699. 
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The same result seems certain in French conflicts law; as 
early as I 8 3 7, the Court of Cassation defined the scope of 
the lex situs, according to article 3, paragraph 2, C.C., to 
"embrace in its generality all rights of ownership and other 
real rights, claimed on these [French] immovables." 78 It is 
true that express confirmation by the writers is scarce.79 
Similarly, les situs applies in Quebec, 80 Austria, 81 Brazil, 82 
and probably commonly. 
Only in Germany are the authors unsure, due to an article 
in the Civil Code ( § I 55 I, paragraph 2), prescribing that 
in a marital community of acquests and gains a hypothec is to 
be counted among the movables belonging to the community 
property. Although this rule has been said to contain a 
conflicts rule, 83 it would seem to be applicable only as a 
part of German substantive law and perhaps merely to the 
mentioned species of community property. There is author-
ity for considering a hypothec and a land charge as subject 
to lex situs.84 
78 Cass. civ. (March I4, I837) P. I837.I.ZII, S. I837-I.I95· 
79 It has been given by BARTIN, 3 Principes I97 for the "constitution of the 
right in re itself," as contrasted with the contract. But we understand to 
the same effect LEREBOURS-PIGEONNillRE (ed. 5) 464 § 353; BATIFFOL, Traite 
§ 537· 
80 3 }OHNSON 308, 33 I. 
81 WALKER 339· In domestic Austrian law the contrary view is followed in 
I Klang's Komm. n78. 
82 OcTAVIO RoDRIGO, Dicionario de Direito Internacional Privado ( I933) 54· 
On Cuban hypotheses see Fair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 
3, I937), 9I F. (2d) 218. 
83 M. WOLFF, D. IPR (ed. 3) I7I applies this rule to foreign land of either 
spouse. In his first edition, Io6 § 30, this legal characterization seemed to be 
used for all regimes of matrimonial property but only to be referred to 
German land. 
84 RG. (Dec. 7, I92I) I03 RGZ. Z59 invoked the situs of mortgaged land 
only as an additional criterion for the purpose of jurisdiction over the mort-
gage right. Yet KG (Dec. 2I, I935) JW I936, z466, at z469, Nouv. Rev. 
I937 98 (supra Vol. I, p. 53I n. 55) infers therefrom that a mortgage is 
a right in land subject to lex situs and concludes a fortiori that a land charge 
(Rentenschuld, BGB. § II99) abstracted from any obligation by the German 
legislation-although movable according to § I55I-is likewise characterized, 
and an object of foreign "special provisions" on land reserved in EG. art. z8. 
Also RAAPE D. IPR. ( ed. 3) 407 expresses the same view as our text. 
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If so, the German treatment of a German hypothec in a 
German-governed marital case would resemble the Anglo-
American solution in succession cases. As soon as a British 
or American court finds that a mortgage on English, Cana-
dian, or American land is an asset in a succession, it applies 
the law of the situs; but since under the substantive law 
involved mortgage is personalty, it may be treated differ-
ently from real estate law. The differences have been largely 
reduced in England since the land law reform of 1925 85 
and in most American states. Nevertheless, it is still stated, 
at least in case a testator has established different disposi-
tions for realty and personalty, that the mortgaged premises 
and the thereby secured debts are "personal assets in the 
hands of an executor or administrator, to be administered 
and accounted for as such," viz., administered and distrib-
uted as personalty, although rules of administration for real 
property apply in case of sale and other dispositions.86 
It must be taken in this sense when it is said that English 
law looks primarily at the debt, not the charge.87 
It should be noted that the courts in these cases have been 
compelled to create a new category of interests. The stat-
utist rule rests on the automatic separation of immovables 
by the individual territorial organization; what is im-
movable in Austria is immovable in the meaning of any 
inheritance law, and subject to the normal Austrian succes-
sion in land. What, then, is the criterion for selecting 
English or American immovables that are not "real 
property" ? 
85 WILLIAMS, Executor. (ed. 13, 1953) 303 § 527; supra n. 64. 
86 Restatement §225 If.; Ohio Gen. C. Ann. (Page 1938), § 10509.68; 
Wisconsin St., 1951 § 312.10; Minnesota St. 1947, § 525.38. Model Probate 
Code§ 127. 
87 MONSARRAT AND MAW, The Administration in England of Estates of 
Foreigners, etc., Foreign Law Series No.4, ( 1935) 271 (rather misleading for 
foreigners) . 
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The English courts have obscured their position by ex-
plaining that they had to make a concession to international 
comity and therefore determine the question in conformity 
with the Continental division of movables and immovables. 
An English judge, taking this motivation too seriously, con-
cluded that with respect to mortgages situated in Ontario, 
no such resort to categories other than personal and real 
property was needed. 88 He has been criticized because there 
should not be in England different systems for common-law 
countries and for the rest of the world.89 But the result was 
obviously right, although it should not have been based on 
terminology and alleged concessions, but simply on the fact 
that characterization in Ontario was identical with the Eng-
lish in all points. 
What the English courts really intended, in using (as they 
had done before) the continental distinction of immovables 
and movables and applying it to chattels real, was rather 
unfavorable to the alien laws. English leaseholds of a 
French deceased were excluded from the French succession, 
although they could not be treated as devolving to the heir, 
and had to form a third object of successions. Since the 
land laws of 1925, of course, inheritance to chattels real 
and movables differs only in minor respects. 
The clearly formulated view of Beale, shared by many 
writers, is also misleading: 
"Leasehold interests"-"are immovable, since they are in-
terests in land and cannot be removed from the power of 
the land prevailing at the situs of the land." (If positive 
law decides otherwise, it does so only after it has been 
found applicable under the Conflict of Laws principle.) 90 
88 Farwell, L.J., in In re Hoyles [I9II] I Ch. 179. 
89 ROBERTSON, Characterization 200 f. 
90 2 BEALE 932 f., but 937 § 209.1 recognizes correctly that the lex situs 
decides the question whether land to be converted into personalty is a 
"movable." 
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Thus, the criterion would be natural irremovability, 
reviving the original distinction of the Romans between 
res immobiles and res quae moventur aut sese movent.91 
This, however, contradicts Story and would never conform 
to the old rule, established upon the legal concept of an 
immovable interest that varies from territory to territory. 
And it does not suffice. 
In fact, the characterization of equitable conversion has 
proved a matter of statutory interpretation, and has accord-
ingly been made dependent on the lex situs.92 
Illustration. A testator, dying domiciled in Illinois, estab-
lished a trust of California land to be sold and the proceeds 
to be applied to the purposes of the trust. The will, holo-
graphic, was bad in Illinois but valid in California. Since 
California shares the theory that the interest of the bene-
ficiary was in the land, the will was valid.93 
The same is true, as a matter of course, for the classifi-
cation of fixtures which, for all purposes-including emi-
nent domain, mortgage, conditional sale, bankruptcy, and 
taxation-are judged according to the local rules of their 
situation.94 Modern laws, it is true, tend to emphasize 
91 ROBERTSON, Characterization zo6, zii, on this assumption, suggests "that 
the nature of tangible property as movable or immovable should be deter-
mined by the objective test of what the property in fact is." 
92 Bates v. Decree of Judge of Probate (1932) 131 Me. 176, 183; Restate-
ment § 209; Iowa Annot. §209 cites two decisions for but one against lex fori; 
New York Annot. § 209: "Unsettled." Cf., GooDRICH {ed. 3) 509 § 166. 
9 3 McCaughna v. Bilhorn (1935) 10 Cal. App. (zd) 674, 52 Pac. (zd) 
1025, noted 49 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1936) 994. so id. IIS2 (not quite justifiedly 
critical). 
94 E.g., Coxe, C.J., in Bergh v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. (C.C.A. 
2, 1905) 136 Fed. 368, 370; Triumph Electric Co. v. Patterson (1914) 
zii Fed. 244 (conditional seller against a real estate mortgagee); Manu-
facturer's Bank and Trust Co. of St. Louis v. Lauchli (1941) u8 F. (zd) 
607 (conditional sale); Gardner, C.J. in U.S. v. Becktold Co. (C.C.A. Mo. 
1942) 129 F. (zd.) 473 (for what equipment must the federal Government 
condemning a building compensate?). See, for instance, the extension of 
realty in Nebraska, Joiner v. Pound (1948) 149 Neb. 321, 31 N.W. (zd) roo. 
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physical movability more than use in defining fixtures.95 
British and American courts, therefore, have not gener-
ally deviated from the universal exclusive characterization 
of immovables by the lex situs. They have had to modify 
a long-accepted property categorization into a more natural 
conception of certain interests, producing surprising results 
for foreign courts applying the common-law principles of 
inheritance. But this development also has evolved within 
the national law and may and does vary among the common-
law jurisdictions. 
(c) The lex fori theory. Bartin, one of the two inventors 
of "qualification" according to the lex fori, initially recog-
nized as an exception the distinction of movables and im-
movables in view of the indisputable advantage of deter-
mination by the lex situs.96 Niboyet has opposed even this 
isolated exception.97 More recently, both these writers and 
an increasing number of others98 have compromised on a 
doctrine proposed long ago by the German writers Bar, 
Stobbe, and Kahn :99 where the choice of law refers to the 
lex situs, the applicable internal law of the situation should 
distinguish as it pleases. But when a conflicts rule of the 
forum or a foreign conflicts rule applied by renvoi distin-
guishes between movables and immovables, the lex fori or 
the foreign domestic rule, respectively, characterizes the 
nature to be attributed to property. 
95 PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT ( ed. 21 1952) § 64, states that present 
French law stresses merely movability. The German practice (BGB §§ 93-
97) is more complicated. 
96 BARTIN, Etudes 52 sub II. 
97 NrBOYET, Manuel § 418, and z Repert. 411 n. 27. 
98 BARTIN1 I Principes 236 § 88; MELCHIOR 144 § IOI; LEWALD I75 f.; 
NIBOYET, 3 Traite 365 § 957; 4 id. ZI6 § 1153; M. WOLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 
56; WoLFF, P.I.L. (ed. z) su: (contrary to 4 Rechtsvergl. Handw. 390); 
BATIFFOL, Traite 3I9 §298; 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 5I3. It would seem that 
the position of FALCONBRIDGE's Conflicts of Laws 435-445 is different. Against 
NIBOYET, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 273 § 256. 
99 KAHN, I Abh. 8z, agreeing in part with the theory of I BAR 6zz; STOBBE 
I § 32, 63. 
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Our problem lies with the second part of this theory, 
namely, the interpretation of the conflicts rules which com-
monly, except in a few treatises, do not specify what they 
mean by distinguishing movables and immovables. This 
omission is very easily explained. Before the new learned 
assault, nobody doubted that the lex situs decides this ques-
tion; the treaties have sometimes expressly said so. The 
new theory itself seems to leave a broad avenue for a renvoi 
from the forum to the situs. 
Why must the lex fori qualify in the first instance? Usu-
ally, no other justification is offered than a brief reference 
to the self-constituted theory of lex fori qualification. 
Niboyet adds his endeavor to protect domestic concep-
tions from corruption: 
"If, to ascertain whether property situated outside France 
is movable or immovable, we consult the law of the situa-
tion, we depend on a foreign law for the operation of our 
own system of solving conflicts. If it proclaims immovable 
property that in France would be movable, this is enough to 
exclude French law, applicable to succession in movables, 
and inversely. There is, hence, an effacement that nothing 
justifies and a contradiction with the very foundation of the 
entire theory of qualifications .... It is inadmissible that 
the foreign law should consider things movable which for 
us are not so ... " 100 
These lines are reproduced to show with what narrow-
minded arguments the development of conflicts law, or for 
that matter, of any international order, has to cope. To 
satisfy the mentality of the distinguished, though ill-advised, 
adversaries of the old rule, we may, in their own style, 
advance a triple battery of "arguments," historical, logical, 
and practical. 
History: what justification is there to reverse a century-
old rule, one of very few that are universally recognized, 
100 NIBOYET, 3 Traite 365-6, 366-7. 
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a rule adjusting the differences between the various systems, 
once of feudal states and now of national laws? The very 
principle of lex situs, which no one appears to wish de-
stroyed, is inevitably connected with the auxiliary rule in 
question. When a French court leaves the devolution of 
English land to English law, it means immovables recog-
nized as such in England. Otherwise, there would be an 
English succession to movables, considered immovable in 
France, and a French succession to interests situated in Eng-
land and there considered immovable. Such a jumble was 
unheard of in the old times. 
Logic: Why is it so plain that a reference to the English 
law of immovables may concern things which are not im-
movables in England? What logic requires, furthermore, 
that an English immovable must be held a movable because, 
if French, a like thing would be so considered? 
Practicability: The writers here discussed have induced 
the German Reichsgericht to render the first decision ever 
made in their favor ;101 it is now constantly invoked as 
support. 
A Czechoslovakian national dying with domicil in his 
country left a factory in Saxony, Germany. Under the 
Austrian Civil Code, § 300, then in force in Czechoslovakia, 
immovables are devised and distributed according to the law 
of their situation. The court concedes that the Austrian 
literature construes this as leaving characterization to the 
situs; this would be the German law. But it prefers to look 
for the Czechoslovakian determination, approves the find-
ing of the lower court that under the Czechoslovakian law 
(for some not reported reason) the German factory is a 
movable, and attributes it to the foreign succession. 
101 RG. (July s, 1934), 145 RGZ 85, IPR spr. 1934, 13, Nouv. Revue 1935, 
Sz, with an excellent criticism by Mezger of the specious arguments by which 
the court has been diverted from previous better solutions. 
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Granted for the sake of argument that a Czechoslovakian 
factory would be a movable under the analogous circum-
stances in Czechoslovakia102-why should§ 300 A.BGB. not 
be construed as referring to the lex situs to determine its 
character-as the Austrian and world tradition has as-
sumed? What sense, also, does it make to consider a Ger-
man factory left by a Czechoslovakian citizen as a movable, 
although it would be an immovable when belonging to a 
German? And what should an American court do to accom-
modate this situation? Here, the primary rule subjects the 
factory situated in Germany to German inheritance law. 
The entire meaning of the principle would be shattered. 
Suppose an English leasehold in a German succession. 
Must the German court declare the English interest mova-
ble because, there being no such type in Germany, a German 
lease is movable? Should the English court for this reason 
renounce English inheritance law for immovables? It will 
do nothing of the sort, and harmony is destroyed once more, 
for the sake of scholastic speculations. 
In fact, a Hungarian author declares that a Hungarian 
court should treat an English lease as movable and an Eng-
lish court a Hungarian lease as immovable.103 Correctly, on 
the other hand, in Austria, where a lease of land may be 
transformed into a real right by public recording, the lex 
situs is recognized as decisive.104 
If a mortgage in Michigan for the purpose of German 
marital property really should be regarded in Germany as 
movable, the mortgagee's interest is most certainly an im-
movable for any American court. 
It is submitted that the old rule, practiced in England 
and the United States, is superior in all respects. 
102 See contra STUBENRAUCH, I Comm. (ed. 8) 371 n. 2; but KLANG's 
Komm. 1178 is very vague. 
108 ARATO, 17 Z. ausl. PR. ( 1952) xo. 
104 BOLLA 85. 
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III. Lex Rei Sitae 
1. The Rule 
It is at present the universal principle, manifested in 
abundant decisions and recognized by all writers, that the 
creation, modification, and termination of rights in individ-
ual tangible physical things are determined by the law of 
the place where the thing is physically situated.105 The rule 
relates to the physical things in which the real right in ques-
tion exists. The law of the place of "the keys of a house, 
the stones of a dry wall and the detached or duplicate par-
1° 5 Legal Provisions: 
Quebec: C.C. art. 6. 
Brazil: Ley In trod. art. IO. 
Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 36. 
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 22. 
Egypt: C.C. art. IS. 
Greece: C. C. art. 27. 
Italy: C.C. ( I942) Disp. Pre!. art. 22. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. IO. 
Liechtenstein: C. C., Property Law, art. I I. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6. 
Syria: C.C. art. I9. 
U.S.S.R.: (interstate) S. Ct. Ruling (Feb. Io, I93I), 2 GsovsKI I3 No.2. 
Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay with the restrictions supra n. 39, 44· 
Treaty of Montevideo (I889) art. 26, (I940) art. 33· 
C6digo Bustamante, art. IOS, 112, 113. 
By Practice: 
England: Westlake (ed. I, 1859) c. VIII; Cammell v. Sewell (I858) 
3 H. & N. 6I7i (I86o) 5 H. & N. 728, Exchequer Chamber, and prevailing 
opinion at present. 
Austria: OGH. (Feb. 8, I926) 10 SZ. 57 No. 26, 
Belgium: POULLET, §§ 265, 268 f. 
France: Cass. req. (March I9, I872) D. I874.I.465, S. I872.I.238; (May 
24, 1933) s. 1935-1·257· 
Germany: ROHG. (Sept. 5, I873) u ROHGE. 22 N. 7; RG. (Oct. 20, 
1882) 8 RGZ. uo; (Feb. IS, I884) II RGZ. 52, Clunet I886, 6o8 and con-
stantly; RG. (Oct. 8, I92I) I03 RGZ. 30, 3I (movables); RG. (Oct. I8, 
I93S) I49 RGZ. 93 (immovables). 
The Netherlands: Hooge Raad (June 22, I934) W. 128I5, N.J. I934, I493; 
I VAN HASSELT 140, cf,, I34· 
Switzerland: BG. (Jan. 2I, I9IO) 36 BGE. II 6; (June 6, I912) 38 BGE. 
II 166; (June 26, I912) 38 BGE. II I98 and constantly. For Swiss im-
movables belonging to a Swiss national domiciled abroad the special provision, 
art. 28 NAG. refers to the law and tribunal of his canton of origin as 
opposed to the lex situs, but the result is at present simply Swiss property law. 
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tions of machines, 11106 not the place of the house, wall, or 
the machine, is decisive for the characterization of fix-
tures ;107 whether an easement exists depends on the law of 
the place where the land to be charged is. 
The rule, furthermore, is primarily concerned only with 
the problems of property law, not of obligations. Opposi-
tion by a few very isolated scholars has never carried much 
weight. A new theory, dividing the cases between the lex 
situs and a ulex actus," established by the English writer 
Cheshire, must be likewise rejected.108 
The quasi unanimity in this field is easily understandable, 
since here sheer territorialism is assumed even in the most 
modern systems. In the relevant part, the American Re-
statement, with its strong and consistent emphasis on the 
legislative and judicial power of the state where the land 
or chattel is situated, expresses a universal doctrine. Con-
trary to a confusing reference to party autonomy, still ap-
pearing in the Chilean code, 109 the parties cannot determine 
the applicable law. 
The supporting reasons are no longer speculations on the 
status of things nor on sovereignty as was still the fashion 
in the nineteenth century, with occasional remainders in 
backward theory. No more is the idea, popular with cer-
tain French authors, that the "organization of the property 
regime" is necessarily exclusive and its territorial expres-
sion in law must be a uloi de police et de surete," uncondi-
tionally imperative, entirely acceptable. As a consequence of 
106 10 Encyclopedia Britannica, Fixtures (ed. II, I9IO-I9II) 451, cited 
by FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws n. (9.). 
107 2 ZITELMANN 303. 
108 CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 563 (somewhat corrected in ed. 4, 435 ff.) asserts 
that the lex situs is not the appropriate system in every case, but the proper 
law for the transaction postulated by him is not neatly distinguished from 
the assignment or other transfer, supra Vol. III, p. 78. Cheshire's theory 
is continued by SCHMITTHOFF (ed. 1) 190, cf., 185. An exhaustive refutation 
is now given by the editors of DICEY (ed. 6) 561 ff. 
109 Chile: C. C. art. 16: an exception to lex situs is made if the contract 
determines otherwise, but as a subexception Chilean law applies where the 
contract should have effect in Chile. 
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this idea, it has been recently asserted that in a French 
court a contract made abroad, transferring land situated in 
France, is void, if a ucause" in the French meaning is miss-
ing, or if the property is inalienable under French law.110 
But if so, it would be due to the conflicts rule rather than to 
an automatic effect of an imperative territorialism. The only 
necessary effect of the French territorial law is that of ex-
cluding foreign transfers from enforcement. Whether an 
obligatory sales contract or even an assignment of the own-
ership has some effect in foreign countries, should not be a 
concern of French territorial law; French public law is cer-
tainly not interested at all in foreign obligatory contracts, 
French domestic private law merely has to deny effect in 
France to the contract and to the transfer, while it is the 
province of French and foreign conflicts law to state that 
the French regulation deserves preference with respect to 
the property, though not necessarily the contract, aspect of 
the transaction. 
For conflicts law, however, it may well suffice that an old 
and unchallenged tradition has resulted in a universal prin-
ciple, natural in view of the physical and economic integra-
tion of the property in the territory and affording the 
easiest available certainty to the state of the situation, to all 
interested parties, and to prospective successors and 
creditors. 
Justifications of the principle by individual writers have 
produced an inclination to admit exceptions in situations 
where the reason alleged by the individual writer for the 
lex situs does not apply, as for instance,. in the case of 
voyaging goods. The lex situs, however, would lose much of 
its practical reliability if it were subjected to any exceptions 
at all, especially if it allowed party autonomy as has repeat-
110 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 199, 255· 
TANGIBLE PROPERTY 33 
edly been suggested. That there is no law at the place where 
the thing is-as in the waves of an ocean-or that this 
place is unknown, or casual and temporary, constitute no 
exceptions to the rule, but instances where it cannot be rea-
sonably applied in fact. And that transfer of title may be 
deferred or conditioned purely according to the intention of 
the parties, is a part of Anglo-American and Latin domestic 
laws, but not of their conflicts rules. 
If the law of the place of situation forms an ordinary 
conflicts rule (though universally applied and therefore 
most precious), no mystery inherent in "laws of surety and 
police" is implied. The municipal systems mutually con-
cede, by the conflicts rule, exclusive control of private rights 
in the immovables and movables situated in their territories, 
on the understanding that the effects of private transactions 
complying with the actual law of the situation are recog-
nized so long as the location lasts and, when the location of 
movables changes, so long as the new location does not 
require a modification of the legal condition. 
Our task is much simplified by this statement, since we 
may attribute to the lex situs indiscriminately all the domes-
tic rules regarding the existence of rights of private law in 
immovables and movables, whether these rules, in the last 
resort are intended to serve public or private interests. At 
a later juncture, of course, we shall have to survey the con-
flicts rules regarding territorial change of the locality of 
tangible movables. 
((Situation." It must be noted that movables have not 
always been deemed "situated" for the purpose of conflicts 
law wherever they may be found at a certain moment. 
Occasionally, temporary location has been considered im-
material so as to favor a foreign situs ;111 removal to another 
111 /nfra Ch. 56. 
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state without the consent of the owner has been ignored in 
the United States;112 and ships and travelling goods are 
objects of a comprehensive controversy.113 
While, for the application of the ordinary conflicts prin-
ciples regarding a tangible chattel, Savigny and his school 
required that it should have a permanent location, the word 
"permanent" should not be taken literally. Neither do we 
require more than a merely physicallocation.114 
2. Property and Contract 
Transfer of title. Speaking of the scope of conflict rules 
on contract, and especially sales of goods, we have had the 
opportunity to state that at present, almost unanimously, 
transfer of title is sharply distinguished from promises to 
transfer title.115 This distinction is also made in countries 
where property can be transferred through mere consent as 
at common law and in the large family of systems follow-
ing the French Civil Code. The contract containing the 
promise is governed by its specific law,-for instance, the 
law stipulated by the parties or the law of the place where 
the parties are domiciled and contract. But the problems 
regarding transfer of property,-such as those of the time 
when, or the conditions under which, the transfer becomes 
effective; of whether acquisition from a nonowner has 
effects, and, in the common-law system, of the capacity to 
alienate and acquire-depend on the law where the thing 
is at the critical time. 
Transfer of movables. While the contractual part of a 
112 Infra Ch. s6. 
113 Infra Ch. 57· 
114 RAAPE, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 37:z, against Niboyet. 
115 See Vol. III, p. 76 If.; and on the relationship between marital property 
law and lex situs,· Vol. I pp. 335-343. Add, e.g., Scotland: 13 Encyclopaedia 
of the Law of Scotland 130; DoNALDSON, 4 Int. L. Q. 1951, 106, and about the 
frequent confusions, also see CAEMMERER, r:z Z. ausl. PR. ( 1939) 675, 698. 
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transaction respecting movables is commonly recognized, the 
part governed by the lex situs has been often overlooked 
and, in recent times, doubted by some courts and writers. 
Imagining that in English or French law property passed 
by "contract," they would extend the proper law of the con-
tract beyond its obligatory effects. Thus, Cheshire contends 
that if two Englishmen make a contract in London, whereby 
goods lying in Paris are sold, English law determines not 
only whether the goods are fit and merchantable but also 
whether the transaction is formally valid and whether a 
right of property has passed to the buyer; a title to goods 
claimed to have been derived from one of the parties to a 
transfer must be determined by the lex actus of the original 
transfer.116 No proof is adduced for this mixture of obliga-
tion and ownership. 
The question has been more thoroughly investigated with 
respect to the Code Napoleon. Bufnoir117 recalled and 
J osel Kohler 118 in an erudite study confirmed how, starting 
from Celsus' construction of the constitutum possessorium,119 
practitioners have continuously worked to replace the trans-
fer of physical possession as part of a conveyance by less 
cumbersome formalities and finally by mere consent. The 
Postglossators, the Italian and French documents, the great 
wealth of French coutumes and from the sixteenth century 
authors such as Tiraquellus120 and Ricard,121 drew attention 
to various contractual clauses in deeds, such as the clauses 
of usufruct, lease, precarium, constitutum simplex, or simply 
the uclause de dessaisine saisine." These clauses early he-
came ude style" and were presumed to be implied when they 
116 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 437• 
117 BuFNOIR, Propriete et Contrat ( 1900) 39 ff., especially 42, 45· 
118 JosEPH KoHLER, Vertrag und ttbergabe, r8 Archiv. f. biirg. R. (1900) r. 
119 Dig. 41, 2, r8 pr. 
120 TIRAOUELLUS, De iure constituti, IV Jimitatio 31; KoHLER Joe. cit. 37· 
121 RICARD, Traite des donations entre vifs et testamentaires, part r, 
ch. IV, sect. II, dist. r § 917 ff. ( ed. 1783) p. 235. KoHLER Joe. cit. 38. 
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were mtssmg. The Code, after different projects, adopted 
the traditional conception. Immovables as well as movables 
are considered transferred when a contract of sale, exchange, 
or donation is made and the parties do not indicate that 
they postpone the transfer of the title. Literally, the text 
of article 1138, setting the transfer on the time for which 
it is promised, says just this;122 the current construction also 
reaches the same result. The clauses of divestment and 
vestment, substituting the effective surrender of possession, 
have always been a part of the conveyance, not of the 
obligatory contract. The same is obvious for their legal 
implication. 
The consequences for their classification in conflicts law 
are now realized in France.123 Passing of title depends on 
the respective agreement of the parties, which regards the 
property, not the obligation, but is ordinarily to be ascer-
tained from the clauses or circumstances of the contract.124 
If no other clue emerges, title passes instantly by virtue of 
the implied clause, or better, the subsidiary legal rule. All 
this is naturally governed by lex rei sitae, which must pre-
vail in case it is different from the law governing the obliga-
tory contract, as may happen even in case of sale of im-
movables. 
Also under the light of rational analysis, the effect of a 
party agreement on the passing of title is a question of 
property and not of obligation. Therefore, we may disre-
gard the opposite view, even though English judges may 
have erroneously adhered to it, which has not been proved. 
Lease of land in Roman and modern German law is a 
122BuFNOIR, supra n. II7; DESBOIS, Clunet I93 I at 292; ARMIN JON, 2 Precis 
(ed. 2) n6 § 28; PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT (ed. 2) 628 § 620. 
123 NIBOYET, Acquisition ( I923) I24 ff. and repeatedly since; PILLET, I 
Traite §§ 33, 352; 359-366; PICARD, loc. cit. 
124 Recently, GoRE, 45 Revue Trim. D. Civ. ( I947) I6I, discusses the 
French opinions for the various situations involved, but seems to tread on 
thin ice. 
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mere contract producing obligations ;125 this is also true of 
French law, although the tenants of commercial premises 
and of rural land have been protected in various respects.126 
At common law, however, leasehold, conceived as an estate, 
a real right created by a conveyance, in strict opposition to 
contract, 127 constitutes a jus in re. Correspondingly, lease 
on the Continent is subject to the conflicts rules concerning 
contracts, whereas at common law the law of the situs alone 
is traditionally called in to function, and this is the rule of 
the United States, as alleged by Beale.128 In this matter, it 
is the contractual element of the agreement that was neg-
lected. 
However, American courts have stressed the contractual 
character of those party obligations that do not touch the 
use of the premises.129 The duty to pay rent and damages 
for anticipated breach of contract by the tenant was early 
recognized as an exception to the prevalence of lex situs/80 
Thus, rights in rem under a lease are governed by lex situs, 
125 BGB. §§ 535, 581. 
126 See in particular the laws on propriete commerciale, last deer. July I, 
I939; and the postwar legislation, Ord. of Oct. I7, I945 and Law, April I3, 
I 946, on rural leases. 
127 See BuRBY, Real Property I43; WILLISTON, 53 Harv. L. Rev. ( I940). 
896. 
128 2 BEALE § 222.1. Of his seven citations, however, two are against him; 
in four, situs and place of contracting were identical, as Beale concedes p. 
I2I6 when talking of obligations; only in Galleher v. O'Grady ( I9I7) 78 
N.H. 343, IOO Atl. 549, lex situs is applied without mentioning the place 
of contracting; in this case the issue was the existence of the (principal) 
debt to pay rent after a partial eviction, clearly a contractual problem. 
The same simple application of the law of the situation occurs again in 
Hotz v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1939) 108 F. (2d) 216. In 
Richardson v. Neblett, I22 Miss. 723, 84 So. 695, IO A.L.R. 272, the problem 
is different, viz. whether a domiciliary administrator of an estate may collect 
rent as personal property. See also recently McCrow v. Simpson ( I944) I4I 
F. (2d) 789. 
129 IS A.L.R. (2d) II99-I209. 
130 1 WHARTON, Ch. VII and § 276 If.; BuRBY, loc. cit.; IS A.L.R. (2d) 
1203. 
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but as far as payments and mutual rights under covenants 
are concerned, lex loci contractus applies.181 
Similarly, when a landlord in Chicago leased local prem-
ises to a shoe store firm of Baltimore which became bank-
rupt, the federal judge held that although any rights in rem 
created by the lease were governed by the lex situs ( Illi-
nois), any rights in personam created by virtue of its cove-
nants were subject to the law of the place of contracting 
(Maryland) .182 
Hence, the "contract" also covers the landlord's failure 
to make repairs, covenants to pay taxes, rights of warranty 
for fitness, etc.133 
However, this does not exclude situs as a subsidiary con-
tact in cases not distinguished by party choice of law184 or 
special circumstances. Such a special case occurs where 
both parties have their domicil in one state, in which they 
also negotiate and conclude the lease; the law of this state 
applies even though the object be foreign land.185 On the 
other hand, when the lease is "made" or "executed" or 
"delivered" in the state where the land lies, American 
courts have not hesitated to apply the law of that state,136 
131 In re Barnett ( 1926) 12 F. (2d) 70, 77, cert. den. 273 U.S. 699, not 
mentioned by Beale; here the second Circuit Court reversed the decision 
cited by 2 BEALE 943, n. 7 in favor of lex situs ( 12 Fed. (2d) 70) ; followed 
in U.S. v. Warren R. Co. (1952) I27 F. (2d) I36 with respect to "the 
contractual rights and obligations created by the leases." 
182 In re Newark Shoe Stores, Inc. (D. C. Md. I933) 2 F. Supp. 384. 
133 IS A.L.R. (2d) uos ff. 
134 France: Trib. Seine (June I, I926) Clunet I927, 400; See alsc 
DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 629 on the presumption that the parties had the lex 
situs in mind. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 29, I90I) I2 Z. int R. II3· 
135 2 FRANKENSTEIN 332 against RG (Oct. I4, I897) JW. I897. S8I Nr. 
57· Contra Austria: OGH. (Oct. n, I934) r6 S.Z. No. 210. 
136 Amer. Realty Co., Inc., v. Eastern Tire and Rubber Co. ( I93 r) 274 
Mass. 297; Bondy v. Harvey (1933) 62 F. (2d) 52I; Franzen v. G. R. 
Kinney Co. (1935) 218 Wis. 53· 
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even though one party signs elsewhere.131 In a recent obiter 
dictum, it is true, the place of contracting was preferred to 
that of the land, but this would have been a meager ground; 
the decision finally was rested upon an express and clear 
clause of the contract.188 In Eurpose, lex situs fur-
nishes the subsidiary rule39 in the same manner as for sales 
of immovables, although the situs may be confused with the 
place of contracting. 
Conditional sales. It needs only a brief reminder that 
the usual conditional sale combines two distinguishable 
transactions, a sales contract and a conditional transfer of 
the title. The mistake of subjecting both elements to a con-
tractual test such as the law of the place of contracting 
occurs in American courts140 and abroad.141 
Co-ownership likewise, in any of its forms, as a real right 
is subject to lex situs, in distinction to the contract for crea-
tion of the right.142 
187 Cassidy's Lt. v. Rowan ( I9I7) I63 N.Y. Supp. I079, 5I C.J.S. 8Io § 205 
n. 44· The Canadian corporation signed in Canada but received the com-
pleted instrument ("delivered") in New York. 
138 Lee Wilson & Co. v. Fleming ( I94I) 203 Ark. 4I7. 
139 England: St. Pierre v. South American Stores [I937] I All Eng. Rep. 
206-C.A.: owners in Paris, tenants in England, law of Chile applied as 
lex situs. 
Austria: OGH. (Oct. II, I934) 10Z. ausl. PR. (I936) 790. 
France: Cass. civ. (May 3I, I932) D. I933·I.I7I, S. I933·I.I7, Clunet I933, 
347; and Cass. req. (Nov. 2, I937) Nouv. Revue I937, 766 referring to the 
same case, invoke submission, party agreement, and lex loci contractus, but 
all coincide with the situs; cf., NIBOYET, Revue I929, 592 If. 
Germany: RG (Nov. II, I89I) 3 Z. int. R. I57; (Oct. I4, I897) JW. 
I897. 58I No. 57; (Apr. 29, I90I) JW. I90I 452; (Dec. 7. I920) IOI RGZ. 
64; 2 BAR Io8; NussBAUM D. IPR. 232. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law. art. 8 ( 2). 
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. 2I, I927) Seemann v. Oswald, 
6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 6 5 S· 
Switzerland: 2 MElLI 77; 2 SCHNITZER ( ed. 3) 621. 
140 Supra, Vol. III p. 82; 87 A.L.R. (I933) I3o9; I48 A.L.R. (I944) 375· 
Cf., IS A.L.R. (2d) (I950) I3I4 If.; STUMBERG, "Security Interests," 27 Iowa 
Law Rev. ( I942) at 532 If. 
141 Even 2 FRANKENSTEIN 65, who stresses the importance of lex situs, 
declares that reservation of property belongs to the obligatory contract. See 
2 GoLDSCHMIDT I66 If. against Cod. Bustamante, art. II8 If.; 2 BUSTAMANTE 
(ed. 3) II3 § 93I. 
142 2 ZITELMANN 330, cf. 363; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 23I §n56. 
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3· Right of Stoppage in Transitu 
This right of an unpaid seller, as developed in England 
since I 690 and stated in the Sales of Goods Act, I 89 3, re-
sults in a lien in case of the buyer's insolvency.143 The 
seller does not cancel the sales contract : he simply recovers 
possession. But in most systems, bankruptcy of the buyer is 
required; in certain systems, goods may be recovered al-
though transportation to the buyer has been completed 
before the commencement of bankruptcy, or even after it; 
and particulars vary especially with respect to the rights of 
a bona fide holder of a document or title, who has pur-
chased from the buyer. In addition, there are different 
theories within the same system: 
The nature of this right of recovery is very controversial 
everywhere; some consider it a right in rem (cancelling the 
transfer?) making possible to sue a third acquirer not pro-
tected by good faith; others recognize but an obligatory 
claim unsuitable against third acquirers. Some teach that 
the claim is intended to retransfer the goods to the seller; 
the demand of separation would dissolve the sales contract 
as an effect of non-payment. Others assert that the sales 
contract is not affected; the claim would merely result in the 
retransfer of the goods, the re-establishment of things as 
they would have been without the delivery, so as to put the 
seller again into a position to exercise his right of retention; 
not ownership but possession would be revindicated/44 
Since the systems differ so widely and especially on the 
proprietary or merely contractual character of the right, 
the entire solution evidently must be left to the law indi-
cated by the territorial situation of the goods. This, it 
would seem, points to the law of the place where the goods 
are at the time of stoppage.145 
143 §§ 44-46; United States, Uniform Sales Act, §§57-59· 
144 DOLLE, "Konkurs," Rechtsvergleichendes Handwiirterbuch, 137· 
145 Infra 100. 
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In Inglis v. Usherwood146 stoppage was obviously per-
missible according to Russian law, as against the English 
law of the buyer's domicil, since the contract was made in 
Russia between the seller and the buyer's local agent and 
the goods were still in the Russian port of departure. The 
decision, therefore, has been regarded as reconcilable with 
the lex situs theory in general, although it is not conclusive 
for it.141 No case better in point seems to be known. 
Illustration. Cheshire, to demonstrate his singular theory 
of lex actus, submitted the following example: 
"An English merchant, by a contract made in London, 
sells to a Swedish buyer copper stored in a warehouse in 
Antwerp. He draws on the buyer for the price and trans-
mits the bill of exchange and the bill of lading to the buyer 
to secure acceptance. The buyer destroys the bill of ex-
change, but delivers the bill of lading to X in Stockholm 
without receiving value from him. The seller stops the cop-
per in transit before it reaches Stockholm. Let us further 
suppose that the stoppage is unlawful by Swedish law." 148 
Supposing with Cheshire that the sales contract is under 
English law, we cannot take for granted, nevertheless, that 
"the right to stop the goods is an incident of the original 
transaction." This would be true for English law; but 
whether English contracts law is applicable to the right of 
stoppage, and furthermore to the conflict between the seller 
and the holder of the bill of lading, cannot be simply de-
cided under the law of the sales contract. If the stoppage 
is localized in Sweden, stoppage in itself is certainly per-
missible so long as the goods have not reached the buyer.149 
146 (I8oi) I East SIS. 
147 Against CHESHIRE'S ed. 3 S79 see editor of DICEY (ed. 6) S6I-S6Z. 
148 CHESHIRE (ed. 3) S8I. I have to note, however, in the proofs, that this 
passage is omitted in Cheshire's fourth edition. 
14 9 Sweden: Sales Law § 39· 
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But of course, the right of the seller has no effect against 
bona fide purchasers having acquired under Swedish law.150 
English law has nothing directly to say about all this, al-
though it does decide what the effect on the contract is. 
The following chapters will first deal with the applica-
tion of the principle to rights in immovables and in mova-
bles insofar as they are thought to remain in one jurisdic-
tion (Chapter 55). Thereafter, the problems raised by re-
moval of a chattel to another jurisdiction, that is, by the 
change of lex situs, will require separate discussion (Chap-
ter 56). 
1 5° Sweden: Marit. Law § 166; 1 ToRE ALMEN, Skand. Kaufrecht, 653, 
Anhang zu §§ 39-41, n. :u-z8b. 
CHAPTER 55 
Scope of Lex Situs 
I. CREATION OF REAL RIGHTS BY TRANSACTION 
I. Capacity to Dispose and Acquire 
T HE Anglo-American doctrine has maintained the full dominance of the situs over the capacity of the parties. 
The lex situs determines the ability to convey and to 
accept or hold an interest in land 1 as well as in a chattel. 
But the reference of this principle to movables has not been 
so firm, either in England where opinions are divided in 
the absence of authority, or even in this country.2 Story 
held with the great majority of authors of his time that 
since movables were subject to the personal law of the 
owner, capacity was also governed by the law of the 
domicil.3 
1 Immovables (constant practice) : Birthwhistle v. Vardill ( 1840) 7 CI. & 
Fin. 895; Bank of Africa Ltd. v. Cohen ( I909) 2 Ch. I29, I3S, I43; on 
objectionable grounds, see DICEY (ed. 6) 53 I; CLARENCE SMITH, I Int. & 
Comp. L.Q. (I9S2) at 470; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 5SI. . 
Scotland: Ogilvy v. Ogilvy's Trustees ( I927) Sc.L.T. 83; Black v. Black's 
Trustees (I9SO) Sc.L.T. (Notes) 32; DoNALDSON, 4 Int. L.Q. (I9SI) I02. 
Canada: Landry v. Lachapelle [1937] 2 D.L.R. 504. 
United States: Restatement §2I6; 2 BEALE 94I §2I6.1; GooDRICH (ed. 3) 
148, 474; CLARENCE SMITH, "Capacity in the Conflict of Laws," I Int. & Comp. 
L.Q. (I9S2) 447.468. 
2 Movables: United States: Restatement § 255; cf., 2 BEALE § 333·3• 340·I; 
GooDRICH § IS4 n. 83. 
England: For lex situs also as to movables, WESTLAKE § ISO, cf., § 165; 
FOOTE 279, cf., 2SI• 
For the law of the domicil, except for gifts and commercial transactions, 
DICEY (ed. s) 6o6, rule ISI; M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 523 § 499 (gen-
erally); (Scotch) Black case supra: Lord Mackintosh held a trust settle-
ment of a married woman domiciled in Transvaal invalid under Transvaal 
law respecting movables everywhere. 
3 STORY §§ 367, 368; I FOELIX §§ 6I, 87, 92, 93; see CLARENCE SMITH 
(supra n. I) on Louisiana, Ohio and New Hampshire (infra n. 9). 
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On the Continent, the broad expanse of lex situs in trans-
actions involving land has been followed occasionally, 
notably in France.4 The present doctrine, however, is en-
tirely fixed in favor of the personal law, that is, the national 
or domiciliary law.5 This view is so strong also in Latin 
America that a provision of the Argentine Code, literally 
taken from Story, has been explained away.6 
Apart from the problems concerning corporations, 7 the 
question has lost much of its practical importance by the 
emancipation of married women. It is still encountered 
under numerous systems when a married woman encumbers 
her land for the benefit of her husband, 8 and of course with 
respect to the disabilities of lunatics and minors. 
In no system is importance attached in principle either 
to the place where an instrument of conveyance is executed, 9 
4 France: See on and against the older decisions involved, PRUDHOMME, "De 
l'application de Ia loi de l'etranger 'repute absent' par sa jurisdiction nationale 
aux immeubles situes en France," Clunet 193Z, 53, commenting on Trib. 
Civ. Seine (April z4, 1931) ibid. 83, which opened a path to the personal law. 
Austria: WALKER 135 n. 55 cites a similar decision, OGH. (Oct. zo, 19Z4). 
Greece: Cass. (195Z Nr. 3Z3) 5 Rev. Hell. 310: a stock corporation possessed 
land in Lesbos, now Greek; its right was denied not because it was an 
alien but because under the former Ottoman law of situs a stock corporation 
had no capacity to have possessory rights in land. 
5 Louisiana: Augusta Ins. & Banking Co. v. Morton (1848) 3 La. Ann. 417. 
France: Cass. Civ. (April q, 193z) D. 193Z.1.89 note Basdevant, S. 
193Z.1.36I note Audinet, Revue 193z, 549· 
Germany: EG.BGB. art. 7· 
Switzerland: C. C. Final Disp. art. 7b par. z: national law governs 
capacity to dispose of foreign land, whereas for Swiss land capacity accord-
ing to Swiss law suffices. 
6 Argentina: C. C. art. 10, see the literature in z ROMERO DEL PRADO, 
Manual Z55 ff.; this author himself, Z7z, seems to interpret "capacity of 
acquisition" as meaning the ability of the thing to be an object of property. 
7 See Vol. II, p. 73· 
8 Cf., Restatement §zz5 comment (b); GoODRICH 391; DIENA, Dir. reali 
z87 § 8z. 
9 But see Proctor v. Frost ( 1938) 89 N.H. 304, 197 Atl. 813; cf., CooK, 
Legal Bases 274; GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) IZo6; a mortgage on 
New Hampshire land by a married woman securing her husband's debt is 
declared valid against the law of the situs according to Massachusetts law, 
with emphasis on the place of execution, although the court could have 
better invoked her domicil in Massachusetts; see Note 51 Harv. L. Rev. 
~•;;38) 1444. Cook has inspired the editors of DICEY (ed. 6) 531 to 
original suggestions. 
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or to the place where the obligatory contract is made, or 
to any contact of its performance. Civil law, however, 
has the well-known exceptions enabling foreigners to con-
tract in the forum with the capacity they would have under 
the domestic law. In Germany, this exception allows a 
foreigner to dispose of his German immovables or of his 
movables situated anywhere, though not of his foreign 
immovables.10 
Some modern writers, once more, seem dissatisfied, each 
with the rule of his own country. Cook declared the law 
of the situs undesirable and seemed inclined towards the 
law of the domicil,11 while Niboyet advocates the lex 
situs.12 Recalling the assumption that the American con-
flicts rule on capacity to contract is sound in reference to 
business matters 13 and that for sales contracts respecting 
land a subsidiary rule should refer to the lex situs, 14 it seems 
consistent to prefer the lex situs. 
This result cannot be based on a renvOI. Repeatedly 
scholars have attempted to trace the lex situs to a renvoi 
from the law of the domicil, or vice versa to derive the 
personal law from a concession by the lex situs. Both as-
sumptions are historically unfounded, since both personal 
and real statutes were the elements of the statutist doc-
trines. Nevertheless, we may accept determination of 
capacity by the law of the situation much more easily if at 
the same time we admit that capacity may alternatively be 
granted by the law of the domicil, on the basis of a renvoi 
by the lex situs. 
10 Germany: EG.BGB., art. 7 par. 3; RAAPE, D. IPR. 373 f., illustrates. 
A Hungarian (then held minor at 22 years) sells a painting hanging in 
Budapest and transfers ownership by contract in Germany; after having 
brought the chattel to Germany, he tries without success to plead minority. 
11 CooK, 52 Harv. L. Rev. at 1269 n. 48. 
12 NIBOYET, 4 Traite zos § 1148; 38S § 1196; s id. so8 § IS3I· 
13 Supra, Vol. I, p. I9S· 
14 Supra, Vol. III, p. 104. 
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2. Form 
(a) Exclusive lex situs. In the older civilian doctrine/5 
the Anglo-American, 16 and a German-influenced group, 17 lex 
situs exclusively governs the formalities of transactions cre-
ating, modifying, or terminating real rights, as opposed to 
the contract promising a transfer.18 Hence, compliance 
with the law where the conveyance is made or a deed de-
livered is not primarily sufficient. The rule locus regit 
actum is not applicable in this opinion. Accordingly/9 the 
courts put it up to the foreign law of the situation, irrespec-
tive of the lex fori, to prescribe registration, 20 or execution 
of a mortgage before a court. 21 
In the United States, however, the statutes in a number 
of states respecting their own land, in turn, recognize a 
conveyance executed in another state under the form used 
there, 22 and thus restore to a degree the idea of locus regit 
15 Prussian A.L.R., Einleitung §us, cf., FOERSTER Eccws, Pr. PR. I (ed. 
s) 6o n. 29; 2 FIORE §§ 83 x-833; DIENA, Dir. reali 152. 
16 England: Adams v. Clutterbuck ( 1883) 10 Q.B.D. 403; In re Hernando 
( I884} 27 Ch. 284. 
United States: Restatement§§ 217, 256. 
17 Czechoslovakia: Priv. Int. Law art. 7, 36. 
Germany: EG.BGB. art. u par. 2; BGB. §§ 313, 925, cf., x BAR 6xs; 2 
ZITELMANN 336 j RG. JW. 1928, 2454 j KG. ( 1925) 44 ROLG. IS2· 
Greece: C. C. art. 12. 
Italy: Disp. Prel. (1942) art. 26 par. 2. 
Japan: Priv. Int. Law art. 8 par. 3· 
Montenegro: Code on Property ( 1888), art. 799· 
Poland: Priv. Int. Law, art. 6, no. 3 (mentioning only immovables). 
Also: Montevideo Treaty, art. 26, ( 1940) art. 32. Cod. Bustamante, art. 
140 (semble). 
18 Supra, Vol. III, p. xo8. 
19 Doe dem. Seebkristo v. East India Co. ( 1856) xo Moore P.C.C. 140, 
sometimes cited as permitting oral transfer, is based on the Hindu law of the 
grantor rather than the coinciding le% situs. 
20 Hicks v. Powell ( 1869) L.R. 4 Ch. 741; Norton v. Florence Land & 
Public Works Co. ( 1877} 7 Ch. 332. 
21 Waterhouse v. Stansfield (1851) 9 Hare 234i (1852) 10 Hare 254· 
22 Restatement (immovables): § 217, comment d.; on the laws extending 
their compulsory force even to the obligatory contract, see Vol. III, 109. 
The states of the Union having such statutes as of 19II have been noted 
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actum. In this case a true renvoi is created. The Re-
statement expressly points to these statutes as an excep-
tional permission of renvoi with respect to land.28 They 
are much less frequent, however, than the analogous con-
cessions respecting formal validity of wills. The civilian 
laws of this group are more rigorous; the German Code 
directly excludes the principle of locus regit actum.24 
(b) The French-influenced group, however, directly ap-
plies the maxim, locus regit actum, except when the pro-
visions of the situs are intended to protect third persons 
or, what is sometimes synonymous, serve the general social 
interest.25 It has been concluded that two Italian nationals, 
by a marriage settlement in England without a public 
official, may transfer Italian land, and that two foreign 
nationals may so transact anywhere outside Italy in the 
form of their national law, in both cases contrary to the 
municipal Italian rules. On the other hand, by a special 
express provision of the French code 26 and those follow-
ing, 27 a mortgage on domestic property cannot be created 
by LoRENZEN, 20 Yale L.J. ( I9II) at 433, and see cases in GooDRICH 454 
n. 5· 
Ontario: Re Mills [I912] 3 D.L.R. 6I4, 3 O.W.N. 1036. 
To the same effect among the member states, Cod. Bustamante, art. I36. 
23 Restatement § 8 (I). 
24 EG.BGB. art. II par. 2. See also, e.g., the old application of arts. 7 and IO 
of the Dutch "General Provisions," Hof Gelder land (May 6, I856) W. I765: 
Dutch law as to Dutch immovables does not admit renvoi. 
25 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 205 and cit. 
Italy: DIENA, Dir. reali 89 and cit. n. I; 292, 319; but see App. Milano 
(March 30, I909) Clunet I9IO, I323 (pledge in France of goods situated 
in Italy). 
26 France: C.C. art. 2I28; followed in The Netherlands, C.C. art. I218, and 
the Dutch colonies. 
27 Luxemburg: C.C. art. 2188 and Monaco: C.C. art. I966. 
Netherlands: C.C. art. I:u8. 
Haiti: C. C. art. I895· 
Dominican Rep.: C.C. art. 2I28. 
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in a foreign country, a rule considered anachronistic and 
not to be enlarged by analogy. 28 
(c) Irrespective of the contrast of doctrines just indi-
cated, whenever at the situs measures of publication-re-
cording in land register, transcriptions or inscriptions, title 
publication, etc.-are required, they can only be effectuated 
in the country and district of the thing.29 The C6digo 
Bustamante, article 136, states that provisions establishing 
and regulating registers of property and imposing them as 
necessary as respects third persons, are "of international 
public order." More clearly said, according to the uni-
versal force of lex situs, these provisions are essential for 
the recognition of real rights in any court. 
Another consideration is exemplified by a Swiss decision; 
a German certificate of mortgage, a negotiable paper, was 
ineffectually transferred in Switzerland; to transfer the 
mortgage, the parties should have observed the formalities 
described in the German code. 30 
28 In 1894 DIENA, Dir. reali 291 n. 5 cited much literature to this effect; 
see esp. VALERY in Clunet 1928, 926; BEVILAQUA (ed. 3) 346 and §§ 34, 36. 
The French provision is rejected, e.g., in: 
Belgium: Mortgage Law of Dec. 16, 1851, art. 77· 
Italy: C.C. (1865) art. 1990; (1942) art. 2837. 
Argentina: C.C. art. 3129. 
Bolivia: C. C. art. 1475. 
Brazil: TENORIO 407 § 544 calls the French provision absurd. 
Chile: C. C. art. 24II. 
Colombia: C. C. art. 2436. 
Ecuador: C.C. art. 2430. 
El Salvador: C.C. art. 740. 
Nicaragua: C.C. art. 3823. 
Portugal: C. C. art. 964. 
Uruguay: C. C. art. 2324, C.Com. art. 768. 
29 Italy: Disp. Pre!. art. 26, par. 2. Of course, an exception is made, e.g., 
for automobiles registered in Italy under the D.L. March 15, 1927, n. 436/Law 
Feb. 19, 1928, n. 510, further disposal of which needs inscription in Italy to 
have effect against third persons in Italy. MORELLI, Elementi 140; BALLADORE 
PALLIERE DIP I62. 
30 App. Bern (Nov. 19, 1936) 73 ZBJV ( 1937) 620. 
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3· Structure of the Right 
49 
As the speaker for the unanimous Supreme Court of the 
United States said in 1869, the law of the situs of land con-
veniently determines "descent, alienation, and transfer, and 
... the effect and construction of conveyances." 31 Ex-
cept inheritance and marital property, the same broad rule 
obtains with respect to all other tangibles. 
Hence, the doctrine of all countries agrees 32 that the 
lex situs determines: 
whether only certain enumerated proprietary interests are 
admitted, as in the Austrian and German system ( nu-
merus clausus), or parties may create new kinds of in-
terests, as is permitted in common law and is contro-
versial in France ;33 
what intrinsic requirements exist for conveyances, releases, 
adverse possession, prescription, attachment, etc. This 
includes also the requisites of consent, delivery of an 
instrument or a chattel, and good cause (justus titulus), 
good faith, and other elements of acquisition from a non-
owner;84 
the nature of the interest created ;35 
the construction of a deed, with due consideration of the in-
tention and knowledge of the draftsmen ;36 
whether creditors of the conveyor may attack an alienation 
outside of bankruptcy proceedings. 37 
31 Mr. Justice Miller in McGuon v. Scales (U.S. x869) 9 Wall. 23, 27. 
3 2 See, for instance, the American cases cited by GoODRICH, "Two States 
and Real Estate," 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1941) 418; and the German cases in 
NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 304. 
33 PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 54, § 48. 
Spain: no numerus clausus, according to the dominant opinion, but 
contra Fed. Puis Pefia, Tratado der. cio Espafiol III vol. x (1951) 20. 
34 Corresponding with Restatement§§ 215, 257. 
35 Restatement §§ 221, 258. 
36 Restatement § 214; but see Taylor v. Taylor ( 1945) 3 xo Mich. 541, 17 
N.W. (2d) 745, 157 A.L.R., for primary regard to the intention of the parties. 
37 Restatement § 218, comment f. 
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Illustrations. (i) Floating charges are invalid in Scot-
land; this covers documents situated in Scotland embodying 
a part of the charge and the entire encumbrance if the com-
pany has its registered office in Scotland. 58 
(ii) In Germany the owner of real property may have a 
mortgage on his own land, in Switzerland an "open rank" 
for a mortgage to be given by him, in Austria a right to 
dispose of a mortgage discharged by him.89 No applica-
tions for registering a different type are accepted. 
4· Place 
As a rule, the requirements of the lex situs may be com-
plied with at any place 40 by an act, which, on the other 
hand, may mean nothing under the law of such place. This 
is particularly true of the transfer of movables.41 Goods 
stored in Chicago may be transferred by sales contract 
under common law; the contract may be made anywhere. 
Thus a transfer of goods stored in Argentina was validly 
made in New York, without interference by the New York 
statutory requirement of an inventory for bulk merchandise 
sales ;42 and goods stored in Brazil were validly transferred 
in Germany.43 In both cases the Latin-American laws of 
property were satisfied by an implied constitutum posses-
sorium.44 
Foreign judgments. Of course, the forum will not rec-
ognize a foreign judgment adjudging an interest in an im-
38 Shop Fronts (Great Britain) Ltd. in Liqu., per Lord Birnam (I950), 
see DONALDSON, 4 Int. L.Q. (I9SI) I09. 
39 BGB. § u63; ZGB. art. 8I3; Ost. ABGB. § 469 and in case of can-
celling the mortgage, a priority for three years III Teilnovelle § 37· 
40 See against former teaching by SAVIGNY I87 f. and I BAR 633: 2 FIORE 
§ 832; DIENA, Diritti reali I67; NIBOYET, Acquisition 292. 
41 OLG. Hamburg (May IS, 1894) 5 Z. int. R. 286. 
Austria: OLG. Wien (July IS, I948) O.J.Z. I948, No. 654, Ob. Riick-
stattungs-Kommission (Feb. I2, I949) id. I949r No. 355· 
42 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Hessey (C.C.A. 4, Md. I935) 76 F. (2d) 
645, 648, cert. den. 296 U.S. 595 (Lowendahl v. Hessey). 
48 RG. (Sept. I6, I9II) Bay. Z. I9I2, 45· 
44 Argentina: C.C. arts. 2602, 2387. 
Brazil: C.C. arts. 675, 620. 
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movable or movable as of the time when the things were 
situated in the forum.45 
II. SPECIAL APPLICATIONS OF Lex Situs 
I. Remedies 
Civil law sharply distinguishes right and possession. But 
also possession, as a legally defined factual situation with 
determinated legal conditions and effects, is a matter of 
lex situs.46 Civilian authors, therefore, say that lex situs 
rather than the law governing inheritance decides whether 
possession ends with death or is a subject of succession, u_ 
a point, however, that needs inquiry-and that lex situs 
rather than lex fori determines whether possession may be 
recovered.48 Certainly, the lex situs governs not only the 
remedies based on ownership or minor interests but, in 
principle, also the remedies based on possession as such, 
that is, older or superior possession. At common law, the 
same result follows as a matter of course from the nature 
of a real right as a right to possession. 
The conflicts situation, however, is overshadowed by the 
jurisdiction of the court of the situs. "No real action or 
action to recover possession of a tangible thing, whether 
land or chattel, can be maintained outside the state where 
the land or chattel is situated." 49 A similar exclusivity 
45 Canada: Chassy v. May (1921) 68 D.L.R. 427, affirming 29 B.C.R. 83: 
a judgment in the United States adjudging an interest of a free minor in 
Canada has no effect; the plaintiff invoking it is not a bona fide purchaser 
and acquires no title. 
46 Greece: C. C. art. 27. 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. art. u. 
Egypt: C.C. art. 18. 
Poland: P.I.L. § 6 (I). 
For the unanimous continental literature, see, e.g., 2 FRANKENSTEIN 81; 
NIBOYET, 4 Traite 229 § IISS· 
47 2 ZITELMANN 951. See infra Ch. 65. 
48 I BAR 626. 
49 Restatement§ 613; 3 BEALE 1652; GooDRICH ( ed. 3) r69 If. 
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of jurisdictions exists universally by old tradition 50 for 
actions based on rights in immovables. 51 
As a natural consequence of this attitude, in actions de-
rived from real rights, at least those respecting land, the 
local court applies its domestic law on a large scale. 
Nevertheless, the matter is not quite clear. It would 
seem that a more exact statement might be as follows: 
At common law, lex fori applies in the threefold func-
tion as procedural law, lex situs, and lex delicti commissi. 
( I) As far as remedies are considered a part of procedural 
law-which traditionally goes a long way-the actions re-
lating to property are subject to the domestic law of the 
court having jurisdiction in rem, irrespective of the where-
abouts or residence of the owner. ( 2) The existence of 
possession and of real rights depends on the substantive 
law of the forum, qua lex situs. And (3) trespass or dis-
possession or conversion by severing crops, lumber, minerals, 
etc., from the land, are governed by the same system as 
lex delicti commissi. (In addition, only recently some-
what challenged, 52 trespass to land produces merely a "local 
action," exclusively bound to personal jurisdiction at the 
situs, although the action is merely for damages.) In fact, 
there does not seem to exist any authority either in England 
or the United States for the application of a law other than 
that (of the municipal law) of the situs, to determine the 
conditions and effects of a real action. Also, respecting 
50 Not by attraction from choice of law, as arguments upon the codes as-
sume, esp. the French literature, lastly BATIFFOL, Traite 700 and citations n. 
1. Originally, jurisdiction in rem was even the basis for the principle of 
lex situs. 
51 E.g. France: C. Proc. Civ. art. 59 par. S· 
Germany: ZPO. § 24. 
Italy: C.P.C. art. 21 par. I. 
Argentina: C.P.C. art. S· 
Brazil: C.P.C. art. 136. 
52 Judicial abandon of the theory in Minnesota and Arkansas: see note, 6 
Vanderbilt L. Rev. (1953) 786-789. 
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such claims as to recover damages for mesne profits, which 
can be sued upon separately,53 no doubt about the applicable 
law has been expressed, to my knowledge; probably the 
land has always been found to be the place of the wrong. 
Among the remedies for disturbance and deprivation of 
the enjoyment of movables, detinue must be separated from 
trespass and conversion. Presumably, detinue is always 
considered a part of the procedural law of the forum. 
More adequately, the same result would be based on the 
cause of action which is unlawful refusal of restitution, to 
be localized at the court. Trespass and conversion have 
retained the character of tort. Here, it may happen that 
the place of wrong is different from the situs at the time 
of the action. 
The Continental literature, however, differentiates sev-
eral groups of actions. According to the Romanistic tra-
dition, in a long development from the second century 
A.D., the petition of recovery (rei vindicatio) by which 
an owner sues a possessing nonowner, covers various claims, 
distinguishable in conflicts law. 54 As the German Civil 
Code distinctly expresses the large range of vindication,55 
the owner's action may be analysed as comprising three 
groups of claims: 
( 1 ) The tangible thing and, according to circumstances, 
the tangible proceeds still existing in their specific form 56 
are the direct subject of the proprietary right and clearly 
governed by lex situs. 
( 2) Proceeds and gains converted into the property of 
53 England: Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 214. 
United States: Restatement §222; the case cited contra in Illinois Annota-
tions, p. 71, MacDonald v. Dexter, 234 Ill. 517, 85 N.E. 209, has a different 
subject. 
54 Fundamental, 2 ZITELMANN 237, 303. 
55 BGB. § 985. 
56 §§ 987 par. x, 990· 
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the possessor 57 are recoverable by claims derived by law 
from the objective violation of ownership, but of the nature 
of obligations; their measure is determined by analogy to 
unjust enrichment. 
( 3) Damages for delay in restitution, or compensation 
for omitted earning of proceeds, or for destruction, deteri-
oration, or other impossibility of restitution by fault, 58 are 
objects of other obligations ex lege. 
The claims under ( 2) and ( 3), though included in the 
complex scope of one action in rem, are not necessarily 
governed by lex situs. Some writers have applied the tests 
adopted for extra-contractual obligations.59 Zitelmann re-
sorted to a renvoi by the personal law of the debtor to 
lex situs. 60 Lex situs is right, but for another reason.61 
As we have found, 62 claims for unjust enrichment should 
be governed by the law of the underlying relationship, and 
this is the law of the situs when claims for profit are raised 
separately as a consequence of transformations such as in-
nocent conversion. These demands are based upon the 
property right and included in the enlarged scope of the 
action in rem. Convenience, not necessity, directs us to the 
lex situs. 
A concurring tort action, of course, is subject to the law 
of the place of the wrong. 
Finally, an analogous rule is commendable for counter-
claims of the defendant, which he may be able to oppose 
to the action for recovery, or which, in some systems, he 
57 §§ 987 par. x, 988, 993· 
58 §§ 987 par. 2, 989, 990. 
59 2 FRANKENSTEIN 29; M. WoLFF, IPR. ( ed. 3) I79· 
60 2 ZITELMANN 240. 
61 RAAPE IPR. 382 reaches the same result through emphasis on the 
identical life relation on which both claims are based. 
62 Vol. III, p. 372 If. 
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may use in a separate action, particularly on the ground of 
expenses incurred for the object of the claim.63 
In sum, the lex situs may well be universally recognized 
as determining the remedies based on a violation of real 
rights. 
2. Documents of Title 
Certain commodity papers contributing to the transfer 
of title in goods are treated legally in different ways in the 
several systems. These regard not only the requisites for 
their recognition but also their effects in the twofold re-
spect: whether the document legally represents the goods, 
and whether it is negotiable on order or on the bearer. In 
the English,64 American,65 and German 66 jurisdictions, bills 
of lading,67 warehouse receipts, air bills, and delivery orders 
are "documents of title" (German: Traditionspapiere) , 
with the meaning that under certain conditions transfer 
of the paper transfers the ownership in the goods. The 
French law denies this effect, although practically the trans-
fer of property rights through consent produces similar 
effects, when parties use such instruments. 68 
What law, however, determines whether issue or en-
dorsement and delivery of the document by themselves 
transfer the ownership in the goods? And whether by the 
63 2 FIORE § 788; 2 ZITELMANN 252; DIENA, Dir. reali 337; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 90; GUTZWILLER 1596. 
64 England: (not negotiable) ; Bowen, L.J., in Sanders v. Maclean ( r883) 
II Q.B.D. 327, 341 C.A.: "During this period of transit and voyage, the 
bill of lading by the law merchant is universally recognized as its symbol." 
65 Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. s. 40, 41; Uniform Bills of Lading 
Act §§ 3 r, 32; Federal Bills of Lading Act §§ 30, 31 ; the entire doctrine 
is unified in the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, s. 7-502. 
66 Germany: Com. C. § 364. 
61 Other functions of bills of lading have been discussed in Vol. III, p. 
273 If. 
68 RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § 1910; cf., LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT, s Traite 
§§ 714, 715; RG. (May 7, r88o) r RGZ. 415 (Rhineland law). 
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acquisition of the instrument the holder acquires more right 
than his predecessor had? 
In one view, the law governing the obligation of de-
livering the goods also governs the quality of the instru-
ment in which the obligation is formally laid down. In 
the case of a bill of lading, the law of the port of destina-
tion has been advocated, under the influence of the German 
approach.69 Probably the same result would find sympathy 
by many friends of lex loci solutionis. 
But by far the dominant opinion, adopted by the Re-
statement, predicates that: 
"Whether the title to a chattel is embodied in a docu-
ment is determined by the law of the place where the chattel 
is at the time when the document is issued." 70 
Illustration. Goods were stored in a bonded warehouse 
in Scotland; the owner endorsed and delivered in England 
the warrants as security. The pledgee lost his case to an 
arresting creditor of the owner. Although under English 
law the warrant would have represented the goods, under 
Scotch law, the warehouse keeper should have been notified 
of the pledge. 71 
Only this view is consistent with the all-inclusive scope 
of the lex situs. It is at the same time in harmony with the 
advisable choice of law for the contract of transportation, 
based on the port where the bill of lading is issued. 
69 WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) I74· In the Seventh Hague Conference of 
I.P.L., I9SI 1 (Actes p. I06), Prof. ALTEN (Norway) contended that a bill of 
lading may be said to embody the claim against the carrier but not the 
goods. It would not be a universally acceptable proposition that the instru-
ment cannot embody the property in the goods. 
7 0 Restatement § 26 I (I). 
England: Inglis v. Robertson [1898] A. C. 6I6, by clear implication, see 
CHESHIRE (ed. 3) 584 j HELLENDALL, I7 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1939) at 2I. 
France: NIBOYET, Acquisition ISs; 4 Traite 622. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 8, I927) II9 RGZ. 215 (semble), cf., NussBAUM 
D.IPR. 3I2 f. 
Netherlands: VAN BRAKEL I87 § I43· 
71 Inglis v. Robertson [1898] A.C. 616. Closely analogous, Hallgar-
ten v. Oldham (Mass. 1893) infra n. 77· 
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It must be warned, however, that complications are pos-
sible. Transfer of goods may be effected through transfer 
and endorsement of documents, according to the law of the 
place where the goods are at the time of the issue of the 
documents. But not even in Germany, where this doctrine 
is most developed, is transfer disregarding the document 
excluded.72 Great doubts, moreover, are caused in common 
law and French-influenced law by the role attributed to the 
intention of the parties. Does title pass on shipment of 
the goods to the carrier or on the arrival of the bill of 
lading to the buyer, bank, or agent? We have encountered 
this question before.73 Also the various trade clauses pro-
voke uncertainty. 74 In the normal overseas sale C.I.F., 
it may be recalled, the American law presumes that the 
seller contemplates giving up his title by shipping, and pre-
serving merely a "security title," 75 a theory not generally 
shared. 
At this junction, other questions are prominent. If the 
paper is endowed with the ability of transferring ownership 
by the law of the place where it is issued, is this law de-
terminative of all subsequent transfers? 76 Or is it true 
that quite as the lex situs of the goods at the time of the 
issue determines the initial character of the document, the 
law of the place where the goods are at the time of their 
ulterior transfer determines the function of the endorse-
72 RG. (Dec. 8, I9Z7) 119 RGZ. 215, z17: assignment of claim for 
possession. 
73 Vol. III, p. 64. 
74 Cf., God, 45 Rev. Trim. D. Civ. ( 1947) 169 If. 
75 The correct American doctrine has now been shortly formulated in 
opposition to the strange language of the Uniform Commercial Code (Section 
z-sos and 2-509) by WILLISTON, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform 
Commercial Code," 63 Harv. L. Rev. (1950) 561, sSI If. The problem, 
being substantive, will be discussed in another work. 
76 RAAPI!, IPR. 377 If. 
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ment? 77 The latter theory would gravely impair the use-
fulness of negotiable instruments and probably has never 
been adopted in practice. Once a bill embodies the title by 
the lex situs of the goods, it serves internationally until its 
end. Merely the contract of transfer of a bill as a piece 
of paper and the form and effect of endorsement must be 
sanctioned by the law of the place where the paper is 
situated at that moment. 
However, a profound discussion of the nature of bills of 
lading has been occasioned in Germany by the case where 
the carrier involuntarily loses possession of the goods or 
fraudulently alienates them. The courts and the majority 
of writers assume that the translative effect of the bill de-
pends on the constructive possession of the goods that the 
holder exercises through the carrier. Deprived of this 
material power, the holder is limited to the obligatory claim 
against the carrier and a claim against the possessing third 
party.78 Presumably, most systems agree on the result. 
In any case, despite its theoretical underground, this con-
ception would seem to pertain to the law governing posses-
sion of the paper at the time of each transfer. 
3. Easements 
Restatement § 222. "The creation, transfer and termi-
nation of non-possessory interests in land are determined 
77 z FRANKENSTEIN 58 restricts the ubiquitous force of the paper to its 
obligatory effects; HELLENDALL at Z3 invokes Holmes, J ., in Hallgarten v. 
Oldham (1883) 135 Mass. r, 46 Am. Rep. 433· But the decision deals with 
goods stored in a Boston warehouse at all material times and correctly sub-
jects the effect of the endorsement of the warehouse receipt to Massachusetts 
law. The problem in question did not turn up. 
HELLENDALL 25 n. 44 also cites NIBOYET, Acquisition 195, who does not 
express the same opinion and in 4 Traite 622 expressly denies it; and BARTIN, 
3 Principes 236. 
78 KARL AUGUST ECKHARDT, "Die Traditionswirkung des Konossements," 
in Rechtswiss. Beitrage zum 25. j. bestehen der Handelshochschule Berlin 
(1931) 62. 
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by the law of the state where the land is." Such interests 
are "easement, profits and licenses in land." Since the in-
terest diminishes the powers of the owner, the law of the 
servient land is naturally competent to impose the burden. 
This, again, is a universal principle and includes con-
tractual as well as legal charges. 79 An illustration of the 
latter by a Louisiana case has been discussed earlier.80 
Is this unquestionable rule inappropriate for the purpose, 
residential or agricultural, for which servitudes are cre-
ated? 81 No. The needs of the restriction must he recog-
nized by the state of the situation of the land upon which 
the use shall rest. A view requiring that both laws agree 
to the restriction 82 is certainly inacceptable. 
The scope of the rule includes the permissibility of the 
charge, the conditions of its creation ;83 its extinction by 
lapse of time, destruction, or merger of ownership; its 
transfer, etc. Lex situs must also govern legal obligations 
with which a real interest is burdened, irrespective of tort, 
such as when a usufructuary has to give security to the 
owner, or must indemnize him for proceeds unlawfully de-
rived or for illicit changes of the object.84 
Equally, the lex situs, and not the lex fori, decides 
whether an obligation is personal to an individual land-
owner or runs with the land ;85 whether, vice versa, the 
79 France: Cass. (April 20, I89I) Clunet I892, zoo; DIENA, Dir. reali 203 
§ 57; 2 FIORE § 8 53; VALERY § 6I6; WEISS, 4 Traite 230 f.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 
98; GuTZWILLER IS99 c; NIBOYET, Revue Droit Int. (Bruxelles) I933, 47I; 
MATOs 424; BATIFFoL, Traite SIS§ 5I2. 
But see the singular provisions of C6digo Bustamante arts. I3I ff. 
8° Caldwell v. Gore ( I932) I75 La. SOI, I43 So. 387, I44 So. ISI; supra 
Vol. II, 330. 
81 BATIFFOL, Traite SI6 n. I § 512. 
82 2 ZITELMANN 328, 565 n. 258; WoLFF, D. IPR (ed. 3) I So, n. II. Contra, 
2 FRANKENSTEIN 98 n. 20; supra Vol. II, p. 331· 
83 E.g., whether immovables are created "by destination." 
54 GUTZWILLER IS99· 
85 Restatement § 222, comment b. Cf. supra, Vol. III, no ff. 
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successive owners of the serving land have the duty of 
positive acting, as, for instance, of maintaining a wall or 
an aqueduct in good repair; and whether a liability to pay 
money or furnish labor (surviving in modernized form 
from the old institutions of tithe and peasants socage in 
many present laws) is merely due as a land charge 86 or 
implies a personal liability of the successive owner. 
4· Encumbrances 
(a) In general. The authors of Article 9 of the Ameri-
can Uniform Commercial Code have had the felicitous idea 
of largely unifying, for the purpose of their rules, almost 
all types of transactions creating collateral rights in chattels 
as security for debts. Irrespective of their juristic forms, 
chattel mortgage, trust receipt, conditional sale, bailment-
lease in goods and documents, are thus joined in the cate-
gory of security transactions, superseding the present uni-
form laws covering parts of the ground. The Code further 
includes security by accounts and contracts rights. In con-
flicts law, we ought rather to deal, as with one class, with 
all transactions providing security by tangible movables. 
Whether the creditor immediately acquires possession 
need not be distinguished fundamentally. But intangibles 
are different. 
Again, the law of the place of the material situation 
effectively determines the existence of real rights. In the 
case of any security for a debt, it is universally agreed that 
lex situs decides whether a real right must be accessory to 
a debt, which it is not in all juristic types of security. The 
lex situs, it is recognized, does not necessarily govern the 
debt. The debt may be under a different law stipulated by 
the parties or judicially selected. Also a promise to create 
or transfer a mortgage may have its own law. 
86 Restatement § 231. 
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Illustration. A Belgian debtor secured his debt to an-
other Belgian by an act in Belgium, pledging goods which 
he had in France in custody of a third person. The Belgian 
court rightly applied Belgian law to the debt, and French 
law to the pledge and its sale. (French law, by the way, 
recognizes a pledge made abroad, in contrast to a hy-
pothec.) 81 It had been argued that the creditor possessed 
the goods through the bailee and the goods were therefore 
to be considered situated in Belgium. The court rejected 
this fiction. 88 
Nevertheless, although the obligations may follow a dis-
tinct law, when we look for a typical subsidiary rule, con-
tracts promising to convey a charge on land ought to be 
subjected to the law of obligation prevailing at the situs,89 
quite as other contracts "relating" to land. This is partic-
ularly persuasive when the buyer of land assumes the per-
sonal debt underlying a mortgage. 90 
(b) In particular. The lex situs includes the following 
incidents :91 
on what objects a pledge may exist ;92 
what is a real right of security; the nature of legal 
or equitable right, a mortgage, pledge, or lien; or, 
in other words, the validity and effect of such 
right ;93 
87 See also NIBOYET, 4 Traite 453· 
88 Trib. com. Bruxelles (Jan. 29, 1930) Clunet 1931, 452. 
89 France: BATIFFOL, Traite 517. 
Germany: KG. (Dec. 2r, .1935) JW. 1936, 2466 at 2469 (supra ch. 54 n. 
83) respecting the personal debt although not very clearly reasoning. 
Italy: CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Priv. 165. 
90 Austria: OGH. (June 26, 1930) JW. 1931, 635 (personal debt secured 
by mortgage on German land and assumed by the vendee of the land as 
sole debtor; applicability of the German law on revalorization). 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 12, 1887) 4 BOLZE Nr. 22, cited by NusSBAUM 300 
n. S· On necessary application of le:r situs to the assignment of the debt 
according to BGB. § II 54, see M. WoLFF, Sachenrecht § 159. 
Brazil: BEVILAQUA 346. 
91 See Restatement, statements cited in the following notes, and for liens 
§ 230 and charges § 231. 
92 RG. (Dec. 7, 1921) 103 RGZ. 259· 
93 Restatement §§ 225, zss, 265, 279· 
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the assignment of such interest and whether a mort-
gage may be transferred without the debt secured;94 
the defenses of the owner, as, e.g., referring the 
creditor to other securities ;95 
the power to redeem mortgaged land, after a fore-
closure sale and after limitation of action for the 
mortgage debt has run ;96 
the discharge of mortgages: whether payment after 
the maturity of the debt suffices; which satisfaction 
is needed; whether an attaching creditor may dis-
charge the mortgage. 97 
On these lines it should be settled that any foreign type 
of security is to be recognized, except in the narrow field of 
public policy. A "bailment and lease contract" of Pennsyl-
vania must not be construed in Georgia as a sale with reser-
vation of title.98 
The situation is different when the goods are in the 
forum and the transaction occurs abroad. The title of 
three cars, deposited in France, was conveyed by a French 
company as security for a loan by a Dutch firm, in a trans-
action in Germany in the German style of a fiduciary trans-
fer of ownership (Sicherungsiibereignung), and German law 
was expressly stipulated. The French Supreme Court re-
jected the creditor's claim of ownership in the debtor's 
bankruptcy, because the acquisition by the creditor of the 
94 Restatement § zz6. 
95 Austria: Inversely OGH. (Dec. 4, 1906} 43 Gl. U. 612 Nr. 3586 allows 
an Austrian debtor to refer the creditor to a Swiss mortgage according to 
Swiss law, which is questionable except where the entire debt was governed 
by Swiss law. 
9 6 Restatement § 228. 
n Restatement § 229. 
Austrian OGH. (Jan. 26, 1904) 41 Gl. U. 47, Nr. 2586: who bears the costs 
of a receipt required for canceling the incumbrance in the land register? 
98 In Motors Mortgage Corporation v. Purchase-Money Note Co. ( 1928) 
38 Ga. App. 222, 143 S.E. 459, this was done merely in the absence of proof 
of the Pennsylvania law, to satisfy the common Jaw. 
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cars without judicial formalities would run counter to the 
prohibition of a lex commissoria in contracts of pledge, im-
posed by the French lex situs. 99 The decision has raised a 
complicated dispute 100 and is questionable. But on the one 
hand, the foreign transaction, except for the sanction, was 
recognized as creating a real interest, and on the other 
hand, the law of the country where the goods are situated 
at the time of the transaction is indeed entitled to restrict 
its sanction to those foreign types that correspond to the 
transactions admitted in the forum. Here, for once, the 
usual process of assimilation to domestic types is not 
objectionable. 
(c) Satisfaction. In the civilian codes, the chapters of 
conventional securities contain provisions defining their 
purpose in the case of default. They say whether the 
creditor may claim possession of a land or chattel serving 
as security without physical apprehension; appropriate the 
thing against the debt (lex commissoria); appropriate it 
for a price judicially foreordained; have the thing sold in 
public auction under or without court supervision, etc. Do 
these provisions and the analogous customary rules be-
long to the substantive real relationship or to procedure? 
The Restatement subjects method and effect of foreclosure, 
with or without judicial proceedings, to the lex situs.101 
The substantive characterization is commonly recognized, 
but this has sometimes been derived from the obligatory 
relationship between pledgor and pledgee rather than from 
the effects of the real interest; therefore lex loci contractus 
would have applied. This is inexact.102 An obligation, 
99 Cass. req. (May 24, 1933) S. 1935·1.257, Rev. Crit. 1934, 142, Clunet 
1935. 381. 
100 See the various arguments by NIBOYET, Rev. Crit. 1934. 143; 4 Traite 
454; BATIFFOL, Rev. Crit. 1934, 631; S. 1935·1.257: LIGEROPOULOS, 8 Repert. 
520 No. 28 ff. 
101 Restatement§§ 227, 228. 
102 C/. infra, Chapter 56. 
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whether resting on the pledge contract or on the law, creates 
merely a "shall," not a "can." Lex situs governs these 
questions with the force of public policy and procedural 
compulsion, and controls the binding force of the contract 
and what a former lex situs may have permitted. This is 
evidently the American doctrine, 103 although in one opinion 
the law of the contract governs the right to redeem a 
security.104 
Lex commissoria has been usually prohibited since the 
Emperor Constantine and therefore is void at the situs as 
¥ell as, by public policy, in other courts.105 
(d) Liens. There is an abundant and sometimes ob-
scure variety of obligations and real encumbrances going 
under the names of liens, privileges, and rights of reten-
tion. As a principle, it is settled that the lex situs decides 
whether a right has the character of a real interest/06 An 
author said even that "it is the lex rei sitae that decides and 
decides alone whether an alien is admitted or not to avail 
himself of (the privilege) and there is no account of either 
the law of the state to which the parties belong or that 
presiding at the origin of the obligation." 107 However, 
the lex situs must not create the right, it has merely to 
control its qualification. As the Institute of International 
10 3 Annot. 64 L.R.A. 3 54· 
104 Annot. 57 A.L.R. 707· 
105 OAG. Rostock, Dec. 17, 1857, 19 Seuff. Arch. 651 No. 107; DIENA, 
Dir. reali 315 § 93· 
106 Restatement § 279 (despite ambiguous drafting); Cf. 2 Beale § 230.1. 
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (May 10, 1899) Clunet 1900; 1012. 
England: London & Provincial Leather Processes Ltd. v. Hudson [1939] 
2 K.B. 734· 
France: NIBOYET, Acquisition 237· 
Germany: 81 RGZ. 283; NUSSBAUM 314 f.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 91. The liens 
of innkeepers (BGB. § 704), forwarding agents, warehouses, and carriers 
(HGB. §§ 410, 421, 440) are legal pledges. 
Italy: DIENA, Dir. reali 336; id. 3 Dir. Com. Int. 549· 
Switzerland: BG. (June 6, 1912) 38 BGE. II 163, 166; (May 13, 1914) 
40 BGE. II 203, 208. 
107 WEiss, 4 Traite 267. 
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Law once formulated the principle, the lex situs has the 
function "to limit or exclude ... the effects of privileges 
established by the law governing the legal relationship to 
which the privilege is attached." 108 
Hence, a privilege, granted at the forum for debts of a 
certain kind, extends to foreign-governed debts of the same 
or a comparable kind. But in the most recent French 
literature, it has been asserted that the priority of enforce-
ment, accorded by the French Civil Code to the fee of a 
physician who treated a deceased person in his last illness, 
is not allowed to a Belgian physician whose claim is under 
the identical Belgian law.109 The French draft on private 
international law, article 52, submits privileges to the law 
of the place where they are exercised by seizure or other-
wise.110 This, except for maritime law, is a step backward. 
The Berne Convention on rail transport of goods has 
adopted an international statutory recognition of the liens 
of rail carriers. The French text speaks of "gage," which 
means pledge, but corresponds with a common-law general 
lien by operation of law. In (my) translation: 
Article 2 I § I. The railroad has the right of a lienor 
upon the goods for the total debt indicated in article 20. 
These rights subsist so long as the goods are in the posses-
sion of the railroad or a third person holding them on its 
behalf. 
108 Institute of Int. Law, Madrid ( 1910), 24 Annuaire 394 art. 3, Revue 
19II, 573• 
France: Trib. com. Seine (Sept. 6, 1906) Clunet 1907, 366; NrBOYET, 
Acquisition 216. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. Io, 191I) 24 Z. Int. R. 322, 324; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 901 
911 231. 109 Belg. Trib. Liege (Nov. 141 1907) Clunet 1908, 565; BARTIN, 3 
Principes 257 § 428; NrBOYET, 4 Traite §§ u83, 1219, especially p. 467, who 
also insists that a foreign lien must be identical with a French type, 472 § 1222. 
110 Lours-LucAs, Rev. crit. 1952, at 59 If., proposes the law of the obliga-
tion to which the lien attaches. ' 
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§ 2. The effects of the lien are governed by the laws 
and regulations of the state where delivery is made.111 
5. Limitation of Actions 
An action to recover land in Manitoba is barred by lapse 
of time according to the statute of the province of 
Manitoba, irrespective of the fact that the land patents 
had been signed in Ottawa.112 With respect to land, this 
application of the lex situs is naturally universal, 113 since 
the judicial jurisdiction is generally likewise localized. 
Movables, however, though following the lex situs, are 
subject to the principles concerning the change of situs.114 
III. INTANGIBLES 
The old controversy about the situs of debts has its 
parallel in the question whether "intangible things," ((biens 
incorporels," in general are governed by a law of the place 
where they would be deemed situated. When the exclusive 
rights of authors and inventors matured to recognition, it 
helped them to be labeled literary, artistic, or industrial 
property, names still in misleading use in many countries. 
A more perspicacious analysis has taught, long since, 
that debts have no situs and lack the all-purpose contact 
that tangible things have. Copyright and patent rights 
belong to the large group of rights in incorporeal 
objects that have been termed absolute rights in the 
German pandectistic theory. They are analogous to rights 
in tangible objects insofar as they contain dominance over 
an object and produce actions against any person violating 
111 Convention of Berne of October 23, 1923, art. 25, 77 League of Na-
tions 367 ff., HuDSON, 2 Int. Legislation at 1433; Rome draft of Nov. 23, 1933, 
art. 25, HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation at 548. 
112 Oliver v. The King (1921) 59 D.L.R. 2II, 21 Can. Ex. 49· 
113 Treaty Montevideo (1889 and 1940) art. 52; Cod. Bustamante art. 230. 
114 Infra Ch. s6 j Shelby v. Guy ( 1826) II Wheaton 361; RAAPE, IPR. 
(ed. 3) 382; Cod. Bustamante art. 231: the law of the place where the 
prescription is achieved j BUSTAMANTE, 2 DIP. §§ 1303-6 j 2 VICO 244· 
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it. But because the object is imagined rather than real-
the work of the mind, the new procedure or product of 
industrial expertness-it cannot be localized.115 Further-
more, when these exclusive faculties were created, they were 
not endowed with the unlimited scope and duration of the 
age-old rights in re. By a compromise between the pro-
tection and promotion of the creative human mind and the 
interests of national culture or economy, the modern laws 
of copyright, patents, designs, and models, define with more 
or less generosity the exclusive field of the privilege and 
its period of time. 
On the ground of these facts, the rights in question have 
been commonly conceived as purely national creatures of 
territorial sovereignty. Progress in international courtesy 
has merely been accomplished by extending the enjoyment 
of this territorial right to foreign subjects, an achievement 
in the field of the condition of aliens.116 The vehicles were 
the treaties, except for two decisions of the Tribunal de Ia 
Seine according foreigners the enjoyment of the French 
copyright laws without a treaty.117 
In France, however, a theory has been set forth, reject-
ing the traditional view and contending that intellectual 
property is as good an object of conflict of laws as any 
chattel. This implies that the rights are not confined to a 
territory but are universal, so to speak, of transitory rather 
than local enforcement. Bartin, undertaking to establish 
a conflicts rule, speaks of the law of the place of the first 
publication as lex rei sitae.118 This theory even claims 
115 Vol. III, p. 75, dealing with the contract to transfer it. 
116 See Vol. II, p. 295· This view has been expounded in an excellent article 
by BouCHER, Clunet 1932, 26. 
117 (Feb. 14, 1931) Clunet 1932, II3; (Dec. 6, 1933) Clunet 1934, 907, 
Revue crit. 1934, 420. 
118 BARTIN, 3 Principes 71, 73· 
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validity for the existing laws.119 The facts, however, re· 
fute this view radically. 
If a conflicts rule governed, for instance, copyright, 
which is not so necessarily territorial as patents and their 
kind, a French book would enjoy French copyright in the 
United States. Nothing is farther from the truth. No 
state allows other than a domestically acquired copyright 
to be invoked against counterfeiting. The United States, 
of course, in addition requires special reservations and de-
posits for such acquisition. 
That the international copyright conventions have to 
select a local contact for extraterritorial protection of 
authors is true. They have preferred, in case of publica-
tion, the place of the first publication to the nationality or 
the domicil of the author. The reason is certainly not that 
the manuscript or original is situated there, 120 but the fact 
that publication is the entry of the work of thought into 
the external reality. 
The Berne Convention takes from the place of pub-
lication the condition that the law at this place confers 
copyright in its own territory, not because this law should 
govern abroad but because the other states see no cause 
to protect a work not protected even in its country of origin. 
And the duration of the right according to the same law is 
the maximum granted by the other countries, for the same 
reason and not because the law of origin has a positive 
extraterritorial effect. 
We may, hence, dismiss this subject from the conflict of 
laws. 
The Berne Convention declares in the case of nonpub-
lished works that the country of which the author is a sub-
119 Thus, most eloquent, BATIFFOL, Traite 531 ff. 
120 As BARTIN, supra n. II7 suggests. 
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ject is the country of origin.121 This conforms to the con-
ception that the right to publish or of priority is a right of 
personalty and subject to the personallaw.122 
Aggregates. Commercial enterprises and agricultural 
estates have been increasingly recognized as units of partial-
ly independent existence in the commercial and procedural 
literature, and form also the subject of various laws. 
Nevertheless, neither has the recognition become clear and 
comprehensive enough nor have conflicts rules been pre-
pared giving preference to such parts of enterprises as 
goodwill or real leasehold right so as to create an exception 
to the lex situs of the immovables or movables with which 
the enterprise is connected. 
121 Convention of Berne, art. 9, of Berlin and Rome, art. 4· HuDSON, 4 
Int. Legislation at 2468. 
122 Supra, Vol. I, p. 102. 
CHAPTER 56 
Removal of Chattels 
1. PRINCIPLES 
)\ FTER considerable international discussion in the 
.l"l. civil law countries, agreement has been reached on 
the basic principles suitable to movables changing 
their position. The American doctrine is consistent with 
these principles, although the courts are not always con-
scious of rules transcending "comity." The English opinions 
seem slowly to accept the same standards. 
For the sake of simplicity, acquisition of real rights will 
be primarily envisaged; but modification and termination of 
such rights follow the same principles. 
A chattel, subject to real rights in one territory (X), is 
moved to another territory (Y), hence to a new lex situs. 
The situations are conveniently distinguished by the au-
thors, according to the criterion whether a transaction in-
tending the acquisition of a right prior to removal of the 
chattel has been completed in the jurisdiction of X, with 
success or without success, or has been left uncompleted 
when it is moved to Y. 
I. Successfully Completed Acts 
Real rights in a movable, validly created under the law 
of one state, X, persist with extraterritorial effect after the 
movable has been transported into another state, Y. It 
does not matter that the same right could not have been 
created in Y, whose law has more exacting conditions.1 
1 WAECHTER, zs Arch. Civ. Prax. 387; DIENA, Diritti Reali 163 If.; 
NIBOYET, Acquisition 81 and 4 Traite § II94· 
England: Cammell v. SewelJ (r86o) 5 H. & N. 728, LoRENZEN, Cases 
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When, for instance, title in a piano, exhibited in a show-
room in New York, passes to a buyer by consent, the owner-
ship of the buyer remains intact if the piano is brought to 
Argentina, the law of which requires delivery for transfer 
of title. Recognition is given as well in the United States 
as in Argentina and in third countries. 2 
A German farmer once bought a horse in Mainz where 
French law was in force; when the horse arrived on the 
Rhine bridge, it hit a passerby. He was liable for the injury 
as owner, even though the horse had already reached the 
territory of Roman law.3 
Thus, the universally recognized working of the law of 
the situation, most remarkable in itself, is extended to the 
period of time subsequent to that situation. The effects of 
the former lex situs include formalities, consent, and all 
other intrinsic requirements of conveyances, except, in the 
civil law courts, capacity of the parties/ 
Recognition, however, does not include the capacity or 
incapacity of the chattel to be transferred when it is re-
moved to another jurisdiction. Although the domestic law 
of the situs determines for its own purposes whether a thing 
is alienable at all (in commercia) and the specific person 
who may acquire, other jurisdictions are not committed to 
recognttton. Thus, slaves serving on an estate in Ken-
tucky and considered immovable were held to lose this 
(ed. 4) 6I3; Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [I90S] I K.B. 677; DICEY 
(ed. 5) 6o8; FALCONBRIDGE, 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) at 820. 
United States: Rabun v. Rabun ( I86o) IS La. Ann. 47I; Sleeper v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co. (I882) IOO Pa. 259; GooDRICH (ed. 3) 475 n. 88. 
France: App. Rouen (Jan. 28, I878) S. 1878.2.54· 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Nov. n, 1892) 49 Seuff. Arch. 208 No. uS (al-
though speaking of lex loci contractus instead of lex situs) ; OLG. Hamburg 
(May 18, 1894) 5 Z. Int. R. ( 1895) 286; and subsequent common practice. 
Greece: App. Patras ( 1904) 16 Themis 347, Clunet 1907, 1197. 
2 See cases cited by GooDRICH 475 n. 87. 
To analogous effect: RG. (Sept. 16, 1911) Bay. z. 1912, 45· 
3 OLG. Darmstadt (Dec. 31, 1897) 29 Puchelt's Z. franz. C.R. 688. 
4 Switzerland: App. Bern (June 22, 1926) 62 ZBJV. ( 1926) 474· 
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character when brought to Missouri. 5 The analogous de-
cision of a French court that a Spanish church chalice, res 
sacra and "extra commercium" in Spain, and carried to 
France, where Baron Pichon, a collector, purchased it, was 
transferable,6 has won notoriety in the conflicts literature. 
The modern cases of "nationalization" and confiscation, 
however, have been the subject of fundamental controversy 
far beyond the realm of private international law. 
Ordinarily, when we apply a foreign law to an act we 
also apply subsequent changes in this law. But can lex 
situs X, having created a property right, abolish it sub-
sequently although the chattel meanwhile has been removed 
from X? This is claimed for the French annulment of 
acquisitions during the German occupation of chattels later 
deported from France, notwithstanding the expectation that 
other states would not recognize such destroying effect.7 
Primordial political reasons may justify exorbitant excep-
tions. The rule must be that the power of lex situs is ex-
clusively exercised during the period in which the thing is 
situated in the territory. 
Indeed, the power of the actual situs is unlimited. 
Normally, it modifies the incidents of the right, replacing 
the creating law, for instance, as to the legal restrictions 
to the exercise of ownership, or the period of time allowed 
to an usufruct. It decides whether a pledgee is entitled 
to self-appropriation of a pledge in case of default of re-
demption, although this is not merely a procedural question, 
etc.8 
But though the new law is sovereign, international life 
requires restraint. That the present situs should not rec-
5 Minor v. Cardwell ( 1866) 37 Mo. 350, 356, 90 Am. Dec. 390. 
6 Trib. civ. Seine (April 17, r885) Clunet r886, 593· 
1 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 372 f., § 1193 n. I. 
8 Supra Ch. 55, p. 17. 
France: BATIFFOL, Note to Cass. req. (May 24, 1933) S. 1935.1.257· 
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ognize foreign-created rights when their kind is unknown 
to the forum, is untenable as a general proposition. Even 
where the types of admitted real interests are exclusively 
enumerated and regulated, as in Germany, the consequence 
is merely that foreign created rights are assimilated to 
domestic categories. 
Nonrecognition generally is to be encountered only on 
the ground of repugnance to specific institutions, as when 
the transaction lacks necessary publicity or is usurious in 
the eyes of the forum. This is public policy in its ordinary 
aspect. 9 
Defenses. Since an interest acquired in X has inter-
national effect, equal effect must be attributed to certain 
restrictions and objections acquired under a law which at 
the time was the lex situs. This is normally the time when 
the defendant acquired possession. If such defenses are 
based on substantive grounds under the law of the place 
where the defendant acquired the object and the defense 
thus was created opposable to every holder of the interest, 
they are protected everywhere.10 
An outstanding example is the right of a bona fide pur-
chaser to reimbursement of the price paid by him, under 
rules going back to the thirteenth century, 11 and adopted in 
the former Prussian Landrecht, the French and many other 
codes, including that of Louisiana.12 There is also a cor-
9 Infra II. 
10 RG. (Nov. I4, I89I) 28 RGZ. I09, III (place of pledging); App. Bern 
(June 22, I926) 62 ZB]V.474 (action of the dispossessed owner of securities 
against the purchaser); DIENA, Dir. Reali I6J; I MElLI 395; NIBOYET, Ac-
quisition 297 n. j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 7I, n. Io6, 
Egypt: C.C. art. I8. 
Czechoslovakia: Priv. Int. L. § 39· 
11 For France, see PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT (I952) 393 § 394 n. 3· 
1 2 Prussia: A.L.R. part. I, Title I 5, § 26, French C.C. art. 2280; Louisiana 
C.C. ( I870) art. 3507; Netherlands B. W. art. 637; Italy former C. C. ( I86s) 
art. 709; Switzerland C. C. art. 934 par. 2. Cf., Austria: ABGB. § 33 I. 
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responding rule in England and New Y ork.13 The French 
provision allows the owner of a "stolen" or lost movable 
to sue a possessor who purchases at a fair or market or in 
a public sale or from a merchant dealing with similar 
goods, provided that he reimburses the price paid. The 
German courts have construed this provision as granting 
a substantive right, though it can be used merely as a dila-
tory defense. This construction is reasonable. Whereas 
some laws permit the owner in such cases to recover with-
out compensation, and others do not allow any recovery, 
the solution in question is a compromise of old date. This 
defense ought to be placed on the same plane of property 
rights as the results of the more extreme provisions. 
Therefore, since the purchaser of a stolen car in a French 
public sale does not acquire ownership (before completing 
adverse possession in three years, article 2279 paragraph 
2) but acquires a counterclaim for recovery of the price 
against an action by the owner, he may assert it in any 
country.14 It does not matter under what law the plaintiff 
acquired his title (unless he acquired title afterwards in 
good faith free from previous encumbrances), or whether 
the lex fori includes a similar provision. 
It has been held, however, in an old German case that 
the possessor cannot transfer his protected position when 
he conveys the chattel to a third person in a state per-
mitting the owner unconditional recovery.15 This is in-
13 Viz., where an apparently authorized selling agent transfers title through 
a commodity paper: 
New York: Factor's Act, Pers. Prop. L. s. 43, ss. 3: nothing shall prevent 
the true owner of a merchandise from demanding or receiving merchandise 
upon prepayment of the money advanced. 
14 Common opinions: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 19, 1894) 49 Seuff. Arch. 386 
No. 229: a diamond pin stolen in the domain of the Prussian Code which 
permits unconditional recovery, was sold to a bona fide purchaser in Ham-
burg requiring compensation of expenses; Hamburg law applied. Accord: 
1 BAR 633 f.; KosTERS 715; I MElLI 396; WALKER 365; see DuDEN 43· 
15 RG. (March 19, 1898) 41 RGZ. 152, Clunet 1900, 635; approved by 
LEWALD 183 § 243, but contra RAAPE IPR. 384 referring to BGB. § 986. 
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acceptable. The owner, in the case involved, lost posses-
sion of securities by theft in Hamburg. The securities 
were sold in Paris between bankers; hence, the owner could 
recover them only against payment of compensation. Should 
the same owner acquire more rights by a new change of 
hands between other persons, this time in Germany, only 
because German substantive law allows full recovery of 
stolen goods? This result is inconsistent with the undis-
puted transferability of ownership acquired in one country 
to successors in other countries. Under all the laws men-
tioned, the right to reimbursement ought to be conceived 
as a proprietary right exercisable as a defense. 
2. Defective Acts 
If an acquisition was attempted in X but failed to be 
effective through absence of a required element, the de-
ficiency cannot be cured merely by removal of the chattel to 
another territory. 
Illustrations. (i) To vary a well-known American case/6 
a diamond entrusted to a broker in New Jersey and there 
pledged by the latter to an innocent purchaser, is not effec-
tively pledged. The result is not changed if the stone is 
brought to New York, under whose Factors' Act an in-
nocent pledgee prevails over the owner. 
(ii) In the old English case of Inglis v. Usherwood, 11 
delivery on board a chartered ship in the port of lading, 
Petersburg, under English law would have been equivalent 
to delivery to the English buyer. But under the Russian 
lex situs, the transfer was cancelled by repossession of the 
goods in the port. The English court recognized this after 
the goods had been landed in England. 
16 Charles T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke (1929) ros N.J. Law 470, 144 
At!. 617, LoRENZEN, Cases (ed. 4) 6r6, mistakenly decided the case by ex-
tending New York law to a pledge in New Jersey, cf., 38 Yale L.J. ( 1929) 
988; STUMBilRG (ed. 2) 394; GoODRICH (ed. 3) 477· 
17 ( r8ox) I East 515. 
PROPERTY 
(iii) Acquisition in Berlin of securities to bearer by a 
banker operating as commission agent made him the owner, 
although under the law of Hanover the principal domiciled 
there would have directly acquired title.18 
By consequence, mere removal to another state also does 
not help the creditors of the acquirer. 
The scope of this rule, however, will be better tested in 
connection with the effects of the new lex situs. 
3· Events in the Second Territory 
The law of the second situs, state Y, determines the effect 
of new events, such as a sale, a pledge, adverse possession, 
seizure, and legalliens.19 
Illustrations. (i) In the English leading case of Gammell 
v. Sewell 20 the title acquired by sale of the cargo on board 
a Russian ship by the master in a Norwegian port, the 
actual situs, was sufficient to defeat the English owners, 
suing for conversion, although the sale would not have 
been valid in England. 
( ii) Horses were sold by a conditional sale in Hesse, 
under German common law, and validly acquired by an 
innocent purchaser while situated in Prussia.21 Instruments 
to bearer, stolen in Germany, were sold at the London stock 
exchange and validly acquired by English law.22 Most 
American courts decide in the same manner. 23 
(iii) Under Austrian law the cars of an Austrian rail-
road were included in a mortgage (immobilized, "hypothe-
cated"), but while, in Bavaria, unless such mortgage was 
recorded, they could be seized as independent movables, 
18 RG. (Feb. 15, 1884} II RGZ. 52. 
19 Switzerland: BG. (June 26, 1912) 38 BGE. II 194, 198: lien of the 
Swiss carrier on goods sent from London and Brussels. 
2° Cammell v. Sewell (186o) s H. & N. 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371. 
21 OLG. Frankfurt (Julys, 1890) 4 Z. int. R. ( 1894} 148. 
22 RG. (Oct. 6, 1897) JW. 1897, 573· 
23 See infra. 
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subject only to rights of pledge.24 Seizure by a creditor was 
therefore allowed. 
An example of a special situation has been furnished by 
the persistence of the common law hostility against secu-
rity arrangements where the creditor is deprived of posses-
sion. Thus, a horse was mortgaged in Maryland by re-
cordation without delivery of possession, third persons 
being charged with knowledge of the incumbrance. But 
brought to Pennsylvania, the horse was acquired by a bona 
fide purchaser, because under the law of this state chattel 
mortgages were ineffective against third persons. 25 Con-
versely, title was retained in a conditional sale in Pennsyl-
vania of a safe and valid only between the parties. But 
when the safe was subsequently removed to New Jersey, 
under the law of the new situs, the title of the owner be-
came superior to the right of a thereafter attaching creditor 
of the buyer.26 The creditor's objection in this case is 
interesting, as it seems theoretically well to describe the 
plaintiff's title as originating in Pennsylvania in the char-
acter of a right too weak to resist a judgment and execution 
or claims of other new acquisitions. But the court replied 
elegantly; also under this original law the buyer had no 
right to sell and make title to a purchaser under all cir-
cumstances. In fact, acquisition of rights defeating the 
reserved title depended on the lex situs of the time of 
acquisition, that is, New Jersey law. The law of Pennsyl-
vania subsequently has become the same, although under 
the Uniform Act conditional sales and under a special 
24 Bay. ObLG. (Nov. n, z882) 38 Seuff. Arch. 213; analogous Ober-
app. Ger. Koln (Jan. 4, z834) 19 Rhein. Arch. 234, see RoBERTSON, Character-
ization 2n; OLG. Karlsruhe (Dec. 12, 1892) 25 Puchelt's Z. franros. Civil-
recht 46: cabs "immobilized" and mortgaged in Basle, validly seized in 
Baden by the owner's creditor. 
25 MacCabe v. Blymyre ( 1872) 9 Phila. 6zs. 
26 Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton ( z886) 48 N.J. Law 410, 7 At!. 418. 
Similarly about a bailment Cooper v. Phil. Worsted Co. (1905) 68 N. J. 
Eq. 622, 6o At!. 352 (under different name). 
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act 27 chattel mortgages were effective when recorded in 
the state, and therefore the courts no longer consider chattel 
mortgages repugnant to the domestic public policy.28 
An excellent exception to the effect of the second situs 
has been established in various American cases. When a 
chattel is removed to another jurisdiction by force or fraud 
in favor of a creditor so that he may attach the chattel at 
the new location, this situs is disregarded and jurisdiction 
denied.29 The Ontario court similarly has released a seizure 
obtained by a creditor who cunningly induced a friend to 
bring a boat from the Detroit side of the bordering river 
to Windsor. 30 
It does not seem, however, to be a basic idea of the 
American decisions that consent of the owner to a removal, 
as such, exposes him to the effect of disposals by other per-
sons in another state. This would amount to a waiver 
where no such intention can be presumed.31 What the 
courts in increasing cases have done, is to stigmatize wrong-
ful removals, assuredly also in pursuance of the common 
law attitude protecting titles. This current is openly dis-
played when recordation in Y is omitted (infra, III, 4). 
4· Incomplete Legal Situations 
More controversy is encountered in the cases where an 
act in X has not ripened either to failure or to success. 
27 Act of July 15, 1936, First Ex. Sess. P.L. 47 (21 P.S. § 842). 
28 Kephart, J., in McCurdy's Est. (1931) 303 Pa. 453, 154 At!. 707; 
Baldridge, J., in Personal Finance Comp. of New York v. General Finance 
Co. ( 1938) 133 Pa. Super. Ct. 582, 587. ' 
29 Timmons v. Garrison (Tenn. 1843) 4 Humph. 148; Deyo v. Jennison 
(Mass. r865) ro Allen 410; Sea-Gate Tire & Rubber Co. v. Moseley ( 1933) 
161 Okla. 256, r8 Pac. (2d) 276 (all dealing with deceit); cf., the English 
decision Hooper v. Gumm (r867) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 282, concealment of the 
mortgage by the mortgagee. 
3 ° Canada: Houghton v. May (1910) 22 Ont. L. R. 434, aff'd 23 id. 252. 
31 But GooDRICH (ed. 3) 483, 487 f., criticizing the role given to the consent, 
and also MORRIS, 22 Br. Y. Int. L. 245, expound different points of view. 
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The most discussed instance is sale and dispatch of goods 
from a country, where delivery is required to pass the title 
-Argentina, Germany, Switzerland-to another jurisdic-
tion considering consent sufficient to do so-United States, 
France, Italy. Does title pass on the border? Before the 
first World War, German shippers sent goods to English 
buyers, and the goods arrived in England but, whether lost 
or seized, were never received by the consignees. Had the 
title passed? Two opposite opinions have been advanced. 
(a) Since the requirements for transfer of ownership 
are unfulfilled so long as the goods are in territory X, the 
seller remains the owner until in Y a new act, such as an 
agreement or adverse possession, complying with the law 
of Y, transfers the title, without regard to what happened 
in X.32 For adherents of the vested rights theory, it is 
obvious that no such right existed in X. 
The Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal gave this 
logically indisputable conclusion an unnatural twist in con-
tending that the intention of transfer required by the Eng-
lish Sales of Goods Act was missing, because German mer-
chants had contrary intentions suggested by the German 
code. 83 This is a fictitious assumption of an intention, ex-
tending German legal conceptions of property questions to 
English territory, whereas the merchant mind is notoriously 
indifferent to these questions.34 
(b) In the contrary view, the facts existing at the 
moment when the situs changes are evaluated under the 
3 2 BAR TIN, 3 Princi pes 2 33 ; DESBOIS, CJ unet I 93 I, 309 at 3 I 5 requires 
that the title must be based on the lex situs as of the time of its alleged 
acquisition; NIBOYET, 9 Repert. 23I, Nr. 57; I04 Traite 374 (requiring a new 
sale in France) ; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 390. 
33 E. Liittges & Co. v. Ormiston & Glass, Ltd. ( I926) 6 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 564; Biisse v. British Manufacturing Stationery Co. (I927) 7 id. 345· 
34 RABEL AND RAISER, 3 Z. ausl. PR. (I929) 62, 67; RAAPE, IPR. 38I, 
394 n. 36. An anticritique by HELLENDALL, "Res in Transitu, etc.," I7 Can. 
Bar Rev. (1939) 7 at 17 misses the point. 
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new law. 35 A sales contract and goods dispatched in Ger-
many, at the moment when the goods cross the frontier to 
France become sufficient operating facts to exercise the 
3ame effect as if they had occurred in France or England.86 
:-Iowever, the j~stification of this result varies somewhat.37 
Either the rule of article 2279: En fait de meubles, posses-
sion vaut titre, is interpreted as protecting the transaction 
between the possessor and a purchaser in good faith; this 
transaction is construed from the facts that took place 
abroad. Or the great principle of article 2279 is under-
stood broadly to protect possession as such, rather than 
the transaction, against the claim of ownership; hence the 
buyer, as soon as he possesses through the railway or the 
forwarding agent, acquires title. 
Conforming to the latter variant, when a chattel is in-
nocently purchased from a nonowner in England where no 
title is acquired, and thereafter imported into France, the 
purchaser may now enjoy the French usucapion of three 
years (article 2279 paragraph 2) .88 It seems surprising 
that article 2279 should operate without regard to article 
IIJ8. But it does have its peculiar history.89 Yet re-
specting conflicts law, both opinions are inexact, because the 
entire question is exclusively concerned with the municipal 
35 OLG. Zweibriicken (July 13, 1898) xo Z. int. R. 220, S. 1901-4·25; RG. 
(May 7, x88o) x RGZ. 415; 2 ZITELMANN 337· 
36 DIENA, Diritti Reali 175 ff.; 2 FIORE § 818 j 4 WEISS 212 j 8 LYON-CAEN 
ET RENAULT § 1291 j see cases in NIBOYET, Acquisition 397 ff. j and id. 9 
Repert. 230 §§ 49, 51 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 69. 
37 LEWALD 187, § 248; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 3) 393 f. (apparently in contrast 
top. 381) j BATIFFOL, Traite 5II n. I. 
38 Cass. civ. (March 141 1939) S. I939•I.I82 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
§ 355i SURVILLE § 174; BATIFFOL, Traite 510. 
39 See the valuable study by WALTER MERK, "Die Entwicklung der 
Fahrnisverfolgung im franziisischen Recht," 7 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil. u. Prozess-
recht ( 1914) 81, 173, at 218 ff. 
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law of the new situs.40 In conflicts law, the second situs 
has to work with its own system and with the facts occurring 
during its own reign. True, it must not be required that 
all party declarations should be faithfully recited on the 
territory of Y as if a void sales contract were to be cured. 
We understand well what the parties intend. But as the 
ways of the law go, this continued intention ought to be 
in some manner manifested. Receipt by the buyer's for-
warding agent or by the railway, if considered the buyer's 
agent, suffice for this purpose.41 
II. LocAL PuBLIC PoLicY 
r. NewYork 
While we shall have to note remarkable exceptions ac-
corded by American courts to foreign-created security in-
terests (infra III), exceptional favor has been shown 
sporadically to the law of the forum. In litigation between 
citizens of New York, the New York Court of Appeals 
has restored property rights when chattels were removed 
from the forum without the owner's consent and the rights 
were lost abroad under the foreign law.42 
In Edgerly v. Bush/8 two horses were mortgaged in 
New York State, then taken by the mortgagor to Quebec 
and sold by a trader to a bona fide purchaser who, as the 
4° Contra: BATIFFOL, Traite §§ sos, so6, who bases his position on his 
theory that our problem should be solved in analogy to a (questionable) in-
tertemporal doctrine distinguishing between the regime of subjective rights 
(which is the new statute) and the procedure of acquiring these rights 
(governed by the old statute). Cf. infra n. 53· 
41 RABEL-RAISER, 3 z. ausl. PR. 67; in this conclusion followed by 
HELLENDALL, supra n. 34 at 18. 
42 BEALE, "Jurisdiction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel," 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. ( 1927) 8os against the Edgerly case. Note, "Jurisdiction over Mov-
able Property Brought into a State Without the Owner's Consent," 24 Harv. 
L. Rev. ( 1911) 567. 
48 Edgerly v. Bush (r88o) 81 N.Y. 199. 
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court understood it, 44 acquired title according to Quebec 
law. When the horses were sold another time to the 
defendant, a resident of New York, but remained in 
Canada, the mortgagee sued with success for conversion. 
The court recognized that the defendant acquired title in 
Canada although he knew of the mortgage, but as the 
property was taken out without the consent of the plain-
tiff, the foreign rule was overcome by the domestic policy. 
Wylie v. Speyer 45 was suggested by the preceding decision. 
Railway bonds were stolen from the plaintiff's New York 
bank deposit; coupons from them were bought after matu-
rity validly at a German stock exchange by the bank of 
Speyer & Co., who sent them to their New York affiliate 
for collection. Under New York law the coupons, acquired 
after maturity, were ordinary property to which the court 
declared the law of the forum applicable as against the 
former German lex situs. 
The arguments employed in the two decisions have been 
refuted by Beale and Goodrich.46 The first decision was 
the more shocking as the chattels had remained outside 
New York and even in the very jurisdiction in which the 
recognized acquisition had occurred. The Restatement has 
refrained from formulating a general preference of older 
rights in case of removal without the consent of the entitled 
person, although it adopted such rules in favor of chattel 
mortgage and conditional sale.47 But it apparently dis-
courages the state into which the chattel is brought without 
44 Wrongly, see Quebec C.C. art. 1489 and FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of 
Laws 381 n. (f). 
45 Wylie v. Speyer (N.Y. 1881) 62 How. Pr. 107. GoODRICH (ed. 3) 
479, n. 102 observes that in both cases the court maintained the domiciliary 
law of the owner and did not mention the removal without the consent of 
the owner. 
46 GoODRICH supra n. 45· 
47 Restatement§§ 268, 275. 
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the consent of the owner from taking "jurisdiction," 48 
which is a very strange idea. 
Neither in England nor Canada, nor in any civilian coun-
try, have such unprincipled singularities been known.49 It 
seems promising that these decisions have not been fol-
lowed, although the New York court has not yet clearly 
abandoned its special favor for its domiciliaries. What 
would become of the universal rules, included in the lex 
situs, if every court were to protect only its own citizens, 
flouting rights acquired abroad? 
2. France 
A law of 1872 bars the acqutsttwn of lost or "stolen" 
instruments to bearer, registered in a "bulletin des opposi-
tions," under the assumption that the mere fact of publi-
cation in the bulletin destroys any purchaser's good faith. 
The courts have applied this exclusion of bona fide purchase 
in the widest sphere, even to foreign-created securities and 
to foreign thefts or losses. Registered instruments are 
therefore always recoverable in France, irrespective of any 
interest created abroad at a temporary situs. 5° 
This ruthless practice, fully inconsistent with the cher-
ished doctrine of vested rights, has been analyzed and 
severely criticized in the older French literature and in 
other countries.51 Present French writers tend to excuse 
this defiance of international order as a legitimate exercise 
48 Restatement § 49, Caveat and Comment to Caveat. 
49 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 384 f. 
5° French Laws of June IS, I87z, Feb. 8, I90Z, March 8, I9IZ, and special 
laws concerning losses during the wars. Banknotes and French governmental 
securities, excepting railway bonds, are excluded (art. I6). The bar to circu-
lation does not affect separate coupons of interest or dividend (art. z par. 7, 
of I872). 
51 LYON-CAEN, I9 Annuaire Inst. Int. Law ( I902) I 59; PILLET, I Traite 
778 § 375 and Principes 564 § 3I4i DuDEN, "Der Rechtserwerb vom Nicht-
berechtigten," 8 Beitr. Ausl. PR. 92 ff. and in 8 Z. ausl. PR. (1934) 642. 
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of territorial power.52 After several other lame explana-
tions, a distinguished author asserts that the intertemporal 
principles serve as analogy and that the question is one of 
domestic rather than of conflicts law.58 I must disagree 
on both counts. It is certainly a conflicts problem whether 
foreign-acquired rights are to be enforced against domestic 
interests; and respect for an intervening foreign law may be 
due even though an analogous new domestic regulation was 
and ought to be deprived of retroactive force. 
In Germany 54 and Switzerland/5 the courts have stated 
that a banker acts with gross negligence if he fails to or-
ganize and supervise a continuous and exact list of lost or 
stolen securities notified by the police or other authorities. 
But for international needs it is not helpful to dictate to 
the world. What is required is a reliable network of inter-
national notification. Although at present bank deposits 
and safes operate as preventives of theft, an international 
convention for co-operation is recommendable. 
III. SECURITY INTERESTS 56 
The American courts agree with the civil law doctrine on 
the principles described above, but have developed some 
special rules respecting conditional sales and chattel mort-
gages. This requires a discussion of the security interests 
in tangibles, in which we include all legal forms of trans-
actions intended to procure security to a creditor for satis-
faction of his claim by providing him with a true real right 
in a tangible movable thing. 
The transactions creating such rights also comprise obliga-
52 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 432. 
53 BATIFFOL, Traite 512, cf. supra n. 40. 
54 37 RGZ. 71; 41 id. 207; 28 id. 109. 
65 BG. (Nov. 24, 1899) 25 BGE. II 840, 846 f.; Trib. com. Bern (Sept. 
17, 1946) 83 ZBJV. ( 1947) 79· 
56 See supra Ch. 55, III. 
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tions and are connected with procedural steps. N everthe-
less, primary importance prevailingly attaches to the meas-
ure of recognition a security enjoys at a new situs as re-
spects attaching creditors and bona fide purchasers. 
Using the American statutory terminology, 57 we may 
speak of "creditor" and "debtor" to indicate generally the 
parties to a security agreement. 
The fact that in American law no certain line divides 
mortgages and pledges from privileges in execution and 
therefore "title" and "lien" doctrines are in strife, has 
increased the uncertainty in this field. The draft of a 
Uniform Commercial Code-"Secured Transactions"-
claims to be independent of this controversy. Whether or 
not this draft deals exclusively with true "interests in 
goods," these must be here our primary object. The so-
called liens, hence, are included, if under the competent 
law they are real rights. But this restriction does not seem 
very important respecting liens created in the United States. 
Here it may be assumed that liens are presumptively real 
interests. 
At the outset, it should be remembered that under all 
circumstances a security interest must have been validly cre-
ated under its lex situs of the time.58 Reservation of title 
in Louisiana, 59 or if not recorded in Switzerland, 60 is void; 
hence, the buyer's title is considered absolute also after re-
moval to another jurisdiction.61 Moreover, it may be im-
portant whether in the state where it is originally created, 
e.g., a conditional sale protects the seller against bona fide 
57 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 58. The Draft, Uniform Commercial 
Code, 9-105 ss. 1, d. i, etc., speaks of "secured party" and "debtor." 
58 Restatement§§ 272, z8o, comments. See supra 70 ff. 
59 Motors Securities Co. v. Duck ( 1939) 198 Ark. 647, 130 S.W. (zd) 3· 
60 Swiss C. C. art. 715; cf. infra n. 89. 
61 A different theory once obtained in Germany with respect to a pro-
hibition by the Jaw of Oldenburg, RG. (Feb. z8, 1893) JW. 1893, 207; (July 
7, 1899) id. 1899, 581. 
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purchasers or an execution creditor (as in the great ma-
jority of American states) or not (as in Illinois 62 ) • 
1. Normal Principles 
A validly established interest persists despite any change 
of situs, but the new situs governs new acquisitions by 
third persons, detrimental to that interest. A purchaser in 
good faith or (in the Romanistic tradition) a buyer at 
a public auction, if protected by the property law of Y, 
prevails over the creditor invoking the law of X, according 
to universal conflicts law. As a rule, in Continental laws 
attaching creditors of the debtor or purchasers in bad faith 
have no more rights than the debtor; the prior creditor's 
real right is superior.63 However, state Y may accord 
priority to certain liens acquired at the new situs over the 
old title. 64 
Thus, in civil law jurisdictions, state Y applies its own 
rules on the acquisition of real rights on its own territory. 
If these rules confer on a bona fide purchaser a title free 
from previous charges, a foreign security interest perishes 
exactly like a domestic one. 65 
At common law, the general conflicts rule leaves state Y 
equally free to determine priority, 66 but in the American 
courts conflicts law and municipal law are mingled through 
an interpretation of the internal statutes, which produces 
62 Western Union Cold Storage Co. v. Banker's National Bank ( 1898) 
176 Ill. z6o, sz N.E. 30. 
63 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 405. 
64 E.g., Universal Credit Co. v. Marks (Md. 1932) 163 Atl. 810, cf., 87 
A.L.R. at 1312. 
65 Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (July s, 1890) 4 Z. int. R. (1894) 148 
(horses sold conditionally in Hesse, but sold in Prussia; the bona fide pur-
chaser wins). 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 8, 1930) W. IZISO, aff'd., HR. 
(March 27, 1931) W. I23II, N.J. 1931, 701 (instruments mortgaged in Hol-
land but sold abroad, foreign purchaser wins). 
66 Restatement §§ 269, 276; MoRRIS, 22 B.Y. Int. L. at 238 ff. 
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varying results. Two currents have been in opposition. It 
is the "traditional policy of the common law to protect 
the owner rather than the innocent purchaser." 67 Hence, 
sometimes we find attaching creditors of the buyer-who 
enjoy publicity rights-and bona fide purchasers, despite 
the property law of Y, subordinated to the foreign-created 
security right. 68 On the other hand, there exists authority 
to the effect that an attaching creditor is preferred over a 
vendor, bailor, conditional vendor, or mortgagee, if the law 
of the situs of the chattel at the time so provides.69 
In view of the prevailing confusion, it should be remem-
bered that all these tendencies are to be regarded as excep-
tions to the rule that (I) the law of X creating a security 
interest is respected in Y, subject to the extent that (2) new 
events exercise their influence according to the general law of 
property of Y. To stress this rule is important, if for no 
other reason, because decisions in Y conforming to this 
rule are assured interstate and international force. Not 
every fancy solution of a court of Y would be entitled to 
recognition, and we know of retaliation even in an Ameri-
can sister state.70 
61 FALCONBRIDGI!1 Confiict of Laws 383. 
68 This seems to be the basis of the doctrine respecting removal without 
consent, infra sub 4· But Olivier v. Townes (La. I824) 2 Mart. N.S. (La.) 
93 is no support, as Stumberg (ed. I) 3S9, 36I seems to think. The Louisiana 
court failed to recognize the sale of a ship on the high seas which was cor-
rectly perfected without delivery, because the court unjustifiedly applied 
Louisiana property law. It did not decide that Louisiana creditors have 
precedence over foreign vested rights. 
69 STUMBERG (ed. I) 36I, black letters. The text of ed. 2 has been changed 
at page 393 to make clear that this is a minority view. For a more detailed 
survey, see STUMBI!RG, "Chattel Security Transactions and the Conllict of 
Laws," 27 Iowa L. Rev. ( I942) S28. 
70 Retaliating against the former rule of Texas (infra n. 81), Union 
Securities Co. v. Adams ( 192S) 33 Wyo. 4S1 236 Pac. SI3, so A.L.R. 23; 
Forgan v. Bainbridge (1928) 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. ISS much criticized, 
see GoODRICH (ed. 3) 487 § IS8. Contra, Arkansas, Hinton v. Bond Discount 
Co. ( 1949) 214 Ark. 718, 218 S.W. (2d) 7S refused to retaliate, as also New 
Mexico and Louisiana. See 13 A.L.R. (2d) at 1319· 
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Approaching the restrictions on the two parts of this 
rule, the first objection to the extraterritorial effect of the 
interest conferred by X may be based on disapproval in 
Y of the law of X. 
2. Public Policy 
Foreign security rights have been disregarded because 
their creation under the law of X did not comply with the 
publicity requirements of Y. Thus, recognition has been 
denied to mortgaging 11 or retaining of title 72 without sur-
render of physical possession to the mortgagee or a third 
person. Also, the new situs has been said to reject a rule 
of X that the pledgee retains his right when he loses pos-
session against his will.73 General legal hypothecs of the 
former German common law and of French law have been 
refused enforcement in other territories where mortgages 
must be charged upon specific objects.14 Emphasis in such 
decisions is due to a strongly felt public policy rather than 
to the mere lex situs, which in itself must not defeat the 
foreign-created right.75 
It so happens, by the inscrutable wisdom of national law-
making, that Louisiana rejects conditional sales executed 
71 England: Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter (I867) L.R. 4 Eq. 
S2, ( I868) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 479 H.L.: English mortgages on a ship in-
effective in Louisiana. 
France: Cass. req. (March I9, I872) D. I874.J.465, S. I872.I.238; (May 
24, I933) Rev. Crit. ( I934) I42. 
Austria: A.BGB. §§ 45I, 452. 
72 Germany before the Civil Code: RG. (Nov. 25, I895) 6 Z. int. R. 
424; OLG. Braunschweig (Sept. 20, I894) ibid. 5IO. 
73 French C.C. art. 2076 extinguishes a pledge in every case where the 
creditor loses the pledge; German C.C. § I253 par. I only where the creditor 
voluntarily returns it. 
74 Oberapp. Ger. Jena (July 7, I853) I6 Seuff Arch. I; Prussia: Ob. Trib. 
(April 8, I875) 3I id. 257 No. I94· 
75 I WHARTON 709, § 3I7 b. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 28, I893) JW. I893, 207, 3 Z. int. R. 622. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Maastricht (June 26, I930) W. I2354, N.J. I93I1 8. 
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in the forum 76-seller's credit-but the Supreme Court 
and recent legislation permit chattel mortgages-banker's 
credit-while Switzerland after much struggle has admitted 
reservation of title under recording, but strictly disapproves 
of trust receipts ("Sicherungs-lJbereignung"), though re-
cently with weakening vigor. 77 
Under no policy should a court deny recognition in prin-
ciple to a foreign incumbrance on movables brought to the 
forum, merely because the type is alien to the domestic law, 
as has occurred in a few American decisions.78 
3. Recording 
The precarious legal situation of a chattel on which a 
mortgage or a vendor's title has been validly constituted, 
is intended to be stabilized by the machinery of public re-
cording. This protection, of course, ought to cease when 
a dealer, especially of an automobile, is permitted by his 
mortgagee or conditional seller, to resell. The American 
courts try to cope with this complication, either by assum-
ing that in such case recording of the reserved right is not 
constructive notice to a purchaser for value or its effect is 
counteracted by estoppel or waiver. 79 In other cases, diffi-
culties arise where recordation is required at the new situs 
76 Louisiana: Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co. (1908) 
121 La. I 5z, 46 So. I93· Conditional sales executed in other states are recog-
nized; see Note 13 A.L.R. (zd) 13:15. A similar tendency is ascribed to 
the Supreme Court of Colorado by MAcDONALD, "Enforcement of Foreign 
Conditional Sales in Colorado," 6 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. ( 1934) 221, 222. 
77 Switzerland: The Federal Tribunal has recently-BG. (July 5, 1946) 
72 BGE. II 235, 35, Praxis 1946, No. 146-made it clear that a fiduciary 
transfer to a creditor, well-known also in that country, is a good title for 
ownership, and what it objects to is merely transfer without real surrender of 
possession, or, perhaps even merely transfer by constitutum possessorium, as 
GUHL, 183, Z. Bern J.V. 489 suggests; see also 0FTINGER, Zurcher Komm. 
Abt. IV (1952) 2(c). 
78 See 2 BEALE § 273.1 n. 3· 
79 See 136 A.L.R. ( 194:1) 821, under III discussing the effect on creditors 
of the dealer. 
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but the creditor does not comply with the formalities. In 
the strictest view, the situs applies its ordinary requirement 
to all chattels situated in the forum irrespective of their 
original location.80 In the United States formerly the 
courts of Texas drew this consequence,81 and other states, 
notably Colorado,82 showed or show an analogous atti-
tude 83 which, once, was eloquently expounded by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.84 Statutes in in-
creasing number expressly announce that all chattels 
brought into the state must be recorded to preserve previ-
ous security titles.85 Since a French law of 1934, automo-
biles must be registered in France with their foreign-created 
8 0 This is also the effect of not utilizing the very strong protection afforded 
by registration in Peru L. 6565 of March IZ, 1929, on which see DELGADO, 
Compendio ( 1938) 41. 
81 Texas: Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers (1921) III Tex. 293, 
231 S.W. 1072, 1074 (conditional sale, Cal.); Farmer v. Evans (1921) III 
Tex. 283, 233 S.W. 101 (chattel mortgage, Okla.). But contrary, exempting 
foreign executed and recorded mortgage liens from the Texan Certificate 
of Title Law: Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz (Tex., Sup. Ct. 1950) 226 S.W. 
(2d) 843· 
82 Colorado: Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee ( 1933) 92 Colo. 346, 20 
Pac. (2d) 543 (domestic attaching creditor preferred over a Californian 
conditional vendor); American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Hall Cadillac Co. 
(1935) 93 Colo. 186, 24 Pac. (:zd) 98o; Castle v. Commercial Investment 
Trust Corp. ( 1937) 100 Colo. 191, 66 Pac. (2d) 804 (local buyer against for-
eign conditional vendor). See MAcDoNALD, Conditional Sales, 6 Rocky Mt. L. 
Rev. ( 1934) :z:z1. 
88 Alabama: Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley & Koonce (1914) 187 Ala. 533· 
Maryland: Universal Credit Co. v. Marks (1932) 164 Md. 130, 163 At!. 
8Io (conditional sales). 
Mississippi: Patterson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. (Miss. 1948) 37 
So. (2d) 306. 
84 Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works ( 1876) 93 U.S. 664, 
LORENZEN, Cases 685. 
85 13 A.L.R. (:zd) 1320; 1341 adding Kentucky, North Carolina and West 
Virginia. On New Mexico Law 1947, see Cheatham Cases ( 1951) 613 n. 2. 
These statutes oppose the inclination of many courts to exempt conditional 
sellers' rights from the duty of recording; see HoNNOLD, Cases and Materials 
on Sales and Sales Financing (1954) 408. 
But see despite the Michigan Statute Comp. L. 1948 § 566, 140, St. Ann. (1953) 
§ :z6929, the majority in Metro-Plan v. Kotcher-Turner Inc. (1941) 296 
Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304. 
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pledges or title conditions, lest they be considered free of 
charges.86 
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, however, allows ten 
days after the entry of the chattel in Y for recording of the 
rights acquired in X.87 When this period elapses, subse-
quent recording still provides priority over later charges.88 
The Swiss view is similar. A reservation of title 
(Eigentumsvorbehalt) must be recorded at the domicil of 
the purchaser and is maintained in case the latter changes 
his domicil, only if recorded again at the new place.89 No 
such delay is actually granted in case the object is imported 
by a Swiss purchaser. Thus, a conditional sale made in 
Germany informally, under German law, is ineffective as 
soon as the car enters Switzerland. It has been said that 
if the movable returns to Germany, the reserved title re-
vives, although conflicting interests created in the meantime 
enjoy priority.90 This would be an unwarranted breach of 
principle. The efficacy of the lex situs should not be split 
and limited to territorial effects. 
In all these cases, the right of the debtor is deemed ab-
86 Law of December 29, 1934, D. 1936.4.898; NIBOYET, Rev. crit. 1935, 
545 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 5) 467 § 355 n. I. If a chattel mortgage 
registered in France is lost abroad to a purchaser in good faith, it does not 
revive according to the just opinion of NIBOYET, I.e.; Contra, LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE, I.e. (note omitted in ed. 6), followed by BATIFFOL, Traite su 
par. 505 n. 2. 
87 Sec. 14; ef., BOGERT, 2a U.L.A. 129. 
88 Bent v. H.W. Weaver, Inc. (1928) 106 W. Va. 164, 145 S.E. 594i 
White v. E.C. McKallor Drug Co. ( 1933) 239 App. Div. 210, 268 N.Y.S. 371. 
89 Swiss C.C. art. 715; BG. (Jan. 21, 1910) 36 BGE. II 1; (March 30, 
1916) 42 BGE. III 173; App. Bern (Dec. 12, 1913) so ZBJV. s6o. 
Liechtenstein: C. C., Property, art. 175. 
90 BATIFFOL, Traite 5 II n. 2 j 2 SCHNITZER { ed. 3) 520. By an analogous 
conclusion, in case of an automobile, hypothecs registered in France under 
the law of Dec. 29, 1934, are said to have precedence over pledges sub-
sequently created abroad if the car returns to France; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
(ed. 5) 467 n. 1. Contra, M. WoLFF, Sachenrecht § 159, in case a product of 
a land included in a hypothec in X is removed to Y where it becomes free 
from the incumbrance; it remains so when returning to Y. 
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solute for the benefit of new purchasers and attaching 
creditors. 91 
Interesting American decisions except a chattel, mort-
gaged 92 or bought under conditional sale, 93 from the re-
quirement of recordation if it is only temporarily present in 
the forum. One might say, the chattel is treated as a res 
in transitu. But a much more intensive exception to all 
these systems exists in the United States in the following 
case. 
4· Removal Without the Creditor's Consent 
Outside of the United States, no example is known in 
which the domestic formalities of Y for security interests 
are differently construed for domestic and foreign-created 
security interests. 94 This, however, happens in the great 
majority of American courts, and has been proclaimed by 
the Restatement and a few statutes. If the removal 
to Y is wrongful against the creditor, he maintains his 
rights even without the prescribed registration in Y.95 If 
the creditor has consented to the removal, in the prevailing 
opinion, the new lex situs exercises its normal effect, that 
91 Supra n. 61. 
92 Flora v. Julesburg ( 1920) 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545; as noted supra 
n. 76, MAcDONALD observes that the Colorado Court favors chattel mortgages, 
in contrast to reservation of title. 
93 Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Walters ( 1949) 230 N.C. 443, 53 S.E. 
(2d) 520, 10 A.L.R. (2d) 758. See 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1346. 
94 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 384 f. 
95 Edgerly v. Bush ( 188o) 81 N.Y. 199; Restatement §§ 268, comment c, 
275; Mich. Comp. Stat. 1948, § 566, 14oa; Virginia Code 1950, § 55-99; 
GoODRICH§ 157; Note, 87 A.L.R. 1314; 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1318. BEALE, "Juris-
diction over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel," 40 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1927) 
8os, and the Restatement, Caveat to §49 and Comment, even assert that under 
common law a state does not exercise jurisdiction over a chattel brought into 
the state without the consent of the owner. See contra Note, 37 Yale L.J. 
(1928) 966, and cf., Note, 41 Harv. L. Rev. (1928) 779; WATSON, 7 Tul. L. 
Rev. (1933) 451, 452; GoODRICH§ 156; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 381. 
For Louisiana see DAINOW, 13 La. L. Rev. (1953) at 235· 
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is, "any dealings with the chattel in the second state" 96 
create the same effect as under domestic law. A small 
group of abnormal decisions destroying the interest in the 
case of consent to removal is erroneous. 97 Consent could 
have such effect only if it were a waiver. 
The highest New York court has invoked common law 
against its own statutory provision for registration.98 An 
automobile was bought in California, brought without the 
consent of the seller to New York, and sold there to an in-
nocent purchaser. The court explained that in California 
the seller still had a right superior to a subsequent bona 
fide purchaser from the buyer, and that this law agreed 
with the New York common law. Conforming to the 
ancient rules of narrow statutory construction, the court 
restricted the recording statute so as not to affect common 
law and the right acquired in California. This was based 
on the text of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, but the 
futility of the reasoning makes it clear that the traditional 
superiority of the legitimate owner is favored, although 
the result is directly opposed to the abnormal preference 
for domiciliaries of New York. 
The American exceptional favor for foreign-created con-
ditional titles and mortgages is unique. It seems to me that 
it belongs to the considerable group of tolerance rules aris-
ing in the American interstate sphere ;99 as such it is a re-
markable phenomenon. So long as no uniform law for the 
nation organizes a reasonable system of measures by which 
a creditor can safeguard himself with ordinary diligence, 
the courts are anxious to protect legitimate credit against 
96 Restatement §§ .z69, 276. 
97 GoODRICH (ed. 3) 483. Cf. supra n. 31. 
98 Lehman, J., in Goetschius v. Brightman ( 1927) 245 N.Y. 186, 156 N.E. 
66o. 
99 See Vol. I, 340 (married women's capacity); II, 412, 427 (usury), 565 
(Sunday contracts), III, 177 (liquor sales). 
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dishonest frustration unknown to the creditor. Their 
remedy, however, endangers quite similarly legitimate 
interests of other persons dealing in good faith and unable 
to guess the origin of the transferor's possession. That 
they may believe themselves well protected by the recording 
statute of the forum makes the legislative situation still 
worse. 
5. The Concept of the First Situs 
In a line of American decisions, the principles are modi-
fied by submitting a conditional sale not to the lex situs of 
the goods at the time of the contract but to the law of the 
place whereto the parties intend the goods to be sent by 
the seller. The alleged reason is ordinarily that the trans-
action is not completed until delivery/00 by analogy to the 
theory of the last act completing a contract and fixing the 
place of contracting.101 But the conditional agreement oc-
curs while the goods are not yet delivered; delivery, on 
the other hand, does not transfer the title until payment. 
Any analogy to the unfortunate theory of the last act is 
thereby excluded. 
However, a court tending to confuse in the conflicts field 
property and contracts theories and mingling lex situs and 
lex contractus, approaches nevertheless the correct result 
when it identifies delivery to the carrier in X for shipment 
to Y with "performance" and applies the law of X as the 
state of both contracting and performance.102 The situs 
100 See z BEALE 1002 n. 4· 
101 Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher {1895) 57 N.J. Law 490, 31 Ad. 
306; GooDRICH 484-
102 E.g., Marvin Safe Comp. v. Joshua Norton {1886) supra n. z6, at 
48 N.J. Law 415. The problem of stating at what phase a conditional sales 
contract is "executed" is serious, for instance, in the case of bankruptcy or 
insolvency of either party, a question much discussed in Germany. See RiiHL, 
"Die Vergleichsordnung und der Verkauf unter Eigentumsvorbehalt," 56 
Zeitschr. f. Deutschen Zivilprozess (1931) 154, who found no help in foreign 
laws, p. 165. 
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of the thing at the time of the contract should simply be 
respected, without opportunistic exceptions. 
It is true that Stumberg has suggested that the place 
where the chattel in the contemplation of the parties is to 
be habitually used, should be considered the most sub-
stantial connection of both obligation and security.103 This, 
however, is an unnecessary exception to the settled signifi-
cance of the situs, substituting to a certain territorial place 
an uncertain place dependent on party intention. 
American legislation. Evidently conflicts law has very 
inadequately dealt with the problems of credit by sellers 
and bankers within the states of the United States, not to 
speak of international relationships, once more to be qual-
ified as desperate. In the case of automobiles sold by con-
ditional reservation of title in the United States, even the 
domestic situation of retail dealers between the wholesale 
dealers or manufacturers retaining title but allowing sales 
and the buying public is a source of contradictory judicial 
opinions.104 With a view to the interstate complications, 
103 STUMBERG, "Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws," 
27 Iowa L. Rev. ( 1942) 528, 536 and n. n. 
104 Note, "Record of Chattel Mortgage on, or Conditional Sale of an 
Automobile," 136 A.L.R. (1942) 82r; see also Note, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
( 1940) 367. 
And see on the doubts relating to liens, FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 
401; cf., BEALE, 33 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1919) 8rs f. and now in particular 
HONNOLD, Cases (supra n. 84) 573, who states the usual preference given the 
conditional seller over the repairman, at least where the seller retained the 
certificate of title. The decision in Willys-Overland Co. v. Evans (1919) 
104 Kan. 623, r8o Pac. 235, emphasizes the local policy of protecting the 
workman repairing a transient car. What about the carrier's lien confronting 
a conditional seller's title? The Uniform Commercial Code refrains from a 
provision (sec. 9-104c), although it gives priority to the lien acquired for 
services of material (sec. 9-310) in the line of the decisions, and by generaliz-
ing privileges accorded in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The German 
courts recognize the priority of a carrier's or forwarding agent's lien acquired 
in good faith (on the current transportation only) over a conditional seller's 
title. See KARL JoSEF PARTSCH, Zuriickbehaltungsrecht (Diss., Wiirzburg 
1938) 47· 
No doubt, a carrier assuming transportation in Y has as extensive a 
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the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the special state 
statutes on recording and certificates of automobiles have 
tried at least four different methods for reconciling the 
legitimate interests of an unpaid seller and an innocent pur-
chaser. But in a recent study it has been demonstrated 
that the "skip-state" operator, buying a car on a down pay-
ment in X and reselling it for full value in Y or Z, is 
blooming despite all these laws.105 Evidently, the proposal 
in the Uniform Commercial Code prolonging the time for 
recording at the new situs from ten days to four months 106 
would be a strangely one-sided reform. Only consistent 
regulation, with stricter supervision of recording and re-
ciprocal official information, as Leary proposes, would 
furnish an adequate remedy. 
On the international plane, neither the present attempts 
nor the advocated reforms provide a serious hope of recon-
ciliation. 
Effective universal help is merely available in the sphere 
of facts rather than that of the rules. Careful methods 
of issuing certificates of registration, a duty of careful in-
vestigation of the secondary seller's title by the buyer, and 
conscientious inquiries by the responsible officers in execu-
tion sales, may help to educate all concerned and minimize 
the conflicts. 
statutory or conventional lien as state Y grants him. But if the carrier 
loads the goods in X and delivers them in Y, which law decides on his right 
and priority in the absence of interstate and international regulations? 
105 LEARY, "Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles," 96 
U. of Pa. L Rev. ( 1948) 4SS· See also the survey of recent court decisions 
on the dubious effect of certificates of title of motor vehicles "showing or not 
showing liens," 13 A.LR. (2d) at 1326-1329. 
106 October 1949 Revision, sec. 8-109, CCU. sec. 9-103 (3). The text speaks 
merely of two jurisdictions involved: that "in which it was last situated" and 
"this state." The number of states possibly involved is, of course, unlimited. 
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IV. ADvERSE PossEssiON 
If a title is acquired by completed adverse pos·session 
under the law of the lex situs/07-or a permanent defense 
against any aggressor or certain persons-it is recognized 
wherever the chattel is subsequently brought.108 The older 
literature, however, split into a variety of opinions respect-
ing the case where the period of acquisition by lapse of 
time has merely begun to run in X and a new lex situs, Y, 
prescribes a different period.109 The Restatement takes 
up one of these old and long refuted ideas.11° From the 
conception of the statute real, it was deduced that each of 
several subsequent situations should be considered as effect-
ing a part of the acquisition. In one view, hence, the neces-
sary period of possession should have been computed in 
proportion to the several spaces of time during which the 
chattel has been possessed under the several territorial 
laws.111 Instead of this impossible method, the Restate-
ment proposes the application of the longest period required 
by any one of the states in which the chattel has been. 
Confessedly, 112 no American decision has authorized this 
arbitrary solution. 
An unfinished period as such does not generate any effect. 
In the only view consistent with the principles, therefore, 
107 It would seem that a minor effect of adverse possession, as occurs in 
common law respecting land, must be characterized as extinctive limitation 
of action. The English Limitation Act, I939, Sec. 3(I) (2), now recognizes 
extinction of the title. 
108 Universally settled. Restatement par. 259 comment a; GooDRICH (ed. 
3) 478 n. 98. In England it is said that "positive or acquisitive prescription" 
that transfers ownership goes to the substance of a transaction, CHESHIRE 
(ed. 4) 641 f. 
109 See SAVIGNY I86; I WHARTON 821 f.; I BAR 637 § 237; ARMIN JON, 
"L'usucapion, etc.," I Melanges Pillet I9; NIBOYET, IO Repert. 289. 
110 Restatement § 259, comment b. 
111 I MElLI 397· 
112 Restatement, Tentative Draft No. 3 ( 1927) § 279, Special Note. 
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the law of the last situs decides exclusively. This opinion 
is universally dominant.113 
Illustration. If X requires four years andY three years, 
the Restatement requires four years/14 and the prevailing 
opinion three years.115 
The prevailing theory must be followed to the extent 
that the factual requirements for adverse possession are 
indicated by the property law of the last situs. At the 
same time, it will ordinarily be true that a time of posses-
sion exercised under a previous lex situs is good enough to 
satisfy the last law, so that the past periods of possession 
may be counted in the required period. Consequently, ac-
quisition may be completed at the crossing of the frontier 
if y has a shorter period than X.116 
In a more precise elaboration of this reference to previ-
ous law, where no acquisitive prescription in stolen chattels 
is permitted in X, it has been said that adverse possession 
under the law of Y, not knowing such restriction, merely 
runs from the removal to Y. 117 Also suspension and inter-
ruption are governed by the new law.118 
113 E.g., SAVIGNY I86; I WHARTON 821; DIENA, Dir. Reali I36, I74; cf., 
Z3 Annuaire (I910) 246; Z FIORE § 8I8; Z ZITELMANN 347; WEISS, 4 
Traite zo8, ZI2; NIBOYET, Acquisition 329; Z FRANKENSTEIN 78; Z SCHNITZER 
(ed. 3) 522. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. IO (semble); 
Liechtenstein: C.C., Property Law, art. I3, par. I. 
Rumania: C. C. art. 33 ; 
Nicaragua: C.C. art. VI I8, I9; 
Montevideo Treaty, art. SS; 
C6digo Bustamante, arts, 227 f. 
114 Expressly so, Restatement illustration,§ 259, comment b. 
115 See also WATSON ]R., "The Doctrine of Adverse Possession," 7 Tul. L. 
Rev. ( I933) 451, 4S4· 
116 DIENA, Dir. Reali 171, I7S; 2 ZITELMANN 348; DESPAGNET 1186 § 420; 
(order public territorial) ; SUR VILLE § 174; VALERY 896 § 6zz ; Z FRANKEN-
STEIN 79; 2 ALCORTA 469 f.; MATOS 422 § 302. 
117 WEISS, 4 Traite z12; M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. z) IS6. The application 
to France depends on the controversial interpretation of C.C. art. ZZ79· 
118 See z ROMERO DEL PRADO, Manual Z8I on the civil law reference to 
the personal law for determining capacity to sue. 
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In a weak middle solution, advanced in the Austrian 
draft and adopted in Poland, the possessor has an option 
between the old and new laws of situs.119 
The dominant opinion is no doubt preferable. 
119 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 par. 2; Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law 
§ 49· 
CHAPTER 57 
Ambulatory Chattels 
I. Goons IN TRANSIT 
I N accordance with Savigny's theory, 1 a well-considered doctrine assumes that the reasons for allowing the law 
of the situation to decide on the rights in a thing pre-
suppose a stable localization and do not include "chattels 
in transportation" (res in transitu). 
In order that a tangible movable should be subject to the 
law of a territory, it must have a permanent location, its 
place of destination. This relationship is missing if a 
chattel from the viewpoint of its destination touches a ter-
ritory but temporarily, such as merchandise dispatched, the 
baggage of a traveler, land and water vehicles and vessels.2 
Before carriage, goods sold are no longer included in this 
exceptional group ;3 these are discussed above. 4 The ques-
tion is what law governs when ownership is transferred 
during the time a chattel is in transit. 
Despite the many opinions expressed on this subject, it 
would seem that the doubt inherent in this question should 
be further reduced in scope. Goods in transit, if stopped 
intentionally at a specified place for a sufficient period, may 
be seized ;5 they may also become subject to a lien of the 
earner. There is no doubt that lex situs applies in such 
1 SAVIGNY § 366 (tr. Guthrie) 179; ROHG., (Apr. 26, 1872) 6 ROHGE. 
So, No. 14, 28 Seuff. Arch. No. 2. 
2 REGELSBERGER, Pandekten 172. 
3 Thanks to NIBOYET, Acquisition 70. They still appear in Brazil: Lei 
Introd. 1942, art. 8 § I, but ESPINOLA, Lei Introd. 470 § 210 seems to restrict 
the new version of the article to chattels of uncertain situation. 
4 Supra 40. 
5 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 622; VALERY 898; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 50. 
IOO 
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cases. Moreover, in maritime transportation, goods are 
regularly transferred through endorsement of the bill of 
lading, the law of the place of the document prescribing 
the requisites of transfer of the paper. Transactions affect-
ing a ship or aircraft are commonly considered to be 
governed by the law of the flag. 6 
The needed emergency solution, hence, is restricted to 
chattels during interstate rail or truck transportation, when 
their temporary place is casual or unknown to the parties. 
This group, however, includes transshipment. Writers 
have advocated the domicil of the owner,7 the ordinary 
lex situs,S the law of the contract,9 and strangely, choice 
of law by the parties ;10 the two last opinions, deserting 
the principle of real rights, are prejudicial to third per-
sons.11 The law of the place of destination 12 or delivery 
is especially favored/3 justifiedly insofar as it is the first 
securely foreseeable point and evidently preferred by the 
courts when they are thus enabled to apply their own law.14 
6 BATIFFOL, Traite so8, 509 § 503; for aircraft, LEMOINE, Traite de droit 
aerien (I947) I75 contra RIESE, Rev. fran~. droit aerien (I95I) I3I, I43· 
7 SAVIGNY (Guthrie) I85; I WHARTON § 30I; WESTLAKE, I4 Revue Dr. 
Int. (Bruxelles) 287; 2 FIORE § 834; 
Argentina: C. C. art. u. 
Brazil: Lei In trod. I942, art. 8. 
Siam: Priv. Int. L. art. I6 (2). 
8 I BAR 6o8; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 3 I I. 
9 Cases cited by I WHARTON 736; cf., CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 438. ASSER ET 
RIVIER 99; WEISS, 4 Traite 205. 
10M. WOLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) I74· 
11 HELLENDALL, "Res in Transitu in the Conflict of Laws," I7 Can. Bar 
Rev. ( I939) 7, 33· 
12 SUR VILLE ET ARTHUYS 232 § I76 j NIBOYET, Acquisition I07 j 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 54; LEWALD I9I; decisions and authors cited 9 Repert. 236, Nos. I08 
If. j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 355; 2 SCHNITZER ( ed. 3) 526 j BATIFFOL, 
Traite 507 § 502. 
Germany: RG. (Sept. I6, I911) Recht I911 No. 3476, Z. f. Rechtspflege in 
Bayern I9I2, 45: stones sent from Brazil on their way to Germany. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law ( I889) art. 28 (cargo on high 
seas). 
13 Int. Law Ass. Oxford draft I932, art. 4· 
14 RABEL-RAISER, 3 Z. ausl. PR. 64 f. For the same reason, BARTIN, 3 
Principes 23 I. 
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Such an idea may account for the provision in the draft 
of a Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act § 43, 3, that chattel 
mortgages should normally be registered at the place of 
situation, but: 
"Where at the time a mortgage is given, goods covered 
thereby are in transit or are intended to be and within a 
reasonable time actually are put in transit, such goods are 
to be taken for purposes of this section as located at the 
place of destination." 15 
While the place of destination of goods transported is 
not usually also the place of their permanent location, this 
solution may suffice to cover the gap in which fall the nar-
row group of cases indicated above. A subcommittee of 
the Seventh Hague Conference discussed a more compli-
cated solution on the basis of the laws of the place whence 
the goods are sent and where they are delivered ;16 the com-
mittee did not agree on this point. 
II. RIGHTS IN SHIPS IN GENERAL 17 
1. Present Theories 
A confusing variety of opmwns on the subject of real 
interests in seagoing vessels is not surprising in view of the 
unlimited, even chaotic, condition of the maritime laws, 
but it contrasts with the dearth of conclusive judicial 
authority. The older doctrine treated ships like any other 
chattels, referring to the law of the temporary situation 
whenever one could be ascertained.18 Voluntary transfer 
15 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (1926) at 440. 
16 Actes de Ia Septieme Conference 1951, p. 92 art. s, 101 art. s. For the 
place of dispatch, also ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 2) 126 § 31; BALLADORO 
PALLIERI, DIP. 220; MONACO, Efficacia 213 § IIS· 
17 HELLENDALL, supra n. II, at 109 ff.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 476 ff., 538 ff.; 
ABRAHAM, Die Schiffshypothek im deutschen und ausliindischen Recht 
( Oberseestudien, Heft 20), ( 19 so) 302 ff. 
18 RG. (Feb. s, 1913) 81 RGZ. 283; and still in England, The Jupiter 
No. 3 [1927] P. 122; in France, Trib. civ. Tarascon (March 27, 1931) 
Clunet 1932, 423. 
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of a ship while it was on the seas did not suggest a special 
conflicts rule but was allowed to take place by consent with-
out delivery, as it is still provided (although now requiring 
registration), even in Germany, 19 as an exception to the 
principle of tradition. 
This doctrine is not so improper as often believed, in-
sofar as the rules prevailing for the removal of a chattel 
are certainly applicable in principle also to ships. For 
instance, the old case of Hooper v. Gumm would have to 
be decided likewise today under analogous circumstances. 
A mortgage was validly constituted in the United States 
under American law without being registered in the ship's 
papers. The vessel was then sold in England for value 
to a purchaser without notice. The mortgage would have 
been recognized and held superior to the English purchaser 
but for the estoppel, incurred by the mortgagee consenting 
to the concealment of his mortgage. 20 A maritime hypo-
thec validly created in Rotterdam was subordinated to a 
subsequent mortgage acquired by an innocent mortgagee 
when the vessel was registered in Germany.21 
The basic conception of vessels as objects of rights, 
however, has changed. On the one hand, registration 
has obtained an ever increasing importance. On the other 
hand, the modern literature continuously emphasizes the 
special nature of ships, 22 and declares the principle that all 
transactions affecting interests in a ship are governed by 
the law of the place of registration, and its representative, 
the law of the flag.23 
19 Germany: Law on Ship Registration, (Nov. IS, I940) § z par. I, for 
registered ocean vessels; C. Corn. § 474 for nonregistered ocean vessels. 
20 ( I867) L.R. z Ch. z8z. 
21 RG. (June I4, I9II) 77 RGZ. I. 
22 France: Cass. civ. (June 24, I9IZ) S. I9IZ.I-433: ships are taken out 
of the group of regular movables. 
23 United States: I WHARTON 784 § 356. 
England: WESTLAKE§ 150; DICEY (ed. 5) 996. 
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However, neither principle satisfies all needs. The 
writers, therefore, make tentative distinctions, according 
as the ship is on the high seas or in territorial waters ;24 
transactions occur in the country of registration or 
abroad ;25 or there is title transfer, creation of liens, or 
seizure.26 Occasionally, there has been resort to the lex 
loci contractus or actus, or even to the intention of the 
parties, 27 disregarding situs and flag. Certain courts dis-
regard everything but their own law. 
The courts are largely uncertain or vague. It is claimed 
that English courts apply the law of the flag 28 as well 
as the lex situs, at least if the ship is not on the sea.29 
German courts are often believed by foreign writers to 
adhere to the lex situs 30 and by recent German authors to 
follow the law of the flag. 31 In the United States, a foreign 
France: The great majority of all writers sustain the general rule of the 
law of the flag. LYON-CAEN, Clunet I877, 479; NIBOYET, Acquisition I I4; 
id., Manuel 646; PILLET, I Traite 742; RIPERT, I Droit Marit. (ed. 3) 
502 § 436; VALERY I3IS; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 24I § 229; NIBOYET, 
IO Repert. II No. 27. Contra: Weiss, 4 Traite 3IO ff. 
Germany: Citations in MELCHIOR 493 n. I; LEWALD I92; M. WOLFF, IPR. 
(ed. 3) I74; NussBAUM 313· 
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6; ownership, the other real rights and the rights of 
security in vessels and aircraft, as well as the form of publicity for the 
acts of creating, transferring, and extinguishing such rights, are regulated 
by the national law of the vessel or aircraft. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 488. 
Institute of Int. Law, 8 Annuaire ( I88s) I26. 
24 WHARTON AND WESTLAKE, [.c., MELCHIOR 492 f.; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 475; 
HELLENDALL, supra n. II, II I. 
25 HELLENDALL, supra n. II, II5. 
26 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 3I4; LEWALD I92 f. 
2 7 United States: See decisions infra n. 34· 
The Netherlands: App. Den Haag (June 30, I9I6) W. I008S, Clunet I92I, 
280. 
Germany: LEWALD I93 f.; Obergericht fiir die Britische Zone (July 7, I949) 
2 N. Jur. Woch. 784. 
28 E.g., WESTLAKE 202 § ISO: the personal law of the owner. 
20 HELLENDALL, supra n. II. 
30 E.g., NIBOYET, IO Repert. I6 No. 70; GRIFFITH PRICE, The Law of Mari~ 
time Liens ( I940) 2I3. 
31 LEWALD, NussBAUM, M. WoLFF, supra n. 23. 
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authority apparently has found total inconsistency.32 As-
suredly, the only known decision of the Supreme Court in 
I 873 33 recognized assignment of a ship forming part of 
an insolvent estate to the assignee in insolvency under the 
law of Massachusetts, the state of both the domicil of 
the owner and the port of registration. Similar coinci-
dences occur in other cases.34 It may be conceded that the 
decisions neglect the scope of the problem and are not too 
well-considered. But they can be reconciled. 
River boats. Despite the frequent assertion that fluvial 
navigation is an internal subject for the country of navi-
gation,35 its principles have been laid down in a European 
convention of 1930, providing satisfactory rules on the 
basis of registration in one country.36 This accomplish-
ment suggests a basis for improvement as respects maritime 
vessels. 
Distinguishing the various situations, we may discover 
somewhat more agreement in this important and never con-
structively summarized international matter. 
In the first place, it is agreed that the law of the place 
3 2 NOLDE, zz Revue Dor. ( 1930) 36. 
33 Crapo v. Kelly (1873) 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 610, 630, 638. 34 In Koster v. Merritt ( 1864) 32 Conn. 246, the situs coincided with the 
locus actus. 
Lex loci actus was asserted in Thuret v. Jenkins ( 18zo) 7 Mart. (La.) 
318, but the ship was also registered at that place. In Southern Bank v. 
Wood (1859) 14 La. Ann. 554 and Moore v. Willett (186z) 35 Barb. S.C. 
663, the locus actus was also the residence or domicil of the ship owner. 
This has been noted by HELLENDALL, supra n. u, 117. 
35 Germany: Prussian Ob. Trib. (Nov. 13, 1868) 24 Seulf. Arch. No. 102; 
ROHG. (April z6, 187z) 6 ROHGE. No. 14. But the German delegation 
proposed at the Geneva Conference (infra n. 36) the principle of lex situs, 
see Vogels, 5 Z. ausl. PR. (1931) 311. 
The Netherlands: Rb. den Bosch (March 7, 1919) W. 10497, N.J. 1919, 461. 
36 Convention of Geneva, 1930, on the registration of inland vessels, rights 
in rem over such vessels, and other cognate questions. L. of N. Off. Publ. 
1931, VIII, z-5, Conf. U.D.F. 57-60; HuDSON, 5 Internat. Legislation No. 
276; comment by NIBOYET, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles, 1931) 303 and in 4 
Traite 569 If. 
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of registration exclusively decides whether a ship is sea-
going.37 
We shall deal presently with ownership and mortgage, 
created by agreement, in ships. The conflicts rules concern-
ing ship mortgages were doubtful for a long time, quite as 
their operation was precarious. But most countries have 
introduced ship mortgage legislation in increasing detail, 
and in the Brussels Convention of 1926 (infra n. 54), a 
unitary law, that of the flag, has been established for mort-
gages, hypothecations, and other similar charges. Since 
then, there has been a common and growing inclination 
to apply to ship mortgages the same principles as apply to 
ownership. The great hopes with which these reforms 
were adopted, however, are acutely impaired by the absence 
of international uniform preference of liens in ships. Al-
though foreign ship mortgages are readily recognized, their 
enforcement depends on the competition of other more or 
less privileged actions against the ship, which must be 
discussed separately (infra III, 2). 
2. Situations: (a) The ship is in home waters 
As long as a vessel finds itself in the country where it is 
also registered, the law of this country clearly governs the 
real rights. 38 
(b) The ship is on the high seas 
J7 oluntary alienations. Probably all laws intend to im-
pose compulsorily observance of their own respective pro-
visions on domestically registered vessels. Thus, registra-
tion and other formalities of the home port especially are 
required for sales, conveyances, and mortgages. This is 
87 I VAN HASSELT 357· 
88 This is the case envisaged by British Merchant Shipping Act, 18941 s. 24. 
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certain for numerous countries. 39 Any transfer within 
the country is included. A transfer made in another 
country, at least to a national of the home country, with-
out complying with the formalities would either be held 
entirely invalid or ineffective against third purchasers in 
good faith registering in the home state. 40 
However, if the vessel is not registered in the country 
where the transfer occurs, the law of the flag is indis-
pensable to avoid an impossible legal situation in third 
jurisdictions.41 The home port is, moreover, the one to 
which the ship will regularly return and where it takes more 
than a casual or temporary stay.42 
Nevertheless, the question exists whether mortgages may 
also be established and transferred under the local law of 
a foreign port with full effect, without registration at the 
39 United States: Ship Mortgage Act of June s, I920, c. 250, § 30, subsec. 
c. 4I Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C.A. 6I4 § 92I. 
England: British Merchant Shipping Act, s. I and 265. 
France: Laws of July 10, I88s, art. 33, July s, I9I7, requiring registration 
in France for mortgages constituted abroad on French ships; WEISS, 4 Traite 
3 IO ff.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 498 § U29. 
Germany: Now: Law on Ship Registration (Nov. IS, I940) §I par. 2 
(acquisition and loss of ownership in a vessel entered in a German ship 
register is determined by the German law). Previously: OLG. Dusseldorf 
(Nov. 23, I909) I08 Rhein. Arch. I87, aff'd, RG. (June I4, I9II) 77 RGZ. 
I; BAR, Int. Handelsr. 423. An express statutory rule for mortgages is 
missing, ABRAHAM (supra n. I7) 305. 
4° France: Cass. civ. (June 24, I9I2) S. I9I2.I.433, Clunet I9I3, I47· 
Germany: 77 RGZ. I, supra n. 38; under § I, par. 2 of the Ship Registra-
tion Law; WiiSTENDORFER, Neuzeitl. Seehandelsrecht (I947) 75, states that 
the case of a transfer abroad to a foreigner is doubtful. 
41 United States: Crapo v. Kelly {I872) I6 Wall. (83 U.S.) 610, con-
current opinion by Mr. Justice Clifford at 639: "as if the ship was moored 
at her wharf." 
Scotland: Schultz v. Robinson and Niven (Court of Session, I86I) 24 
Sess. Cas. 120: Prussian ship sold by a bill of sale while on the high seas; 
title passed under Prussian law, although under Scottish law entry in the 
beil brief would have been necessary. Applicable in English courts, accord-
ing to DICEY (ed. 5) 997· 
France: Common opinion, supra n. 23. 
Germany: WiisTENDORFER, supra n. 40, p. 75· 
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6, I3. 
42 2 FRANKENSTEIN 471. 
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home port. The negative answer will follow from later 
discussion. 
(c) The ship is in foreign waters. 
Involuntary assignments. Despite occasional devia-
tions/8 it may be assumed that attachments, seizures, and 
judgments in rem by a legitimate territorial authority, ac-
companied by sale of a vessel, are internationally recog-
nized.44 A justifiable exception has been made in the 
country of registration, when the foreign court disregards 
a previous transaction valid by the law of the forum ;45 this 
exception should even enjoy extraterritorial force. 
Unjustifiedly, however, the French Court of Cassation, 
in its only decision in point, has proclaimed that a mort-
gage in a French vessel cannot be purged by a foreign 
sale of the ship, but only by application of the French 
procedure, that is, in a French court.46 
17 oluntary alienation. Transfer of title and mortgaging 
43 England: The Segredo, otherwise "Eliza Cornish" (I853) I Spinks 
Ecc. & Ad. 36: British ship, because of unseaworthiness sold under the law 
of Fayal; sale not recognized under "general maritime law;" but the decision 
is overruled by Cammell v. Sewell ( I86o) 5 H. & N. 728, as interpreted in 
subsequent cases. See HELLENDALL, supra n. n, II4 f. against DICEY ( ed. 
5) 999· 
44 United States: Olivier v. Townes (La. I824) 2 Mart. (N.S.) 93; Green 
v. Van Buskirk (I866) 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 307, (I868) 7 Wall. I39; dictum 
in Crapo v. Kelly (I872) I6 Wall. 6Io, 622 respecting assignment and in-
solvency; cf., KuHN, Comp. Com. 240. 
England: Cammell v. Sewell {I86o) 5 H. & N. 728; Castrique v. Imrie 
( I87o) L.R. 4 H.L. 4I4, per Lord Blackburn: British ship sold upon a 
competent foreign judgment; The Jupiter No. 3 [ I927] P. I22. 
The Netherlands: I VAN HASSELT 359· 
45 England: Simpson v. Fogo ( I863) I Hem. & Mill. I95 repudiates a 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana for the sale of a British ship; 
the Louisiana court had discarded a mortgage given on the high seas valid 
under English law. 
46 France: Cass. civ. (June 24, I9I2) S. I9I2.1.433 rejects a judicial sale 
of a French ship in England, because an attaching French maritime lien 
could not be extinguished without French formalities. The case is thus 
decided contrarily to the House of Lords in Castrique v. Imrie, supra n. 44, 
and to the German decision, LG. Schwerin (Jan. ro, I9IO) Leipz. Z. I9II, 52. 
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is the center of controversy. If a ship lies in a foreign 
port, should such contract comply with, and the effect be 
governed by the local law, 47 or the law of the flag (place 
of registration) ? 48 
A compromise attempted by Dutch courts points prima-
rily to the "personal law" of the ship, i.e., of the port of 
registration, but concedes minor consideration to the na-
tionality of the transferor and the place of the transac-
tion.49 However, in the only decision of the Dutch 
Supreme Court, registration of a sale and conveyance in 
Belgium was respected, although the ship was being built 
in a Dutch dockyard, with the result of preferring the 
foreign buyer to domestic creditors. 5° 
French doctrine inclines to the largest scope of the law 
of the flag, advocated by the authors. Nevertheless, cer-
tain decisions have repudiated formless transfer of owner-
ship of a British ship from one Englishman to another, 
because the French requirement of publicity was not satis-
47 England: Hooper v. Gumm ( I867) L.R. 2 Ch. 282, with respect to a 
mortgage on an American ship registered in the United States, cf., CHESHIRE 
(ed. 3) S9I· Cf. The Jupiter No.3 [I927] P. Izz; Russian flag immaterial 
for subjection to Soviet nationalization. 
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 3 IO If. against the dominant opinion. 
The Netherlands: H.R. (Jan. 22, I934) infra n. so. 
Colombia: C. com. marit. arts. IS, I9, 34· I RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ IS9 
§ 365. 
48 England: DICEY (ed. 5) 996: "the balance of reason is in favor of 
making the law of the country to which the ship belongs decisive as to 
voluntary transfers of ships." 
France: See supra n. 22. 
Germany: Law of the flag of foreign ships, WusTENDORFER, supra n. 
39 at 75· 
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6. 
The Netherlands: VAN BRAKEL I89 § I46. 
Spain: C. Com. arts. I7, 573, and Regulation of the Mercantil Register, 
arts. I49, I 52; with primary effect of private law, GARRIGUES, 2 Curso de 
Der. Mere. ( I940) 626 f.; cf., I GAMECHOGOICOECHEA, 2 Trat. de Derecho 
Maritimo Espaiiol (without year) 59 If. For mortgages, C.C. art. I875 and 
Law of August 2I, I893, art. I4, GARRIGUES, ib. 622. 49 I VAN HASSELT 357• 
50 H.R. (June 22, I934) W. I28I5, N.J. I934, I493, I VAN HASSELT 426. 
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fie d. 51 Niboyet also contends that for the same reason 
sales of German vessels in France should comply with 
French publicity requirements, whereas German courts 
should observe French law in disposing of French vessels. 52 
This goes too far. But it is a well-known valid argument 
in favor of the law of the place of registration that third 
parties should be informed by a decent record at the home 
port. Indeed, the Convention of Geneva of December 9, 
1930, generally speaking of all voluntary transfers of 
fluvial vessels, provides: 
Voluntary transfer inter vivos of the rights of ownership 
in a vessel shall be governed by the law of the country of 
registration if that law requires as a condition for the trans-
fer, or at least for the effect of this transfer as to third 
persons, either the inscription in a register for the publicity 
of the rights, or the transfer of possession to the acquirer.53 
Voluntary securities. The same idea that sufficient public 
registration in the home port is required in principle, under-
lies the Brussels Convention of 1926 for the Unification 
of Certain Rules of Law relating to Maritime Mortgages, 
and Liens, 54 the first significant step toward a firm inter-
national recognition of rights in vessels. Yet this conven-
tion has been adopted neither by the Anglo-American nor 
51 App. Rouen (July 31, 1876) Clunet 1877, 428, simulation suspected 
without proof; Trib. Saint-Malo June 27, 885) Clunet 1886, 196; approved 
by NIBOYET, Acquisition 514 and 4 Traite so1 n. 1. Contra: LYON-CAEN, 
Clunet 1877, 481. 
Also the German Reichsgericht once rejected a Russian hypothec filed 
with the ship documents only, RG. (Oct. 2, 1912) So RGZ. 129, contra, 2 
FRANKENSTEIN 478. 
52 NIBOYET, 10 Repert. 12 Nos. 39, 43· 
53 Supra n. 35, art. 20 (I). 
54 Convention pour !'unification de certaines regles de droit relatives aux 
privileges et hypotheques maritimes, signee a Bruxelles, le IO avril 1926, 
120 L. of N. Treaty Series No. 276s; HuDSON, 3 Int. Legislation No. ISS; 
BENEDICT, 6 American Admiralty 78; 2 Recueil Niboyet et Goule 464. In 
force among 17 states. Comments: RIPERT, Precis de droit maritime 153; 
BRUNETTI, I Dir. marittimo 561; SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN, I Dr. marit. 
et dr. fluvial so. 
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the Central European countries, although France partici-
pates in it. 
Voluntary securities obligating the ship may be of two 
classes. Loans secured by bottomry in cases of proved 
emergency during a voyage are evidently recognized, if 
they comply with the local law. The case has become rare, 
but should a real emergency occur requiring such a loan 
without giving the shipowner an opportunity to act at home, 
recognition is due. 55 
Longer standing credit is provided by means of ship 
mortgages ( hypothecs). Recognition of a foreign ship 
mortgage, or any conventional conveyance of real security 
in ships, now is universal as an institution, since the great 
majority of states interested in seafaring have introduced 
this type of rights into their municipal laws. The govern-
ing law cannot yet be said to be clearly settled everywhere. 
But it would seem that the principle of the Brussels Con-
vention is actually followed, to the effect that a mortgage 
complying with the law of the port of registration of the 
vessel is likely to be recognized not only in France 56 but 
in any country,57 although no holding squarely in point 
55 DICEY ( ed. 6) 666. 
56 See NIBOYET, 4 Traite 538 If. 
57 England: Hooper v. Gumm (I 887) L.R. 2 Ch. 282; American mortgage, 
not recognized because the action was defeated by estoppel ; The Colorado 
[ 1923] P. 102: French mortgage; The Zigurds [ 1932] P. II3: Latvian 
equitable assignment. 
Germany: Oberapp. G. Oldenburg (May x8, x86x) 17 Seuff. Arch. Nr. 
xu: Hanover mortgage; RG. (Feb. 9, 1900) 45 RGZ. 276, 278: Dutch 
mortgage; "No doubt, the vessel at the time of the creation of the mortgage, 
belonged to an owner domiciled in Holland from where the vessel was also 
managed." 
Italy: C. Navig. art. 6; formerly Cass. Turin (Dec. xo, 1906) 22 Revue 
Autran 714: English mortgage; recognized despite the Italian prohibition of 
forfeiture (pactum commissorium). 
The Netherlands: VAN OPSTALL, Scheepshypotheek, (Thesis, Leiden 1932) 
305. 
Norway: Law of May p, 1929. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 488. 
Sweden: Law of May r8, 1928. 
II2 PROPERTY 
exists in the United States. 5 8 
That mortgagees registered at one port lose their priority, 
where registration is transferred to another country and 
purchasers or creditors are recorded in the new register, 59 
accords with the general principles. 
Other events. Illustration. On a German ship, leaving 
New York and sailing in the harbor between New York 
and New Jersey, a steward found in a stateroom a roll of 
banknotes. The German court defined the rights of the 
finder under the identical laws of New York and New 
Jersey. If the discovery had been made later on the high 
seas, German law would have been applied.60 
Conclusion. International law concedes many and im-
portant prerogatives to the state whose flag a ship flies. 
Prevailing opinion even recognizes a real right under public 
international law of the state in whose ports private ships 
are registered. 61 In accordance with this fact, the existing 
laws and conventions and the general impression conveyed 
by the literature allow a reasonable way out of the pres-
ent unsettled doctrine. The law of the flag is indispensable 
during the time a vessel is on the high seas. It is the most 
suitable law for the creation and transfer of real rights 
by voluntary private transactions also when the ship is in 
foreign territorial waters. In view of the advantages of 
the publicity obtained by central registration in the home 
port and of the considerations of public policy familiar to 
58 United States: The Secundus (D.C.N.Y. 1927) 15 F. (2d) 713, 1927 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 641, contains only an indication that a French preferred mortgage 
would receive the preference given to it by French law, RoBINSON, Admiralty 
435 in fine. 
59 RG. (June 14, 1911), Ned. Scheepsverband M. v. Coblenzer Volksbank, 
77 RGZ. 1. On recognition of unregistered foreign mortgages, see ABRAHAM 
(supra n. 17) 313. 
60 OLG. Hamburg (May 14, 1904) Hans. GZ. 1904, Beiblatt no. 122, citing 
2 BAR 609, 6 14. 
61 This theory has been eruditely supported against adversaries by 
UBERTAZZI, Studi sui diritti reali nell'ordine internazionale, Milano 1949· 
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some countries, it is highly advisable for such voluntary 
transactions to give normally exclusive force to the law of 
the place of registration. 
On the other hand, the law of the port where the ship 
lies must have competence to regulate involuntary assign-
ments and in emergency cases securities established by 
special agreement. 
III. MARITIME LIENS (PRIVILEGES BY LAw) 
Anglo-American admiralty law recognizes charges upon 
ships for services done to the ship or injury caused by it, 
accruing by law and enforceable by an action in rem. Eng-
lish writers in the nineteenth century developed various 
theories as to the nature of these liens, among which that 
of Marsden 62 was adopted in the English courts. This 
so-called "procedural theory" regards the lien as "a form 
of proceeding to compel an appearance" by the owner of 
the vessel. In consequence, the vessel is not liable if the 
owner is not personally liable, and if he is, his responsi-
bility is unlimited. 5 3 The American courts since 1809 have 
followed the "personification theory," later expounded by 
Holmes, 64 regarding the ship as liable, and alone liable, 
without personal obligation of the owner; this lien re-
mains "indelible" irrespective of a change of ownership. 65 
The theory of Holmes and of the American courts cor-
responds with the medieval institution of "fortune de mer," 
one of the applications of pure liability of a thing 
(Sachhaftung). The premise of the procedural theory that 
62 MARSDEN, "Two Points of Admiralty Law," 2 Law Q. Rev. (1886) 
357; id. Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, vol. 1 (London 1894). 
63 HEBERT, "The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens," 4 Tul. L. Rev. 
( 1930) 381, 385. 
64 HOLMES, Common Law 25 ff.; The City of Athens (1949) 83 F. Supp. 
67, 1949 Am. Mar. Cas. 582, aff. (C.C.A. 4, 1949) 177 F. (2d) 961, 1950 
Am. Marit. Cas. 282. 
65 MAYERS, Admiralty Law and Practice 8. 
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the owner is personally liable cannot be maintained in case 
of a new owner.66 And practically, to dispense with the 
idea of a proprietary right, as the procedural theory now 
pretends, or to merge maritime liens with the obscure cate-
gory of actions in rem, confuses the international situation 
which requires recognition of foreign-created rights, even 
though foreign privileges of priority may be rejected. 
The Continental laws in part rest upon the same founda-
tion of the ship's obligation, as in particular does the 
German system, but, including the common law, there are 
at least five different systems of allowing privileged rights 
in the case of a judicial sale of a vessel. They are based 
upon heterogeneous ideas, granted to very different classes 
of creditors, and differ greatly in regulating the rank for 
satisfaction by the proceeds of the sale.67 The task of find-
ing suitable conflicts rules for this matter, after strenuous 
efforts, was given up by the numerous successive inter-
national conferences. In the 192o's, unification of the sub-
stantive rules was believed easier. But the resultant unifi-
cations by both the Brussels Convention on liens and mort-
gages of 1926 and the Geneva Convention on ships regis-
tration of 1930 had to leave a multitude of minor liens to 
the pleasure of the lex fori. 68 
The Brussels Convention, however, for the limited 
domain of its member states, enumerates five types of 
privileged liens enjoying priority over registered mort-
gages, while the national laws may grant other liens rank-
66 The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo. P. C. C. 267. 
67 See in the first place, RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 3) II9 If. §§ IIS7-
I 160; for the Anglo-American laws, ROBINSON, Admiralty 363 If., 434 § 62; 
GRIFFITH PRICE, The Law of Maritime Liens (London 1940) with com-
parative surveys which seem somewhat questionable; for Germany, WusTEN-
oORFER, Neuzeitliches Seehandelsrecht ( 1947) u8 If. 
68 PLAISANT, Les regles de conftit de lois dans les Traites ( 1946) 141; also 
with comment on the effects of bankruptcy on the choice of law according 
to the existing conventions. 
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ing after those first two groups.69 Among other provisions, 
a somewhat vague uniform rule is established, requiring pre-
liminary notice of "a sale" to the register office, in order 
that privileges should be extinguished by the sale. 
Jurisdiction to enforce foreign-created liens may at times 
be absent, particularly in English courts. But this is a 
rare case in other countries and scarcely occurs in the 
United States. 
Recognition and priority must be strictly separated in 
regard to liens; the question of rank affects also conven-
tional securities. 
I. Recognition of foreign-created liens 
The great majority of the decisions refer to those liens 
which arise by force of law from services rendered to the 
vessel. 
(a) Repair and supply. It is perfectly settled that per-
sons acquiring a lien on the ship or the cargo by furnishing 
repairs or "necessaries" under the law of the place where 
the services are rendered are protected in other countries. 70 
In the usual conflicts terms, the applicable law is char-
acterized as lex loci contractus or as lex situs. 11 The law 
69 Brussels Convention, cited supra n. 54, art. 2, liens privileged in cases 
of certain expenses, employment, salvage, etc., accidents of navigation, and 
necessary contracts of the master. 
70 United States: Mills v. The Scotia (D.C.N.Y. 1888) 35 Fed. 907, 909, 
"the law of the place of transaction;" 1 WHARTON §§ 322, 358. 
Canada: Sir Douglas Hazen, L.J.A., in Marquis v. The Astoria [1931] 
Ex. C.R. 195, 199: "where the services are rendered" quoting The Scotia; 
and since, usual formula in Canada; the remarkable decision, Harney v. 
Terry [1948] 1 D.L.R. 728 uses the term lex loci contractus. 
Scotland: Constant v. Klompus ( 1912) so Scot. L. Rep. 27. For more 
details see GRIFFITH PRICE, 57 L.Q.L.R. ( 1941) 409. 
71 United States: The Graf Klot Trautvetter (1881) 8 Fed. 833; The 
Olga (1887) 32 Fed. 329; The Scotia (1888) 35 Fed. 907; The Kaiser Wil-
helm II ( 1916) 230 Fed. 717; The Woudrichem ( 1921) 278 Fed. 568; The 
City of Atlanta ( 1924) 17 F. (2d) 308, 1924 Am. Marit. Cas. 1305, 9 Revue 
Dor ( 1925) 396: (lex loci contractus); The Northern Star ( 1925) 1925 Am. 
Marit. Cas. II3S, 12 Revue Dor (1925) 238. 
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of the flag has been sharply rejected in this country.72 
Illustration. Necessaries were supplied to an American 
ship in Boston. American law grants a maritime lien, while 
in Canada merely a statutory lien of much minor impor-
tance exists. Canadian courts, nevertheless, recognize the 
American lien, arguing that otherwise they would promote 
fraudulent removal of lien-bound American ships to Cana-
dian ports. 73 
Italian conflicts law applies the law of the flag also to 
maritime privileges.74 Therefore, two American decisions 
have resorted to renvoi. When a German ship had taken 
bunker coal in an Italian port, the Italian reference led to 
German law, under which no lien existed, because the sup-
plier knew that the charterer rather than the owner had 
to pay.75 This clear and reasonable adoption of the theory 
England: The Colorado (I923] P. I02. 
Scotland: Constant v. Klornpus (I912) so Scot. L. Rep. 27. 
Canada: Sup. Ct. in The Strandhill v. Walter W. Hodder Co. (1926] 
S.C.R. 68o, 4 D.L.R. 8oi; Harney v. M.V. "Terry'' (Ex. Ct. of Can. 1947) 
[I948] I D.L.R. 728. 
France: Trib. civ. Tarascon (March 27, I93I) Clunet I932, 423, where the 
editor protests that the fictitious situation of a ship is the place of its 
matriculation. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. IO, I9I3) [The Colorado] Warn. Repr. I9I3, 302 No. 
254, citing I BAR 6I3, 65I; EMIL BoYENS, 1 Das deutsche Seerecht ( I897) 
§ 22e; OLG. Stettin (Sept. 29, I93I) IPRspr. I932, uo No. 55· 
Greece: App. Athens (I933 No. 1095) Clunet I934, I053i it is true that 
the flag coincided with the place of the accident. 
The Netherlands: I VAN HASSELT 359· 
But see also infra n. 8 5· 
72 United States: The Kaiser Wilhelm II, supra n. 7I. 
73 See the citations supra n. 70, Canada. 
74 Italy: Now, likewise, Dis. Prel. C. Navig. arts. 6, I3. 
75 Cilento v. S.S. Rickmers ( I924) I924 Am. Marit. Cas. 97I, 8 Revue Dor 
I98, applying §§ 486, 53 I of the German Commercial Code. Under similar 
facts, Socied. Anon. Ricardo Ganlino v. S.S. Coastwise ( I923) I923 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 942, 6 Revue Dor. 357· On knowledge of the supplier, see 
the analogous provisions of the American Ship Mortgage Act of June s, 
I920, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 97I-973; see, e.g., The Kongo ( I946) ISS F. (2d) 492, 
I74 F. (:zd) 67, I946 Am. Marit. Cas. 1200; Univ. Nat' I Bank v. Horne 
( I946) 65 F. Supp. 94, I946 Am. Marit. Cas. 585. 
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of renvoi seems to have escaped the attention of the many 
writers clinging to the unfortunate Talmadge case.76 
A foreign writer believed, in 1930, that the American 
decisions on the subject commonly adopted American mari· 
time law. 77 This does not square with the decisions/ 8 
(b) Wages of master and crew. A decision by the 
famous admiralty Judge Brown, of 1887, held that even 
the priority of liens arising for the wages of crew and 
master ("those on board") "among themselves" should 
be determined by the law of the flag, although the rank 
of liens arising from the contracts concluded by the master 
followed the law of the place of contracting.79 An old 
English case concerning the wages of a master of a foreign 
vessel was decided under the lex fori. 80 More recently in 
The T a gus ( 1 903), the Argentine law of the flag was 
applied, but the privilege of the master was extended, by 
British law of the forum, from the last voyage to all back 
salary.81 Recently, however, the Canadian Court of Ex-
chequer in a learned judgment applied the general theory 
that liens follow, according to their contractual or delictual 
occasion, the law governing the contract or the tort.82 
Claims for wages of master and crew consequently fall 
under the law of the flag. 
76 See, ultimately, Note, 48 Mich. L. Rev. (1950) 702. 
77 BARON NOLDE, 22 Revue Dor (1930) at 50 f. 
78 See also PRICE (supra n. 29, 67) 212. In The Hoxie (1923) 1923 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 937, the supplier was deemed to be an American mother com-
pany of the Danish firm; in The Lydia ( 1924) 1924 Am. Marit. Cas. roar, 
the court recognizing foreign liens as arising under general maritime law 
explained that English law was not pleaded and that the decision was based 
on conversion in the United States; in The Coastwise ( 1923) 1923 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 942, American law was applied as law of the flag by renvoi 
from Italian law, supra n. 75· Other cases must be explained by historical 
development, as especially in respect to priority, cf., infra n. 88. 
79 The Olga ( 1887) 32 Fed. 329; The Angela Maria ( 1888) 35 Fed. 430; 
The Belvidere ( 1898) 90 Fed. 106. 
80 The Milford (1858) Swabey 362. 
81 The Tagus [1903] P. 44· 
82 Harney v. M.V. "Terry" (1947) [1948] I D.L.R. 728. 
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(c) Injury. Under the same theory, emphasizing the 
substantive character of the problem, lex loci delicti applies 
in tort cases. A stevedore, injured through the fault of 
those in charge of unloading chemicals from a Norwegian 
ship in Victoria, British Columbia, was denied recovery in 
the United States, because no maritime lien existed in the 
Canadian province. 83 In the case of collision on the high 
seas where no place of wrong exists, American courts apply 
the Act of March JO, 1920, concerning "Death on the 
High Seas by Wrongful Act." 84 
(d) Carrier's default. Still in the same order of ideas, 
passengers, mistakenly left ashore by a Rumanian steamer, 
were allowed to sue in rem against the vessel only after the 
law of Rumania was found to justify such action, since that 
country was the place where the contract of carriage was 
entered and the voyage was to be ended. 85 
With respect to the existence of a right to sue in rem 
against the vessel, based on a lien, the fairly settled pres-
ent English, Canadian, German, and American doctrines 
thus may be summarized as follows: The law of the flag 
is resorted to insofar as wages of seamen are concerned 
and as a substitute for the ordinary applicable territorial 
law, in the case of events on the high seas. Normally, a 
lien, presupposing a contract, is connected with the port 
where the ship is situated at the time of the contract, and 
a lien protecting a tort claim with the territorial waters 
in which the wrong was committed. 
83 The Cuzco ( 1915) 225 Fed. 169, The Apurimac ( 1925) 1925 Am. Marit. 
Cas. 604, II Revue Dor 224: American law was preferred to the Peruvian 
law of the flag, respecting injury to a seaman aboard a Peruvian vessel in 
an American port, caused by the vessel's unseaworthiness, following The 
Scotland {r88r) 105 U.S. 24; Koziol v. Fylgia, 1953 Am. Marit. Cas. 220: 
injury on the high seas, Swedish law of the flag. 
84 The Buenos Aires (C.C.A. z 1924) 5 F. (2d) 425. 
85 The Constantinople (D.C.N.Y. 1935) 15 F. (2d) 97, as commented 
upon by ROBINSON, Admiralty 439· 
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These, indeed, are the firmest connections available in 
this matter. Whether the lien or privilege is recognized 
in the domestic law of the forum is entirely immaterial.86 
Over this point, it is true, isolated decisions, particularly 
older ones, have stumbled. And French objections on the 
ground of public policy may be possible. 87 
2. Priority 
In a line of older American decisions, the application of 
foreign law to mortgages and liens was extended to the 
question of their precedence in the distribution of the pro-
ceeds in an executory sale.88 Such generosity is no longer 
displayed anywhere in the world. Eminent writers have 
urged in vain uniform treatment of recognition and priority 
of liens, now basing their doctrine, in contrast to the former 
emphasis on the situs as of the time of the creation of the 
right, rather on an all-embracing dominance of the law of 
the flag. 89 
Quite commonly the priority between mortgages and liens 
and among liens is determined according to the law of the 
forum. 9° For justification, it is ordinarily contended that, 
86 See, e.g., the Canadian decisions supra n. 70, and the Reichsgericht 
(Feb. IO, I9I3) cited ibid., against OLG. Rostock (July 7, I09) 65 Seuff. 
Arch. No. 34· 
87 Cf., NIBOYET, 4 Traite 547 ff.; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 3) §§ 116I ff. 
88 The Velox (I884) 21 Fed. 479; The Olga (I887) 32 Fed. 329; The 
Angela Maria (I888) 35 Fed. 430; The Belvidere (I898) 90 Fed. I06. 
89 Particularly forceful, RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 124 ff. §§ 116I-1164. 
90 United States: Brown, J., in The Scotia (I888) 35 Fed. 907, 911, citing 
STORY §§ 323, 423 b, d.; The Oconee (I922) 280 Fed. 927; RoBINSON, 
Admiralty§ 62; Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I3) 358. 
England: WESTLAKE § 35I; The Colorado [I923] P. I02. 
Canada: Sir Douglas Hazen, L.J.A., in Marquis v. The Astoria [I93I] 
Ex. C.R. I95, I99· 
Scotland: Robert Clark v. Bowring & Comp. ( I908) S.C. 1168, rejecting 
the claim of an American firm for monies paid in New York. 
France: see for citations, RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. I3 I § 1168. 
Denmark: Comm. and Admir. Court (March ZI, I939) U.F.R. 1939, 589; 
(Jan. 3, I950) S.H.T. 1950, 46; Clunet I954, 502. 
Germany: RG. (Nov. 25, I89o) I Z. int. R. 365; (Feb. 9, 1900) 45 RGZ. 
276, 28I, IO Z. int. R. 472; (Feb. s, I9I3) 8I RGZ. 283; and others; z BAR. 
199· 
Netherlands: H.R. (June IS, I9I7) W. I0139, N.J. I9I7j 8u. 
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although foreign-created rights are recognized, their rank 
is a matter of procedure. This is an untenable assertion.91 
Enforcement presupposes a substantive quality of the right 
to be enforced. It should also not be believed that execu-
tive sales proceedings, frequent as they are, furnish the 
only situation in which the order of the rights is important. 
Clearly, priority pertains to the substantive part of the law. 
Nevertheless, this does not decide the conflicts prob-
lem. When courts and writers have considered the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of lex fori and the law of the 
flag, there are arguments for either. The resort to the 
domestic law of the casually competent court rewards the 
shrewdest creditor choosing the place of attachment. Where 
the law of the flag determines the existence of the right, 
its coexistence with the lex fori, governing the priority, is 
a source of conflicts.92 The judicial sale, for instance, 
purges rights, irrespective of the law of the flag. On the 
other hand, it must be conceded that unity of treatment 
for rights originating all over the world under disparate 
laws can be guaranteed by the lex fori as well as by the 
law of the flag which would logically require (and has been 
said to establish) a total subjection of all these rights to 
the unitary law of the home state. In this matter, the law 
of the forum agrees too well with the usual conceptions 
of admiralty judges, to be erased for reasons of theoretical 
elegance, or even convenience. 
It can be better understood than in other matters, that a 
court would think as a Dutch judge has said, in pondering 
the virtues of the law of the forum and the law of the flag 
for distributing proceeds of an executive sale of a vessel: 
A Dutch judge cannot be forced to recognize privileges of 
91 2 FRANKENSTEIN 491, 
92 NIBOYET, 10 Repert. 17 No. 84, 18 No. 93· 
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enforcement not existent in our country to the detriment of 
our own subjects.98 
Normally, and in this matter with better foundation than 
ordinarily, the courts analyze foreign rights and equalize 
them with a type provided from those available in the 
domestic law.94 It may happen that a French ship mort-
gage thereby gains a better position in England than at 
home, 95 and a Dutch ship mortgage has a preference over 
liens in Germany which it does not have in the Nether-
lands, 96 which shows an unhappy method of comparative 
research by legislators. 
Again, if the law of the forum is not explained by a non-
existent procedural character of priority, it may rather be 
based on the emergency function of this device, an idea 
that may have practical consequences. The older American 
cases, mentioned before, applied the various foreign laws 
governing the individual rights. This, in application to 
recognition, though not to priority, is also the dominant 
attitude of the present courts, as demonstrated above. It 
follows that whenever these laws produce identical results 
of rank, they should prevail over the lex fori. In fact, 
such an exception has been made by the Dutch district court 
of Rotterdam. When the laws governing the competing 
93 Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 2, I927) W. 118I7, N.J. 1928, I27, I VAN HASSELT 
399· 
94 United States: The Graf Klot Trautvetter (I881) 8 Fed. 833. 
England: The Zigurds [I932] P. 113. 
Canada: Harney v. M.V. "Terry" ( 1947) [I948] I D.L.R. 728. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 20, I913) 57 Gruchots Beitrage I037; OLG. Hamburg 
(Jan. 30, 1894) and (Feb. 25, I899) Hans. GZ. I894, Hbl. No. 32 and Hans. 
GZ. 1899, Hbl. No. 65; FRANKENSTEIN 493 n. 90. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 20, I937) W. 1937, no. 879; Hof 
den Haag (Feb. 5, I937) W. I937 no. 875. 
95 The Colorado [I923] P. 102. 
96 RG. (Feb. 2, 1900) 45 RGZ. 276, with the curious observation, p. 283, 
that the Dutch mortgage is not lesser in value because there the privileges 
are of prior rank; does, thus, the mortgage gain "in value" if invoked in 
Germany? 
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claims, such as a mortgage contracted in Norway and an 
English lien for supply, agree on their rank, the lex fori 
is disregarded. 97 Thus, the emergency function of the 
domestic law of the court is perceived and adequately 
limited. Assuredly, the court for this purpose had to solve 
a difficult task of comparison. 
IV. RIGHTS IN AIRCRAFT 
I. Municipal Laws 
Although the national statutes relating to rights in air 
vehicles, despite some growth, are comparatively few, they 
have gone in different directions, making the sorely needed 
unification very difficult. A convention of I 948 had to be 
reduced for the most part to uniform rules stating require-
ments for extraterritorial recognition. Even so, of the 
nineteen signatories, the United States is the only major 
power that thus far has ratified the Convention. 98 
The cardinal differences 99 turn around the nature of air-
planes as simple chattels or special objects of rights; the 
existence and function of registers for private law pur-
poses; the types of security for financing the acquisition of 
rights ;100 and the treatment of the valuable engmes, acces-
sories, and spare parts. 
97 Rb. Rotterdam (May 5, I924) W. 11245, N.J. I925, 907, I VAN HASSELT 
381; accord, same court (Feb. 23, I928) W. 11822, N.J. 928, 778, I VAN 
HASSELT 402, cf., p. 359· 
98 Convention on Rights in Aircraft, Geneva, June I9, I948, I948 U.S. Av. 
R. 554; 4 Schweiz. Jahrb. Int. R. (I947/48) 297, ratified by the United 
States and Pakistan; ratifications by Chile and Mexico were declared in-
acceptable by the United States because of their reservations. 
99 See especially LEMOINE, Traite de droit aerien (Paris I952) ; OTTO 
RIESE, Luftfahrsrecht (Stuttgart I949); A. RABUT, Le transfer de propriete 
des aeronefs, Rev. franc;. de droit aerien (I950) IOj GAY DE MoNTELLA, 
Principios de derecho aeronautico (Buenos Aires I950); MoLINA, Nociones 
de derecho aeronautico (Tucuman I95I); SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, On Air 
Law (London I95I); M. DE JONGLART, Traite elementaire de droit aerien 
(Paris I952). 
100 See especially WILBERFORCE, "The International Recognition of Rights 
in Aircraft," 2 Int. L. Q. ( I948) 421. 
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In a development analogous to that of maritime law, 
aerovehicles are still regarded in some countries as ordi-
nary chattels subject to lex situs, 101 but the corresponding 
modes of transfer of title and constitution of rights in 
aircraft are progressively being replaced by registration, 
not requiring a transfer of possession.102 The Convention 
of 1948, though not in force, exercises some influence in 
this respect. Very few states, however, have a register 
specially designed for private law transactions; the others 
use the register of immatriculation, created for purposes 
of public law and police, if they have such. Also in the 
United States the register of the Civil Aeronautic Author-
ity serves for recording title and security transactions, 108 
although particular state statutes provide for recording 
of liens.104 
Effect of Recording. The American federal statute ex-
pressly states that registration with the Civil Aeronautic 
Board, though mandatory for the operation of an air-
craft, does not furnish conclusive evidence of ownership 
in a law suit.105 It has been held, in consequence, that a 
conditional sale without registration is not void.106 A com-
prehensive decision 107 explains that recording with the Civil 
101 England: SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, I.e. § 507A. 
Switzerland: BGes. Dec. 21, 1948; GuLDIMANN, 10 NF. Z. Schw. R. 19 
ff.; RIESE ET LACOUR, Precis de droit aerien (Paris 1951). 
102 France: LEMOINE, I.e., 173 states that airplanes are meubles par nature, 
but deviate in seven points from the principle; likewise: 
Italy: C. Navig. art. 861 concerning title; but arts. 1022-1037 regulate the 
hypothec completely. 
Cf., Uruguay: Law Dec. 3, 1942 § 8. 
103 Civil Aeronautics Act (June 23, 1938) 49 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522, 1948 U.S. 
Av. R. 554, 577; Act June 19, 1948, on recordation of ownership of aircraft, 
aircraft engines, and spare parts, 49 U.S.C. § 523, 1948 U.S. Av. R. 578. 
104 Infra u8. 
105 49 u.s.c. § 52I(b). 
106 Bishop v. B. S. Evans East Point Inc. ( 1949) So Ga. App. 324, 56 
S.E. (2d) 134. 
107 Jack Marshall v. Bardin (Kansas 1950) 216 P. (2d) 812, 1950 U. S. 
Av. 292. 
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Aeronautic Board is only necessary "to enable the pur-
chaser to operate the aircraft legally or to deal with the 
title as by a new sale or pledge;" that is, the protection is 
given to persons "who have dealt on the faith of the re-
corded title and to whom it would be a fraud to give effect 
to unrecorded titles to their detriment." Hence, an attach-
ment obtained by a money creditor of the recorded owner 
who had sold the plane by an unrecorded sale, was dis-
approved. As, however, this creditor was also said to 
have had knowledge of the sale, the theory of the case is 
difficult to define. 
Recording is considered an essential requisite of a pur-
chase in Italy, 108 Spain, and other countries; 109 much de-
bated, this view seems finally to prevail also in France.110 
Likewise parallel to the progress in maritime law, the 
creation of true rights in re has been reached in various 
forms through the medium of registration: hypothec, 111 
chattel mortgage, conditional sale or hire purchase, equip-
ment trust, and fleet mortgages. On the other hand, these 
types have very different characteristics, and more than any 
others, the question of separate security transactions con-
cerning accessories has divided the views. While motors 
108 Italy: former law Aug. 20, 1923, art. 7; Cod. Navig. art. 865: For 
the effects provided for by the Civil Code, the acts, constitutive, translative, 
or extinctive of title or other rights in re aeromobiles, or quotas thereof, are 
made public by transcription in the national aeronautic register, etc. 
109 Spain: see supra n. 48. 
Uruguay: Law Dec. 3, 1942. 
Venezuela: Law July 14, 1941. 
11° France: Law May 31, 1924, arts. II and u: "£'inscription au registre 
vaut titre," is interpreted very differently, but RIPERT, 1 Dr. Marit. (ed. 3) 
§ 430, states filing brings certainty as one in the German Grundbuch, fol-
lowed by RABUT, I.e. 16; JONGLART, I.e. 94 § 84. 
111 HOFSTETTER, L'Hypotheque aerienne (these Lausanne 1950). 
France: Law of May 31, 1924, art. 14, prescribes analogy to the fluvial 
hypotheque (Loi of July s, 1917), a much criticized solution, see LE GoFF, 
l.c. 541 § 107 S· 
Italv: C. Navig. arts. 1022 ff. 
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permanently connected with planes are incapable in many 
civil law countries of forming an independent object of 
security, 112 the American statute admits liens on aircraft 
engines, propellers, appliances, and spare parts by mere 
recording. 113 This contrast seems to be among those fatal 
to unification. 
2. Conflicts Rules 
The Convention of 1948, by making international recog-
nition dependent on recording, intended to encourage the 
establishment of registers of any kind, if only available to 
record private rights. The eligible types of rights for 
which this protection was provided were enumerated in a 
broad catalogue. But the text failed to define the validity 
of the acquisition of the rights. It is therefore contro-
versial what law governs the conditions and effects of the 
conveyance as contrasted with the conditions of recording. 
The question has been discussed in connection with the 
problem of the nationality of aircraft which was doubt-
ful114 but is increasingly fixed by the immatriculation. 
Nevertheless, in conflict law the significance of situs or 
flag, 115 as well as of the place of contracting or of the 
parties' intention,116 are not favored. While the Ameri-
can delegate to the 1948 Convention, Calkins, thinks the 
courts would prefer the law of the place where the plane 
is habitually held, 117 the question must be regarded as un-
settled. Evidently the necessary experience is not yet 
available. 
112 But see for Germany§ 93 BGB.; RIESE, Luftfahrsrecht 259· 
113 49 u.s.c. §§ 522, 523· 114 LE GoFF, Traite de droit aerien ( 1934) 183 § 339· 
115 RIESE, Luftrecht 28o; RIESE ET LACOUR 121 § 128. 116 WILBERFORCE, I.e. 426. 
117 CALKINS, "Creation of International Recognition of Title and Security 
Rights in Aircraft," 15 J. Air L. and Comm. (1948) 156, 160, citing N.W. 
Airlines v. Minnesota ( 1943) 322 U.S. 292 • 
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A peculiar situation exists in the United States in the 
federal-state relation. 
Recording with the Civil Aeronautic Board is insufficient 
to create recognition of a chattel mortgage in New York, 
where compliance with the local lien law is indispensable.118 
A state lien is also needed when a chattel mortgage has 
been defectively described at the federal level.119 On the 
other hand, a chattel mortgage recorded under the federal 
regulation has been held to enjoy priority over a state lien 
for repair .120 
118 Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardiner (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) 4 Misc. 798, 
22 N.Y. S. (2d) 37, 1948 U.S. Av. R. 633- This would be changed by U.C.C. 
sec. 9-302, 2(a). 
119 United States v. United Aircraft Corp. ( 1948) So F. Supp. 52, 1948 
U.S. Av. R. 473· 
120 Veterans and Express Co. (1948) 76 F. Supp. 684, 1948 U.S. Av. R. 178. 
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BILLS AND NOTES 
CHAPTER 58 
Principles 
I. SouRcEs 
T HE law of bills and notes has developed in the law merchant through many centuries. Although it has 
not everywhere been so responsive to mercantile habits 
and conceptions in such relatively 1 high degree as in the 
English courts, after they absorbed cases involving negoti-
able instruments from the merchant courts, the special 
requirements of commercial needs are observed in all juris-
dictions. 2 Most important of all, formal, simple, and re-
liable documentation of obligations is the primary char-
acteristic. And, of course, as one of the oldest means of 
international commerce, bills and notes should satisfy this 
requirement also during their travels through several coun-
tries. Unfortunately, usage and legislation, producing 
different rules, have impeded the unity of purpose. Con-
flicts law, at least, could have been expected to provide a 
clear and easy co-ordination of the national differences. 
The unification of conflicts law, however, that was obtained 
in Geneva, after long and intensive labor at the most suc-
cessful of all international commercial conferences, is limited 
as respects both territorial domain and material problems. 
1 Even the English courts, as is well known, submitted the merchant 
practice respecting bills of exchange to such common-law doctrines as that 
of consideration. 
2 Argentina: C.Com. art. 738 expressly mentions in connection with the 
laws also the commercial usages of the place where the instrument is 
executed. 
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1. The Written Laws 
(a) Communities. The Montevideo Treaty of Inter-
national Private Law of I889 established a series of con-
flicts rules relating to negotiable instruments, 3 which were 
substantially reproduced in the C6digo Bustamante. 4 
The Hague Uniform Regulation of I9IO-I9I2, pred-
ecessor of the Hague Convention of I930, was adopted as 
law in Yugoslavia, Turkey, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
and Venezuela. 
The uniform conflicts rules stipulated in Geneva in I930 
for bills of exchange and promissory notes-cited here-
after as Geneva Rules 5-and in I 9 3 I for checks have been 
ratified by eighteen states, including Soviet Russia and 
Japan, but no American country.6 The core of this legal 
community consists of the two groups developed either 
on the French system or on the German W echselordnung 
of I 848. The influence of the latter enactment, one of the 
most outstanding legislative works of all times, has been 
fortified by the German and Italian literature. German 
and Italian doctrine, in fact, is the natural counterpart of 
the common-law decisions in this matter, 
The Anglo-American group, although without an inter-
national agreement, is fairly united by the substantive rules 
of the British Bills of Exchange Act, I882, 7 and the Uni-
3 Argentina and four other states: See Vol. I, p. 29. 
4 Fifteen Latin-American states, see Vol. I, p. 32 ff., but without much 
visible effect on the practice. A comprehensive comment is offered by Josi! 
ANTONIO CORDIDO FREYTES, Les conflits en matiere de lettre de change dans 
Ia Convention de La Havane (these Paris 1954). 
5 The substantive Geneva treaty on bills of exchange and promissory 
notes will be cited as Geneva Convention. 
6 Austria (1932), Belgium (1932), Denmark (1932), Danzig (1935), 
Finland (1932), France (1936), Germany (1933), Greece (1931), Italy 
(1932), Japan (1932), Monaco (1934), Netherlands (1932), Norway (1932), 
Poland ( 1936), Portugal ( 1934), Sweden ( 1932), Switzerland ( 1932), 
U.S.S.R. (1936). 
7 The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 and 46 Viet. Ch. 61. 
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form Negotiable Instrument Act, in which all states of 
the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Colombia, 
Panama, and the Philippines participate. The conflicts 
rules, however, contained in the British Act (section 72), 
unhappily drafted, were omitted in the American Act and 
are replaced in this country by a confusing set of largely 
uncertain maxims. 
If, hence, the two groups of the common-law and the 
Geneva Rules have to be in the forefront of our discus-
. sion, nevertheless the fragmentary character of these prin-
cipal materials must be kept in mind. Even the Geneva 
Rules, though more complete than the provisions on con-
flict of laws in the Hague Uniform Law of 1912,8 are 
greatly disappointing because of their restricted scope. The 
Convention on the substantive law itself is incomplete. The 
Conflicts Rules have more omissions. Particularly, there 
is no provision on the essential requirements of validity of 
the contracts involved; on negotiability of the instruments; 
on the transfer of obligations by indorsement; on identifi-
cation of a person as holder. Neither do they determine 
the law governing the duties of the holder; the procedures 
of enforcement and of annulling titles lost or destroyed; 
the conflicts respecting "provision" (cover) ; accommoda-
tion bills; or the effect of limitation of action or preclusion 
impairing the rights of the holder. 
The effects of the obligations are more fully treated in 
the English Act and the Latin-American treaties, which, 
however, in other respects are even more fragmentary. 
(b) Isolated laws. Outside the conventions, some coun-
tries of the former French-Latin group have remained iso-
lated, such as Albania, Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
s They were restricted to form and capacity; on similar laws see 1 MEYER 
643 j TRUMPLER I 54· 
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Mexico, 9 Spain, and of the former German group Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. The impact of 
the present Soviet law is unknown to the writer. 
(c) Scope. The scope of the special conflicts matter 
seems to coincide with the extent of the law of negotiable 
instruments. The Anglo-American acts include "bills of 
exchange, cheques and promissory notes." The compar-
able older Continental laws were merely concerned with 
drafts (lettre de change, cambiale, gezogener W echsel) 
and notes (billet a ordre, vaglia or pagher6, eigener · 
Wechsel). More recently, separate enactments codified the 
rules on checks. 
To use correct language, we are forced to restrict our 
principal survey to bills of exchange and notes, or even to 
bills alone, although on most subjects the rules are the 
same in the larger categories. Some special problems of 
checks will be examined thereafter. 
2. Main Differences of Internal Law 
Opposite principles remain between the Anglo-American 
laws and the Continental groups, which are principally 
represented by the Geneva Conventions. We find ourselves 
today in essentially the same situation as Lorenzen (p. 20 
ff.) described in I 9 I 9, after the Hague but before the 
Geneva unification.10 It is therefore appropriate to follow 
his lead in enumerating what now remain as major sub-
stantial differences. 
9 Mexico: General ley de titulos y operaci6nes de credito, 1932. 
10 See for full analysis HUDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1931) 333; 
WIGNY, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) 1931, 8os; AscARELLI, Actes Congr. 
Rome, 303-3 n. 
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Anglo-American Group 
Elasticity of form 
Promise of interest allowed 
England : bill cannot be in a cer-
tain foreign currency (contra 
United States) 
Bill to bearer admitted 
Consideration necessary 
Conditional indorsement allowed 
Indorsement after maturity 
equivalent to bill at sight 
Reasonable time of presentation 
for acceptance 
Time for deliberation 24 hours 
Acceptance not dated in bills at 
sight may be completed by holder 
Continental Laws 
Rigorous formalism 
Geneva : only if the bill 
is after sight 
Contra 
Not admitted 
Contra 
Contra 
Merely an assignment 
Fixed periods, Geneva 
art. 34: one year 
Geneva art. 24 : the fol-
lowing day 
Geneva art. 25 al. 2: the 
holder must make pro-
test 
Partial acceptance not allowed Contra 
Indorsements following a spuri- Contra 
ous signature invalid 
3· Special and General Law 
The special statutes on bills of exchange, etc., do not ex-
haust the requirements and effects of the obligations or 
"contracts" of which they speak. The uniform rules are 
supplemented by the national special rules on negotiable 
instruments called for by the broad reservations and gaps 
ieft by the Geneva Convention and to a much smaller ex-
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tent by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.11 And 
there is a large domain, which varies and sometimes is 
very large, left to the general law of contract. According-
ly, we must evidently divorce the conflicts rules of the 
special matter from the general conflicts rules, so often 
applied by so many courts to "contracts" in general, al-
though we also have to co-ordinate the two groups. In 
this respect, lack of thought is manifest in almost all sys-
tems. 
Terminology. To obtain a clearer view of this subject, 
distinctive language will be indispensable. It does not exist 
in the common-law sphere, but it does in the Continental 
doctrines. German theory significantly speaks of W ech-
selerkliirung, W echselrechtssatz, and W echselanspruch, con-
trasting these with the declarations, rules, and claims of 
the "general" or "common" law. Likewise, Italians and 
French lawyers use the adjectives cambiario and cambial 
respectively, in opposition to what is outside, extra-
cambiario.12 
It is proposed that the terms cambial and extracambial 
may be employed to indicate a necessary and greatly, though 
not entirely, neglected distinction also in American law.13 
The obligations created by the acts of issue, indorsement, 
acceptance, etc., are often governed by the special "cambial" 
law as far as its limits are defined by the special conflicts 
11 See, e.g., City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ( 1939) 
105 F. (2d) 348. 
12 See the elegant definition by ANGELONI, La Cambiale 38: These obli-
gations are literal and complete in the sense that their content is exclusively 
determined on the basis of what results from the instrument which must 
suffice for itself. Cf., the Mexican thesis by ALMANZA, infra n. 47, 18; 
and see now Mexico: S.C., Amparo, Julio 4, 1952, 2 Rev. Fac. Der. (1952) 
254 no. 8, using Ley de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, art. 5, to dis-
tinguish the relaci6n subjacente from the literal obligation. 
13 The effect of the distinction is well expressed, for instance, in Alcock 
v. Smith [1892] 1 Ch. 238 speaking of an obligation: "This is not a question 
arising on the bill as a piece of paper or chattel." 
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rules. If a relationship, however, is uextracambial," as 
certainly should be recognized, e.g., in the case of the rela-
tionship underlying a writing on the bill, the special conflicts 
rules generally will not be competent, although there may 
be doubts and questions. (/ nfra II, 4). 
Another concept, difficult to do without, is what the 
Italian writers understand by 11letteralita" and the Germans 
have emphasized by their theory that the obligations flow-
ing from the bill are essentially conditioned by their writ-
ten form: obligation by the writing, "scriptural" obligation. 
Despite theoretical differences in the various systems, it is 
not true that Anglo-American law ignores the role of writ-
ing. This may most clearly be perceived when a bona fide 
holder for value is attributed just what the writing in the 
bill assures to him. 
These two new terms, cambial and written obligation, 
may suffice to facilitate our language.14 
II. THE RoLE OF THEORY 
1. Municipal Theories 
Anglo-American writers seem commonly satisfied with 
the language of the Acts speaking of the "contracts" ap-
pearing on negotiable instruments. (BEA s. 27 ( r) ; NIL 
s. 1 6) , without analyzing the elements of these transac-
tions. German and Italian literature, on the contrary, 
abounds in controversies and constructions respecting either 
the foundation or the nature of the special law on bills and 
notes.15 So much industry and cleverness has been expended 
14 A further differentiation was made by older writers such as GRiiNHUT, 
I I; KARL LEHMANN, Lehrbuch Hand. R. ( ed. 2) 613, 646, calling cambial 
private law, Wechselzi'Uilrecht, those parts of the general law to which the 
law of bills refers without incorporating them, e.g., capacity, form, effects of 
contract. However, no effect on the formation of conflicts rules has ever 
been suggested. 
15 For a complete though short review see MossA, Cambiale 27-125. 
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in this field that a reaction was due. The draftsmen of 
the Geneva Convention on the substantive law were very 
anxious not to be influenced by any theory, and insisted 
on being motivated exclusively by reasons of expediency.16 
Some commentators, therefore, declare it unnecessary to 
continue the old disputes.17 Other scholars, however, in-
vestigate the Convention in search of its theoretical basis, 
yet the variety of their conclusions somewhat defies their 
efforts. 
Whatever the truth of this matter may be, our study of 
the conflicts rules ought to start from a twofold statement. 
On the one hand, not only the Geneva product but 
virtually all present statutes do not purport to express any 
theoretical foundation. Their history in the law merchant 
is too old to depend on modern dogmatism. What sup-
ports them is mercantile convenience, mixed with lawyers' 
techniques, and, in the conflicts sphere, guided or misguided 
by the well-known mechanical rules. 
On the other hand, contempt of theories is to be avoided, 
insofar as they explain legislative half-thought by discover-
ing the rational underground. It would be difficult, indeed, 
to determine the most decisive local connections, established 
by an international bill of exchange, if we lacked clarity 
about the nature of the acts composing such a bill. This 
will appear conducive to a study of the different connecting 
factors such as delivery in common law and signature in 
civil law, the nature and extent of defenses, limitation of 
action, relationship between principal and guaranteeing 
debtors, etc. 
Theories were wrong in claiming that they explain the 
16 Conventions on bills, annex II art. 16; on checks, annex II art. 19. 
17 For information, see especially CAMILLO TROJANI, Teorie Cambiarie e 
Iegge uniforme (Roma 1936) ; HEINZ WIERS, Wechselannahme und Theorien 
im neuen Wechselgesetz, Kiilner Rechtswiss. Abh. N.F. Heft 19 (Mannheim-
Berlin-Leipzig 1935). 
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entire peculiarity of negotiable instruments, covering the 
relationships of drawer, acceptor, indorsers, and indorsees. 
We must recognize likewise that the legal ideas behind the 
particular, municipal or conflicts, rules are not mysterious 
theories of the kind of the popular doctrine discovering 
behind the favor granted to the good faith of a holder 
an effect of the appearance that his endorser was the 
right creditor (theory of apparent right, Rechtsschein-
theorie). But every single rule has a purpose that must 
be clarified and justified by a legal idea, as part of a sys-
tem. This is theory enough. In this connection three prob-
lems may be considered in the first instance. 
2. The Cambial Contracts 
The original concept of a contract based on a bill was 
coined by the old lawyers in view of the function served 
by bills of exchange at the time. The contract between 
the issuer and the recipient of the order to pay was a 
written delegation of a debt, saving the effective transpor-
tation of a sum of money, to be paid at a distant 
place. The French Ordinance of 1673 was accordingly 
interpreted by Pothier, 18 who was followed by more re-
cent authors. This contract included both the delegation 
or assignment of a debt agreed upon against consideration 
( valuta) and the delivery of the instrument as performance 
of the issue. Yet it was also possible to distinguish these 
two elements as pactum de cambiando and issue against 
valuta, a distinction often made in former German works. 
The French rule that the cover, the debt of the drawer 
against the drawee, is assigned by the bill is another de-
rivative of the delegation. 
In the common law, the contracts written in the bill are 
18 POTHIER, Traite du contrat de change, Oeuvres de Pothier ( 1847) vol. 4, 
p. 473 ff. 
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cornerstones of the legal system of bills. But what do they 
mean? Lorenzen 19 regretfully defines this contract as 
the ordinary concept expressed by this word, without re-
gard to the important fact that the obligation arises from 
the form of the bill rather than from mere agreement; this 
contract should not be burdened at all by the requirement 
of consideration. 
Our question is this: Does the "contract" as the word is 
used in the acts still mean the ancient contract of delega-
tion? If I am not mistaken, the answer should be negative, 
and what is meant is the pre-existent agreement presup-
posed before any formal contract is executed. It is the 
agreement between the immediate parties that the bill 
should be delivered with the signature of one party; hence, 
delivery of the bill, in correspondence with, "in order to 
give effect" to, 20 that agreement completes the transaction. 
This, of course, is simple language, neutral in itself to more 
searching analysis. But it does not justify the common 
notion of a "contract" including the entire legal transaction 
between the parties in question. Hence, the constantly 
urged opposition between the common-law emphasis on 
delivery as last act of the "contract" and the civil-law stress 
on the signature does not appear a priori quite convincing. 
On the Continent, quite a number of theories underlie 
a "contract" to assume cambial obligations. This is a 
different concept. What the parties agree upon by this con-
tract has primarily nothing to do with their basic relation-
ship such as sale, payment, or gift, but is limited either to 
unilateral issue of the bill or to issue plus delivery. Be-
19 LORENZEN 29. 
20 National Exchange Bank v. Rock Granite Co. (1911) ISS N.C. 43, 70 
S.E. 1002: In view of the rule that a contract is executed where "the same 
becomes a binding agreement," the courts hold that the liability of an in-
dorser is controlled by the laws of the state in which the note is indorsed 
and delivered. 
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tween these two variants there was much controversy; re-
cently, however, the theory, once proposed by Einert, re-
garding the unilateral "creation" of the instrument by the 
drawer as the source of the obligation has lost most of its 
following. There is a marked tendency among leading 
writers toward a combination of the written declaration 
by drawer or indorser, with a contract between him and 
the payee or indorsee, respectively, concluded by the de-
livery of the bill (German Begebungsvertrag). The 
German Reichsgericht has adopted this theory with respect 
to issuance and indorsement, though not acceptance.21 It 
has been contended that this is also the best foundation 
for the rules of the Geneva Convention.22 But even if this 
is correct, which must not be examined here, it should not 
imply in any case that all states, members of the Conven-
tion, have agreed on the high degree of abstractness as-
cribed to the German obligation written in a bill of ex-
change. This leads us to a problem not yet considered 
in the conflictS literature. 
3· Influence of Underlying Relationships 
To define the problem, a few facts of the municipal 
systems ought to be borne in mind. 
The problem scarcely regards the provisions of all legal 
systems whereby either "a bona fide holder," or "a holder 
in due course for value" is protected against the defenses 
that his debtor may draw from his underlying relationship 
with another cambial debtor. The position of this privi-
leged holder is independent of the ground on which prior 
holders acquired their own positions. This phenomenon 
21 RG. JW. 1928, 231; 134 RGZ. 33; formerly this theory was also applied 
to the obligation of the acceptor, 24 RGZ. 87; but this was abandoned, 
delivery not being required. 74 RGZ. 353, cf., 134 id. 34· 
22 Hence, the German Reichsgericht maintains its twofold theory, s. last 
note; 162 RGZ. 338; PRIESE-REBENTROST 4, 7· 
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is analogous to many other situations where a bona fide 
purchaser is protected. Particulars of requirements vary, 
but no fundamental divergence of views is in issue. 
If, however, we set aside this case, most important in 
practice but exceptional in the organization of the law of 
bills, there is a basic difference of degree in which the bill 
is detached from the underlying relation. The German 
law of negotiable instruments has elaborated a rigorous 
separation of the obligation flowing from the writing on 
the bill and the "cause" or legal ground of the undertaking. 
The debt arises from the signature and is enforceable even 
though fraud, error, duress, or dissent mar the underlying 
agreement,23 as is apparent when the holder sues his own 
indorser who fails to appear in court. The defect must be 
alleged and proved by the defendant. This is essentially 
the reborn classical Roman law of stipulatio and exceptio 
doli or exceptio pacti. In the French system, the writing 
produces but a presumption of the validity of the written 
obligation. Common law does not even recognize this 
much, although it is very difficult to ascertain its exact con-
ception. Without doubt, basically the efficacy of every obli-
gation in the bill presupposes the fulfillment of all require-
ments for validity and enforceability of contracts. 
This conceptional divergence has its principal importance 
in procedural situations such as nonappearance of the de-
fendant, summary procedure on instruments or privileges 
of enforcement, traditional in civil-law countries, but is 
not devoid of substantive effects. 
What, then, ought to be our approach to the following 
simple cases? 
23 The Reichsgericht (March 20, 1941) 166 RGZ. 306, overruling its own 
former practice, stated that the debtor cannot oppose defenses of his in-
dorser to a bona fide holder even though the latter is also creditor of the 
underlying debt. 
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In a lawsuit in Germany, the holder-for some reason 
not a holder in due course-sues on a bill issued in Chicago 
and indorsed to him in Frankfurt, Germany. The de-
fendant drawer, an American in Chicago, pleads usury in 
the contract between him and the payee. Or the signature 
of a French drawer, defendant against a subsequent in-
dorsee, upon an indorsement made in Germany, is attacked 
in a German court under evidence of fraud. Are these 
defenses to be construed under German lex fori? Under this 
law, this would mean the existence of a full right arising 
from the writing and of a mere defense based on unjust 
enrichment or on the tort of a collusive conspiration. Under 
Illinois law, there would be no obligation, nor under French 
law, after rebuttal of the presumption. Is the German con-
ception even applicable in all countries, because the rights 
of the holder are acquired under German law ex scriptura? 
No I Such approach would be detrimental to inter-
national circulation by exaggerating the power of local laws 
at the cost of the law under which the issue occurred. In 
other words, the law of Illinois or France, governing the 
validity and effect of the drawer's obligation, also deter-
mines what influence its own general law of contracts should 
have on the cambial obligation. Merely in favor of a 
privileged bona fide holder, a very large exception frees 
him from restrictions of prior holders, and, as we shall see, 
even models for him a new law of acquisition. 
A similar case occurs when an English drawer proves 
that no valuable consideration has been given either be-
tween drawer and drawee or between indorser and the 
present holder. The holder has no right at common law. 
In the exaggerated German system, he has a claim which 
must be repelled by a defense strongly controversial in the . 
literature. 24 
24 ULMER, Festgabe fiir Heck (133 Arch. Civ. Prax 1931) 213-ZIS· 
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Generally, it may be submitted that the influence of the 
underlying transaction on the obligation based on the bill 
is governed by the same law governing this obligation. 
This trivial result points to an important method. The 
special conflicts rules are deemed to refer to so much of 
the ordinary law of obligations of the decisive place as 
the domestic law of this place prescribes. This principle 
will help answer our next question. 
4· Scope of the Cambial Rights 
"Extracambial" (general law) obligations are naturally 
controlled by their own laws rather than by the law of the 
place of issue or indorsement or payment, the preferred 
contacts of cambial conflicts rules. A sale of goods pro-
duces obligations governed, e.g., by the law of the seller's 
domicil. If the buyer accepts a trade bill of exchange, he 
enters into an obligation under the law of the place where 
he has to pay, which is normally his own domicil. The 
seller may transfer both his debts to the same person, e.g., 
his discount bank, and the causes may be joined in a law 
suit. But the causes of action remain different. 
The questions whether the drawer has to furnish the 
funds to the drawee, 25 and whether the drawee is bound 
to honor the bill by acceptance and payment, depend mere-
ly on the underlying relationship between drawer and 
drawee, such as bank account, letter of credit, confirmed 
documentary credit, or other credit arrangement. Most 
25 ARMIN JON ET CARRY § 453; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 339 § 178; G. 
ARANGio-Ruxz § 85 against the older opinion of French Cass. civ. (Feb. 6, 
1900) Clunet 1900, 6os; DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 217; 0TTOLENGHI §55; PILLET, 2 
Traite 845; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 373; WEISS, 4 Traite 460. 
On the question whether the provision is transferred and by which act, see 
Geneva Rules art. 6, vol. 3, p. 442; cf., ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 341 § 180; 
otherwise DICEY (ed. 6) 683. And see on various connected problems 
HUPKA, Wechselr. 272. 
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authors apply the law of the drawee's domicil.26 More 
correctly, Arminjon invokes the law of the contract exist-
ing between drawer and drawee.27 That holders do not 
know whether there is a duty to accept, is certainly a dis-
advantage, but not one caused by conflicts law. 
Illustrations. (i) A bill issued in Germany, payable in 
Switzerland, was attacked by the acceptor on the ground of 
immoral consideration. German law governed the cambial 
requirements, but Swiss law was applied to determine 
whether good morals were offended. 28 
( ii) A bill of exchange was issued and accepted in the 
state of Monaco and payable in Rouen, France; the defense 
of the acceptors against the action of the holder was that 
the bill was given for payment of a sales price higher than 
the amount of the bill, to evade the tax laws, and that the 
debt depended on a certain condition. The Tribunal of 
Rouen allowed the action under the alleged law of Monaco. 
In correct application of the Geneva Rules, not the law 
of Monaco, but French law as lex loci solutionis governed, 
under which only a rebuttable presumption obtains for the 
existence of cover and the French provision avoiding a 
debt for fiscal fraud was inapplicable to a Monaco trans-
action. The alleged unfulfilled condition belonged to the 
extracambial relationship, effective between the original 
parties, though not against a holder in good faith.29 
(iii) A buyer paid a part of the price by indorsing a 
promissory note of a third person which was not honored. 
The court in Puerto Rico denied recourse of the seller 
against the buyer ( C.C. I I 70, derived from Spanish C.C. 
art. I I 70) on the theory that NIL abolished such claim. 
In reality, recourse in the underlying relationship is not 
affected by the cambiallaw.30 
2 6 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT § 646; DIENA, 3 Tratt. I I8 ff. § 227. 
27 ARMINJON ET CARRY § 438, p. 498 n. I, 2; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 326 
§ I7I; against other opinions, cf., LoRENZEN I48 n. 3 I3-law of the place of 
presentment; DICEY (ed. 6) 683. 
28 App. Zurich (Sept. I7, I929) 29 Bl. Zii. R. 298 No. I23. 
29 Trib. com. Rouen (June I7, I949), Roganne v. Quevillon, S.I950.2.4I, 
Clunet I9SO, 554, with critical notes. 
so Paris v. Canely (I9S2) 73 D.P.R. 403; Note, 22 Rev. Jur. Un. P.R. 
( 1953) 43· 
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Two doubtful cases have been dealt with by the Geneva 
Conflicts Rules. One regards the so-called claim for un-
just enrichment recognized by law where an extinguished 
bill is excluded as a cause of action. This claim is con-
strued in Germany as a residue of the "cambial" claim.31 
The other case is that of a French bill dishonored and 
lacking cover, so that the holder has no extracambial hold 
on the drawee, but under French law still enjoys a claim 
on the ground of the bill against the drawer, even though 
he lost his recourse through negligence. 32 
The Geneva treaty leaves both these cases to be deter-
mined by the law of the place of issue, although merely 
with force within the territory of this law.88 This is an 
arbitrary and unsatisfactory escape.84 
Cover. The Hague and Geneva Conferences proved un-
able to unify the conspicuous diversity of the laws concern-
ing the assignment of cover ("provision") . 35 By express 
statement, it was left to the national laws to decide whether 
the drawer has to provide cover at maturity and whether 
the holder has "special rights" in the cover.36 Conflicts 
rule 6 adds the provision that: 
"The question whether there has been an assignment 
31 See STAUB-STRANZ, art. 89 n. 2, and other comments to the Wechsel-
ordnung. See also ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 380 § 209. 
3 2 France: C. Com. art. u6, par. 6. 
33 Hague Convention, art. 6; Geneva Convention, annex II art. IS· 
34 For other subjects on the fringe of the law of bills see MoNACO I7. 
35 Supra Vol. III, p. 4I5 f., 44I ff. The particular laws are described 
by JoAQUIN VIJIL TARDON, La provision de Ia lettre de change (Paris/Laus-
anne I939) and the problems surveyed by ERNST E. HIRSCH, Der Rechts-
begriff Provision-im franwsischen und internationalen Wechselrecht (Mar-
burg I930). 
86 Annexe II to the Geneva Convention, art. I6. The legislators, thus, 
though inserting the assignments into the formal cambial law, separated them 
from the Convention. In this spirit, Italy used separate legislation to intro-
duce transfer of the underlying debt of the drawee in special cases, although 
requiring a formal clause on the instrument. See MossA, Cambiale I79 § SI; 
ANGELONI, Cambiale 765; R.D. Sept. 2I, I933 Nr. I34S, L. Jan. IS, I934 n. 48, 
art. I on bills secured through assignment of debts derived from supply of 
merchandise. 
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to the holder of the debt which has given rise to the issue 
of the instrument, is determined by the law of the place 
where the instrument was issued." 
The complex of problems thus excluded from the uni-
form set of rules, once prevailingly considered as of cambial 
nature, is of uncertain delimitation as respects the general, 
"civil," law.37 It would seem settled, however, that lex 
loci contractus governs the conditions of the transfer (e.g., 
whether there is an assignable debt or what is "cover"), 
the form of the transfer (by a written clause or by the 
force of law, that is, the fact of the issue), and at what 
time the assignment occurs (at issue, or at the time of the 
drawer's bankruptcy or at maturity).38 It results also 
from the long debates that the relationship between the 
holder and the drawee as well as the holder's preference 
over the creditors of the drawer depends on the law of the 
place of the issue.89 However, the rights and duties exist-
ing between the drawer and the drawee remain in the 
sphere mentioned above governed by the law of their con-
tract. 
The draftsmen chose the law of the issue against the 
strongly advocated minority view that the law of the place 
of payment is most directly concerned.40 In the law of 
checks, in fact, the latter contact .was adopted. This 
controversy and the further question whether the effect 
of the issue of a bill on the assignment of cover is really 
a cambial matter (as we think is the case), may explain a 
curious proposition by the editors of Dicey.41 They char-
37 Cj., supra n. zs and see the recent writings: ARMIN JON RT CARRY § 453; 
ARMIN]ON, DIP. Com. §§ 178-ISo; G. ARANGIO-Rmz § 85 where the partly 
different views of older writers are cited. 
38 HUPKA 273; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 339 § 178. 
39 STAUB-STRANZ, art. 95 n. s and cited German writers. 
40 This was still the proposal of PERCRROU in the Conference, Comptes 
rendus 364. 
H DICEY (ed. 6) 683 in fine. 
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acterize this problem as one not pertaining to the bill but 
to assignment and conclude that "a cheque drawn and is-
sued in Scotland" (where cover is deemed to be assigned) 
on a London bank should not operate as an assignment 
of the drawer's balance in England. This solution is in-
acceptable in the member states of the Geneva Convention 
as well as in the United States. Speaking of checks, the 
lex loci solutionis would be quite reasonable, b~t only with 
respect to cambial effects. As the English Act now stands, 
it presumably prescribes the lex loci contractus; 42 and 
an assignment of a simple debt ought to be governed by 
the law of the place of transfer rather than by the law of 
the debtor.43 
Again, if in the absence of any assignment by cambial 
law, the parties to the issue of a bill make an accessory 
special contract of equitable assignment, this, of course, re-
enters into the noncambial sphere; and this is true not-
withstanding the duty of diligence, which the payee or 
holder must observe where the bill is not paid.44 
Enforcement Privileges. The old instrumenta guaran-
tigiata permitted the creditor immediate enforcement with-
out preceding law suit for judicial ascertainment and con-
demnation. Such privileges still exist, particularly for en-
forcing a claim upon bills of exchange. In German law, 
there is no doubt about the procedural nature of this faculty 
of the creditor.45 In Italy, however, the decisions were 
divided on the characterization of the effects of a bill en-
42 BEA sec. 72 (2); the second paragraph on inland bills in this case 
is not applicable because of sec. 53· 
43 Supra Vol. III, p. 433 f., 415 f. 
44 England: Banner v. Johnston (I87I) L.R. 5 H.L. I57; Ex parte Dever 
in re Suse ( I884) I3 Q.B.D. 766. 
United States: 6 C.J.S., Assignments § 6o, esp. p. III2 relating to checks. 
45 RG. 9 RGZ. 430 and JW. Igo6, 7I6, n. IS· Once, it is true, SALPIUS, 
I9 Z. Handelsr. ( I874) I, 64, had to refute a theory connecting the law 
of protest and notification with the executive force of bills. 
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abling the holder to enforce without judgment. The 
majority considered the executive effect of the bill as a 
material quality of the obligation, controlled by the law of 
the place of the issue, hence accessible also to foreign 
bills. 46 Learned opinion, 47 sanctioned by the Supreme 
Court, correctly emphasized the procedural nature of the 
problem, calling for the law of the forum. 48 Hence, foreign 
bills sufficient as such under their law of issue should have 
enjoyed the privilege. The legislation of 1933, however, 
has restricted this consequence to bills so enforceable under 
their law of issue.49 
In the United States, clauses permitting the creditor to 
confess for the debtor, in order to reach at once a confes-
sion judgment, are prohibited in most, but not all, juris-
dictions. An unsettled controversy has brought up the 
most diverse answers to the question which law applies.50 
III. PRIVATE AuTONOMY 
Prevailing judicial authority in the United States 51 as 
well as in Europe 52 has taken it for granted that the free-
46 App. Venezia (Feb. 23, 1928) Rivista 1929, 273; (May 16, 1930) id. 
1931, 544i Cass. Ita!. (Nov. 23, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1935 I 17; App. Napoli 
(Dec. 8, 1935) Rivista 1938, 185; cf., DE NovA, Revue Crit. 1950, 362, n. 16. 
47 CHIOVENDA, Principii di diritto processuale civile (ed. 4, 1928) 130, 253; 
L. MoRTARA, Manuale della procedura civile (1926) vol. 2 § 790; D'AMELIO, 
Scritti 271; Bosco, Rivista 1929, 278; BALDONI, id. 1931, 548; MoNAco, 3 
Giur. Comp. DIP. 44; CAVAGLIERI in Banco, Borsa e Titoli di Credito 1942 
I 130 ff. 
Mexico: C. Com. art. 1391, IV: H.R. ALMANZA, Los Conflictos inter-
nacionales de !eyes en materia de Titulos de credito (Thesis, Mexico 1940) 
23, criticizes the lack of reciprocity. 
48 Cass. Ita!. (June 17, 1929) Foro Ita!. 30 I 101; App. Milano (July 
16, 1932) Foro Lomb. 1933, 464 cited by CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 400. 
49 Decree of Dec. 14, 1933, no. 1669 (Bills of Exchange Law) art. 63; 
MoRELLI, Dir. Proc. Civ. Int. 25 § 12. 
50 BEUTEL-BRANNAN (ed. 7) 290 ff., § 5 (2) j Note, 13 A.L.R. (2d) 1312 
(1950); DEAN, Ann. Survey Am. L. (1950) 48. 
51 STORY § 317 i 2 WHARTON §§ 447 ff. 
52 SURVILLE § 484 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 426 j HAUDEK 151 43 j RAISER 22 ff., 
34 ff., 42; KESSLER 141-143; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 297 § 150. 
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dom of the parties, in the limits as it exists in the various 
countries, extends to bills and notes. The American de-
cisions, from early beginnings in Massachusetts, applied the 
intended law of the contract, although this law was variably 
identified. It has frequently been argued in this country 
and abroad that the law of the place of drawing or endors-
ing governs because intended by the parties to the issue 
or to an indorsement, or that the place of payment is de-
cisive because it is contemplated when a note is made or 
acceptance is declared or even in other cases.58 In an im-
portant practical application, an intentionally wrong indi-
cation of a place of issue in a bill of exchange has been 
recognized as valid for the reason that the parties may 
thus determine the applicable law. The C6digo Bustamante 
in its primary rule of the matter declares for the law in-
tended by the parties. 54 
All these borrowings from freedom of contract are un-
necessary. Hypothetic intention is now replaced by ob-
jective criteria ;55 a false date presents a problem of its 
own.56 Assuredly, no positive law prohibits express agree-
ments to select a law;57 to have effect, however, within the 
cambial relation, the agreement would have to be written 
in the bill, 58 such as "Pay according to the law of Panama;" 
and such a clause seems to be extremely rare. 
Without a clear direction by the instrument's wording, 
the nature of negotiable papers is repugnant to party agree-
53 SALPIUS op. cit. n. 26, 17, taught that the place of payment is intended 
by the parties to govern the acts necessary for exercising and preserving re-
course; RENAUD, Wechselrecht, followed this view, but changed it later 
(ed. s, § 8). 
54 Cod. Bust. a. 264 ff. ("a falta de convenio"), criticized by CoRDIDO 
FRI!YTI!S (supra n. 4) 40 f., 93, 96, 98. 
55 Supra Vol. II, 436 ff. 
56 Infra Ch. 61. 
57 France: Paris (Aug. 18, 18s6) D. r8s7.1.39; (June 17, 1899) S. 1900.1.22S. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. IS, 1894) 32 RGZ. us. 
58 See the excellent argument of RAISER 51 ff. 
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ments outside the writing. Clauses not visible on the face 
of the instrument can have no effect except between the 
parties to the agreement. To accord private autonomy 
where- it does not belong compromises its necessary func-
tions elsewhere. 
The editors of Dicey's sixth edition to the same effect 
oppose the traditional doctrine of the proper law in mat-
ters of negotiable instruments.59 
This is also the case of the times allowed by the laws for 
presentment, protest, and notice. Modifications of the 
periods of time or of the sanctions, allowed in certain 
limits, must be indicated in the bill to affect third parties. 
Another matter is interpretation of the cambial declara-
tions. As the Italian Supreme Court puts it, neither the 
principle of letteralita nor even that of formalism prevents 
an interpretation of the declarations according to their true 
meaning. Thus, which of several signatures was that of 
the drawer, should be ascertained from the instrument but 
with the aid of all circumstances.60 
IV. THE BILL AND THE AccEssoRY OBLIGATIONS 
I. Principles. 
(a) The principle of the basic bill. Section 3 (I) of 
the British Act defines the formal requirements of a bill. 
It must contain the person who shall pay, the payee, the 
sum to be paid, the time of maturity, and the place of 
payment. Observance of these requirements is a condition 
for the existence of any right to be based on the bill; they 
are the common basis of the obligations of drawer and 
59 DICEY (ed. 6) 68I; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law § 468; WIGNY, Revue 
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) I93I, 8u; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 298 § I so; 2 PERCEROU 
ET BOUTERON I79 § 210. 
60 Italy: Cass. (Jan. IS, I940) Riv. Dir. Com. I940 II 237, 8 Giur. Comp. 
D. Com. n. 3 I. 
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acceptor as well as of all indorsers and other obligors. The 
German name for this basis is Grundwechsel. Its sub-
stance is analyzed as a mandate by the drawer to the 
drawee to pay, or in a note, the promise of the maker to 
pay. English expressions are "the bill," "the instrument," 
"the order or promise to pay." In more pregnant lan-
guage, Lorenzen speaks of the original contract in contrast 
to the ((acceding" contracts. In conflicts law the basic bill 
is doubtless subject to one, "the single" law, whereas the 
supervenient writings produce obligations either submitted 
to several laws or forming the subject of profound doubts. 
Again, consciousness of these contrasting concepts saves 
notable error and confusion. How could one so ignore 
the fundamental concepts as to advocate the law of each 
indorsement for determining the maturity of the bill! 
The American courts properly oppose the place of issue 
to that of payment, although all other contacts should not 
be excluded a priori. 
"The drawer of such a bill does not contract to pay 
the money in the foreign place on which it is drawn but 
only guarantees its acceptance and payment in that place 
by the drawee ... His contract is regarded as made at 
the place where the bill is drawn," with the conclusion 
that "the necessity of making a demand and protest and 
the circumstances under which the same may be required 
or dispensed with are incidents of the original contract 
which are governed by the law of the place where the 
bill is drawn rather than of the place where it is pay-
able. They constitute implied conditions upon which 
the liability of the drawer is to attach according to the 
lex loci contractus." 61 
(b) The principle of independence. The great majority 
of the courts in all countries have shown a remarkable unity 
61 Amsinck v. Rogers ( 1907) 189 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. 134, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
875· 
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in establishing the leading idea that the various obligations 
arising from declarations on the bill are governed by sev-
eral laws, each by its own independent law.62 In the United 
States, this principle has been stressed from the beginning 
in early Massachusetts decisions 63 and carried out more 
consistently than in English law.64 The statutes and con-
ventions have all followed the same path, despite mounting 
opposition. 
The reasons for this attitude are plain. Historically, 
the principle is connected with the rule, locus regit actum, 
working separately in every contract documented in the bill. 
It is argued, as usual, that a signer intends to be bound so 
far as the law of the place of contracting goes. "The law 
of the place of contracting and independence of contracts 
in a bill stay and fall together." 65 More impressive, a 
bank discounting a bill or a creditor taking it in lieu of 
payment does not want to inquire into foreign laws control-
ling anterior written obligations. 56 The courts seek to protect 
a resident of the forum as well ·as to avoid foreign laws. 
2. Difficulties 
The coexistence of the single law of the bill and the 
several independent laws of the accessory obligations is 
the most potent cause of disunity. In view of the discon-
certing divisions that arose in American decisions, a unitary 
law once postulated by Pothier 67 has been sought with 
62 On this subject see in the first place LoRENZEN'S book and RAISER 58 
ff., both with comparative research. 
63 Z WHARTON §§ 449 ff.; I DANIEL §§ 895 ff. The only clear deviation, 
in Shanklin v. Cooper (Ind. I846) 8 Blackf. 41, was overruled in Hunt v. 
Standart (I86o) 15 Ind. 33, 77 Am. Dec. 79· 
64 RAISER 41. 
65 GUTTERIDGE 16 (ser. 3) J. Comp. L. at 67. 
66 Both RAISER 59 and STUMBERG ZSS ff. emphasize this point. 
67 See I DANIEL § 901; MINOR 396; Committee of Legal Experts of the 
League of Nations, Doc. pn!par. 8. 
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particular energy in this country, aiming at "interdepend-
ence" rather than "independence." 68 But the law of the 
place of payment, most frequently resorted to in this 
effort, too evidently failed to help as a general criterion. 
The Geneva Rules disregarded the countercurrents to 
the dominance of the two principles, and merely established 
certain exceptions in favor of a single law. Severe criticism 
attaches at least to one of these exceptions, while others 
have been missed. 
The great problem remains almost as it was posited by 
Lorenzen in I 9 I 9: What questions are attributable to the 
law governing the bill as a whole and what questions ought 
to have their own law? This will be the subject of all fol-
lowing discussions. Clearly, the idea of independent obli-
gations is naturally limited by the basic requirements for 
the validity of all obligations in the bill. We should not 
forget that the law thereby applicable includes construction 
and general rules. 
Examples of settled solutions. (i) A bill is issued in 
France without indicating a time for payment and circulates 
in England. French law governing the original contract 
also determines the manner in which the day of payment 
should be filled in.69 
( ii) Where the amount of the sum is written in figures 
and letters contradicting each other, the law of the issue 
determines which amount is decisive. 70 
(iii) If the bill is "payable to P," the law of the place 
of issue determines whether it is payable to order ( BEA, 
s. 8, 34) or non-negotiable (NIL, s. 8). 71 
68 POTHIER, Contrat de change § 155 (for protest) ; 2 BAR 169; 2 BROCHER 
314; PILLET, 2 Traite 856 If. 
69 Infra Ch. 6r, IV. 
70 ARMIN JON ET CARRY 489 § 432. 
71 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws 283. 
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\iv) Whether a drawee may pay upon a forged indorse-
ment and whether, therefore, the drawer is liberated, is 
determined by the law of the place of payment as that 
governing the position of the drawee. 72 
72 Caras v. Thalmann (1910) IZ3 N.Y.S. 97, infra Ch. 6z. 
CHAPTER 59 
Formal Requirements 
I. FoRM AND SuBSTANCE 
I. Essential Requirements 
The traditional Continental doctrine is so accustomed 
to distinguish between formal and intrinsic requirements of 
acts and between validity and effects of obligations, that the 
writers unhesitatingly extend these notions to the law of bills 
and notes. In this spirit the Geneva conflicts rules establish 
different rules for "form" (article 3) and "effects" (article 
4), although they entirely fail to mention the material re-
quirements. 
English and American authors reject any distinction be-
tween formal and material validity/ although it is con-
troversial whether the English statutory rule on validity 
and "interpretation" includes "effects." 
At the same time, Anglo-American law generally is less 
rigorous in establishing invalidity of obligations for lack 
of written expression. They do not require, for instance, 
the indication of the paper as bill of exchange, of the date 
or place of the issue ;2 in the United States, however, the 
order clause is essential, 3 unless the paper is payable to 
bearer. 
The true situation has been explained by a number of 
1 LORENZEN 99 f. and in 30 Yale L. J. s6s; BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. I; 
GUTIERIDGI!, I6 (Ser. 3) J. Comp. L. 62-66. 
2 BEA s. 3 ; NIL s. I and 6 against Gen. Conv. art. I and 2. 
3 NIL sec. I (4) against BEA art. 8 (4) ; Gen. Conv. art. II. For other 
points of comparison see WIGNY, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) I93I at 8os. 
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authors. 4 All essential formal requirements involve the 
necessity of a written word or clause in the bill and at the 
same time are an integral part and condition of the content 
of the contract. The statutes enumerate them exhaustive-
ly. A more appropriate category than form is that of 
"extrinsic" requirements, contrasted with "intrinsic" con-
ditions, such as cause or consideration and consent.5 
"Form," thus, is not a satisfactory category of conflicts 
rules on negotiable instruments. The rules using this term 
are extended by interpretation to broader concepts. But 
the only adequate and also the widest concept is that used 
by the American courts: validity of the contract, which in-
cludes "form and substance." 
Yet, such outstanding statutes as the British Act and the 
Geneva Rules employ narrower language and provoke 
doubtful interpretations. 
2. Narrow Enactments 
Sections 72 (I) and ( 2) BEA subject both "form" and 
"interpretation" of drawing, indorsing, etc., to "the law of 
the place where such contract is made." An active contro-
versy whether "interpretation" includes validity on material 
grounds is still going on. 6 Chalmers advocated broad con-
struction.7 Recently, however, new doubts have arisen from 
the desire to apply the law of the place of payment to the 
bill in general. 8 On the platform of the dominant doctrine, 
Chalmers' construction is certainly right. 
4 DESPAGNET 988; 0TTOLENGHI 8 I; LoRENZEN 100; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 422; 
VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch 493· 
5 G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 183 ff. 
6 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. I; NIBOYET, Manuel 6 57 n. 4; GUTTERIDGE r6 
(Ser. 3) J. Comp. L. 62. 
7 CHALMERS (ed. rr) 236. 
8 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 283; DICEY (ed. 6) 691, advocating the Jaw 
of the place of payment. 
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Article J, paragraph 1 of the Geneva Rules runs as 
follows: 
"The form of any contract arising out of a bill of ex-
change or promissory note is regulated by the laws of the 
territory in which the contract has been signed." 
Article 2 deals with capacity and article 4 with effects; 
both apply, in principle, the same lex loci actus. Nothing 
is said about other requirements of validity. This defect 
must be, and commonly is, cured by extensive construction 
as in the British Act. Since the law of the place of signa-
ture governs "fprm," capacity, and "effects," intrinsic 
validity cannot escape the same law. This result creates a 
partial uniformity with American practice and lessens con-
siderably the importance of the concept of form. 
Nevertheless, the following survey is forced by the exist-
ing legal situation to proceed from "form" to "material 
validity" to "effects." Not only are the obligations of an 
acceptor and a maker governed by special laws under vari-
ous rules, but the enacted laws have piled up distinctions 
and exceptions just in regard to formalities. 
Concept of Form. In this matter, the contention, main-
tained by this writer, is commonly accepted that conflicts 
law must have an autonomous concept of form, viz., the 
external expression of a transaction. 9 To the same effect, 
the English leading case, Guaranty Trust v. Hannay, has 
subordinated to the rule on "form" the question whether 
a chain of indorsements is interrupted by an agent signing 
for the payee or an indorsee, without indicating that he is 
an agent.10 
9 Supra Vol. II, p. 497· 
10 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay [1918] I K.B. 43, [1918] 
2 K.B. 623. Cf., Koechlin et Cie. v. Kestenbaum [1927] I K.B. 616, 897, 
per Bankes, L.J., 899 per Sargant, L.J., and comment by the editors of 
DICEY (ed. 6) 685. 
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3· Scope of Form 
I 57 
Although a sound construction of the statutory and con-
ventional provisions may be satisfied with certain analogies 
to the rules on "form," their direct application goes rather 
far into the province of the substantive function of essential 
form requirements. The rule, referring formalities to 
the law of the place of acting, has been applied, e.g., to the 
questions: 
Whether the instrument is complete in form 11 
Whether a contract in a bill is unconditional 12 
Whether a clause indicating the consideration ("Valuta 
clause") is essential, 13 or 
Whether an indorsement in blank is admitted, 14 and 
Whether acceptance may be declared orally, according 
to one decision of the United States Supreme Court,15 which 
is contradicted by another decision 16-
What law determines the treatment of an incomplete 
declaration, which, however, complies with the formal 
essential of the law of the issue? 17 For instance, a bill is 
issued in the United States and sent to France to be filled 
in when an indorser is found. In one view, American law 
should prescribe how the instrument should be completed, 
because no new contract is made by the agent in France.18 
11 Editors of DICEY ( ed. 6) 68 s n. 77 find this "illogic but convenient," 
but I do not see why it is not a necessary incident of the lex loci. 
12 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay, supra n. 8, found no 
conflict because the bill was not conditional under both laws; Koechlin v. 
Kestenbaum, supra n. 8. 
18 NoRBERTO PINERO, La Letra de Cambio (Buenos Aires 193z) 193• 
14 Admitted in the common law and Argentina, prohibited in the Geneva 
Convention and most civil-law jurisdictions. 
15 Scudder v. The Union National Bank of Chicago (1875) 91 U.S. 406. 
16 Hall v. Cordell ( 1891) 14Z U.S. 116. Both decisions use fictitious as-
sumptions of party intention. 
17 See the exhaustive comment by LoRENZEN 88-90. American courts have 
dealt with very few problems concerning pure form. See z BEALE nBs 
§ 336.1. 
18 Thus, applying art. 3 of the Geneva Rules, ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 301 
J ISZ· 
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Under another view, French law decides, since the local 
law is better suited to regulate the formal requirements.19 
But since a bill carrying a blank permissible under the law 
of the issue is a valid instrument, the first view is correct. 
Only where the bill is deemed to be issued in the second 
country should it be considered subject to the place where 
it is completed. 
Likewise, the law of the issue determines whether un-
desirable additions to the normal initial context of a bill 
should be taken as not written or make the bill void. 20 
II. Locus REGIT AcTUM 
In a notable unanimity of principles, all laws agree that 
the "form" of an act contained in a bill or note is subject 
to the law of the place where this act is done. 
1. Imperative Function 
In this matter, lex loci actus has commonly preserved its 
imperative force. 21 But, curiously, French courts, from the 
beginning of this century, developed the tendency to con-
vert the principle to its general modern role as merely per-
missive, creating an option between lex loci and the national 
law of the parties.22 Under the Geneva Rules, now in 
force, there can scarcely be a doubt, also in France, that 
the parties may not choose their national law. Only the 
provisions reserving the application of the national law to 
the states have the power of derogating from the law of 
the place of the act. The domiciliary law is entirely ex-
cluded. 
19 Cf., ARMIN JON ET CARRY 472, and Gen. Conv. art. 13 par. 2. 
20 On the difference, Swiss BG. (Feb. 28, 1930) 65 BGE. II 66; cf., 74 RGZ. 
339; RG. Jur. Woch. 1935, 1778 against the case of 21 ROHGE. 169. 
21 DIENA, 3 Tratt. 22 §§ 209-212. 
22 DIENA ib. p. 33· Cf., supra Ch. 55 and Ch. 58, III. 
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2. Where is' the act done ? 
I 59 
The problem is old. The statutists usually discussed the 
case where a bill of exchange signed by the drawer or in-
dorser in one place is sent to the payee or indorsee staying 
in another place. Jan Voet solved it as follows: 
"Quia vero, in quibusdam circa cambiorum jura variant 
leges et consuetudines variarum regionum, notandum est, 
in decidendis circa haec controversiis spectandas esse leges 
loci illius, ad quem litterae cambii destinatae, et in quo vel 
acceptatae, sunt, vel acceptari debuerunt, non item loci uncle 
missae; cum illic contractus intelligatur celebratus, ubi im-
plementum eius destinatum est." 23 
This doctrine was fully adopted in England. Sending 
and receiving the document completing the act constitute 
the test of the applicable law. On the Continent, the con-
trary doctrine prevailed. The signer assumes his obliga-
tion by the signature itself, which in some systems may also 
dispossess him of the title. 24 These antagonistic theories 
have been perpetuated with certain modifications. 
(a) The Common-Law Doctrine. According to the 
British Act 25 and established American practice, 26 the ap-
plicable law is determined by the place where a bill is de-
livered by the drawer, or indorser, with his signature. 
Delivery is legally defined as 
"transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one 
person to another." 27 
Leaving out, for the moment, the acceptor, who is treated 
differently, what reason is given for this important rule? 
The statutes themselves seem clearly to indicate that de-
livery is essential inasmuch as it "completes" the act.28 
23 Comm. ad Pand. L. XXIII, tit. II§ xo. 
24 DIENA, 3 Tratt. 25 n. I. 
25 BEA sec. 21; NIL s. x6. Canada: BEA ss. 2, 31, 32, 39, 40, 41, 178. 
26 Ludlow v. Bingham ( 1799) 4 Dal. 47; Restatement § 312. 
2 7 BEA s. 2; NIL s. 191. 
28 BEA s. 21; NIL s. 16: completions to the act. 
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The latter proposition is literally true; if a hill is signed 
on a Sunday and delivered on Monday, it is not deemed 
to fall under the Sunday statutes.29 Hence, the theory that 
the place of the final act in the course of concluding a con-
tract determines the law applicable to the contract, has been 
applied here-this is Beale's teaching.30 
Not believing in the soundness of this theory, I think 
that it does not even do justice to the common-law doc-
trine.31 However, at this juncture, it is important to note 
the large qualifications of the principle. 
Where the signer is authorized to send the hill by mail, 
it is remembered that the English postal regulations pre-
vent the sender from reclaiming a posted hill; therefore, 
the place where the signer mails the letter is deemed to he 
the place of delivery.32 (This theory is not readily appli-
cable to foreign mail in case the sender of a letter may 
retrieve it from the post.) 33 In the absence of authoriza-
tion and of estoppel, the decisive place would he where the 
postman hands out the paper.34 But this case is quite rare. 
In domestic business, it may he taken as the rule that the 
"contract" is completed by a unilateral act quite as ordinary 
29 In re Estate of Martens (1939) 226 Iowa 162, 223 N.W. 885. 30 The definition by 2 BEALE 1047 f. of delivery as the final act making 
the contract binding is corrected by FALCONBRIDGE 276 f.: the issue is com-
pleted by the delivery, but the binding force depends upon the applicable 
law. However, our problem is why common law has derived this rule 
from the binding force of delivery. 
81 lnfra Ch. 61. 
32 England: Ex p. Cote In re Deveze (1873) L.R., 9 Ch. App. 27, 31 f., 
per Mellish, L.J.; Klein worth v. Comptoir National d'Escompte [1894] 2 
Q.B. 157; Thairlwall v. Great Northern Railway [1910] 2 K.B. 509 
CHALMERS ( ed. 12) 52 n. I. 
United States: Trego v. Cunningham's Est. (1915) 267 Ill. 367, 108 N.E. 
350. Restatement§ 314. 
33 In re Deveze (1873} L.R. Ch. App. 27, 31 f.; C.A. in Chancery, per 
Mellish, L.J. 
34 Lysaght v. Bryan ( 1850) 9 C.B. 46, 137 E.R. 8o8. 
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contracts are concluded by mailing acceptance,35 and this 
also in the United States, despite modified postal rules.36 
This act, theoretically, is independent of the transfer of 
ownership; but again, the transfer of title will usually coin-
cide with acceptance according to the intention of the 
parties. As delivery may be constructive, it can be effected 
by what is called in civil law constitutum possessorium.87 
Since signing and sending, thus, occur at the same place, 
the result approaches closely the Continental legal situa-
tion. Yet, this is not all. According to the statutes, a valid 
and intentional delivery is presumed when a signer is no 
longer in possession of the bill ;38 and the same is "con-
clusively presumed" in favor of a holder in due course.39 
A holder in due course is not required to deliver the original 
bill to the payee in order to exercise his indorsement 
rights. 40 "Where the instrument or an acceptance or any 
indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima 
facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance, 
or indorsement." 41 Finally, an indorsement is presumed 
to be made at the place where the instrument is dated.42 
Although the last provision no longer fits the circumstances, 
the other rules are of high practical value, notably the non-
35 It may also be recalled that an insurance policy indicating that it 
is signed, sealed, and delivered may be kept by the insurance company for 
the disposition of the insured and is then deemed to have been delivered. 
Xenos v. Wickham (1867) L.R. z H.L. at 31:z. This has been generalized 
for deeds. 
36 Dick v. U.S. ( 1949) 8z F. Supp. 3:z6, for this reason rebelled against the 
mailbox theory, but see Note, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 140-14Z. 
37 Pennington v. Crossley & Sons ( 1897) 13 T.L.R. 513. 
United States: 6 C.J.S. 513 n. 63, cited with approval by Seawell, J., in 
Everett v. Carolina Mortg. Co. (1939) z14 N.C. 778, I S.E. (zd) 109, 113. 
3S NILs. 16 i.f. BEA s. ZI (3). 
39 NILs. 16 sent. 3; BEA s. ZI (z) i.f. 
4° City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. (Fla. 1939) 
105 F. (zd) 348, 350. 
4 1 NILs. 11; BEA s. 13(1). 
42 NIL s. 46. See also Chemical Nat. Bank of N.Y. v. Kellogg ( 1905) 
I83 N.Y. 9Z, 75 N.E. 1103. 
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rebuttable presumption in favor of the bona fide holder. 
American courts also have held that the place at which an 
instrument is dated is deemed prima facie to be the place 
of delivery 43 and that this presumption is conclusive for 
the benefit of a holder in due course.44 
{b) The Civil-Law Doctrine. The place where the sig-
nature is written has been selected on the Continent be-
cause it is said to be easily identified either by the writing 
or by other evidence. This practical motive inspired the 
draftsmen of the Geneva Rules, who definitely were unwill-
ing to subscribe to any theory of unilateral creation of obli-
gations. But, again, is this reason convincing? The answer 
largely depends on the solution of the question : whether 
the "place of the signature" means the true place where it 
has been executed or the place where the instrument says 
that the signature was made. 
Locus verus or locus scriptus? This is an old and un-
fortunately still controversial problem. Pothier wrote that 
the absence of a date or an error in it cannot be held against 
the drawer or the acceptor, no more than the omission of 
the place where the bill is written.45 Yet modern prevail-
ing opinion clings to the place of signature in its true form 
and denies that ignorance of a holder should be protected 
when he believes in a falsely alleged place. 46 To be sure, 
43 LoRENZEN 84 citing Lennig v. Ralston ( 1854) 23 Pa. Sta. 137; Second 
National Bank v. Smoot (D.C. 1876) 2 MAcARTHUR 371; Parks v. Evans 
(Del. 1879) 5 Houst. 576. 
44 Towne v. Rice ( 1877) 122 Mass. 67; LoRENZEN 85 n. 95· 
45 POTHIER, Contrat d'echange (4 BUGNET 486) § 36. 
46 Austria: OGH. (Oct. 6, 1905) 19 Z. int. R. 285; BETTELHEIM 109. 
France: App. Colmar (March u, 1933) Rev. Crit. 1934, 138; and Note 
NrBOYET. 
Germany: (formerly) OLG. Niirnberg (May 6, 1925) JW. 1926 384; 
check issued in Germany, dated at New York; the presumption that the 
issue was in New York is adopted but held rebutted by the fact that the 
check, as early as four days after issue, was negotiated in Germany. BAR, 
Int. Hand. R. 384; M. WoLFF, Festgabe fiir Wieland ( 1934) 457; STAUB-
STRANZ 85 n. 3, 91 n. 15. 
Italy: Dri!NA, 3 Tratt. 26. 
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there is a rebuttable presumption that the place written is 
the true place.47 
A contrary opinion which originated in Germany main-
tains, however, that the written place enjoys preference, 
whenever its law subjects the debtor to a stronger liabil-
ity.48 Certain authors of this group restrict this view to 
the protection and choice of bona fide holders. A justi-
fication has often been sought in the general freedom of 
the parties to select the applicable law by choosing an 
appropriate place and indicating it as the place of signature. 
At present, on the ground of the Geneva Rules, the 
dominant opinion follows the impressive majority of the 
commission drafting the Geneva Rules who gave unmis-
takable approval to the strict requirement of the real 
place. 49 Diena was particularly eager in advocating this 
ngor. Although the presumption in favor of the written 
place is conceded,50 no holder enjoys a defense against the 
proof that the signature was affixed at a place not visible 
on the bill. 51 Where the fictitious character of the indi-
cation is evident on the face of the instrument, the court 
47 23 RGZ. 500. It is presumed that a merchant signs a bill at his 
business place, a private person at his domicil. 
48 Germany: ROHG. (May u, 1872) 6 ROHGE. 125; RG. (Jan. 15, 
1894) 32 RGZ. 115, 117; 91 id. 130 (with respect to bills issued "abroad"); 
KG. (May 22, 1916) 35 ROLG. 2; and constant practice of the 13th division. 
IPRspr. 193 I 96; 1932 95 and 101; 1933 46; JW. 1932 754, and see supra 
n. 8. 2 BAR 182; 2 GRiiNHUT 579 n. 35; I MEYER 651; 2 id. 368; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 426; NuSSBAUM 319; ULMER, Wertpapiere 286. 
Italy: MossA IX 3 Annuario Dir. Comp. 367 ff.; MoNACO 109. 
Switzerland: BG. (April 6, 1900) 26 BGE. II 258; (April 3, 1912) 33 
BGE. II 135; (July 7, 1914) 40 BGE. II 407. 
49 A German proposal in favor of the written place was rejected, Comptes 
rendus 352, 430. 
50 PRIESE-REBENTROST, Art. 92 n. 2. MoNACO 108: the literal wording has 
preference over the not mentioned reality. 
51 ARMINJON ET CARRY 474; G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 149 ff. 
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has to note it ex offi.cio.52 However, not everyone shares 
this view.53 
In case a written place or date is mtssmg, some laws, 
such as the Geneva Convention (article 1) with respect to 
the drawer's or acceptor's signature, declare the obligation 
inexistent. Where this is not the law,54 it is commonly 
assumed 55 that the place of the signing may be proved by 
means of evidence allowed at the forum. If no evidence is 
presented, much favor is shown for the law of the domicil 
of the obligor,56 because this place is usually known to the 
parties or is easily ascertainable. It is also normally just 
the place where the signature is expected to happen. 
Delivery in municipal civil law. Our comparison would 
be entirely defective, if we were not to appreciate the force-
ful European debates about the role that delivery, that is 
transfer of the title in the paper, exercises in the law of 
negotiable instruments. Without accepting every shade of 
any of the various doctrines, it seems, indeed, almost ob-
vious that a normal creation or transfer of a bill is com-
posed of three acts: agreement, signature, and delivery, 
of which the first in the Germany theory is extracambial. 
Some authorities lay all the weight on the contract of de-
livery (Begebungsvertrag). But even theories starting 
from the idea that the main part of the entire transaction 
is the unilateral act of signing, at present consider delivery 
among the essential elements. Thus, in the view of a 
52 App. Colmar (May II, 1933) Rev. Crit. 1934, 138. 
53 See infra n. 61. The Kammergericht upheld its practice, supra n. 
41 j (Nov. 4. 1935) JW. 1936, 2102, contra: RILK, ibid.,· KNUR UND 
HAMMERSCHLAG, Kommentar zum Wechselgesetz (1949) art. 92 n. I. See 
HUPKA 253, RAISER 57; ULMER, Wertpapiere 285 agrees in principle but 
gives the holder a choice to qualify his claim in accordance with the real 
place of signature, apparently the result of GRUNHUT, supra n. 41. 
u BEA s. 4. 12; NIL s. 129, 13; Portuguese C. Com. art. 282. 
55 See MONACO III f. 
56 SALPIUS, 19 Z. Handelsr. ( 1874) II j 2 BAR 182 j 2 MEYER 368 j BETTEL-
HEIM IIOj RAISER 55· 
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leader of scholarly research, the unilateral act of signature 
creates the cambial obligation only under the legal con-
dition that the contract of delivery of the instrument fol-
lows. The full legal effect is brought about by the two con-
nected acts.57 Of course, in the case of a bona fide holder, 
the contract of delivery is complemented by the protection 
of bona fides. 
Rationale. The Anglo-American modifications of the 
axiomatic function of delivery obviate largely the disad-
vantages connected with the fact that the place of delivery 
is never visible on the bill. But the principle is defeated by 
the exceptions, and the reliance of conflicts rules on pre-
sumptions and fictions also is a sign of an unsound theory. 
On the other hand, the German theory gives the signa-
ture exclusive importance, in contradiction to the necessity 
of delivering the bill for any normal purpose. Moreover, 
the insistence on the real place of signing, ultimately de-
riving from a credence in the magic power of lex loci actus, 
is palpably wrong, while granting a choice of position to a 
bona fide holder merely shows that the main rule is inept. 
It seems that the draftsmen of the Geneva Rules drew an 
exaggerated conclusion from what they thought might be 
a fraude a la loi in the case of a minor who fakes a place 
where he would be of full age; in the case of formalities, 
such fear of fraud in business matters is even more un-
realistic than with respect to capacity. 
The damage done thereby to international circulation of 
bills cannot possibly be repaired by excepting the case where 
the signer is supposed to have advisedly submitted to the 
57 ULMER, Wertpapiere 41 ff., 53· The impressive Italian literature 
reaches a similar conclusion. The act of creation, whether conceived as a 
factual act (MossA, CARNELUTI'I, RAvA) or as a legal transaction 
(ASCARELLI), combines with the act of transfer or issue (emission), con-
sisting of delivery and acceptance; see the summary by G. ARANGIO-
RUIZ, 133 f. 
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law of the written place. Even if party autonomy were 
to be recognized in the law of negotiable instruments 
(which is a wrong theory) uncertainty of proof and arbi-
trariness of its judicial admission are unsound elements. 
Likewise the idea of estoppel, adduced in some American 
decisions against others, 58 is a precarious corrective. 
Whether the misled holder may sue the signer of an in-
strument with a false date by action in tort, 59 a poor sub-
stitute, 60 depends too much on the circumstances to be a 
real help. The only way out is the frank statement that, 
at least in the case of a bona fide holder, the written place 
alone is what counts; this has been judiciously advocated 
even under the equivocal text of the Geneva Rules, in de-
fiance of the draftsmen, especially Diena. 61 
3· Conclusions 
In a considered review of the Geneva debates, Gut-
teridge 62 connects the test of delivery with the commercial 
requirement that the paper should be in the hands of the 
payee or indorsee, and prefers it for instruments to bearer 
(where all systems agree), for giving a paper in escrow, 
and for documents in C.I.F. contracts and bankers com-
mercial credit. With respect to the ordinary instruments 
to order, Gutteridge considers that the problem, restricted 
to the liabilities of drawer and indorser and to circulation 
outside territorial limits, could be solved in either way, 
especially because usages may be changed to increase the 
cases where signature and delivery coincide. 
58 Watson v. Boston Woven Cordage Co. ( 1894) 26 N.Y.S. 1101; Chemical 
Natl. Bank v. Kellogg ( 1905) 183 N.Y. 92, 75 N.E. 1103; Contra: Basilea 
v. Spagnuolo (N.J. 1910) 77 Atl. 531. 
59 M. WoLFF, Festgabe fiir Wieland ( 1934) 459 ff. 
60 MONACO 102. 
61 WIGNY, Rev. Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) 1931, 804: Quod non est in cambio, 
non est in mundo; HuPKA 250; RAISER 57 ff.; VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergleichendes 
Handworterbuch 509; MoNACO 105 ff. § 30. 
62 GUTTERIDGE 16 (ser. 3) J. Comp. L. at 71. M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. L. 
§ 464 goes over to the delivery test. See also DICEY ( ed. 6) 688 n. 4• 
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In my opinion, both systems suffer from theoretical 
prejudices and should make place for a more earthy con-
ception. Delivery, taken as the "final act," and signature, 
taken as the exclusive creative force of the obligations, are 
both incompetent to govern. To restrict their pretended 
scopes, rebuttable and unrebuttable presumptions are in-
adequate. 
In the case of a place written in the bill, a bill intended 
to circulate-and there is really no limit to the territory 
where a negotiable instrument may circulate-it is difficult 
to understand why this date should not indicate the place 
of contracting in the meaning of conflicts rules. The true 
main ground on which the contracts arise and the basis 
for the peculiar working of a bill, is the writing. It is 
definitely the only practical answer to the much ventilated 
problem of locus verus v. locus scriptus, that whenever a 
place is indicated on the bill, this place determines the 
applicable law. That immediate parties are always sub-
ject to the defenses inherent in their underlying relation-
ships and third persons may be liable for tort are self-
evident counter-instances rather than the basic rule in the 
matter. 
In the absence of a writing in the bill indicating the place 
to which the conflicts rule looks, the common-law approach 
is superior for a very conclusive reason. As will be noted 
more explicitly, when the transfer of cambial rights is to 
be examined, the mechanism of negotiable instruments at 
common law has preserved a similar structure for title 
and obligation, appealing to business men. In contrast to 
the German and Geneva systems, the incidents of obliga-
tion and property in the life of a bill of exchange are in-
timately connected. One act, delivery of the instrument, 
transfers obligatory rights as well as title. There is no 
difference between them as respects, for instance, good 
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faith. There need not be any subtle difference where a bill 
is mailed to the cambial successor. Thus, not as the "last 
act" in creating the obligation but as the act effectuating the 
domination of the bill by the grantee in respect of both 
obligation and title, delivery is naturally the right contact 
for choice of law. Since the transfer of title depends on 
the lex situs, Anglo-American courts sometimes have naive-
ly but with adequate results submitted also the obligation 
to the law of the situation of the paper.63 
The difficulties of evidence, conspicuous in the learned 
discussions, are minimized by this approach. Where the 
paper actually was at the moment of a contested transfer, 
rather than where the signature was made, is not so hard 
to discover. To ascertain the situs of a tangible thing 
at a given date, usually causes so little concern that we 
scarcely hear of it in international property law. 
Of course, the acts transferring title are different in the 
various systems. This difficulty would be removed if the 
Romanistic doctrine requiring traditio for the transfer of 
tangible things were abandoned in this application. Not 
only would international harmony be achieved, but within 
the Central European systems themselves obligation and 
title would no longer be governed by incongruous rules. 
Interpersonal law. A check was issued by an English-
man in Shanghai upon a local branch of an American bank 
corporation, at a time when Great Britain and the United 
States enjoyed extraterritorial jurisdiction through their 
own courts in Shanghai.64 Should the law of the place of 
payment be identified with the Chinese Law of Bills of Ex-
change and Checks? It seemed evident that it was the 
Negotiable Instruments Act of the American state in which 
the bank was incorporated, that governed. 
68 See for more detail, infra Ch. 61. 
64 See my report and opinion, 6 Z. ausl. PR. 336-341. 
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE 
I. British Law 
By proviso in Section 72 (I) (b), 
"Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, con-
forms, as regards requisites in form, to the law of the 
United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing pay-
ment thereof, be treated as valid as between all persons 
who negotiate, hold or become parties to it in the United 
Kingdom." 
This proviso is intended to make negotiability in England 
independent of defects attached by the foreign law of its 
origin. The parties must have negotiated in England and 
the lawsuits occur in England, and probably the action must 
be for payment. Favor is not granted to inland transac-
tions as such but only to those from which an actual re-
course between domiciliaries arises. These two features ap-
proach the provision to two exceptional Continental rules 
presently to be quoted. 
2. Geneva Rules 
(a) Article 3, paragraph 2, inspired by the German legis-
lation of I 848, after stating the law of the place of signa-
ture, continues: 
"Nevertheless, where the obligations subscribed in a bill 
of exchange or a promissory note are invalid according to 
the provisions of the preceding paragraph but conform to 
the law where a subsequent obligation is subscribed, the 
irregularity of the first obligations does not affect the valid-
ity of the subsequent obligation." 
The I940 draft of the Montevideo Commercial Treaty, 
article 26, follows this example. 
Thus, the original bill may be void under the basic law, 
or an indorsement invalid under the law of its place of 
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signature, but subsequent contracts are valid, if they com-
ply with the formal requirements of the place where they 
are written, and this validity is recognized in all member 
states, inclusive of the country of issue. Such contracts 
may be acceptance, indorsements, aval, or intervention for 
honor, all regularly presupposing a valid basic bill. 
On the other hand, the exception is not limited to an in-
strument invalid on the ground of formalities. The issue 
or preceding indorsement may be invalid for any cause 
under its own law, although not under the law of the sub-
sequent contract. 
The provision also does not require that the holder 
should inquire into the foreign law and be in good faith 
about it. The purpose is to favor circulation in all cases. 
This paragraph, therefore, disregards the principles of 
the convention in several respects. But were this exception 
the only one, it might possibly be defended as a forceful 
addition to the independence of indorsements and other 
accessory contracts in the interest of convenience. It is 
the same tendency that impells the American courts to 
establish each contract on its own conditions. 
Unfortunately, paragraph 2 is accompanied by a second 
exception. Together they destroy whatever fabric the 
Rules may claim. 
(b) Geneva Rules, article 3, paragraph 3, states under 
the influence of another old German rule, but by mistake 
even enlarging this questionable provision,65 
65 See HuPKA 246 ff. A German proposal intended only to reproduce 
art. 85 sent. 3 of the German Wechselordnung of 1908 (also Swiss C.O. of 
r88r art. 823 par. 3, Austria W.O. of r8so art. Ss par. 3) referring to 
engagements entered by a national (German) toward a national (German) 
abroad. This is a (misplaced) application of the lex patriae communis. 
But in Asser's formulation adopted in the Rules, the national may transact 
with any national or foreigner, only the enforcement being restricted to 
nationals. However, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria have used the 
reservation to its full extent. 
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"Every contracting State has the faculty to prescribe that 
the obligations assumed in bills of exchange and promissory 
notes by one of its subjects abroad shall be valid with re-
spect to another of its subjects within its territory, pro-
vided that they are clothed in the form of the national law." 
It is not required (as it was in article 8 5 of the German 
Act) that the subject of the enacting state should have 
transacted with another subject of the state. On the other 
hand, under the former German law, supervening contracts 
with a foreigner, or even between foreigners, were re-
garded as valid in Germany if they conformed to the law 
of the German place of contracting, whereas now in regard 
to a foreigner the law of the place of contracting operates 
with the ordinary restrictions. 
This second exception comes near to the British special 
rule for foreign bills. Both are indefensible nationalistic 
residues.66 Yet paragraph 3 has been welcomed as good 
law for emigrants.67 
The practical significance of these rules may be illus-
trated: 
(i) A bill of exchange drawn in England by A and de-
livered to B, payable to the bearer, is valid everywhere by 
the law of the place of contracting. If issued in Italy it 
would be void under the same principle; but B nevertheless 
would win his recourse against A, if he sues in England 
according to proviso (b), though not in the United States 
nor in any other country outside those following the Bills 
of Exchange Act. 
Had B indorsed the bill issued in Italy to C in Italy, and 
C to D in England, mailing it from Italy, the case would 
66 DIENA, 3 Tratt. 78; e.g., protectionism not inspired by a neat, precise, 
well-determined principle. To the same effect GurrERIDGE r6 (ser. 3) J. 
Comp. L. at 64, who, however, does not seem to include the English proviso 
in his regret; HIRSCH, JW. 1930, 1341; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 292 § 147. 
67 Cf., MoNACO 132 and cited authors. 
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seem outside of proviso (b). Again, if C is an Italian 
national and indorses the bill to another Italian, effect is 
given in Italy under the Geneva Rule 3, paragraph 3, and 
the Italian Bills of Exchange Act. 
( ii) A bill issued in Germany not containing the word 
"Wechsel" or a corresponding word in a foreign language 
used in the bill, was void under the old law and is so under 
the Geneva Rules (art. I, no. I). If it is indorsed in 
England to a firm carrying on business in England, the 
holder may sue in England under proviso (b), though 
the drawer could not.68 Supposing the English indorsee 
indorses the bill to D in the United States, D cannot sue 
anywhere, unless the court were to change over to the law 
of the place of payment, as is, regrettably, possible in the 
United States. 
In any case, the liability of the drawer or indorser de-
pends on what the other party chooses to do.69 And dis-
criminations are made according to criteria not in conform-
ity with the standards of equality of a freely circulating 
commercial paper. The worst consequence, of course, is 
that a debtor can be sued who has no recourse left against 
previous warrantors; but this happens also on the mere 
ground of the principle of independence. 
68 DICEY ( ed. 6) 687, Ill. 4· 
69 GUTTER.IDGE 16 (ser. 3) J. Comp. L at 64· 
CHAPTER 60 
Validity in General 
I. INTRINSIC REQUIREMENTS 
T HE existing statutes contain only fragmentary con-flicts rules, if any, on the subject of essential validity 
of the contracts in negotiable instruments/ There is, 
however, agreement on the proposition that formal and 
material validity ought to be subject to the same law.2 This 
law also determines what ordinary requirements of con-
tracts are to be modified or abandoned in order to promote 
the easy negotiation of bills, and what municipal rules are 
to supplement the special cambial rules.3 
I. Capacity 
The general conflicts rules concerning capacity of con-
tracting are normally also applied to the capacity of signing 
bills and notes.4 Capacity thus is governed by the personal 
law (of nationality or domicil) or the "law of the place 
of contracting" (better the law of the contract), or a mixed 
system. In England, the habitual hesitation recurs.5 Ameri-
1 Generally speaking, lex loci contractus is applied in Argentina, C. Com. 
art. 738, see 4 VICO 105 § 106; Mexico, law of Aug. 26, 1932, on titles and 
operations of credit, art. 2 52-2 54· 
2 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. I; LoRENZEN 99 ff. and in 30 Yale L.J. s6s; 
GUTI'ERIDGE, 16 (Ser. 3) J. Comp. L. 62. 
3 Supra Ch. s8, pp. 133-134· On the cases: HuGO FISCHER, "The Law Govern-
ing Capacity with Regard to Bills of Exchange," 14 Mod. L. Rev. (1951) 144, 
ISI· 
4 For a survey see 1 MEYER 646; VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 
491 ff. In Argentina (C. Com. art. 938, cf., 4 VICO § 109), Brazil (Ley 
Introd. 1942 art. 9, par. r); in Chile (C.C. art. 14, 15) and many other 
Latin-American countries, the domicil governs with the reservations for the 
domestic national law discussed in Vol. I, p. 117 ff. 
5 For domicil WESTLAKE, for lex loci contractus DICEY (ed. 6) 682 n. 58. 
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can courts seldom have resorted to the domiciliary law; 
they employ the lex loci contractus.6 Thus, a married 
woman domiciled in Michigan and signing in Michigan a 
mortgage and note as security for her husband, was not 
allowed by the Michigan court to raise the defense of 
coverture or a defense of misrepresentation, according to 
Michigan law, because the note was delivered to a bank 
in Ohio.7 
The Geneva Rules, ignoring the experience of the com-
mon law, have established a system no one can ever defend. 
In the first place, the Rules base their main provision 
(article 2, paragraph I) on the nationality principle, un-
suited for such an eminently international commercial mat-
ter. A decisive motive was the fear of "fraude a la loi," 
that eternal preoccupation of older European writers. 8 
Else a minor might go to a country where he is regarded 
as of full age-this was a familiar argument. But what 
practical importance has such a possibility, and "how can 
an English banker have all the national laws on capacity 
in his head?" 9 
The next consequence had to be admission of renvoi, to 
the heartfelt grief of its foes: 
"If this national law declared competent the law of 
another country, this latter law applies." (Art. 2, par. 
I, sent. 2). 
An attempt to restrict this unwelcome addition was made 
by interpreting the reference as meaning exclusively the 
internal law of the country referred to.10 This would, 
illogically, exclude "Weiterverweisung." 
6 LoRENZEN 63. 
7 State of Ohio, ex rei. Fulton v. Purse ( 1935) 273 Mich. 507. 
8 DIENA, 3 Tratt. 52 j 2 GRUNHUT 570 n. 6 j 2 MElLI 327. 
9 GuTTERIDGE, I.e. 61. 
10 DIENA, Comptes rend us 347; HUPKA 238; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 283. 
An analogous argument in HIRSCH, JW. 1939, 1338. 
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Illustrations. (i) (Hupka's example of a vicious circle.) 
An Englishman domiciled in England issues a bill of ex-
change in Buenos Aires. England refers to Argentine 
law as lex loci contractus; and allegedly Argentina would 
refer back to England as the domicil. The latter assertion 
agrees with the usual radical arguments ad absurdum but 
is totally inadequate. There is in fact no further reference. 
The English conflicts rule itself must be construed, without 
any help of the Geneva Rules, to refer to the substantive 
Argentine law. Certainly, England has in this case no 
reason to make Argentina arbiter of the choice of law. 
Lex loci contractus governs because of the presumption 
(right or wrong) that the parties know it best. Even the 
English domicil is not considered in England an obstacle 
to applying the foreign lex loci actus. 
( ii) A national of Chile, domiciled in New Y ark, in-
dorses a bill in France. Although Chile refers to the 
domicil, it would not make sense to apply New Y ark law 
while the New York courts apply French law. A reference 
to the domicil means entire abandonment to the law at 
the domicil. 
Also the objections that renvoi complicates the task of 
the judge 11 and needs lawyers to apply it,12 have no more 
force here than in general. 
Corporations and other legal bodies are not mentioned 
in the Geneva Rules.13 Without doubt, their capacity is 
determined by their personal law, that is, in the eyes of the 
member states, the law of the principal seat. An Ameri-
can court will evidently apply the law of the state of in-
corporation; it would not apply the law of the place of 
acting.14 
Exceptions. Article J, paragraph 2, states: 
"If, however, the obligations entered into by means of 
a bill of exchange or promissory note are not valid accord-
11 G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 178. 
12 GuiTERIDGE, I.e. 6o. 
18 AssER, Comptes rendus 347 If. 
14 Supra, Vol. II, 4, 27 If. 
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ing to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, but are in 
conformity with the laws of the territory in which a sub-
sequent contract has been entered into, the circumstance 
that the previous contracts are irregular in form does not 
invalidate the subsequent contract." 
A signature is valid if given in a territory where the 
signer would have capacity. This was already conceded by 
many laws 15 as a needed qualification of the personal law. 
The exception is more generous than in the French Lizardi 
case and the analogous provisions; also a foreign lex loci 
contractus is a recognized source of capacity.16 
Yet, again, another proviso, paragraph 3, allows each 
member state to exclude for its own courts the exception 
of paragraph 2, if a national of this state has contracted 
abroad. Thus the Rules turn away from their course and 
discriminate among territories and nationalities. "The 
validity of the contract varies according to the court." 17 
Conclusion. The awkward and cumbersome legislation 
of Geneva has been deservedly criticized. 18 A better solu-
tion is furnished by the American practice. The law govern-
ing a contract in a bill must also determine the require-
ments of capacity. Domicil would not be a better test than 
nationality. The parties cannot be required to examine 
more than one law to ascertain the value of a signature. 
However, the best rule is more liberal. As generally for 
15 Belgium: Law of May zo, 1872, art. 3· 
France : C. Com. art. 1 14. 
Germany: WO. (1908} art. 3· 
Great Britain: BEA sec. 22. 
Scandinavia: Law of 188o, art. 88. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. ( 19II) art. 721. 
16 Supra, Vol. I, 188. 
17 MONACO 46; ARANGIO-RUIZ 178. 
18 See, e.g., HUPKA, and G. ARANGIO-RUIZ, I.e.,· WIGNY, Revue Dr. Int. 
(Bruxelles, 1931) 784 ff. 
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contractual obligations, 19 capacity under the personal law 
deserves to be considered as an optional basis of validity. 
Although once Lord Esher thought that a "minor," though 
capable under his domiciliary law, cannot be made liable on a 
bill in England, 20 the optional validity according to either lex 
loci contractus or lex domicilii is winning adherents. 21 Security 
of commerce, harmed by an unlimited importance of the 
personal law, is fostered by its auxiliary consideration. 
2. Consent 
There is no doubt that, like all other "essential require-
ments," consent to signature and delivery, as distinguished 
from the "contract giving rise to the issue," is governed 
by the law of the place of execution. 22 
3· Consideration 
The requirement of consideration was introduced into 
the law of bills of exchange when the common-law courts 
had assumed jurisdiction over this matter.23 But the doc-
trine was modified in several respects ;24 notably, valuable 
consideration in this field need not come from the prom-
isee, 25 and its existence is presumed. 26 However, the prin-
ciple was applied in the case of illegality in M oulis v. 
Owen/7 where a foreign check was considered governed by 
English law because payable in England and its purpose 
to cover play at baccarat was regarded illicit under English 
19 Supra Vol. I, and more recently CHESHIRE, International Contracts. A 
related proposal is made by FRANKENSTEIN, Projet d'un Code Europeen de 
Droit internat. prive (Leyden, 1950) art. 58 ff. 
20 In re Soltykoff [1891] I Q.B. 413. 
21 LoRENZEN So. 
22 The former German Wechselordnung, article 85, included this point in 
"ts term "essential requirements." 
28 ULMER, Festgabe fiir Heck ( 133 Arch. Civ. Prax.) 178. 
24 See LoRENZEN 28 n. 72. 
25 BEA sec. 27; NIL sec. 25. 
26 BEA sec. 30; NIL sec. 24. 
27 [1907] I K.B. 746. Cf., Lord Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland (1760) 2 
Burr. 1077; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 311; DICEY (ed. 6) 682,691. 
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law; this invalidity of the loan comprised all accessory 
obligations. The latter may be void also under their own 
lex loci contractus.28 
In no case is failure of consideration a defense against 
a holder in due course. 29 
Illustration. In American municipal law, it is contro-
versial whether the maker of a note which he entrusted 
to a fiduciary payee may set up the defense of failure of 
consideration against a holder who purchased from the 
payee in breach of trust and with knowledge thereof. 30 
No such defense is given against a holder in good faith. 
For conflicts law, there is no reason why lack of consider-
ation, though a defect under the original applicable law, 
should be strong enough to break the position of a bona fide 
holder protected by the law of his purchase. 
The exceptional option of the most favorable law granted 
by American courts to creditors attacked on the ground of 
usury has been discussed before. 31 
Another means to avoid the defense of failure of con-
sideration was sought by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, when it resorted to the Louisiana law of the place 
of payment instead of the New York law of the place of 
delivery, 32 in order to effect the presumed intention of the 
parties, an inadvisable method of dealing with conflicts 
rules. 
4· Other Incidents 
The law of each contract also governs the permissibility 
of stipulations of interest and conditional indorsements, 
28 Canada: Story v. McKay (1888) 15 O.R. 169; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 316. 
29 England: BEA sec. 29 ( 3). 
United States: NIL sec. 28, 58. 
France: ARMINJON ET CARRY 475 § 417. 
Italy: MoNACO 121 ff. 
30 See BRITTON (1943) 487 ff.; PALMER, 48 Mich. L. Rev. (1950) 255, 261. 
31 Supra Vol. II, 408. 
32 Pritchard v. Norton {1882) 106 U.S. 124. 
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mostly identified with questions of form, and, of course, 
the necessity of delivery of the instrument. 
II. ACCEPTANCE 
The contract of acceptance normally shares the prm-
ciples of the law of bills of exchange. It consists of pre-
sentment for acceptance and the acceptance necessarily 
written in the bill, plus return, i.e., delivery of the bill. In 
case of acceptance before issue, the acceptor writes his 
signature, which again becomes effective by delivery, though 
this is delivery by the drawer to the payee. 
An "anomalous" 33 provision of the American Negotiable 
Instruments Act, 34 however, allows any form of declaration 
effective by notification 35 without delivery. On the other 
hand, the Geneva Convention permits a drawee who wrote 
his acceptance on the bill to revoke it until he returns the 
instrument.36 According to what seems to me the better 
construction, it is not the unilateral act of the drawer that 
forms the acceptance (as was the theory of the German 
Reichsgericht), 37 but the written acceptance plus either re-
turn on presentment or delivery to the payee.38 
Revocation, thus, merely strikes down an incomplete act. 
It may be asked whether these requirements of acceptance 
should not be governed by the law of the place where the 
bill is returned (delivered) or signed. In fact, the Bill of 
Exchange Act (art. 7 2 ( 1) ) expressly treats the form of 
acceptance on the same footing as the other contracts and 
calls for the law of the place where the acceptance "con-
tract" is made. But when an American drawee notifies 
33 HUDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) at 356. 
34 NIL sec. 134, 135. 
35 BEA sec. z; NIL sec. 191. 
36 Geneva Conv. art. z9. 
37 Z4 RGZ. 90; 77 ib. 141. 
38 ULMER, Wertpapiere 207 j ANGELONI 173 § u8. 
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acceptance by letter sent to Japan without signing the bill, 
and the recipient takes the bill for value "on the face 
thereof," the contract is presumably "made" in the United 
States and therefore binds the drawee, while in the inverse 
case a Japanese drawee would not be bound wherever the 
contract would have to be concluded. For this reason and 
the sake of simplicity, it may be a better solution to extend 
the law of the place of payment to the questions of validity. 
We shall see that it is now greatly preferred over the law 
of the drawee's domicil and of the acceptance itself, as 
respects the effects of acceptance. 39 
III. SPECIAL CONTRACTS 
I. Accommodation Paper 
The English Act ( s. 2 8) and the American Act ( s. 29) 
recognize the liability, to a holder for value, of a party 
signing as a maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without 
receiving value and for the purpose of lending his name. 
The courts hold that an accommodation paper has no 
legal inception until it is received for value, so as to allow 
the accommodator until then to revoke his signature.40 
Hence, the conflicts requirement of delivery is not fulfilled 
until the accommodated party delivers the paper to a holder 
for a value, and this act determines the law applicable to 
the issue.41 
This conflicts problem does not exist in civil law. If 
someone signs a bill in the interest of another person, 
though with the understanding between the two that the 
promisor should not bear a burden, he enters into a serious 
39 Infra Cb. 62, I. 
4° Fox v. Cortner ( 1921) 145 Tenn. 482, 492, 239 S.W. 1069; Dean v. 
Lyde (1931) 223 Ala. 394, 136 So. 857. 
41 Welsh Co. v. Gilette (Wis. 1911) 130 N.W. 879; Stubbs v. Colt (1887) 
30 Fed. 417; 2 BEALE 1059• 
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obligation. Any third holder may avail himself of it, even 
if he knew of the agreement. 42 
The common-law tradition, indeed, rests upon a con-
fusion, familiar to former jurisprudence, between simula-
tion, which does not bind, and a serious declaration to be 
bound to any party to the bill except the accommodated 
person. The Uniform Commercial Code, section 3-415, 
gives a considered new regulation qualifying the accom-
modation party as a surety; this sets him in conflicts law 
at the side of the avalist, presently to be discussed. 
2. Aval 
The act of guaranteeing an obligation in a bill or note, 
unknown to the common law of England, is now recognized 
in all statutes.43 It is also uniformly agreed that this act 
has its own law. Most older writers justify such inde-
pendence by drawing an analogy with the law applicable to 
suretyship,44 while the Montevideo Treaty of I 889 upon 
the same analogy but following the ancient approach to 
suretyship applies the law governing the "guaranteed obli-
gation." 45 
Nevertheless, an aval is not conditioned by the intrinsic 
validity of the principal debt nor is it restricted to the 
amount due on the latter.46 
In consequence, it is now agreed that the admissibility 
42 France: App. Caen (May 30, 1899) D. 1900.2.508; Req. (March n, 
1935) D.H. 210, S. 1935·1.175; I PERCEROU ET BOUTERON 36 § 41. On the 
dangerous position of French banks taking in "effets de complaisance" 
without most strictly examining whether the drawer is really a creditor 
of the drawee and therefore lacking "bonne foi" and action against the 
acceptor, see HAMEL, 2 Banques et operations de banque 750 ff.; id., 
"L'unification de droit en matieres d'instruments negociables" (Int. Bar. Ass., 
3rd Int. con£., London, 1950) printed 1950, The Hague, p. 320. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 24, 1928) 120 RGZ. 207; STAUB-STRANZ, art. 17 n. 26. 
43 LORENZEN 32-34• 
44 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT§ 655; STAUB-STRANZ (ed. 6, 1909) art. 86 n. 8. 
45 Montevideo Treaty Com. ( r889) art. 31. 
46 2 GRtiNHUT 579 n. 33; DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 231; 2 MEYER 374; WEISS, 4 
Traite 461; LoRENZEN 174 n. 420; ARMINJON ET CARRY§ 445· 
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and form of an aval are determined by the law of the place 
where it is "given," that is, signed or delivered, respec-
tively.47 An Italian decision added a presumption, rebut-
table only by the document, that the aval is written at the 
place of the issue of the bill.48 Another Italian decision,49 
however, examining the question of form, rejected the law 
of the American state where the avalist attached his signa-
ture, in favor of the law of Italy to which he sent the bill 
and where the drawer signed subsequently;49 insofar as this 
solution was based on the certain rule that the aval did 
not take effect until the bill was issued, the conclusion was 
objectionable because form and effect are indistinguish-
able.50 But the result agrees with the presumable Ameri-
can conception of the role of delivery in such a case. 
3. Acceptance for Honor 
In the same manner as for aval, it is a constant conclu-
sion that the contract of an acceptor for honor-the now 
rare "intervention"-is an independent transaction, sub-
ject to the law of its own place of making. 51 
In old cases of special contracts, the same conflicts rules 
respecting form, capacity, and material validity are used as 
for issue and indorsement. 
47 Montevideo Treaty Com. Terr. ( 1940) art. 23; cf., ARGANA, in Segundo 
Congreso, Rep. Arg. 223; 4 VICO 95 § 95; Cod. Bustamante, art. 268; Geneva 
Rules, art. 4, par. 2; MoNAco, Rivista ( 1942) 288 n.l. 
48 Italy: App. Milano (Nov. 25, 1929) Mon. Trib. ( 1930) 184. 
49 Cass. Ita!. (Jan. 14, 1941) Foro Ita!. 1941 II. 1055. 50 MONACO, Rivista ( 1942) 286. 51 Treaty of Montevideo, Com. art. 32; Geneva Rules, art. 4, par. 2; 
DIENA, 3 Tratt. 159; LORENZEN 174; RAISER 89; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 
330 § 174· 
CHAPTER 61 
Circulation 
I. THE CHAIN oF HoLDERS 
WE shall consider here the position of the payee and subsequent indorsees. Under the universal approach, 
the sequence of holders is disintegrated or dis-
sected into as many links subjected to different laws as 
there are jurisdictions containing places of contracting. 
The law of the place where an indorsement occurs governs 
the transfer of the rights included in the bilU Such division, 
in addition to the various other connecting factors used in 
the conflicts law of bills, is bound to raise problems of 
classification. They have been regarded under three aspects: 
The rights inherent in the possession of the bill; 
The rights acquired by the formal succession against third 
persons; 
And the relationship between a single indorsement and 
the basic bill. 
1. The Effect of Possession: "legitimation" 
While little Anglo-American authority seems available, 2 
1 England: BEA sec. 72 (2) according to the prevailing meaning of "in-
terpretation." 
United States: LoRENZEN 139. 
France: WEISS, 4 Traite 443· 
Germany: 2 BAR § 306. 
Italy: DIENA, 3 Tratt. 94 § 222. 
Geneva Rules, art. 4, par. 2, speaking of "the effects of the obligations 
produced by the signatures • . . ;" Treaty of Montevideo, Com. L., art. 29 ; 
Cod. Bustamante, art. 226. 
2 Note, 95 A.L.R. ( 1935) 658. 
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tt IS agreed on the Continent that an indorsement has a 
threefold function: 
(a) The possessor of the bill who is either named or 
covered by a blank indorsement has the ostensible power 
of indorsing the bill in the eyes of the indorsees; 
(b) The indorsee possessing the bill has the power to 
present the bill to the drawer or acceptor; 
(c) Under the same circumstances, the drawee is en-
titled to pay to the indorsee with liberating effect. 
In conflicts law, these problems are generally included 
in the broader questions concerning the rights of the holder. 
According to the principle of independence, the individual 
legal systems prescribe the particulars. Thus, the law of 
each place of indorsement determines whether an indorser 
is a reliable transferor, while in the relation between in-
dorsee and drawee the unsettled rivalry of the place of in-
dorsement with the place of payment persists. 
2. Translative Function of Indorsement 
Again, the Continental doctrine distinguishes three effects 
of indorsement :3 
(a) Indorsement transfers the right flowing from the 
bill against acceptor or maker; 
(b) It procures the indorsee the position as holder "in 
due course" or "in good faith" respectively; 
(c) It makes the indorser liable for warranty. 
Moreover, however, indorsement completed by delivery 
transfers "title," meaning ownership in the paper of the 
instrument. (The expression should not be used otherwise, 
and notably should not include the debt.) 
Taken as an isolated act of transferring tangible prop-
erty, this conveyance is naturally subject to the law of the 
3 LUIZ M. RAMIREZ B., "Capacity under the Negotiable Instruments Laws 
of the Americas," 43 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1944) 559 ff.; ]ACOBI, Wertpapiere 249 
ff.; STAUB-STRANZ, s6 n. 19j RILK (1933) z; II ROHGZ. zso. 
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place where the instrument is situated. Anglo-American 
law, however, consistently connects both title and obliga-
tion; they are transferred by the same act of delivery. 
Correctly, therefore, English decisions in modern times 
have determined the entire translative effect of indorse-
ment as a unit, although sometimes, with undue emphasis on 
the property aspect, speaking only of the lex situs for chattels! 
Elsewhere, the same approach is adopted for bills pay-
able to bearer 5 or issued or indorsed in blank. But in bills 
to order, Continental doctrine holds it possible that at the 
place of signature an indorsement may create effective 
creditor rights, although at the place of delivery property 
in the bill is not effectively acquired.6 
In fact, the divorce of obligation and title is old in 
German legislation and now also persists on the basis of 
the Geneva Convention, which treats merely the obligation 
and not the title. On the one hand, the particular rules 
on bills develop the doctrine of the holder in good faith; 
on the other hand, the laws of property provide for the 
protection of a purchaser in good faith of movables. It is 
characteristic that not even the concept of good faith is 
the same; in German law ignorance of a defect by gross 
negligence counts as bad faith in acquiring title to a chattel, 
but as good faith in acquiring rights against acceptor and 
indorsees. 7 Hence, opinions are divided in cases where 
title and obligation seem to part ways. In the prevail-
4 Alcock v. Smith [I892] I Ch. 238; Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank 
[I904] 2 K.B. 87o; [I90S] I K.B. 677; Koechlin v. Kestenbaum [I927] 
I K.B. 6I6, 889; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay [I9I8] I 
K.B. 43; [I9I8] 2 K.B. 623. On the problems of title see BRITrON, Bills and 
Notes ( I943) 734 If. 
5 See authors cited by 2 FRANKI!NSTEIN no; RAISER 102 If. 
6 ULMER, Festgabe fiir Heck ( 133 Arch. Civ. Prax.) 192; DuDEN, Eigen-
tumserwerb 68; WOLFF, Priv. Int. L. ( ed. 2) 551; German W.O. ( 1908) 
art. 74, 82; Geneva Convention, art. 16, 17. 
7 German W.O. ( 1908) art. 74, 82; Geneva Conv. art. 16, 17; German 
BGB. § 932. 
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ing view, the right accruing from the bill follows the right 
in the bill, which agrees with the true content of the com-
mon-law principle. Minority opinions, however, hold that 
the title passes by the indorsement itself.8 
There can be no doubt that the commercial view repre-
sented in the Anglo-American rules excels by its unity and 
simplicity. All translative effects of the transaction are 
simultaneously derived from the law of the place where 
the instrument is situated at the time of delivery. 
3· The Doubtful Scope of the Principle of Independence 
There does not exist a visible guiding idea for defining 
classification of problems that fall under the scope of the 
individual law of the place of an endorsement, rather than 
under some other conflicts rule respecting particular inci-
dents of the bill of exchange. Even worse, no general 
agreement exists about the relative weight to give the law 
under which the obligation of a signer (A) is entered into 
and the law under which a subsequent signature (of B) 
confers rights (to C) against the precedent obligor (A). 
Our main materials consist in isolated groups of judicial-
ly treated topics and the respective comments or equally 
sporadic literary problems. Accordingly, we have to look 
for the desirable legal rules through the study of particular 
situations. 
Only one general application of the several laws prin-
ciple, although even this with qualifications, seems to be 
universally admitted, viz. the rule that the obligation of 
warranty is governed by the law of each indorsement.9 
This law determines the time, place, and currency of the 
8 RAISER 109 denies application of BGB. § 952 whereby an instrument 
follows the creditor's right. ULMER, I.e. 192 ff., would apply § 952 "to a 
certain degree." 
9 United States cases cited by LORENZEN 122 n. 232; RAISER 59; KESSLER 
138. 
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warranty, as well as the requirements and extent of the 
liability. It includes the permissibility of conditional obli-
gations (commonly ineffective) 10 and of partial indorse-
ments (commonly void) ;11 and the questions whether the 
indorser's liability is subsidiary to that of the drawer or 
in solidum for all warrantors,12 whether the recourse must 
run through the entire chain or may jump to remote m-
dorsers, 13 etc. 
Where acceptance is refused, the law of the place of 
indorsement determines whether the holder may resort to 
the guarantors for payment 14 or security ;15 it de.cides also 
whether release of the principal debtor has effects on the 
secondary obligors.16 
Hence, the law of the basic bill, though determining the 
primary obligations, does not affect the liabilities of re-
course. 
But that we have not reached a complete solution is shown 
by the next following doubt concerning classification. 
II. WHICH LAW OF INDORSEMENT PREVAILS IN DETERMINING 
THE RIGHTS OF HoLDERS? 
This is a curious aspect of the principle of independence. 
Suppose A indorses to B in state X, and B indorses to C 
10 Permitted in BEA sec. 33; NIL sec. 39; prohibited in Geneva Con-
vention, art. I2, par. I. 
11 Not permitted by BEA sec. 32 (2) ; NIL sec. 32; Geneva Convention, 
art. 12, par. 2. 
12 Williams v. Wade (Mass. I84o) I Metcalf 82; ARANGIO-RUIZ 252 and 
cit. in n. 1. 
13 United States, whether previous suit against maker or acceptor is nec-
essary: Williams v. Wade (Mass. I84o) I Metcalf 82; Trabue v. Short 
( 1866) 18 La. Ann. 257; Wei) v. Sturgis (Ky. 1901) 63 S.W. 602; 2 
WHARTON § 452 ff. 
DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 222. 
14 Geneva Convention, art. 43; BEA sec. 43; NIL sec. I5I· 
15 Former German W.O. art. 25; French C. Com. (1807) art. 120; I 
MEYER 464; now Egypt: C. Com. mixte art. 12 5; C. indigene 119. 
16 Spies v. National City Bank ( 1903) I74 N.Y. 222, 66 N.E. 736, 61 
L.R.A. 193 a.o. 
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in state Y. The two laws define differently the position of 
indorsees, for instance, as to protection of good faith against 
defenses of duress, fraud, mistakes, lack of consideration, 
lack of delivery. A seems to obligate himself just to what 
the law of the first indorsement compels him, no less and 
no more. However, C acquires rights under the law of 
the second indorsement, rights that may be larger or nar-
rower than what B acquired. The analogous question arises 
if A is the drawer and B, the payee, indorses to C in an-
other jurisdiction. In other words : is the obligation of A 
definitively fixed by the law of X or is it subsequently modi~ 
fied by the law of Y? 
This problem has been discussed incompletely in several 
applications, two of which follow: 
1. Defenses of Warrantor 
Continental writers have believed that the American 
courts in the matter of defenses almost always look to the 
law of the particular obligor.17 But in the United States 
no substantial authority exists on the question, since al-
most 18 all decisions to which we may resort concern the 
obligation of primary obligors upon promissory notes. Yet 
we may submit that American courts are prepared to go 
along with the English comments on the Bill of Exchange 
Act, Section 7 2 ( 2), and the prevailing Continental opinion. 
According to these, in any case, it is the law of the place 
of the indorsement by which the individual holder acquires 
17 See HUPKA 264. 
18 LORENZEN 134 n. 264 cites Ory v. Winter (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N.S. zn, 
for the proposition that when a party contracts under the law allowing him 
a certain defense, he is protected against a holder who is a holder in due 
course under the law of his contract. But the reasoning of LORENZEN 141 ff. 
seems to evaluate grounds pro and contra and to arrive at a contrary result. 
The majority of the cases, increased by Stout v. American Nat!. Bank and 
Trust Co. (Miss. 1942) 7 So. (zd) 824, apply lex loci contractus and seem 
to think of the place where the holder purchased the bill. 
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his position that decides on the admissibility of defenses 
against him.19 
This law, thus, on the one hand determines what re-
quirements the holder in due course (or bona fide holder) 
must fulfill, e.g., whether bad faith requires positive knowl-
edge of a defect of title 20 or also includes "dishonesty," 21 
lack of "honest, credible confidence," 22 or requires "know-
ingly acting to the detriment of the debtor." 23 The latter 
formula has been understood as excluding any considera-
tion of negligence; the holder is protected except when he 
acts with direct or indirect intention.24 Also the burden of 
proof is subject to this law.25 
On the other hand, all defenses that law X may concede 
to A are cut off against a holder privileged under the law 
of his own acquisition. 26 This very remarkable result is 
justified in the Continental literature by the necessity to 
protect the holder in the interest of undisturbed circulation. 
The indiscriminate language of the Geneva Rules, article 
4, paragraph 2, in stating the principle of independence 
certainly encourages a corresponding solution. 27 
That American practice favors the same view may be in-
ferred from one decision holding "that a transfer of per-
sonal property which is valid by the law of the place where 
such transfer is made is insufficient to pass a valid title to 
19 RAISER 91; HUPKA 263 If. i QuASSOWSKI ALBRECHT 94i ULMER, Wert-
papiere 287. The wording of Unif. Com. Code, s. 3-305, seems to confirm 
the same view with respect to the numerous differences of American statutes. 
20 NIL sec. 56; cf., BEA sec. z. 
21 NIL sec. 59; BEA sec. 90. 
22 Hurst v. Lee ( 1911) 143 App. Div. 614, 127 N.Y.S. 104o; "Good faith 
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," Unif. Com. 
Code, s. 1-201 Nr. 19. 
2 8 Geneva Conv. art. 17. 
24 Comptes rend us 133, 291 If.; HuPKA 52 n. 2. 
25 Compare BEA sec. 30, par. 2; NIL sec. 59, sent. x, with Geneva Conv. 
art. 17 (the debtor must prove the dishonesty of the holder). 
26 BEA sec. 30, par. 2; NIL sec. 59· 
27 RAISER 104j ARMINJON ET CARRY 478 §422. 
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it," so as to protect a holder in due course of a note against 
the defense of the maker based on fraud. 28 With greater 
clarity the same conclusion seems to follow from the lead-
ing American decision on forged indorsements, to be dis-
cussed presently. 
A doubt, however, is revealed precisely by a case dis-
cussed in the United States. Payee A, taking with notice 
of fraud committed against the maker, negotiates the note 
to B who is immune against the defense of fraud, but after-
wards A reacquires the instrument. American courts and 
now the Draft of a Commercial Code hold A subject to 
the defense.29 If A takes in the United States without 
knowledge but without due inquiry into a suspicious situa-
tion and negotiates the note in Germany, where negligence 
is no bar to the protection of the holder, no American court, 
evidently, will admit his claim. It might be argued even 
under the Geneva Convention that if A has acted "sciem-
ment au detriment du debiteur," his claim should be dis-
missed, whatever his credentials may be. The case recalls 
the model case of collusion used in Geneva. 
Results, hence, seem identical all around. 
courts would not need resort to public policy 
undesirable situations. 
American 
to obviate 
A special instance of such effort to promote smooth cir-
culation has developed in the case of forged signatures. 
2. Spurious Signatures 
Under the Anglo-American acts, signatures forged or 
attached in the name of a person without his authorization 
28 Brook v. Vannest (1895) 58 N.J.L. 162, 33 At!. 382; LORENZEN 140; 
RAISER adds Fogarty v. Neal ( 1923) 201 Ky. 85, 255 S.W. 1049 in referring 
to the special case of spouses between themselves. 
29 Berenson v. Conant (1913) 214 Mass. 127, 101 N.E. 6o; CHAFEE, "The 
Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party," 21 Col. L. Rev. 
(1921) 538, 542; Uniform Com. Code, 3-201(1). 
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are inoperative. No right can be acquired "through or 
under that signature." 30 The law recognizes exceptions 
in the case of estoppel and ratification by the person whose 
signature is not genuine or unauthorized. Other rules 
mitigate the result, such as the English statute allowing 
bankers to pay in good faith drafts without verifying the 
indorsements, 31 and the judicial practice shifting the dam-
age from a paying bank upon the true owner.32 
In the civil-law countries, on the contrary, a bona fide 
holder may base his claim on any genuine signature, for 
using part of a merely formally uninterrupted chain of 
indorsements. According to article I 6, paragraph 2, of 
the Geneva Convention: 
"Where a person has been dispossessed of a bill of ex-
change by any event whatever, the holder, justifying his 
claim (by an uninterrupted sequence of endorsements), is 
not liable to surrender the bill, unless he has acquired it 
in bad faith or has committed a gross fault in acquiring it." 
This contrast of legislation much debated in the fruitless 
efforts for a universal bills of exchange law and, in fact, 
of doubtful solution, 33 could also have disturbed conflicts 
law. It is gratifying to see how the courts, though reason-
ing on various formal principles, yet have bridged the gap, 
distinctly favoring easy circulation and protection of dis-
counting banks. 
30 England: BEA s. 24; Canada: BEA s. 49; U.S.: NIL s. 23. 
31 BEA s. 6o. 
32 NIL s. 15; Uniform Comm. C., s. 3-us and 3-406; to obviate City 
Nat. Bank of Galveston v. American Express Co. (Tex. 1929) r6 S.W. 
(2d) 278, cf., Palmer, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 266. On the thoughtful American 
practice concerning the question who should bear the damages, the bank or 
the owner, see BRITTON §§ 142, 146. In a recent decision, in Strickland Trans-
portation Co. v. First State Bank of Memphis (Tex. Sup. 1948) 214 S.W. 
(2d) 934, ann. 27 Tex. L. Rev. (1949) 713, the court by majority vote 
assumed that the damage caused by the faithlessness of the forging agent 
should fall on the person who employed him. 
33 Cf., HuDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) at 354· 
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The English Court of Appeal, in Embiricos v. Anglo-
Austrian Bank 34 argued on the basis of the principle of 
independence, although this also could have been used for 
an opposite decision. However, it recognized the civil-
law rule with respect to a check payable in England. 
The clerk of the payee A stole a check on a London 
bank, already indorsed to B, forged B's indorsement, and 
discounted the check with a Viennese bank. The bank, 
again, indorsed the check to London and received payment. 
When the payee sued the London bank for a second pay-
ment his action was dismissed. The bank in Vienna was 
authorized by the Austrian law to discount the apparently 
regular instrument in good faith. 
To this extent, in the relationship between a holder and 
the drawee, it is universally settled that the law of the place 
where an indorsement is made-as in the Embiricos case, the 
Austrian law-determines the justification of the indorsee's 
title and, hence,35 of the drawee's right to pay to him. 
There arose grave doubt, however, about the recourse 
against precedent indorsers and the drawer. Could the 
Viennese bank, or its indorsee who cashed the check, in 
the absence of payment, recover from the payee or the 
drawer? In his opinion, Vaughan Williams, L.J ., by an 
obiter dictum, held it "convenient, as well from a legal as 
from a commercial point of view, that it should be estab-
lished that the title by such an indorsement is good as 
against the original parties to a negotiable instrument." 
He considered that otherwise, even though the indorsement 
abroad was valid to legalize the possession by the indorsee 
claiming under the foreign law, yet he would be guilty of a 
conversion if he obtained payment from an original party 
to the negotiable instrument from which he could not have 
34 [1905] I K.B. 677. 
35 That is, under the law of the place of payment (infra, Ch. 62 n. 30), 
referring to the law of the indorsement. 
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recovered by process of law.36 ' An analogous decision has 
been rendered in New York. 87 
A corresponding general rule to bind American parties 
issuing, accepting; or indorsing a bill has been proposed by 
Lorenzen.38 The Supreme Court of the United States 
took a broad view, but on technically different grounds. 
This time, the lex situs was invoked as the chief basis of 
the decision. 
The Supreme Court held, indeed, that the right of a 
holder against the drawer as well as the drawee is governed 
by the law of the place where the indorsed bill is delivered 
to the holder. 
A check was drawn by the United States Veterans Bureau 
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the Treasury 
of the U.S. The check was payable to L. Makanja in 
Yugoslavia and mailed to him, but failed to reach him. 
Somebody forged his signature and an attestation by the 
city and sold it to the Merkur Bank in Zagreb (Croatia), 
whence it came to the Guaranty Trust Company to which 
it was paid by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as 
fiscal agent of the U.S.39 
The decision is squarely built on the conflicts rule for 
transfer of chattels. The bank in Yugoslavia acquired the 
title under its last situs, by the effect of good faith. The 
court, in this view, was influenced by the consideration that 
the owner of the paper, the Government, by mailing the 
check consented to negotiation in Yugoslavia. From these 
antecedents, the trust company acquired the check and the 
right to enforce the obligation it represents, as an incident 
of the transfer of a chattel. 
86 Ibid. at 684. 
37 Casper v. Kiihne ( 1913) 159 App. Div. 389, 144 N.Y.S. soz; payment 
in good faith by the drawee bank in Vienna. 
38 LORENZEN 139· 
89 United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (1934) 293 U.S. 
340, 95 A.L.R. 651; STEFFEN, Cases 390. 
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It is very difficult to follow this sequence of ideas, since 
a check to order is not an ordinary chattel. The result in 
the instant case was right, but the reasoning expressed a 
not quite satisfactory theory. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the court and intent 
on combating the theory of the defendant government, ex-
plained that the holder in the case had, indeed, more than 
a title in a valueless paper, derived from the local lex situs; 
the situation was likened to that of a transferee without 
indorsement or an indorsee after maturity, that is, the 
holder was not owner of "the debt," but he had the right 
to collect the proceeds such as the payee would have. This 
construction unnecessarily separates title and debt. Why 
was the holder not also the owner of the debt as well 
as of the paper? If the Yugoslavian law was seriously 
applied, the discount bank did acquire "the debt," not mean-
ing of course the underlying relationship between the payee 
and the drawer, or that between the drawer and the drawee, 
but "the debt" flowing from the instrument, the scriptural 
rights. It is illogical and unsound to convert this effect 
into a conception that neither corresponds to Yugoslavian 
nor to American law. For assuming that the foreign bank 
became a regular holder in good faith, so as to cut off the 
objection of previous forged signatures, his successors in 
due course enjoyed his privileges and were not in a hybrid 
and possibly precarious position. 
It is an important requirement that title and cambial 
debt both be considered in full, and at the same time kept 
together as often as possible. 
In France the principle of independence was understood 
to require that English parties should not be made liable 
contrary to their own law (of contracting), except on the 
ground that the latter contravenes public policy.40 Yet the 
40 ARMIN JON ET CARRY 507 § 448. 
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only English and American opinions rendered so far ap-
prove such liability even in their own courts. The same 
view has been taken by the German writers, because the 
recourse must be continued to reach the original parties. 
They contend that the drawer has no interest in the person 
who a vails himself of the recourse. 41 In any case, the 
courts do feel the necessity of bridging the gaps threatening 
the value of international bills of exchange. 
Liability of Agent. According to the English and Amer-
ican Acts/2 an agent "signing for or on behalf of a princi-
pal or in representative capacity" is not liable on the instru-
ment "if he was duly authorized." Otherwise, he is 
personally liable. The same is stated in the Geneva Con-
vention, article 8. Are these incidents of the signature? 
Arminjon proposed first to consult the lex fori on the 
"preliminary question" whether the relationship is to be 
characterized as ucambiaire" or not;43 in the affirmative, 
the agent would have to use the forms of the lex loci con-
tractus, and his own obligation would be determined by the 
bill of exchange law. The detour seems unnecessary. The 
laws of bills of exchange expressly incorporate the liabil-
ity of unauthorized agents, correctly so, since his relation-
ship to third parties is governed by the law of the contract 
that he concludes (Vol. III, p. 141). Indeed, by reimburs-
ing the holder he enters into the cambial rights quite as 
the principal would.44 
41 8TAUB-8TRANZ 744 n. 24; KESSLER 152 n. 36; RAISER 105. 
42 Supra n. 28. 
43 ARMIN JON ET CARRY 491 § 433 with some distinctions; ARMIN JON, DIP. 
Com. 320 § 16 5· 
44 Whether there should be an analogy in the case where an authorized 
agent signed with the name of his principal without his own name and 
finally pays the bill, is questioned by ULMER, Wertpapiere 179. 
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III. "Lex Loci Contractus" OF THE SINGLE OBLIGATION 
OR LAw oF THE ORIGINAL CoNTRACT? 
I. Negotiability 
The ability of a paper to be transferred by indorse-
ment or delivery depends on compliance with formal re-
quirements. It might simply be regarded as an incident of 
form. But American courts distinguish negotiability from 
form, and various considerations have been introduced into 
the problem. 
(a) In English and Continental laws/5 it is plainly 
recognized that the law of the place of issue governs the 
original contract also with regard to the questions whether 
the payee may transfer the instrument to order, in blank, 
or to bearer. A bill of exchange drawn and delivered in 
England and payable in Paris was negotiable and indors-
able anywhere without the clause "or order" as former 
French law required, and is endorsable now although not 
named "bill of exchange," as the Geneva law adopted in 
France requires. Conversely, a bill issued in a country of 
the Geneva Convention is negotiable everywhere, if des-
ignated as bill of exchange (article 1), though clauses re-
quired elsewhere are lacking. 
It is furthermore settled that accessory contracts, such as 
indorsements or avals, enjoy the negotiability of the original 
bill. An indorser therefore cannot restrict his signature by 
prohibiting subsequent indorsements (Gen. Conv., art. IS, 
par. 2). 
But where the drawer himself uses the clause "not to 
order," 46 or for that matter when the law of the first is-
45 z DIENA, Principi 312; 3 Trattato 95 §zzz; 0TrOLENGHI zu §84; 
RAISER 99; HUPKA 265. 
46 Generally allowed, see DIENA, 3 Tratt. 94 n. I; Geneva Conv. art. u, 
par. z. 
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sue excludes negotiability in the absence of a clause "to 
order," 47 the municipal enactments and doctrines are divid-
ed. Among them, the view that non-negotiability extends 
to all further contracts 48 has been adopted in the British 
Act, section 8 (I) and the Geneva Convention, article I I, 
paragraph 2: 
If the drawer has inserted in the bill the words 'not 
to order' or an equivalent clause, the bill can only be 
transferred in the form and with the effects of an or-
dinary assignment. 
Other laws, however, pursuing the principle of independ-
ence as conceived in municipal law, restrict the effect of 
the clause to its signer, even though he is the drawer; the 
bill, hence, reacquires its full force in the hands of any 
holder.49 
The conflicts problem appears where, under the first 
group of laws, now under the Geneva Convention, the 
drawer, according to his law, excludes subsequent negotia-
tions, which nevertheless occur in a country denying the ab-
solute effect of the clause. The municipal doctrines have 
influenced the decisions. Leading writers belonging to 
the jurisdictions of the second group extending their munici-
pal conception to the conflicts rule have invoked the inde-
pendence of subsequent indorsements as governed by their 
own laws of contracting.50 Against this view, a scholarly 
47 Egypt, Code Com. mixte art. uo; Code C. Com. indigene art. 105 
(following a former provision of the French (Com.). 
48 France: Cass. (Dec. u, 1849) S. r8so.r.ur, D. r8so.1.47; 
Germany: former Wechselordnung art. 9, 15; 
Scandinavia: Bills of Exchange Act (188o) art. 9, rs; Swiss C. Obi. art. 
727, 733; 
Hungary: Bills of Exchange Law ( 1876) art. 8, 13. 
49 Italy: former law: VIVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com. § r6I7j actual Bills of 
Exchange Law, 1933, art. 15, 19. 
50 Italy: DIENA, 3 Trattato 97 §222; BONELLI 230; 0TIOLENGHI §84 (but 
see §57) ; G. ARANGIO-RUIZ 254 § 98; 
France: ARMIN JON ET CARRY 507 § 449· 
Germany: STAUB-STRANZ 739-740 n. 16. 
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opinion considers the drawer's declaration to be an integral 
or at least prominent part of the original contract, binding 
on all participant parties, throughout the circulation of the 
bill.51 
But the defenders of the independence principle 52 again 
may point to its adoption, without an exception for the 
clause "not to order," in the Geneva Rules (article 4, para-
graph 2). Also certain of the draftsmen have denied that 
a bill could be made non-negotiable from birth forever. 53 
On the other hand, it is clear that accessory parties may 
end initial negotiability by appropriately restricting their 
signatures. 54 
(b) United States. Also in the United States it ts 
controversial what law governs negotiability. Lorenzen 55 
and the Restatement (§ 336) have well perceived that in 
principle negotiability is an incident of the basic contract, 
governed by the law of the place of the first issue. Only 
a small minority of the decisions, however, follow this 
course.56 Beale says that most decisions contain "as usual 
no square holding." 57 Wharton thought that the courts 
decided according to individual incidents rather than prin-
ciples.58 Favor for one party has certainly influenced some 
51 2 BAR 166 n. 143; RAISER 99; HIRSCH, JW. 1932, 709; HUPKA 265; 
KESSLER 138. 
France: VALERY§ 923; ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 336 § 177. 
52 STAUB-STRANZ, art. 93, n. 16; HUPKA 26 ( 5). 
53 RAISER III. 
54 RAISER 101 consistently denies this possibility as excluded by the original 
contract. 
55 LoRENZEN IZ9 If.; Popp v. Exchange Bank, noted n Calif. L. Rev. 
II4 (1923). 56 Carnegie v. Morrison (Mass. 1841) 2 Metcalf 381; Swift & Co. v. 
Bankers Trust Co. ( 1939) 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E. (2d) 992. 57 2 BEALE n86 § 336.1; cf., Notes, 61 L.R.A. 193, 205; 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
665; See also BEUTEL-BRENNAN 971 § 66 with comment on Mackintosh v. 
Gibbs ( 1909) 79 N.J.L. 40, 74 At!. 708; add ( 19II) 81 N.J.L. 577, So At!. 
554· 58 2 WHARTON 966, cf., LORENZEN 130. 
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holdings.59 According to Stumberg's analysis, in the case 
of a maker or an acceptor, the weight of authority favors 
the law of the place of payment, although for secondary 
obligations the decided tendency goes toward the separate 
laws of the places of drawing or indorsing. But authority 
exists for the proposition that if a check is drawn in Mexico 
and payable in New York, its negotiability depends on the 
law of Mexico, because the check is a bill of exchange.60 
Application of the independent laws is often advocated 
by the usual formalistic arguments. The law of the place 
of payment is not explained at all. But, as the next topic 
will show, it is regarded as the alternative to plurality of 
laws which is not attractive in itself with respect to the pri-
mary obligation. 
(c) Conclusion. If we want a simple and coherent law 
we cannot disregard the initial role of a bill if issued as a 
negotiable instrument. Any indorser may eliminate its 
effect for himself by an express clause. But he should not 
be able to restrict the characteristic quality of the paper 
with respect to subsequent parties who sign without re-
striction. This quality is an immediate effect of compliance 
with the formal requirements of the original contract. 61 
Where, however, an instrument is non-negotiable under 
its original law, it accords with the modern compromises 
respecting form and capacity to allow subsequent additions 
altering the nature of the instrument as respects the parties 
involved thereafter.62 
2. Indorsement after Maturity 
Indorsement after maturity has "a most diversified effect 
in the different countries." 63 This is also true of indorse-
59 See, e.g., Nicholas v. Porter ( 1867) 2 W.Va. 13, 94 Am. Dec. sor. 
60 Henne Iotter v. De Orvananos ( 1921) 114 Misc. 333, r86 N.Y.S. 488 and 
supra n. so. 
61 Everything on this point has been said by LoRENZEN roo. 
6 2 LoRENZEN 132 seemed to be of the same opinion. 
63 LoRENZEN 32. 
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ments after protest or after the time for protest has 
elapsed. However, the great tendency has been in all these 
cases to treat the indorsee as an ordinary assignee.64 Con-
flicts do arise where duly protested bills give rise to this 
situation, as formerly in Germany,65 or conversely these 
events do not impair the indorsement, as formerly in 
France.66 
The reason for the infirmity of the indorsee's position 
is not a defect of title, but the end of the normal life of 
the instrument. This gives no reason to exclude the in-
dividual laws in just this case.67 
IV. SINGLE LAW OF INDORSEMENT OR LAW OF THE 
PLACE OF PAYMENT? 
I. Amount of Damages in Recourse 
In this matter there has been no doubt respecting the 
substantive nature of the extent of recovery due in case of 
recourse on a dishonored bill.68 In England formerly, the 
"several laws" doctrine applied to the rate of interest, 69 
and related questions, 70 but the Bills of Exchange Act, 
section 57 ( 2), states that in the case of a bill dishonored 
abroad, the last holder or a warrantor may choose be-
tween the English measure of damages and the amount of 
re-exchange with interest. A decision has given the same 
right to a foreign drawer against an English acceptor.71 
Otherwise, foreign parties seem to be restricted to the Eng-
64 BEA sec. 10 (2); NIL sec. 7, par. 3· 
Geneva Conv., art. 20. 
65 Former Germon W.O. art. 16. 
66 Former French doctrine, 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT§ I3S· 
67 See RAISER 107. 
68 In re Gillespie, ex p. Robarts ( 1886) 18 Q.B. 286; Re Commercial 
Bank of S. Australia (1887) 36 Ch. D. 522; DICEY (ed. 6) 702 n. 84. 
69 Gibbs v. Freemont (1853) 9 Exch. 25. 
7° Cooper v. Earl of Waldegrave ( 1840) 2 Beav. 282; CHALMERS 238. 
71 In re Gillespie, supra n. 62. 
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I ish provisions in an English court. 72 Hence, apart from 
re-exchange, which has little importance at present, the 
acknowledgment of the substantive character of damages 
does not help much. 
American courts, speaking of lex loci contractus 73 or of 
lex loci of "performance," 74 have applied the law of each 
single contract; the maker of a note and the acceptor, of 
course, remaining subject to the law of the place of the pay-
ment of the instrument.75 The German law and discussions 
preceding the uniform Geneva Convention were dominated 
by the idea that in the event of recourse the amount of the 
bill and the original addition of interest and costs ought 
to be successively increased by new interest and costs. 76 
This system of "plural return costs" is mitigated by a right 
of every party liable to offer payment and require that the 
bill shall be given up to him. 77 With this system of sub-
stantive law, accentuating by itself the independence of 
the single laws with international effect, it is only a step to 
the similar conflicts system, accounting for the additional 
costs according to the single laws. 
It would seem, indeed, that, once the single law doctrine 
obtains at all, it has the relatively best case in this very 
question which is really such as would be contemplated by 
a bank discounting a payee's check.78 
2. Defenses of Acceptor or Maker 
The analogous rivalry of conflicts rules involving the 
position of the primary obligors belongs to the next chapter. 
72 DICEY (ed. 6) 703; LoRENZEN 168. 
73 Slacum v. Pomery (U.S. 1810) 6 Cranch 221, 3 L. Ed. 2os; Bank of 
Illinois v. Brady ( 1843) 3 McLean 268, Fed. Cas. no. 888. 
74 Peck v. Mayo ( 1842) 14 Vt. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 2os, and cases cited by 
LoRENZEN 169 n. 401-403. But see Mullen v. Morris ( 184s) 2 Pa. St. Ss: 
place of payment of the bill, i.e., New York, for indorser of Pennsylvania 
(semble). 
75 Scofield v. Day (N.Y. 1822) 20 Johns. 102: English law for a note 
payable in England. 
76 Geneva Conv., art. 48, 49; cf., former German W.O. art. so, Sl· 
77 Geneva Conv., art. so; W.O. art. 48. 
78 See LORENZEN's conclusion 173; RAISER 65 ff. 
CHAPTER 62 
Payment and Recourse 
I. PAYMENT 
P AYMENT here means the fulfillment of the primary cambial debt, by the drawee or maker. The law ap-
plicable to this relationship is primarily concerned 
with the obligation of a maker or an acceptor to a holder, 
but also includes such incidents as the offer of partial pay-
ment and certain other questions, the scope of which is 
sometimes much enlarged. 
1. The Applicable Law 
Matters respecting payment are commonly controlled by 
the law of the place where the bill is payable. Thus, the 
Geneva Rules (article 41 paragraph 1) state that 
"The effects of the obligations of the acceptor of a bill 
of exchange or maker of a promissory note are determined 
by the law of the place where the instrument is payable." 
This rule contrasts with the effect given in the Geneva Rules 
to the law of the place of signature in the case of other 
parties.1 
Story and the weight of American judicial authority 2 
agree with this rule. 
The former German doctrine, true to the principle of 
the law of the place of performance, tended rather to the 
1 This contrast, notwithstanding some variance as to the exact point of 
reference (infra n. 3) was stated early in Germany: I ROHG. E. 289; 14 id. 
258; 1 RGZ. 125; 6 id. 24; 7 id. 22; 107 id. 46; STAUB-STRANZ, art. 93 n. 6; 
see also Swiss BG. (Jan. 24, 1878) 5 BGE. 19. 
2 STORY 478 § 333; Heller v. Goslin ( 1900) 65 N.Y.S. 232; Midland 
Steel Co. v. Citizens Nat!. Bank ( 1904) 72 N.E. 290; Egley v. Bennett 
(Ind. 1923) 139 N.E. 385; Montana v. Worthington ( 1912) 162 Mo. 508, 
142 s.w. 1082. 
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place which, as a subsidiary rule, was identified with the 
domicil of the debtor.3 The same contact or the place 
where the acceptance is made, have also been urged on 
the ground of general theories.4 Also, the English Bills 
of Exchange Act, section 72 ( 2), submits "interpretation" 
of acceptance, like that of other acts, to the law of the 
place "where such contract is made." This embarrasses 
the modern commentators, 5 and has been expressly rejected 
in the United States ;6 the place of payment may be or 
may not be that where acceptance occurs.7 
Place of payment named (u domiciled draft"). Where 
a place of payment, different from the domicil of the 
drawee, is named in the bill, this has always been regarded 
as the surest expression of the intention that the law of 
this place should govern the obligation of the acceptor.8 
The place for performing the duties as a guarantor, of 
course, is not affected by this consideration. 
Absence of Place of Payment. Where there is no as-
certainable place of payment, as in the case of a bill pay-
able to bearer or in blank, a substitute is needed. The 
place of issue may serve for the obligation of the maker 
and that of the drawee's domicil for his duty.9 But cer-
3 2 RGZ. 13; 6 id. 24; 7 id. 21; etc. 107 id. 44, 46. 
4 E.g., STORY 478 § 333· 
5 CHALMI!RS, Bills of Exchange, thought that the mistake could be corrected; 
Wl!STLAKI! § 229 ignored the provision; DICI!Y (ed. 6) 690 doubts whether 
the law can be helped. 
The Act of India, s. 134, a year older, has a different rule, likewise un-
satisfactory in the opinion of an Indian comment, see DICI!Y, /.c. 
6 By an ancient decision, Grimshaw v. Bender (1809) 6 Mass. 157. The 
place of acceptance was used, e.g., in Briggs v. Latham ( 1887) 36 Kansas 
255, 13 Pac. 393· 
7 Rouquette v. Overman ( 1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 525: place of acceptance 
or place named for payment; Hall v. Cordell (1891) 142 U.S. u6; etc. 
8 United States: Brown v. Gates (1903) 97 N.W. 221, 98 N.W. 205: a 
very persuasive evidence of the intention of the parties. 
9 Geneva Convention on Bills, art. 2 (3) (4), on Checks art. 2 (2)-(4) 
and reservation 3 (allowing the place of creation, used in Italy and Greece). 
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tainty is achieved by the laws prescribing that the place of 
payment be indicated in the bil1.10 
2. The Scope of the Law of Payment 
(a) Modalities of payment. The normal application of the 
law of the place of performance is natural also here. The law 
of the place of payment, in such capacity, determines the 
means of payment :11 local or foreign currency; meaning 
of "pounds" or "francs," 12 or of money in the old 
days of markets and fairs; holidays and hours to be ob-
served ;13 the days of grace ;14 and anticipation or deferment 
of the payment.15 
(b) Time of maturity. The periphery of "modalities" 
has been gradually stretched, which in this field cor-
responds to the special needs. The Geneva Convention, 
article 37, to end much controversy, expressly prefers 
the calendar at the place of payment to that of the place 
of issue. The English Act covers this solution broadly 
with respect to the "due date," 16 and other statutes agree.11 
The lex loci solutionis is commonly preferred to the lex 
loci contractus.18 
10 Hague Uniform Law, art. 1 no. 5; Geneva Conv., art I no. 5· 
11 Caras v. Thalmann (1910) 138 App. Div. 297, 123 N.Y.S. 97; Geneva 
Conv., art. 4I par. 2 (usages of the place of payment) ; Montevideo Treaty 
Com. Terr. ( I940) art. 30 par. 3· 
12 2 BAR 164; 1 FIORE 223; 2 ROLIN 543; LoRENZEN 163 n. 371; Adelaide 
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd, [1934] A.C. 122, 
I5I, per Lord Wright, supra Vol. II, p. 464; but see Bonython v. Common-
wealth of Australia [1950] 66 T.L.R., Pt. 2, 969, 978. 
13 LoRENZEN 144, n. 29I, citing the international literature. 
H United States: Cockburn v. Kinsley (1913) 25 Colo. App. 89, 135 Pac. 
II IZ; Second Nat!. Bank of Richmond v. Smith ( I903) n8 Wis. I8, 94 
N.W. 664; other cases: STUMBERG 264. LoRENZEN 144 n. 292, with many 
citations of Continental authors. 
15 England: Rouquette v. Overmann (I875) L.R. IO Q.B. 525 (moratory). 
16 Sec. 72 (5). 
11 Switzerland: C.Obl. art. I092. 
18 France: ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 348 n. I citing opponents, cited 347 n. I; 
cf. ARMINJON ET CARRY 517 § 548 on the French controversy. 
Germany: STAUB-STRANZ art. 93 n. 8. 
Italy: FIORE§ 328; DIENA, 3 Trattato § 233· 
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Illustration. Are "three months after date" calendar 
months or ninety days? The Portuguese law of the place 
of payment decides.19 "Thirty days after date" in a seller's 
draft, drawn in the United States and accepted in England, 
the steamer with the goods arriving earlier than foreseen: 
English law applies.20 
(c) Part payment. Although the Anglo-American acts 
allow the holder an option to receive or refuse partial 
acceptance by the drawee or partial payment,21 the Geneva 
Convention states that the holder must receive it.22 The 
Geneva Rules, article 7, apply the law of the place of 
payment to this question.23 
The same must be true of a conditional acceptance.24 
If the laws of the place of indorsement were applied, an 
American could be made liable by a holder having refused 
part payment but would not be able to sue his Italian 
indorser. 
(d) Amortization. In conformity with the universal 
view,25 the Geneva Rules add to the scope of the lex loci 
solutionis the "measures to be taken in case of loss or 
theft of a bill of exchange or promissory note." "Loss" 
includes destruction 26 and the "measures" include restitu-
tion following such measures. 27 
(e) Excuses and discharge. Finally, the same law de-
termines the excuses for delaying or not performing pay-
19 OLG. Hamburg (May 28, 1895) 5 Z. int. R. 570, Clunet 1897, 386, 
aff'd. RG. (Dec. n, 1895) 36 RGZ. xz6, 6 Z. int. R. x66, 429, Clunet 
1897. 827. 
20 Hammond, Snyder & Co. v. American Express (1908) 107 Md. 295, 68 
Atl. 496. 
21 BEA s. 44 (I) ; NIL s. 142 ;-a bad rule, HUDSON AND FELLER, 44 Harv. 
L.Rev. (1931) at357. 
22 Geneva Conv., art. 39· 
23 Likewise LoRENZEN 163 f. 
24 ARMIN JON ET CARRY 498 § 438. 
Treaty of Montevideo, Com. Terr., art. 30 par. 4· 
25 VEITH 526. 
26 Comptes rendus, 157 § 203 i.f. 
27 ld. 366. 
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ment.28 And as the law of the place of payment predicates 
what amount is due on the bill, it also decides whether the 
entire bill is discharged by payment, release, setoff, or other 
event, 29 and therefore also whether an acceptor is dis-
charged by payment on a forged instrument or has to 
pay again to satisfy the bill (not his underlying relation-
ship to the drawer) ,80 
3· Enlargements of Scope 
(a) The British Act, Section 72 ( 2), subjecting all "in-
terpretation" of any cambial act to the law of the place 
of payment, however this vague provision may be con-
strued, by far exceeds the reasonable scope of this law. 
(b) In the United States, many decisions sound as if 
the law of the place of payment governed the total obli-
gation of the maker of a promissory note. It is said to 
govern "execution, construction, and validity." However, 
there is no reason why the validity of issue should be 
judged from the viewpoint of the place of performance.81 
More thoughtful courts have restricted the scope of this 
law to the incidents of performance itsel£.82 Also the 
obligation created by the issue of a check must not be 
determined by that law,33 as the Geneva Rules on Checks 
correctly state.34 In the present system, it is unavoidable 
that validity of drawing and making be subject to the law 
of the place where signature and delivery to the payee 
occur. 
2 8 For U.S. see STUMBERG 263. 
29 BEA sees. 59, 6o. DICEY (ed. 6) 694 f. 
30 E.g., Casper v. Kiihne ( 1913) 159 App. Div. 389, 144 N.Y.S. 501, 
Austrian Jaw of the drawee bank. 
31 This criticism seems to be shared in 11 Am. Jur. ( 1938) 437· Most 
decisions allege "intention," in a purely fictitious manner. 
32 Brabston v. Gibson (1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 263; Bank of U.S. v. Daniel 
( 1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 32. 
38 Contra: Moulis v. Owen [1907] I K.B. 746- C.A. 
34 Geneva Rules concerning checks, art. 2 par. 2. 
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Acceptance, it is true, is "independent" of issue. Its 
place has been identified either with the locality of the 
declaration of acceptance, or, as in the United States, simply 
with the place where payment is due. 35 
II. THE STEPS TO PRESERVE RECOURSE 
I. Survey of Theories 
(a) Controversy. Are presentment of the bill, protest, 
and notice of default to be governed by the law of the 
first issue as the basic law of the bill? Or by the law of 
every single indorsement, in virtue of the principle of 
independence? Or by the law of the place of payment as 
a unitary law in matters not directly connected with issue? 
There have been controversies on these questions for a 
long time in various countries.36 The European discus-
sion originated in connection with the French moratory 
law of I 870, which under the pressure of war postponed 
the maturity of bills and the time for presentment and 
protest. Brilliant expert opinions brought no agreement 
on the international effect of the French law.37 Very com-
prehensive debates in the preparation of the Hague and 
the Geneva conflicts rules were no more fortunate. Neither 
are the rules reasonably settled, nor even the problems 
completely envisaged. 
The ideas underlying the substantive rules requiring the 
holder to take certain measures are approximately uniform, 
with just one exception. In the Anglo-American laws, the 
holder is expected to exercise diligence; negligence in per-
35 Supra Ch. 59· 
36 We owe an excellent report to LORENZEN 158 ff. An almost forgotten 
but historically important and profound contribution was made by voN 
SALPIUS, "Anwendung ausliindischen Rechtes auf den Wechselregress," 19 
Z. Handels R. ( 1874) 1. 
37 See infra 219. 
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forming this duty deprives him of his recourse. Con-
tinental laws agree in the main but usually add the con-
sideration that the holder loses his right by force of law. 
Thus, it seems that Anglo-American lawyers base the duty 
on the contract between the holder and his indorser, where-
as Continental doctrines, though also emphasizing con-
tractual aspects, at the same time have in mind a legal 
effect of inaction equivalent to estoppel, 38 operating with-
out any fault of the holder. This contract is now mitigated 
by the fact that the Geneva Convention concedes the excuse 
of vis major. Nevertheless, the principles are sufficiently 
different to have inspired different points of view in the 
conflicts field. 
In the United States, the principle of independence, 
fostered by isolated contractual privity, dominates in sur-
prising strength. 39 In the Continental doctrine, the same 
powerful current 40 encounters opposite tendencies with such 
uncertain results that the comments on the Geneva rules 
still hesitate where to draw the line between the principle 
of independence sanctioned in article 4 and the law of the 
place of payment invoked in article 8.41 
In general, the law of the place of payment has an un-
challenged role in certain parts of the matter and a con-
troversial one respecting other incidents. 
(b) Statutes. The only statutes apparently attempting 
a comprehensive conflicts rule have given enigmatic direc-
tives. 
The British Bills of Exchange Act, section 7 2 ( 3), follow-
ing some leading precedents,42 subjects all duties of the 
38 Very instructive: HUPKA I49 j ULMER I87. 
39 See the cases in 2 WHARTON § 452b i I DANIEL ( ed. 6} § 909; LoRENZEN 
I48 n. 3 I7 j RAISER 40 n. 3· 
40 2 MEYER 373 for documentation. 
41 Infra. 
42 Rothschild v. Currie (184I) I Q.B. 43; Hirschfield v. Smith (I866) 
L.R. I C.P. 340, quoted by LoRENZEN IS2-IS4· 
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holder to "the law of the place where the act is done or 
the bill is dishonoured." Since the text only mentions the 
place where the act is done, without adding "or to be done," 
the courts have refused to apply the provision to the ques-
tion whether, e.g., an act of presentment is required at all.48 
Among many other doubts, it is even queried whether the 
law includes other indorsees than the last holder.44 
In the Geneva Rules, article 8 speaks of the form of 
protest and other necessary acts, submitting it to the law 
of the place of acting (infra 3), but the text fails to say 
what law decides whether an act is necessary for the con-
servation of rights. No help is afforded by the preparatory 
materials. 
We shall first discuss a problem that is quite commonly 
treated as an incident of the independent laws, viz. the 
necessity of the various measures in question; thereafter 
the problems generally considered subject to the law of 
the place of performance-time and manner of these 
measures; and finally the problems of doubtful classifica-
tion. 
2. Necessity of Preserving Steps 
Not only the vastly dominating American practice, 45 
48 Bank Polski v. Mulder & Co. [1941] 2 K.B. 266, [1941] 2 All E.R. 647, 
per Tucker J.; Cornelius v. Banque Franco-Serbe [ 1941] 2 All E.R. 728, 
732 per Stable J.; on the reasoning see the critical comment by MANN, 5 
Mod. L. Rev. (1941/42) 251, and CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 254· 
44 WESTLAKE§ 232: no; contra: DICEY (ed. 6) 698. 
45 II Am. Jur. 444 n. 2; Aymar v. Sheldon (N.Y. 1834) 12 Wend. 439, 
27 Am. Dec. 137; Musson v. Lake (1845) 4 How. (U.S.) 262. Among more 
recent decisions, see, e.g.: 
Liability of drawer: Casper v. Kuhne (1913) 79 Misc. 411, 140 N.Y.S. 86, 
aff'd. 144 N.Y.S. 502; Ellenbogen v. State Bank ( 1922) 119 Misc. 711, 197 
N.Y.S. 278; Mazukiewicz v. Hanover Nat. Bank of City of New York (1925) 
240 N.Y. 317, 148 N.E. 535; Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel (C.C.A. 1st 
1952) 106 F. (2d) 950. 
Liability of indorser: Briggs v. Latham (1887) 36 Kan. 255, 13 Pac. 393; 
Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (C.C.A. 8th 1911) 188 Fed. 300. 
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but also the majority of Continental courts 46 and the 
writers 47 profess that "necessity" and "sufficiency" of pre-
sentment, protest, and notice are subject to the several 
independent laws. The justification of this rule is sought 
in "logic"; where the obligation of the indorsers is made 
dependent on a protest, this is a condition precedent of the 
guaranty to be governed by the law controlling this obliga-
gation. 
A contrary opinion, however, objects that no valid 
reason exists for compelling the holder to observe the Ia ws 
under which the previous engagements occurred. 48 The 
result is application of the law of the place of payment, 
quite as the British Bills of Exchange Act, section 72 (3) 
predicates. 
A related rule has been introduced into the Uni-
form Commercial Code, section 4-102, but only for actions 
taken by a bank in the course of collection. The place of 
the bank, however, though a better contact than the place 
of the indorser, is not of such practicability as that of the 
place of payment. 
The commentators on the Geneva Rules split into the 
46 France: Trib. Com. Seine (April 6, 1875) Clunet 1876, 103. 
Germany: 9 ROHGE. 203; RG. (May 27, 1913) Leipz. Z. 1913, 674· 
Italy: Cass. Firenze (Apr. 8, 1895) S. 1896·4·7· 
47 2 MEYER 373 j RAISER 20 n. 21 3 j 72 n. 3 j VEITH 517 f. 
England: WESTLAKE § 232. 
U.S.: STORY§ 360; 2 WHARTON 986 § 452 b, d.; LORENZEN 148-150j DANIEL 
( ed. 6) §9o9. 
Austria: BETTELHEIM 157 f., 162 f.; 2 GRUNHUT 581; CANSTEIN 182. 
France: DESPAGNET 994 § 345 j VALfiRY 1288 j SURVILLE § 497 j WEISS, 2 
Traite 444; AUDINET 6r8, 620. 
Germany: 2 BAR § 306; 2 GRUNHUT 58Ij 19 ROHG. 203j 9 RGZ. 430j 
STAUB-STRANZ (ed. 10) art. 86, n. 9; KGJW. 1932, 754· 
Italy: DIENA, 3 Tratt. 169, 2 Principii 327; 0TTOLENGHI 366; Bosco, 
Rivista 1928, 97, ro6. 
Switzerland: 2 MElLI 347 § 192. 
48 England: FOOTE (ed. 5) 460; DICEY (ed. 6) 698; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 253· 
Germany: 2 FRANKENSTEIN 434i NUSSBAUM 324 f. 
Italy: SRAFFA, Riv. Dir. Com. 1927, r. 255; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Corn. 
392 f.; App. Napoli (May 2, 1924) Rivista 1925, 101 (promissory note). 
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same two views. Either they trust the broad language of 
article 4, stating the principle of independence,49 or they 
construe article 8, establishing the law of the place of pay-
ment, extensively.50 
A third view looking to the place of issue 51 has no at-
traction. The consequences may be illustrated: 
( i) A bill issued and payable in the United States (or 
England) to P is indorsed in the United States {or Eng-
land) to A and by A in Germany to B. Since under 
German law protest is a condition of recourse, B omitting 
the levy of protest loses his right against A. This is still 
true under the Geneva Convention, article 44, paragraph 3, 
for bills payable on a fixed day or in a fixed period after date 
or sight and otherwise, where the protest is not made within 
a year (article 34). However, under American (or Eng-
lish or Mexican) law concerning an inland bill which does 
not need to be protested, 52 A has, without protest, recourse 
against P and P against the drawer. 53 
( ii) A commercial order was drawn in New York on 
a firm in Vienna, Austria, to the order of plaintiff. Pro-
test in Vienna was omitted as unnecessary because the in-
strument was not a true check. Under New York law, 
however, it was a foreign bill and protest was required. 
The liability of the drawer is denied,-correctly under the 
law of the drawer, wrongly under that of the place of 
payment. 
If it may be allowed to doubt whether the issue warrants 
an exception to the several laws principle-as Lorenzen 
did-the presence of both conflicts rules in the same world 
is one disadvantage too many. 
The decision in favor of the lex loci contractus is ordi-
narily believed easier with respect to notification. The duty 
49 HUPKA 256 f. 
50 ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 359 § 193. 
51 Institute of International Law, 8 Annuaire 122, resolution IV. 
52 BEA sec. 51 (z); NIL sec. 152; Mexico: Ley de Titulos, art. I45· 
53 RABEL, 6 Z. ausl. PR. r"~51 332 j KESSLER 151, 157 j HUPKA 257 n. 1. 
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of the holder is now regulated with less difference but 
not quite similarly by the Anglo-American Acts which pre-
scribe notices to the drawer and every indorser, and the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions requiring notice to the 
drawer and the precedent indorser who has to communicate 
with his own indorser. 54 The writers think that with good 
reason an American indorser may expect notice from the 
last holder. 55 
Illustration. A indorsed in England a bill payable in 
Spain, and B indorsed in Spain to C where no notice was 
required. C gave notice to B twelve days after dishonor, 
B at once to A. The English court allowed recourse by B 
against A;56 indeed, B could not act earlier. 5 7 
It is difficult to see why even in such questions a world 
law could not provide unity. 
3. Form and Time 
(a) Form. The Geneva Rules, article 8, expressly state 
that 
"the form ... of protest as well as the form of the other 
measures necessary for the exercise or preservation of 
rights concerning bills of exchange or promissory notes, 
are regulated by the laws of the country in which the pro-
test must be drawn up or the measures in question taken." 
The same rule is established for all "duties" of the holder 
in the British Act, section 72(3),58 for the duty of levying 
protest in the laws of the German group before the Geneva 
54 BEA sec. 48; NIL sec. 89; Hague U nif. Law art. 44; Geneva Conv. 
art. 4S· 
55 To this effect recently ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 361. 
56 Horne v. Rouquette ( 1878) 3 Q.B.D. 514-C.A. 
57 
"How could the English indorsee have given what would have been 
timely notice from the point of view of English domestic Jaw, if his own 
knowledge of the dishonour depended on the compliance with Spanish Jaw?" 
DICEY's editors ( ed. 6) 698 ask. 
58 DICEY (ed. 6) 698. 
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Rules, 59 in the Latin-American codes and treaties,60 and is 
familiar to the literature.61 A prominent American de-
cision 62 shares this view, speaking of the "days of grace, 
the manner of making the protest and the person by whom 
protest should be made," as equally subject to the law of 
the place of payment. We may take it that the former 
contrary opinions respecting time and form of notification 
are to be regarded as obsolete.63 The law or custom of 
the place where the bill is payable governs, as it is often 
said. 
What is "form"? Agreement seems to exist that here, 
once more, form is a broad term, really a misleading name, 
including external expression of presentment, protest, or 
notification or "noting," but also the officers, manner, time 
of day, and locality involved. The British Act happily 
avoids this term. It appears that even such questions as 
follows are included in the "mode of presentment" :64 
Whether a mere possessor who is not the owner of the 
bill may present it and levy protest in his own name ;65 
Whether upon a presentment for acceptance the drawee 
·
59 I MEYER 659. Germany: former WO. art. 86; 2 GRiiNHUT 577· 
6° Montevideo Treaty Com. art. 26. 
Cod. Bustamante, art. 270. 
Chile: C. C. art. I7 par. 2, involving "effects" of an instrument, applied 
by Sup. Ct in Bco. Germanico de Ia America del Sur v. Lizarralde (Aug. 
IS, I928) 26 Rev. Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. I929 I, 474, 48I, to the form of 
protest in Buenos Aires; it was a bill of exchange, indorsed in Chile upon a 
person domiciled in Argentina. 
Mexico: Ley de titulos I, ( I932) art. 256, calls this law lex fori. 
61 STUMBERG, 253; PILLET, 2 Traite 84I, 848. 
62 Amsinck v. Rogers (I907) I89 N.Y. 252, 82 N.E. I34; Wooley v. Lyon 
(I886) II7 Ill. 244, 6 N.E. 88s; cf. Gleason v. Thayer (I9I3) 87 Conn. 
248, 87 Atl. 790. 
63 See LoRENZEN ISI n. 329; add Sec. Natl. Bank of Richmond v. Smith 
( I903) n8 Wis. I8, 94 N.W. 664. 
64 LoRENZEN I48, par. I. 
65 He may, according to Geneva Conv. art. I6 if he shows an uninter-
rupted series of indorsements. 
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may revoke his acceptance written on the bill, as the Geneva 
Convention allows him until he returns the bill.66 
uSufficiency of notice" is an ambiguous term occurring in 
American decisions, to be located between "necessity" and 
"manner." If the holder has given a reasonable notice 
to the defendant according to the law of his contract, it 
would seem that any other possible requirement regards 
either "time" or "mode," both of which belong to the 
place of payment. 
Renvoi. One American case applying the law of the 
place of payment is known as admitting renvoi. 67 A promis-
sory note was made and indorsed in Illinois and payable 
in Canada. It was dishonored, and the notice complied 
with the Canadian but not with Illinois law. Judge San-
born, directly adducing the Canadian law of the place of 
payment to "time and manner of giving notice," argued 
ad abundantiam that even though Illinois law were to apply, 
it would refer to Canadian law. This decision has un-
necessarily been criticized with the usual arguments against 
renvoi.68 
(b) Time. In the United States, the time for present-
ment and protest is by prevailing authority determined 
under the law of the place of payment.69 For the time 
and manner of giving notice some old decisions applied the 
independent laws of the several contracts,70 but more re-
cently the single law of the place of payment obtains.71 
In agreement with the universal view/2 article 8 of the 
Geneva Rules also follows the law of the place of pay-
6 6 Geneva Conv. art. 29. 
67 Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (1911) 188 Fed. 300, 301. 
68 LORENZEN 175 f.; cf, RAISER 39· 
69 10 C.J.S. 498 § 66 n. 59· 
70 10 C.J.S. 499 n. 64, 6s. For the old cases on presentment, cf. RAISER 72. 
71 Guernsey v. Imperial Bank of Canada (1911) 188 Fed. 300, 305. 
72 LORENZEN 154· 
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ment for protest. The time for presentment and par-
ticularly notice continues as a subject of controversy. 73 
The several laws doctrine produces a disorderly chain 
of recourse in which an indorsee may be liable to his 
creditor and unable to recover from his debtor.74 Under 
the Geneva Rules the extensive interpretation of article 8, 
to cover presentment and notification, has been urged, not 
only as a requirement of harmony 75 but also because the 
local law of the place of payment is the only one known 
to the persons charged with cashing the bill. 76 
At least, respecting the time for presentment, all courts 
should follow this argument, especially, but not only, where 
the basic bill indicates a certain date for presentment or 
maturity. 77 The place of payment is also here preferable 
to that where presentment is due.78 
Reasonable time. The Anglo-American Acts prescribe 
a reasonable time: for acceptance of a bill payable after 
sight (the time running from the issue) (NIL § I 44) ; 
for presentment and protest of a bill payable at demand 
(from the issue or the last negotiation) (NIL§§ 7I, I 55); 
and for the liability of the drawer of a check (from the 
issue of the check) (NIL § I 86) .79 Moreover, an old 
practice is frequently continued whereby a check must be 
sent for presentment the day after receipt. These are 
73 VEITH soo. 
H Despite a Yugoslavian proposal and a monitum by the Northern states, 
see HUPKA 2SS n. 3· 
75 RABEL I.e.; RAISER 74. 7S; VEITH SIS; HUPKA 2S6. 
76 KESSLER 156; but the dominant opinion takes, with regret, the inde-
pendence principle as prescribed; see RAISER So; QuASSOWSKI-ALBRECHT art. 
97, n. 6; HuPKA 2s6, all following former rules; cf. RENAULT, Actes, Second 
Hague Conference on Bills of Exchange, 1912, I ISO. 
77 ARMIN JON-CARRY,§§ 436, 462. 
78 STAUB-STRANZ art. 97 n. 9 advocates the place of presentment. But 
this is too subtle; presentment may also be considered a modality of payment. 
79 BEA sec. 40 (1), 45 (2), 86 (1); 51 (4); 74· 
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contradictory principles which cannot be reconciled.80 How-
ever, they may be corrected; only one decision has taken 
section 7 I literally.81 Commonly in case of a check, the 
reasonable time is simply understood to mean that each 
holder, to preserve the liability of his immediate indorsers, 
must present a check on the next following working day. 
Yet a bank issuing a check is deemed to put the instrument 
into circulation for a certain time.82 
The interesting point here is, how foreign courts the 
laws of which do not know the criterion of "reasonable 
time," should apply this measure. 
The main principle to be observed by a foreign court 
defining the duty of presentment is contained in § 193 NIL 
(sec. 40 ( 3 ), 4 5 ( 3 ) , 8 6 ( 2) BEA) : 
"In determining what is 'reasonable time' or an 'unreason-
able time,' regard is had to the nature of the instrument, 
the usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to 
such instrument and the facts of the particular case." 
Foreign courts, applying American law as that of the 
place of payment, sometimes have failed to understand that 
this period must be estimated from case to case, and that 
drawer and indorser are on a different footing. The date 
of receiving a check, sending it to a bank for collection, 
dispatch to a correspondent bank and to the drawee must 
be ascertained; the holder must prove diligence in a severe 
examination. 
No matter whether the Anglo-American "reasonable" 
time applies abroad as an incident of the indorser-indorsee 
80 Insofar (not respecting his own theory) I agree with BIGELOW-LILE, 
Bills, Notes and Checks (ed. 3, 1928) §§ 223, 351-355 against the authors 
who try vainly to harmonize the rules, with varying results. Cf. 6 Z. ausl. 
PR. 327 f. 
81 Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen (1908) 134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451. 
82 2 DANIEL (ed. 6) 1789 f. 
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relation or as the unitary rule of the place of payment, 
this concept must be used in its original meaning. 83 
4· Exemptions from the Duties. 
It is a difficult question whether excuses for delaying 
or omitting protests or other measures fall into the cate-
gory of the independence principle or of the law of the 
place of payment. 
The older authors either accorded to each signer dis-
charge as provided by his own laws, 84 or likened temporary 
obstacles to the days of grace, subject to the law of the 
place of payment. 85 Lorenzen, declaring for the first 
principle, nevertheless on grounds of convenience, states 
an exception for the "definition of vis major" which should 
be that of the place of payment.86 But this defeats the 
alleged principle. Arminjon distinguishes liberation by 
vis major and the obligations of the holders, which re-
main under their several laws.87 Their duties, however, 
are essentially changed. The decisive question is: whether 
the law of the place of payment, quite contrary to the 
several laws principle, ought to be stretched, 88 so as to 
afford equitable relief to the holder, menaced in the preser-
vation of his recourse. This should be affirmed with the 
exception of events affecting merely personal relationships. 5 9 
The American Negotiable Instruments Act uses a three-
fold language to define the exceptions to the duties of pro-
test, presentment, and notice; these steps are "not re-
83 RABEL, 5 Z. a us!. PR. ( 1932) 326, 330. 
84 E.g., 2 BAR § 310; SURVILLE § 498; 4 LYON-CAEN ET RENAULT § 660; 
4 WEISS 463 f. 
85 2 BROCHER 33 I; DIENA, 3 Tratt. 182, 192; 2 MElLI § 193; CAVAGLIERI, 
Dir. Int. Com. 390. 
86 LORENZEN 156. 
87 ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 371 § 203. 
88 Stretched over its normal scope which does not, despite the Restatement, 
§ 332, include the causes of nonperformance, supra Vol. II, 466, cf. supra 
205 f. 
89 RABEL, 6 Z. ausl. PR. 332 ff.; v. CAEMMERER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Hand-
worterbuch 265; KESSLER 151; HUPKA 256 f. 
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quired," 90 or "excused," 91 or "dispensed with." 92 Never-
theless, we do not see that these expressions have ever been 
neatly differentiated,-they are in fact merged in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, section 3-5 I 1-or would be able 
to furnish adequate categories for conflicts purposes. Yet, 
all these cases cannot be treated on the same footing. The 
following divisions may be proposed. 
(a) Personal defenses. To stay within the American 
examples, an indorsee may sue the indorser or a maker 
or drawer without presentment, protest, or notice, where 
both parties knew that the instrument would not be honored 
and both were in fraud or the drawer was dishonest and 
the indorser knew it. 93 Likewise, where the indorser has 
participated in an application for bankruptcy of the maker, 
which made payment impossible at the time of maturity ;94 
or the indorsee had to retain the check for a few days in 
the interest of the drawer and the indorser.95 
The courts invoke waiver by conduct or construe sections 
79, 8o "broadly." In truth, the exemption is based on 
circumstances outside the instrument, characterizing the 
underlying relationship between just the two parties. The 
individual contract and its law, under the principle of in-
dependence, govern the incident. 
A different situation which, however, equally must pro-
duce the application of the several laws doctrine, arises 
where really waiver is written in the bill with restriction 
to a two-parties-relation. 
90 §§ 79, II4 no. 4, 159 (liability of the drawer) ; §§So, II5 no. 3, 159 
(liability of indorser). 
91 §§ 81, u3, (delay by 'Vis major). 
92 §§ 82 (3), 109-1II, 159 (waiver); 82, (1), 112, 159 (impossibility). 
93 DANIEL 1236, 1792; going farther: First Nat. Bank v. Currie ( 1907) 
147 Mich. 72, 110 N.W. 499; Start v. Tupper ( 1908} 8r Vt. 19, 69 Atl. 151 
(semble); NORTON, Bills and Notes (ed. 4) 561. 
94 J. W. O'Bannon Co. v. Curran (1908) 129 App. Div. 90, 113 N.Y.S. 359· 
95 Churchill v. Yeatman, Gray Grocer Co. (1914) rrr Ark. 529, r64 
s.w. 283· 
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(b) Incidents of Payment. In contrast to the group 
just described, the holder may encounter obstacles "beyond 
his control" or "not imputable to his fault." It stands 
to reason 96 that the law of the place of payment is com-
petent, e.g., to free the holder unable to levy protest. 
Impossibility and frustration will work in this manner as 
grounds of exemption under the Anglo-American acts.97 
Although the Geneva Convention introduces the excep-
tion of vis major, 98 it does not fully reach the scope of the 
Anglo-American exemptions on which recourse may be 
based when protest etc. is delayed. It excuses only absolute 
and objective, total impossibility, not frustration, excessive 
or extraordinary difficulty, partial or relative impossibility, 
while on the other hand destruction of the instrument be-
longs to another category.99 Where, e.g., death or illness 
prevent the holder or his agent from presenting the bill, 
he may be excused under American law, but not according 
to the uniform law. 
Illustration. A check could not be presented at a bank 
in Amsterdam during the German occupation. Dutch law 
had to control the question whether the recourse survived. 
This also agrees with BEA, section 72 (3). Strangely, 
an English judge instead applied the substantive rule of 
BEA, section 46 ( 2), to dispense with presentment.100 
The much debated question concerning the moratory 
laws of the place of payment 101 has finally been answered 
96 To the same effect: 
England : BEA sec. 72 ( 3) . 
Italy: Cass. (July 4, I927) 4-5 Annuario Dir. Comp., Parte III, Io; Cass. 
Sez. Unite (July I, I927) Rivista I928, 94· 
97 NIL sec. 8I, 82 no. I, n2, BEA 46, so; Uniform Commercial Code 
3-SII (I). 
9 8 Geneva Conv., art. 54· 
99 See in particular HUPKA I48 ff.; ANGELONI, Cambiale ( ed. 3) 448 ff., 
§§ 222 f. 
10° Cornelius v. Banque Franco-Serbe ( I94I) 2 All E.R. 728; cf. DICEY 
( ed. 6) 699, illustration 2. 
101 LoRENZEN IS8, I6I; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 372 § 204. 
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by the Geneva Convention insofar as the wording of article 
54 on vis major expressly names prevention by a "legal 
prohibition," "prescription lt!gale," by any state.102 De-
crees and ordinances are included, but the co-ordination with 
acts of God introduces too short a waiting period of thirty 
days for termination of the unsurmountable obstacle to 
presentment or protest, and the ample reservations of the 
states, allowing deviations from article 54 and defense 
against foreign moratoria ( annexe II, article 22), have 
marred the uniformity of the regulation.103 
(c) Estoppel. The difference between the two situations 
described under (a) and (b) is illustrated by a German 
decision applying the American rule of estoppel. This rule 
prescribes, according to a frequent quotation, that: 
"Where the indorser of a note by words or acts has in 
fact misled and put the holder off his guard and reasonably 
induced him to omit due presentation for payment and 
notice of non-payments, he is deemed in law to have waived 
the performance of these ceremonies ... " 104 
In a case of the Appeal Court of Berlin, the holder, suing 
upon a German executed indorsement in a bill payable in 
New Y ark, sought excuse for not having given timely notice 
and resorted to the American estoppel rule, under the 
theory that the unitary law of the place of payment should 
prevail. The bill was indorsed by the signature of the de-
fendant's son as authorized agent, but the father, falsely 
denying that the son's signature was genuine, induced the 
holder to fetch back the instrument from New York where 
it had been sent for presentment, in order to have the de-
fendant examine it. After exact investigation of the facts, 
102 Comptes rendus 1930 p. 253, 256-262. 
103 HUPKA 162-171. 
104 Foster, J. in Kent v. Warner (Mass. 1866) 12 Allen 561, 563; In re 
Swift ( 1901) 106 Fed. 65, 68. 
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the court held that the plaintiff's conduct satisfied the con-
ditions under which NIL, section 159 dispenses with pro-
test, for the time being, allowing it when the cause of 
delay ceases to operate. 
The court wandered off from the principle of the several 
laws: 
"The question is only whether the provisions excusing 
failure to protest belong to the provisions involving the 
time for protest (law of the place of payment) or to the 
provisions involving the necessity of a timely protest (law 
of the domicil of the defendant in recourse). The first view 
is preferable and highly suggested by convenience. Protest 
is an act to be made at one time by the last holder of the 
bill, commonly in a very short space of time. The last 
holder cannot be supposed to know and observe all laws of 
the debtors in recourse. Security of commerce therefore 
requires that a protest still permissible and in time under 
the law of the place of payment should also be available 
against a regressee whose domicil has other rules on the 
effect of delay in making protest." 105 
This eloquent reasoning unfortunately clashes with the 
existing rules. The recourse against the German in-
dorser stood under German law which seemed to afford 
merely an action for tortious violation of good morals, but 
may have provided a more efficient remedy than that recog-
nized for the case at bar. In any case, also under Ameri-
can law to which the court resorted, estoppel dispenses only 
with the recourse against the one indorser who induced the 
holder. 
III. TIME FOR SUING 
1. Suing for Recourse 
In the common-law jurisdictions, scarcely a doubt has 
been expressed that limitation of action, as usual/06 is 
105 KG; (13th Div.), (April 25, 1932), 6 Z. ausl. PR 334, IPRspr. 1932, 
97. 100. 
106 Vol. III, p. 475 ff. 
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governed by the lex fori. 101 Some of the old leading de-
cisions to this effect dealt with negotiable instruments. The 
exceptions, such as contained in the borrowing statutes, 
apply of course, and "extinction" of the action or discharge 
of the debtor takes the case out of the rule. 
In the civil-law doctrine,108 by which limitation of action 
is recognized as a substantive institution, governed by the 
law of the contract, it was taken for granted that the prin-
ciple of independence was to prevail.109 But the draftsmen 
of the Geneva Rules, apprehensive that the drawer might 
be freed earlier than his indorsee, chose just this situation 
to impose a single applicable law. As such they selected 
the law of the place of issue, because the basic law of the 
bill would afford the appropriate contractual ground for 
the single law.110 
Article 5 of the Geneva Rules expresses this meaning so 
badly that it became controversial whether it refers only 
to periods of preclusion rather than also to limitation of 
action. The broader construction, however, prevails and 
is founded upon the fact that the time restrictions almost 
everywhere are but genuine limitations of action. No in-
terpretation serves to extend the provision to the causes of 
interruption and suspension of the time period, which are 
left either to the lex fori 111 or to the several laws, 112 or 
reserved to nationallegislation.113 
107 LoRENZEN 164; more recently, e.g., Coral Gables v. Christopher (1937) 
108 Vt. 414. 189 At!. 147, 109 A.L.R. 474; Gaffe v. Williams (1942) 194 Ga. 
673; Western Coal and Mining Co. v. Jones ( 1946) 27 Cal. (2d) 819. 
108 An attempt to collect decisions on the special matter ends in failure 
to discover a principle; see ARMINJON, DIP. Com. 374 § 206. 
109 2 BAR § 308; DIENA, 3 Tratt. § 247· 
110 The writers also refer to an express utterance of a draftsman, Comptes 
rend us p. 363, cf. 2 MossA, La cambiale secondo Ia nuova Iegge ( 1937) 841 
§8u; KESSLER 153 n. 1; ARMINJON ET CARRY 531 §476. 
111 HUPKA 221 invoking a conflicts rule implied by Conv., art. 16 and 
Reservation, art. 17. 
112 ARMINJON-CARRY 531 § 476; ARMIN JON, DIP. Com. 376 § 207 refers 
suspension for minor age to the national law. 
113 Geneva Conv., Annex II art. 17. 
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The entire idea of article 5, however, is wrong. This 
very problem could have remained in the domain of the 
principle of independence, since commonly the time periods 
run successively. As the rule now is, a bill issued in Eng-
land carries a privilege to sue during three years in Con-
tinental recourses, which are normally of a few months 
or even weeks, and of one year under the Geneva Conven-
tion, article 70, for the holder and six months for an in-
dorser, provided that the Geneva Rules have been made the 
only conflicts rules of the matter at the forum. 
2. Suing for Payment 
There is a problem for the civil law courts, respecting 
the obligation of a maker or acceptor, whether they should 
use a criterion different from what they would select for 
the respective contract as a whole. It would seem that 
there is a strong and sound tendency to apply the law of the 
place of payment, irrespective of its application to the 
obligation of the primary parties.114 
114 See for France the comment by BATIIFOL, Traite sso § 549 on Cass. 
civ. (July 7, 1938) Gaz. Pal. Oct. 27, 1938, p. 530 (which establishes even 
a unitary rule for recourse against the Geneva Rules. In Germany lex loci 
solutionis has been applied in its quality as the general rule of contracts 
(2 RGZ. 13; 6 RGZ. 24, etc.). 
CHAPTER 63 
Checks 
I. THE SPECIAL LAw ON CHECKS 
Differentiation. In the Anglo-American enactments the 
check is defined as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank 
payable on demand.1 What particular elements this variety 
of a bill of exchange does have, is relegated to the back-
ground, but they are not insignificant. 2 The Continental 
laws, developing the check more recently, and then rapidly, 
instituted an "autonomous" type of commercial paper. It 
is now regulated separately in the Geneva Convention of 
I 93 I, 3 though supplemented by national legal rules of the 
member states, and in many special statutes in other coun-
tries. The authors of the Convention, however, were 
anxious to preserve as much analogy as feasible to the 
Convention on Bills and Notes of I930. 
Whereas the long preparation of the prior treaty was 
largely inspired by the hope for accession of the common-
law countries, no illusion in this respect remained in I93 1.4 
The effort became a purely European compromise. Even 
so, three main systems were to be reconciled, the French, 
German, and Italian. Considering the fundamental diver-
gencies then existing, the unification was hailed as a conspic-
1 BEA s. 73; NILs. 185. 
2 See the enumeration in 10 C.J.S. 412 and Supp. 1953. 
3 Convention portant loi uniforme sur Ies cheques, Geneva, March 1931. 
5 HUDSON, Intern. Legis!. 889 No. 283 (hereafter called Geneva Check 
Convention) ; Convention destinee a regler certains con flits de lois en matiere 
de cheques, Geneva, March 19, 1931, 5 HUDSON, id. 915 No. 284. (hereafter 
called Geneva Rules.) 
4 MossA, Check 86. 
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uous progress, although the 57 sections are incomplete and 
variegated by 3 I reservation clauses, all of which have 
been used, some by all or almost all member states. 5 The 
law of checks was called at the Hague in 1912 "un enfant 
de Boheme" and in Geneva in 1931 "un enfant terrible." 6 
Among the differences between checks and bills of ex-
change, two are outstanding: checks enjoy total or partial 
exemption from the tax imposed on bills, and the time for 
presentment and for suing is much shorter. Conflicts law, 
moreover, is strongly influenced by the importance of the 
banking institution and bank collection tying the check to 
the individual bank visible on the face of the paper; no 
such drastic connection is afforded by similar negotiable 
instruments. 
Also, the conflicts rules of the Bills of Exchange Act and 
those of the American courts on bills and notes pretend to 
include checks, although the peculiar nature of these in-
struments evidently demands some distinction. The Geneva 
Check Convention is accompanied by a convention on con-
flict rules, which shows even more improvisation than its 
counterpart concerning bills and notes, and has unhesitat-
ingly adopted the latter's controversial rules on capacity, 
form (with one meritorious addition), and "effects," as 
well as the time for suing in recourse. A gratifying part 
will be found in article 7, which puts a series of incidents 
uniformly under the law of the place where the check IS 
payable. 
5 See the table in HAMEL ET ANCEL, La convention de Geneve sur 
!'unification du droit du cheque, ( 1937). HAMEL, 1 Banques 8 5 § 703 con-
siders as a reservation art. 4 par. 3 of the Check Convention (allowing a 
member state to validate obligations between its nationals contracted abroad 
in the form of the national law); hence, this paragraph not mentioned in 
the reservations used by France has no effect. The contrary opinion of z 
PERCEROU ET BOUTERON 177 n. 3 seems Jess well-founded. 
6 GIANNINI, Sistema 354· 
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In the other countries, the European controversies are 
shared. 
United States. If the conflicts rules concerning bills of 
exchange largely suffer from uncertainty, an additional 
grievous complication centers on the question whether there 
are modifications of these rules with respect to checks. In 
the most important jurisdiction, New York, the views 
have changed. In Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 
the Court of Appeals declared in a case involving a check 
that the nature, validity, interpretation, and effect of the 
instrument were governed by the law of the place of pay-
ment.7 Amsinck v. Rogers, establishing a scheme of divi-
sion between the topics pertaining to the inception of nego-
tiable instruments and the incidents of performance (pay-
ment), drew a line of distinction between bills and checks. 
The Hibernia decision was explained on the general prin-
ciple of lex loci contractus, because the drawer of a bill of 
exchange undertakes to pay at the place of drawing, and 
the drawer of a check contracts to pay at the place of pay-
ment.8 Finally, in Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust Co., the 
court in I 9 3 9 overruled the distinction, assuming that the 
Negotiable Instruments Act establishes a uniform law in 
which the obligations of a drawer of a check or a bill of 
exchange payable at demand are identical, and hence also 
the conflicts rules are common. Thus, the validity and 
effect of the drawer's contract should be governed by the 
law of the place of contracting. A check drawn in Chicago 
to a fictitious person upon a bank in New York through 
fraud of an employee of the drawing firm, was held to 
be a check payable to the bearer under an Illinois statute 
of I 93 I and correctly paid by the New York bank; under 
the Negotiable Instruments Act, adopted in New Y ark, 
7 84 N.Y. 367. 
8 189 N.Y. 252, 257. 
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the result would have been contrary.9 This cannot be the 
last word. 
Authority in the other American jurisdictions remains 
thoroughly divided.10 
Function. The check is contrasted with bills of exchange 
as serving payment while bills are instruments of credit 
and financing. With the actual low stand of private inter-
national credit operations, hoped to be temporary, the 
check has made an enormous advance and, at present, may 
sometimes replace commercial drafts or promissory notes in 
their own field; certainly it is often used as security. Never-
theless, the statutes and the regulations by bank accords 
and most standard conditions are intended for instruments 
essentially contemplating payment. In the United States, 
the banks handle daily an estimated number of 35 millions 
of checks mainly in the service of collection for payment.11 
By another functional restriction, checks in some parts 
of the world are more or less strictly regarded as local 
paper. At one time, it was specially noted in Latin America 
that Cuba and San Salvador permitted international cir-
culation.12 
Conflicts. The contrasts between the Geneva uniform 
check law and the Anglo-American statutes have been re-
peatedly described in detail, notably by Feller.13 
Conflicts of laws relating to this subject are bound to 
9 Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust Co. ( 1939) z8o N.Y. 135, 144, 19 N.E. 
(zd) 993· Whilst usually the local law of a bank is emphasized, here a 
bank is discharged for the reason that at the place of issue the check was 
payable to bearer, depending on the fraudulent act of an employee of the 
drawer, unknown to both parties. 10 See 10 C.J.S., Supp. 1953, Bills and Notes§ 48. 
11 MALCOLM, "Article 4, A Battle with Complexity," Wise. L. Rev. (195Z) 
z65, z7o and additional information by Mr. Malcolm. 12 ARGANA § 3Z. 
13 FELLER, "The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks," 45 
Harv. L. Rev. ( 193Z) 668. On the fundamental differences from English 
law, see GUTTERIDGE in Z PERCEROU ET BOUTERON zzz. 
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occur in increasing numbers, but for one reason or another, 
they very seldom reach the courts. The Conference of 
I 93 I diligently tried to obtain progress over the prepara-
tory drafts and succeeded in clarifying at least those ques-
tions most troublesome in international circulation. Such 
topics were revocation (stop payment), provision (cover), 
time for presentment, and prescription (time for suing). 
The Rules of Geneva transcend this subject matter, al-
though they leave much open to doubt. 
The habitual neglect of the conflicts rules by the law-
makers has produced doubts even with respect to the scope 
of application of the Geneva Rules. Although Germany 
has adopted them with the Convention in a new domestic 
law, and Italy now has clearly two different laws for the 
member states and other states, in France it is contro-
versial whether the ratified Geneva Conflicts Rules are 
general or intended for the member states.14 
A number of provisions are closely shaped after the 
model of the conflicts rules on bills and notes; they involve 
capacity (art. 2), form (art. 4), effects of obligations (art. 
5), and form of protest (art. 8). Little will have to be 
added in these respects to the remarks made in the fore-
going chapters. 
The Rules have established a list of problems specially 
assigned to the law of the place of payment: 
"Article 7· The law of the country in which the cheque 
is payable shall determine: 
( I ) Whether a cheque must necessarily be payable at 
sight or whether it can be drawn payable at a fixed period 
after sight, and also what the effects are of the post-dating 
of a cheque; 
( 2) The limit of time for presentment; 
14 For general application because France has not restricted the ratification 
of the Convention, HAMEL, Banques Suppl. 84 § 700; contra z PERCEROU ET 
BOUTERON 171 § 196. 
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( 3) Whether a cheque can be accepted, certified, con-
firmed or visaed, and what the effects are respectively of 
such acceptance, certification, confirmation or visa; 
( 4) Whether the holder may demand, and whether he 
is bound to accept, partial payment; 
( 5) Whether a cheque can be crossed or marked either 
with the words 'payable in account' or with some equivalent 
expression, and what the effects are of such crossing or of 
the words 'payable in account' or any equivalent expression; 
( 6) Whether the holder has special rights to the cover 
and what the nature is of these rights; 
( 7) Whether the drawer may countermand payment of 
a cheque or take proceedings to stop its payment ( opposi-
tion); 
( 8) The measures to be taken in case of loss or theft 
of a cheque; 
( 9) Whether a protest or any equivalent declaration is 
necessary in order to preserve the right of recourse against 
the endorsers, the drawer and the other parties liable." 
The solutions given to the most troublesome questions 
will be reviewed presently. 
II. CREATION 
r. Form. Article 4 of the Geneva Check Rules repro-
duces the obnoxious disunity left in the Rules on bills con-
cerning form, but adds a salutary relief (paragraph r, 
i.f.) : "Where the form of the place of the signature is 
not observed, it shall be sufficient if the forms prescribed 
by the law of payment are observed." 
2. Capacity of Drawer. Article 2 of the Rules, organ-
ized after the model of the analogous rule concerning bills, 
results in the principle that the national law of the drawer 
at the time of the signature determines his capacity of con-
tracting in general and drawing checks in particular, while 
subsequent death or insanity is immaterial (Check Conv. 
art. 33). In the American practice, capacity is governed 
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by the law of the place of delivery; and if capacity existent 
at the time ceases subsequently as the Bill of Exchange Act 
states in case of the drawer's death, a respective notice to 
the bank ends its authority to pay.15 In conflict the law 
of the place of payment should decide (infra III 2). 
3· Capacity of Drawee, "Passive check capacity." The 
legal definition of a check in the Anglo-American Acts re-
quires drawing on a banker. This is also the law of 
Austria, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries and the 
declared aim of article 3 of the Check Convention; but 
subjected to a strong restriction: 
"A cheque must be drawn on a banker holding funds at 
the disposal of the drawer and in conformity with an 
agreement, express or implied, whereby the drawer is en-
titled to dispose of those funds by cheque. Nevertheless, 
if these provisions are not complied with, the instrument 
is still valid as a cheque." 
The statement of the principle was thus deprived of any 
sanction, in order to satisfy the countries where either a 
check could be drawn on anybody, as was then the law in 
France, or on institutions assimilated to bankers, as the 
French law is now.16 A reservation, No. 4, allows strik-
ing out the "nevertheless" sentence or extending the cate-
gory of capable drawees. Both these privileges have been 
utilized, and in some statutes it now seems doubtful whether 
a check on a nonbanker is considered a bill of exchange, as 
in the United States, or radically void. 
The article proceeds to uphold in any case the obliga-
tions arising out of the signatures affixed in countries whose 
laws permit drawing on persons such as the drawee. 
15 BEA sec. 75, and see FELLER, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 686. 
16 France: Decree Law, October 30, 1935, art. 3 amended by Law, Feb. 14, 
1942• 
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In view of these differences, article 3 of the Check Rules 
states: 
"The law of the country in which the cheque is payable 
determines the persons on whom a cheque may be drawn." 
The Convention would certainly have done better either 
to adopt the entire common-law rule or to exclude any 
reservation for nullity as check or nullity altogether.17 
Fiscal interests have played an excessive role in the question. 
The Italian statutes recognize as checks instruments 
issued and payable in a foreign country only where the 
drawee has passive check capacity in that country ;18 but 
these are valid anyway under the Geneva Rules, article 3· 
The principal conflicts rule with its choice of the law 
of the place of payment is clearly adequate; the check be-
ing concentrated upon the right of the drawer to draw 
upon the specific drawee, his quality has to be determined 
by his own law. When, before the Convention, a check 
drawn in Austria on a nonbanker in Paris was a check in 
France, it was no check in Austria.19 
Illustrations. (i) A check is drawn in New York on 
the Credit Municipal de Bordeaux recognized in France 
as assimilated to banks. Under Geneva Rule 3, the check 
is valid in France and under Geneva Convention, article 
3, likewise in Germany. In an American court the law 
of the place of issue would result in invalidity as check, 
that of the place of payment in validity, and the latter 
should be preferred, despite the New York Court of 
Appeals. 
( ii) Vice versa, where a check is drawn in Paris on an 
American stock exchange broker, American indorsers would 
be liable under the law of bills of exchange in most Con-
1 7 For the latter method MossA, Check 140. 
18 Italy: RD., Dec. 21, 1933, art. 3, par. 1, criticized as immaterial by MossA 
I.e. 141. The German Check Law § 25 contained an exception for checks 
payable abroad which made sense in face of a lex loci contractus. 
19 STROBELE 91, 
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tinental and American courts. But what would be the 
French solution? It would seem that article 3 of the French 
Check Law means only French, not foreign agents de 
change and courtiers en valeurs mobilieres, and the instru-
ment would not be considered a check. Yet according to 
an official Instruction concerning the stamp duty, 20 the rea-
soning of which goes beyond the stamp question, it is fatal 
that the instrument does not bear the name "lettre de 
change," wherefore it would not be treated as a negotiable 
instrument at all. 
III. CovER AND SToP PAYMENT 
I. Cover. The most dreaded of all obstacles to unifica-
tion of the law of negotiable instruments has a particular 
aspect in the law of checks; the existence of cover is the 
avowed requirement even in those countries that do not be-
lieve in the tacit transfer of cover by the creation of cambial 
rights. The requirement, it is true, is subject in the Check 
Convention of Geneva to degrees of seriousness depending 
upon the quality of the drawee as banker. The Check 
Rules, article 7 (b), call for the law of the country in 
which the check is payable, to determine: 
"Whether the holder has special rights to the cover and 
what the nature is of these rights." 
This rule, quite contrary to the Rules concerning bills 
and notes, which declare for the law of the issue, was gen-
erally recommended.21 As justification, it was alleged that 
a check is drawn on the basis of a credit the amount of 
which is not identical with the sum of the check; that the 
banks must pay it immediately in the course of large busi-
ness and there is no time to study various foreign laws; 
20 Instruction No. 4228 de Ia Direction generale de !'Enregistrement, etc., 
Dec. z, 1935, Z PERCEROU ET BOUTERON z68. 
21 HIRSCH, Provision 154; STROBELE 95; the commissions of experts, the 
Institute of Int. Law, 33 III Annuaire z68, Z77· The French writers are 
inclined to this solution against Cass. (Feb. 6, 1900) S. I900.I.I6I. 
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and, above all, that subsequent insolvency of a drawer or 
his order of stop payment, subject to a foreign law, ought 
not to disturb a banker, at a place where the underlying 
claim of the drawer is deemed to have been transferred to 
the payee and the holder.22 
Illustration. A check drawn in New York on a bank in 
Paris is presented by the holder at a time when the drawer 
had become a bankrupt. While an American bank knowing 
this would refuse payment, the Paris bank must pay the 
holder in his quality as assignee of the cover to the extent 
of the sum payable on the check. The Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal between Belgium and Germany decided by the 
same test of lex loci solutionis that a Belgian plaintiff had 
no claim in the clearing against a German bank according to 
the German law, ignoring the doctrine of cover.23 
Specific party agreements for the assignment of cover 
are to be distinguished in principle. They are frequent in 
Germany as well as in the United States when banks dis-
count a negotiable instrument in security transactions. On 
the other hand, certification of a check by a bank is con-
sidered assignment of the funds to the amount of the 
check.24 It would seem that despite the theoretical differ-
ence from the French type, the applicable law should al-
ways be that of the bank. 
2. Stop Payment. Common law and civil law are in sharp 
disagreement not only concerning the effect of death and 
bankruptcy of the drawer of a check on the right of the 
holder, but also on revocability. At common law the order 
22 PERCEROU and MARKS VON WURTTEMBERG in the Conference, see 
BOUTERON, Statut 705 ff. 
23 TAM Germano-Belge (Jan. I, 1929) 8 Receuil Trib. Arb. M. 791. 
The point was separate from the added fact that there cover was never 
provided. 
24 Comm. Credit Corp. v. Orange County (1950) 34 Cal. (2d) 766, 214 
Pac. (zd) 319; cf. New York L. 1944 c. 537 § 325; 37 McKinney's Cons. L. 
Ann., § 325a, forbidding stop order; Natl. City Bank of Cleveland v. 
Erskine (N.Y. 1953) IIO N.E. (zd) soS. 
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to pay may be countermanded at pleasure, 25 though there 
may be liability in the internal relations. Evidently the 
revocation also ends the authority of the holder to receive, 
which traditionally, though no longer correctly, is regarded 
as an authority of agency. For the draftsmen of the 
Geneva Convention it was a matter of course that a check 
creates irrevocable relations. 
The Convention left additional differences among its own 
members. The principle is that revocation of a check is 
not effective until the time of presentment has expired 
(article 3 2, paragraph I). But by exercising Reservation 
No. I6, a majority of the states have prohibited revoca-
tion even after the time for presentment ends. Conflicts 
Rule, article 7, no. 7, conveniently makes this question de-
pend on the law of the place of payment. Partly it has 
been perceived that the three problems of cover, subse-
quent incapacity of the drawer, and stop payment, are 
closely connected 26 and ought to be subject to the law of 
the place of payment. 
If the authorization of the bank to pay is emphasized 
over that of the payee or holder to receive, the same test 
will be applied in England and, we hope, also in an Ameri-
can court. 
Illustrations. (i) A check drawn in Chicago on a bank 
in Hamburg, Germany, is countermanded before payment; 
under German law the stopping is immaterial, even after 
the time of presentment expires; under American law it 
25 BEA sec. 75 and for the United States, BRADY, Bank Checks § 206. It 
is interesting that the New York surrogate decision, In re Mason's Estate 
(I948) I94 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 232, likewise does not hesitate to 
apply lex loci solutionis in the case of an Italian check upon a New York 
bank. The drawer died before the bank paid the check, but the bank did 
not know it. The court resorted to the customary New York rule as laid 
down in Glenn an v. Rochester Trust and Safe Deposit Co. ( I 9 I 3) 209 
N.Y. 12. 
26 MossA, Check 3I8. 
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would be effective. The German law should be applied. 
In the case of a German check on an American bank, revo-
cation should be allowed. 
(ii) A check drawn in Paris upon a bank in New York 
is revoked. This has consequences not only in the United 
States but also in France. In France, the drawer is ex-
empt from the heavy penalties of French criminal law, as 
stop payment may be considered outright crooked. 27 In 
the United States, New York law has been applied without 
hesitation, where an Italian drawer died before the check 
upon a New York bank was cashed, although in the same 
breath the Surrogate referred to the applicability of the 
law of the place of contracting to checks.28 In fact, the 
lex loci solutionis was competent. 
3· Restriction to Specific H alders. The Geneva Conven-
tion made a compromise between the English "general" 
and "special" crossing of checks which was adopted in 
France, Italy, and other countries, and the German and 
Austrian clause "payable in account" ( nur zur J7 errechnung, 
a porter en compte). The Convention finished a consider-
able debate by permitting and regulating both types itself 
and opening a large choice to the state laws (articles 37-
39). Where a country allows only crossing, a check carry-
ing the other clause is construed as a crossed check, and 
vice versa (Reservation No. 18). The Conflict Rules 
(article 7, No. 5) add that the law of the place of pay-
ment decides which clause is admissible and what its effect is. 
Illustration. The drawer in London crosses a check on 
a bank in Vienna with two lines not inserting any name 
between them (general crossing). The check figures in 
Austria, and by the Geneva Rules in all member states, 
as a check payable in account. It cannot be paid in cash 
to a third banker or a customer of the drawee (as under 
27 HAMEL, I Banques Supp. § 714, p. 88, d; 2 PERCEROU ET BOUTERON 
185 n. 2. 
28 In re Mason's Estate (1948) 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 232. 
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article 3 8 of the Convention) or to a banker (as under the 
Bills of Exchange Act § 70 ( 2)). 
In England the question falls under the law of the place 
where the check is first delivered; but can the transforma-
tion of the drawee's duty by his own law be ignored? There 
was a long debate in the Geneva Conference on whether 
during the circulation in the country of origin itself the 
law of issue should determine the nature of the payment 
clause. The majority rejected this exception, to give the 
place of payment more importance.29 
In the United States neither type is used, since in con-
trast to the Geneva Convention, article 35, and the Bills 
of Exchange Act, 6o, the drawee is responsible for ex-
amining the genuineness of indorsements.30 
4· Time for Action. The time for suing has been fixed at 
a much shorter period in the Continental laws than for bills 
of exchange.81 The Geneva uniform check law, article 52, 
allows six months after the end of the time for presentment 
against the drawee and six months from reimbursement by 
him or the day when he himself was sued for each endorsee. 
However, under Reservation No. 25, after the expiration 
of these periods actions may be based on enrichment and 
against a drawer who has failed to provide cover; these 
provisions have been commonly instituted.32 
The Check Rules, article 6, assign these problems to the 
law of the place where the check has been created. But 
interruption and suspension of the period of limitation is 
left to "each state," and other states may react as they 
wish.83 In the common-law countries, the lex fori actually 
29 GIANNINI, Sistema 354· 
8° FELLER (supra n. 13) 690 n. 143. 
31 Geneva Conv. on Bills of Exchange, art. 70. 
32 France: art. 25 par. 3; Germany: art. 58; Italy: art. 59· 
33 Reservation No. 26. 
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controls these incidents, though with certain references to 
other laws, but whether under the Convention lex fori or 
lex loci contractus, or lex loci solutionis governs, no one 
knows. 
That the law of the place of issue does not furnish an 
adequate unitary solution, is as true as in the case of bills 
of exchange. This test was simply adopted as a matter 
of school tradition.34 
34 E.g., Italy: Cass. (March 3, 1933) Foro Italiano, 1933 I 730: check 
issued by an Argentinean to the order of an Italian and payable at a branch 
of the same bank in Italy: prescription according to Argentine law; Cf. 
CAVAGLIERI 397· 
CHAPTER 64 
Conclusions to Part Twelve 
Why the Geneva conflicts rules have failed to produce 
uniformity with the Anglo-American countries, providing 
such a poor example of unification, has often been ex-
plained but never justified. It was previously known that 
the differences in the national laws are numerous and of 
many kinds. These have proved too numerous and difficult, 
because the governments were not prepared to abandon 
particular rules and even mere banking habits.1 Despite 
assertions to the contrary, the conflicts rules of the British 
Act have not been commended in authoritative opinions 
and those developed by the courts in the United States are 
considered confused. 2 The divergencies cherished through-
out the world are largely superficial. 
A considerable improvement in the present situation 
might be reached by following a suggestion of Hessel E. 
Y ntema, which he allows me to mention. After investiga-
tions of many years, he proposes an international collabora-
tion of the relatively few leading banks in each country 
which are most active in the field of foreign bills and notes. 
Each bank may issue forms complying with its own law 
and rely on the validity of the instruments approved by a 
partner to the agreement. This experiment should be tried. 
In the long run, of course, uniform legal rules cannot be 
avoided. When the problems are scanned, certain obser-
vations impose themselves. 
No reference should be made to the national law; its 
mingling with form and capacity in the Geneva rules is 
1 ARGANA 215 blames unjustified negative tradition and exaggerated 
nationalism. 
2 LoRONZEN 5; GuTTERIDGE 16 ser. 3· J. Comp. L. 54· 
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deplorable.3 The law of the domicil is adequate only for 
emergency purposes. 
Nor can any effort serve to discover a single local con-
tact to provide a single law for all obligations arising on 
a bill of exchange. Whenever a bill is submitted for dis-
count or acceptance, it is a primordial postulate that no 
foreign law should have to be consulted to determine the 
main effects of the intended transaction. 4 The same is true 
for checks, despite their closer connection with the place 
where payment is due. Since they are handled in millions 
through bank collections, the now frequent proposals to 
determine all check obligations by the law of the place of 
payment 5 are unrealistic. This is an irremovable block on 
the road to simplicity. 
On the other hand, form, capacity, and other initial re-
quirements of "cambial" obligations and their construction 
and effects must be subject to unitary legal treatment, for 
which the lex loci actus has an inveterate claim, although 
its definition needs elaboration and unification. 
To delineate the scope of such acts, various in nature, 
the "extracambial" contracts and obligations must be ex-
cluded and assigned to their own connections ;6 if this is 
done, the "cambial" acts proper group themselves easily in 
three categories. 
I. The law of issue, that is, of the place of negotiation 
through signature and delivery by the drawer or maker to 
the payee, creates the basic instrument, including its nature 
as negotiable 7 and the class of commodity papers to which 
3 Supra Ch. 59 III z; 6o I I (b). 
4 Supra Ch. 61. 
5 E.g., HJALMAR EGNALL, Le cheque et Ia loi du lieu du payment (Paris, 
1935) 103 ff. 
6 Supra 142 ff. 
7 Supra Ch, 61, III. 
BILLS AND NOTES 
it belongs, construction, 8 and general rules. 9 
2. Under the principle of independence, opposed to the 
law of issue, each law of the successive places of contract-
ing controls the respective obligations of drawer, maker, 
indorser, giver of aval, accommodating party, and acceptor 
for honor, with the exception of obligations determined by 
the law of the place of payment.10 The law of the place of 
contracting especially governs validity and effects of war-
ranty,11 including liability after maturity 12 and damages 
in recourse.13 Whether it ought to determine also the 
necessity and time for notification of default is doubtfui.I4 
Worldwide unification of these questions at least and of the 
time for suing should be earnestly sought at the Hague. 
3· The law of the place of payment of the principal 
obligation governs conditions and effects of acceptance, 
time of maturity, modalities of payment, such as currency, 
time and locality, permissibility of part payment and con-
ditional acceptance, amortization, discharge and excuses of 
any acceptor, and the necessity, time, and form of protest.15 
In the case of checks, the scope of the law of payment is 
enlarged, as the Geneva rules have recognized.16 It should 
also be observed that the American courts show unequivocal 
preference for the law of the place of payment in locating 
the liability of the maker of a promissory note.17 Promis-
sory notes in the United States, quite as billets a ordre, 
eigene W echsel abroad, are prevailingly used in bank loans 
and therefore usually are payable at the lending bank. With 
8 Supra 148 ff. 
9 Supra 149 ff., 196. 
10 Supra Ch. 61. 
11 Supra 188 ff. 
12 Supra 198-199. 
13 Supra 200-201. 
14 Supra 215. 
15 Supra Ch. 62, I. 
16 Supra 225. 
17 Supra 206. 
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such facts in mind, a middle road might be found for con-
flicts rules between the civil law separating bills and checks 
and the common law merging them; promissory notes and 
checks may well be subjected to the larger domain of the 
law of the place of payment which, if it can be as·certained, 
is preferable to the domicil of the payee as such.18 
A holder in due course for value or in good faith acquires 
the protection granted him by the law governing the in-
dorsement made to him, when it affords larger rights than 
the law under which a precedent indorser obligated him-
self.19 
As we have seen, the courts seek practical solutions, 
sometimes without any intention to do so but with the 
apparent effect of moderating fundamental contrasts, such 
as the opposition of signature and delivery 20 or the diverse 
treatment of bills carrying forged signatures.21 
18 Supra. 19 Supra. 
20 Supra. 
21 Supra. 
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INHERITANCE 
CHAPTER 65 
Present Conflicts Rules 
I. TERMINOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Terminology 
I N the United States, the common terms employed con-cerning succession on death are "descent and distribu-
tion" (for intestacy), "wills," and "administration." 
But it is gratifying that the Restatement uses "succession on 
death" to cover the first two topices. In the civil law, the 
"law of inheritance" or "law of succession" is a general 
term which will be used here to include all incidents de-
pending on the law governing a decedent's estate, with the 
exception of administration in the common law countries. 
Another linguistic difficulty is caused by the lack in Eng-
lish of a word for the main beneficiaries of an estate. 
"Heir" stricto sensu is merely a successor to land ab in-
testato, as the htfritier once was in French; it is desirable 
in conflicts law to stretch this term as has occurred in 
France, to comprehend all intestate and testate successors 
to ownership of all assets in the civil laws, not only those 
named heres ( Erbe) in the Roman or German systems, 
but also the French Iegataire universel and the beneficiary 
a titre universe/. 
Moreover, devise of real estate and bequest of personal 
property are analogous gifts that fall short of easy corre-
spondence in other systems. Since the residuary legatee who 
would not be heir ab intestato in the same state does not 
incur personal liability in Anglo-American law, the term 
"legatee" may be used to denote all beneficiaries directly 
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taking by will and not regarded as "universal successors." 
Finally, readers may be reminded that in the civil law 
the estate in principle forms an entity without regard to 
geographical frontiers, although the consequence that only 
one law of inheritance should govern is not drawn in all 
civil law jurisdictions. The principle, nevertheless, applies, 
at least in the best theories, when the claims of creditors 
of the estate are regulated. 
On the other hand, foreign readers have to bear in mind 
the system of state control of estates prevailing in com-
mon law jurisdictions and a few others such as Austria and 
Denmark, producing many complicated problems in con-
nection with the sovereignty of 48 states in the United 
States. 
Although in England the law reform of 1925 has uni-
fied this system by transferring the title to real as well as 
personal estate at death to the administration of "executors" 
or "administrators," most American states retain the prin· 
ciple that real estate goes directly to the heirs, but the 
powers of administration are more and more extended to 
all assets. 
2. Sources 1 
Assets left by a foreigner at death in foreign territory 
are a frequent topic of treaties, statutes, court decisions, 
and consular activity. On the interstate and international 
1 A second edition of the excellent collection of sources of private inter-
national law by PROF. MAKAROV, while under press, has most kindly been 
made available to me during my writing. A remarkable discussion of the 
treaties on inheritance is to be found in PLAISANT, Les regles de conftit de 
lois dans les Traites ( 1946) 231-261. 
Comparative conflicts law: FRANCESCO P. CoNTUZZI, II Diritto ereditario in-
ternazionale ( 1908); LEWALD, Questions de droit international des succes-
sions, Recueil 1925 IV 5 ff.; id., Internationales Erbrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterb. 448; P. ANLIKER, Die erbrechtl. Verhiiltnisse der Schweizer 
in Ausland und der Auslander in der Schweiz ( 1933). 
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level, many efforts to foster harmony have been under-
taken, but with small success. 
Treaties. A century ago, a series of bilateral agree-
ments were concluded containing provisions on inheritance. 
Commortly, they stabilized court jurisdiction over inherit-
ance claims and competency of consulates to take care of 
property owned by their nationals. Some outstanding 
treaties of this group remain in force, such as, among 
others, those concluded by the United States with France of 
February 23, I853,2 and with Switzerland of November 25, 
I 8 5o, 8 between F ranee and Switzerland of June I 5, 
I869,4 Baden and Switzerland of December 6, I856.5 
These and other treaties, drafted with more good will 
than legal ability, seldom spoke of the applicable law; but 
when they laid down jurisdictional rules, they usually con-
templated that every tribunal would apply its own domestic 
law, although this has often been forgotten. The American-
Swiss treaty of I 8 so, Article VI, says succinctly though 
quite ineptly: 
"Any controversy that may arise among the claimants to 
the same succession, as to whom the property shall belong, 
shall be decided according to the laws and by the judges of 
the country in which the property is situated." 
2 Consular Convention, 10 Stat. 992, U.S. Treaty Ser. No. 92; materials in 
6 MILLER, Treaties 169 If.; also in DELAUME, American-French Priv. Int. 
L. ( 1953) 68-72 with comment. 
3 II Stat. 587 No. 353; MALLOY, 2 Treaties 1763; NussBAUM, American-
Swiss Priv. Int. L. (1950), cf. 47 Col. L. Rev. (1947) 186; ANLIKER II5 If. 
4 Convention on Jurisdiction, Swiss. Off. Coil. IX 1002; NIBOYET ET 
GouL1!, I Recueil 735; ANLIKER 49 If. with large literature; PILLET, Les 
Conventions 147 If.; BATIFFOL, Traite 724 If. 
5 Swiss Off. Coil. V 661; the continued validity of the treaty, not formally 
assumed by Germany, has been challenged by SCHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, 12 
Z. ausl. PR. (1939) 285 and 2 SCHNITZER 503. 
INHERITANCE 
But American decisions overlooked the provision on "the 
laws," and the recent decision In re Schneider has, without 
any reason,6 denied its effect. 
The Franco-Swiss Treaty of June IS, I869, Article 5, 
has no such express provision on the applicable law; it 
states merely that: 
"Any action relating to the liquidation or partition of 
a succession, testamentary or intestate, and to accounting 
among heirs and legatees will be brought before the tribunal 
where the succession opens, that is, in the case of a French-
man dying in Switzerland, the tribunal of his last domicil 
in France, and in the case of a Swiss dying in France, the 
tribunal of his place of origin in Switzerland. N everthe-
less, the partition, auction, or sale of immovables must 
comply with the laws of the country of their situation." 
This text, however, naturally for that time, was under-
stood as meaning that the movable property of a Swiss 
national situated in France should be litigated by claimants 
to the inheritance before the French courts according to 
the French Code Civil, and vice versa. This construction 
has been preserved by the Swiss courts and recently has 
been reaffirmed. 7 The French Court of Cassation, how-
ever, held in I939 that the treaty in the main restricts 
itself to the jurisdictional problem. 8 
A divergent interpretation by an Alsatian decision 9 has 
been called amazing.10 
6 /n re Schneider (1950) 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 652; Clunet 1950, 976; I6 Z. 
ausl. PR. (I9SI) 620 with note ZwEIGERTj 3 Rev. Hell. (I9SO) 3IO. Notes 
in many American Law Reviews. 
1 BG. (June 29, I928) 54 BGE. I 216. BG. (May 21, I942) 68 BGE. 
II ISS, I Schweiz. Jahrb. l.R. (I944) 222. 
KG. Waadt (March 3I, I943) 4I SJZ. (I945) Io6, I Schweiz. Jahrb. 
I.R. 22I. 
8 Cass. Civ. (June I9, I939) S. I940.I.49; to the same effect Clunet I9021 
567. 
9 App. Colmar (June IS, I949) Rev. crit. I9SO, 62. 
10 BATIFFOL, note Rev. crit. I9501 64. 
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Even apart from such failure, these treaties raise con-
troversies of many kinds. Where does the property "lie" 
for the purpose of the American-Swiss treaty? The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal assumes that movables are situated in the 
country of the last domicil, 11 whereas American courts for 
the most part have applied American law to assets belong-
ing to decedents domiciled in Switzerland.12 
On the other hand, in Switzerland two different theories 
arose concerning the law applicable to immovables under 
the Swiss-French treaty; it is either said to be the lex situs 
or the lex domicilii. 13 The Federal Tribunal applies the 
latter opinion in favor of a single court and a single law ;14 
the French courts, with one recent exception/5 have not 
followed this. 
A second comprehensive group of bilateral treaties was 
due to the hopeful international wave after the first world 
war. Their scope is more clearly defined; they rule on the 
functions of consuls, preliminary measures, and sometimes 
measures of liquidation; but they are commonly meager 
regarding conflicts rules. So far as they go, the European 
treaties, with the exception of the Austro-German and the 
German-Polish, differentiate between movables and im-
movables, and with the exception of the West-Scandinavian 
countries, are devoted to the nationality law. 
The treaties relating to property and inheritance, 16 con-
11 BG. (Nov. 24, 1883) in re Wohlwend, 9 BGE. 507, 513 If.; in re 
Gem. Feldis (May s, 1898) 24 BGE. I 312, 319; 43 I 87; cf. App. Bern 
(March s, 1885) 21 ZBJV. ( 1885) 361. 
12 ANLIKER ns; NuSSBAUM, Amer.-Swiss Jaw 27. 
13 See ANLIKER so If.; WEiss, 4 Traite I75· 
14 BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE. I 216, 219. 
15 Seine (Jan. s, 1951) Rev. crit. 1951, 316, criticized by FLATI'ET in the 
note and in J.d. Trib. 1951, 604, refers to the Swiss courts for French 
immovables. 
16 U.S. Department of State, Div. of Research and Publication, Treaty 
Section: Treaty Provisions relating to the Rights of Inheritance, Acquisition 
and Ownership, etc. Compiled March 31, 1943, revised September 4, 1944· 
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eluded by the United States from I850 with a great number 
of countries, contain the usual clauses of equality with the 
nationals of the other power, and free disposal, ordinarily 
with the right of selling real estate if the acquirer is dis-
qualified to possess, 17 but with no conflicts provisions at all. 
Only the treaty with Thailand of I937 declares that for 
the acquisition, possession, and disposition of immovable 
property the law of the situs exclusively shall be appli-
cable.18 
A different class consists of the conventions constituting 
uniform conflicts law, the Treaty of Montevideo, the 
C6digo Bustamante} the Northern Convention, and the 
drafts of the Hague Conference on the Law of Succession 
on Death.19 These enter into many particular questions 
and will be used here on par with the statutes. 
The statutes are short. The most recent codifications 
are disappointing in their reiteration of principles of yes-
terday or the past century. Some are even difficult to 
understand. While the Hague drafts stimulated a certain 
progress, contemporary legislation seems not too much dis-
posed to observe international courtesy. 
The Hague Drafts aroused the greatest hopes. In I 903 
Franz Kahn in his comment on the draft of I 902 expected 
"with fair certainty" that the convention on succession 
would be accomplished.20 The draftsmen and the other 
delegates were highly interested and laborious and were 
believed to be largely conscious of the necessary "sacri-
fices." They were unable, however, to agree on a number 
of fundamental principles. The majority simply adopted 
17 VIRGINIA M. MEEKISON, Treaty Provisions for the Inheritance of Personal 
Property, 44 Am. J. Int. L. (1950) 313 ff. 18 Treaty with Siam of Nov. 13, 1937, Art. z, par. 7, 53 Stat. Part 3, 
1731 ff., U.S. Treaty Ser. 940, 192 L. of Nat. Tr. S. p. 247 ff. 
19 Supra Vol. I, pp. 29, 32, 33, 36. 
2° KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 35· 
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the principle of unity of succession and control by the 
last national law of the decedent, against the opposition of 
France and Switzerland, leaving the Anglo-American sys-
tem entirely out of consideration. Comparative efforts 
have been made in the literature, but civilian and common 
lawyers regarded each other so much as complete strangers 
that, in the learned approach, mutual respect was expressed 
from a far distance and without a real resolution to unite. 
II. SuRVEY OF THE CoNFLICTS SYSTEMS 
The systems will be categorized by principles; there exist 
many exceptions to be mentioned subsequently. 
A. Plurality of Successions 
I. Immovables under lex situs 
(a) Movables under lex domicilii. The law of the 
decedent's domicil as of the time of his death governs suc-
cession to movable property in the older system: 
England and almost all common law jurisdictions of 
the British Commonwealth,21 United States,22 including 
Louisiana, 23 but only mistakenly extended to Puerto Rico/4 
and excluding Mississippi. ' 
Argentina, court practice. 25 
21 Re O'Keefe (1940) Ch. 124. 
Canada: Stuart v. Prentiss (r86r) 20 U.C.Q.B. 513 (C.A.); ro Can. 
Abridgement 758 ff. 
Australia: 17 Australian Digest 404 ff. 
22 Mr. Justice Holmes in Bullen v. Wisconsin ( 1916) 240 U.S. 625, 632. 
23 Louisiana: Immovables: Sevier v. Douglass ( 1892) 44 La. Ann. 6os, 
ro So. 804. Movables: Succession of Wells ( 1849) 4 La. Ann. 522; In re 
Lewis' Estate ( r88o) 32 La. Ann. 385. 
24 De los Angeles Melon v. Entidad Provincia Religiosa (1951) 189 F. 
(2d) 163. See the penetrating criticism by EDER, r Am. J. Comp. L. 123. 
25 Argentina: C.C. Art. ro, 3283; see Cam. civ. 2 Cap. (July 13, 1931) 95 
Gac. For. 90 Nr. sro6; (March 30, 1932) 98 id. roo Nr. 5292; Cam. civ. 
r Cap. (May 28, 1934) 121 id. ros Nr. 6693. And others see 2 RoMERO, 
Manual, 203; Cam. civ. r Cap., Jur. Arg. 1942 I 715; Cam. civ. 2 Cap., 
Jur. Arg. 1943 III 723; (Dec. 22, 1948) Case Grimaldi; Jur. Arg. 1949 I 578; 
Contra the writers infra n. 57· 
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Belgium.26 
Chile.27 
Costa Rica. 28 
France.29 
San Salvador.30 
Siam.31 
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Treaty: Switzerland-Baden (I 869), if the estate is in 
both countries. 
The system of France, for a period, was in doubt with 
respect to the question whether the domicil was not super-
seded by the nationallaw,32 but is now resettled. 
(b) Movables under lex patriae. Movables follow the 
law of the decedent's national law as of the time of his 
death: 
Austria.33 
Bolivia.34 
Iran.35 
Liechtenstein. 36 
Luxemburg. 37 
26 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 16, 1926) Revue Pratique du Notariat 
Beige 1928 46, cf. GILON, Clunet, 1928, 1103; Trib. Verviers (Jan. 14, 1936) 
Pasicrisie 1936 III 133; Bruges (May 10, 1939) Rechtsk. WB. 1939-40, 105; 
Rb. Antwerp (June 16, 1950) id. 1950-51, 509. 
21 Chile: C.C. Art. 16, 997, 955· 
28 Costa Rica: C.C. Arts. 4, 5, 7 par. 2. 
29 France: Cass. civ. (June 19, 1939) affaire Labedan, Rev. crit. 1939, 480. 
Cass. Crim. (June 4, 1941) D. 1942.1.4, S. 1944·1.133; Trib. Seine (Feb. 6, 
1952) Rev. crit. 1952, 494, have now also settled the exact point of con-
tact, the place of "opening" the succession, which, of course, regularly in 
France is the last domicil. 
3o El Salvador: C.C. art. 994· 
31 Siam: Int. Priv. L. (1939) arts. 37, 38. 
32 Infra, 1 (b). On Peru C.C. (1936) art. V, see infra n. 56. 
33 Austria: Verlassenschaftspatent ( Gesetz iiber Verfahren ausser Streit-
sachen) of August 9, 1854, as amended, § 22 (immovables), § 23 (movables). 
34 Bolivia: C. C. art. 463, 464. 
35 Iran: C. C. arts. 7 and 8. 
36 Liechtenstein: Law on the estate of foreigners of Dec. 4, 1911, arts. 
1 and 2. 
37 Luxemburg: Immovables: App. Luxemburg (Nov. 13, 1931) 12 Pas. 
Lux. 467. Movables: Trib. Diekirch (Feb. 22, 1900) 7 Pas. Lux. 41, Pas. 
Beige 1908 IV 119; Trib. Luxemburg (June n, 1913) 9 Pas. Lux. 478. 
Contra: Trib. Luxemburg (June 20, 1932) 13 Pas. Lux. 466. 
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Turkey.38 
Treaties: Germany with Soviet Russia, 39 Estonia/0 and 
Turkey.41 
French courts temporarily.42 
Before their Sovietization and allegedly still at present: 
Bulgaria.43 
Hungary.44 
Rumania.45 
2. Other Functions of Lex Situs 
(a) As principle for all assets. That the lex situs should 
govern the totality of a succession including movables, was 
a widespread system before the movables were artificially 
deemed concentrated at the deceased's domicil.46 More re-
cently, it was adopted in ·a code of Latvia. 47 Recently 
abandoned in Illinois,48 this system is represented by the 
law of Mississippi 49 and by the Treaty of Montevideo.50 
The inheritance is thus entirely dismembered, and the 
local position of each asset or debt is of decisive importance. 
The Mississippi court thinks along rigorous territorial 
38 Turkey: Law on the rights and duties of foreigners in the Ottoman 
Empire, I9IS, art. 4; CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 432; BERKI, La succession ab 
intestat dans le droit int. prive de Ia Turquie (these Fribourg, Suisse, I94I). 
Yugoslavia: Law of July 24, I934, §§ 25, 26. 
39 Oct. 12, I925, Annex to art. 22 §§ I3 ff. 
40 March I3, I925, Art. XVIII § I4 ff. 
41 May 28, I929, Annex to Art. 20 § I4. 
42 Decisions from (May s, I875) 2 Clunet 358; (May 8, I894) 21 Clunet 
562. 
4 3 Bulgaria: former Constitution, art. 63 ; DANEFF in 2 5 Bulletin de 
l'lnstitut Intermediaire International 1; GHENOV, 6 Repert. I94· 
44 Hungary: ScHWARTZ, so Z. int. R. 67 f.; SzA.szv, II Z. ausl. PR. (I937) 
I89; see also 6 Repert. 469. 
45 Rumania: Cass. (Feb. 20, I90I) Clunet I902, 9I6; PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 
74· 
46 FRBYRIA, infra Ch. 65, n. I, passim. 
47 Latvia: C.C. of Jan. 28, I937, § 16, literally only referring to domestic 
estates; cf. II Z. ausl. PR. 484. 
48 Illinois: the rule coming from an Ordinance of I787 and reproduced 
in Stat. Annot. (Smith-Hurd) I935, c. 39 § I, was replaced by the Probate 
Act of July 24, I939, Rev. St. I95I, c. 3 § I62 (§ 11). 
49 Mississippi: I C. Ann. I942, § 467, derived from Code I8S7· 
50 Texts of I889 and 1940, arts. 44, 45· 
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lines. 51 Although notes and bonds of a foreign owner 
lying on deposit in Illinois were not held to be located in 
Illinois, 52 the solution would not be analogous in Mississippi. 53 
(b) As exception for all domestic assets. In Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, all movable and 
immovable property situated in the country is submitted 
to the domestic law.54 This attitude is sometimes taken as 
adopting the general principle of lex situs.55 Other pro-
visions in Venezuela and discussions in Peru, however, 
emphasize the law of the last domicil. 56 The latter seems 
to be accepted for foreign situated assets. But here as also 
in other Latin-American countries, the facts seem to point 
to a system where all domestic assets are subject to the lex 
fori, whereas foreign assets are ignored. Legal and factual 
exceptions seem to make this awkward scheme tolerable. 
(c) As exception for certain movables. As noted above, 
the Argentine courts, defying a nearly unanimous learned 
51 Heard v. Drennen ( 1908) 93 Miss. 236, 46 So. 243: "All the rights 
to be derived through the will must be derived from its terms administered 
according to the law of this state, so far as it affects property situated here" 
but concerns real property. Yet the decision in Bolton v. Barnett (1923) 
131 Miss. 802, 95 So. 721 in all respects overrules the often cited case 
Slaughter v. Garland ( 1866) 40 Miss. 172, which restricted the lex situs 
to intestate succession. 
52 Cooper v. Beers (1892) 143 Ill. 25, 33 N.E. 61, cf. 3 BEALE 148o; 
GooDRICH ( ed. I) 401 If. 
53 Money deposited within the state is included, Ewing v. Warren ( 1926) 
144 Miss. 233, 109 So. 6or. The rule naturally includes a money lending 
business of an Italian domiciled in Italy, Jahier v. Rascoe ( 1885) 62 Miss. 
699, and a negotiable warehouse receipt lying in Mississippi, Gidden v. 
Gidden ( 1936) 176 Miss. 98, 167 So. 785. 
54 Mexico: C.C. art. 14. 
Panama: C. C. art. 63 x. 
Peru: art. VI, 692; GARciA GASTANETA, Derecho Internacional Privado 
(ed. 2) 243· 
Uruguay: C.C. art. 5· 
Venezuela: C.C. art. xo. 
55 Thus, CAICEDO CASTILLA, 2 DIP. 34· 
56 Venezuela: C.C. arts. 894, 954· 
Peru: Juuo DELGADO, Compendio de DIP. citing old theories, is doubtful, 
however; and see GARciA GASTANETA, supra n. 54· 
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opposition, follow the American principle in construing 
article IO of the Code in the broad meaning of Story from 
whom it was borrowed. In consequence, it has been argued 
that article I I ought likewise to apply; that is, movables in 
"permanent location" should also follow the law of the 
place where they are. 57 Against former cases, recent 
decisions have adopted this opinion 58 which transfers the 
contradictory statements of what is a permanent location 59 
into the inheritance field. The same argument seems to 
apply to the Code of Uruguay, article I5.60 Is this rule 
also meant to be applied by foreign courts? and also to 
foreign movables when Argentine inheritance law is referred 
to? I hope not. 61 
(d) For domestic immovables only. Although the Swiss 
statute recognizes foreign domiciliary inheritance law for 
movables of a Swiss national, if the foreign state prescribes 
it, Swiss immovables of a Swiss national are always 
governed by the law of the canton of origin.62 
The same rule seems to be accepted in Bolivia, 63 where a 
foreign will, so far as it disposes of domestic immovables, 
is subject to domestic law. 
In all these cases, it might be argued that the statutes are 
inspired by lex fori rather than by lex situs. Nevertheless, 
it does not seem doubtful that the rules are applicable in 
foreign courts, as if they truly came from lex situs. 
(e) Otherwise on the ground of public policy. Where 
57 BAQUE 87 ff.; see supra Ch. 54· 
58 Cam. civ. I Cap. (Dec. 30, I94I) Jur. Arg. I942·I.7I7i Cam. civ. 2 
Cap. (July 27, I943) Jur. Arg. I943·3·723; contra Cam. civ. I Cap (March I6, 
I926) 27 Jur. Arg. 33· 
59 Supra Ch. 58. 
60 Uruguay: C.C. art. I5· 
61 See the hypothetical assumptions by WALDEYER, Sucesiones Argentino-
Aleman ab Intestato, Jur. Arg. I951.I Doctrina 53, 55· 
6 2 N.A.G. art. 28 par. I. 
63 Bolivia: C.C. art. 464. 
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the interests of domestic creditors, beneficiaries, or forced 
heirs are involved, numerous exceptions in favor of the 
domestic law are made by the states in whose territories 
assets are situated. As illustration, it may here suffice to 
mention the California statute, disallowing gifts by a 
testator of more than a third of his assets to charity. While 
the courts of California reduce legacies correspondingly, the 
forum of the domicil tries to correct the result. 64 
(f) On the ground of comity. In Germany since the 
early nineteenth century, the opinion has been maintained 
by some decisions and writers that the personal law adopted 
in principle should be barred in the case of foreign land sub-
ject to special rules of succession, such as feudal estates 
(family fideicommissa) or certain kinds of peasant land 
( dnerbenguter 65). The Civil Code of Zurich provides 
such an exception for family foundations. 66 The German 
Code formulates the general provision repeatedly men-
tioned in this work 67 whereby the German rules yield to 
"special provisions" on objects situated in a foreign state 
whose laws claim to govern these objects. After some 
controversy, it is settled that these foreign provisions do 
not refer only to substantive rules on successions such as 
farms, or homesteads, but also to the conflicts rules of the 
situs. Hence, the lex situs rule for succession to immov-
ables in the common law countries and France, Argentina, 
etc., breaks the unitary German conflicts rules based on 
the national law of the decedent. 68 
64 E.g., Whalley v. Lawrence's Estate ( 1919) 108 A. C. 387; infra Ch. 66. 
65 Thus, of course, the American legislation on homesteads; Poland, IPR. 
art. 30; Liechtenstein: C.C. Pers. L. art. 828, 833, and others. 
66 2 MElLI 139· 
67 EG.BGB. art. 28; Vol. 1, 342, 601; supra Ch. SS· 
68 RG. (Oct. 4, 19u) Warn. Rspr. 19u, 484, n. 437; (Oct. 2, 1930) 85 
Seuff. Arch. (1931) No. 18; IPRspr. 1930, 175 No. 88; Planck's Kommentar, 
EG. art. 28, 2b; MELCHIOR 405; RAAPE 766; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 31I ff.; WOLFF, 
D. IPR. ( ed. 3) 232. 
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The commentators, however, restrict this large reference 
to the lex situs by excepting problems of form and capacity, 
which have an independent conflicts rule in the continental 
doctrines. This leads to absurdities.69 The German con-
ciliatory gesture is excellent, provided it defers compre-
hensively to the foreign laws adopting the lex situs. 
A similar provision is contained in the Swedish law and 
the treaty between Austria and Poland.70 
B. Unity of Succession 
This principle brings the entire succession under the 
personal law of the decedent at his death. The C6digo 
Bustamante, which itself does not determine the connect-
ing factor of the person, accordingly subjects the succes-
sion to the "personal law." 11 
1. All assets are subject to the law of the last domicil: 
Brazil.72 
Chile.13 
Colombia. 74 
Denmark.75 
Ecuador. 76 
69 These have been demonstrated by WILFRIED ZEUGE, Das Recht der 
belegenen Sache im Deutschen Internationalen Erbrecht (Wiirzburg 1939) 
59 ff., although he did not know how to remedy them. 
1° Cf. infra 373· 
Sweden: Intestate Estate Law, art. 2. 
71 Cod. Bustamante, art. 7· 
72 Brazil: Ley Introd. ( 1942) art. 10. 
73 Chile: C.C. art. 955 and Cod. Organico de Tribunales, art. 148, with 
exceptions, notably C.C. arts. 15, 20 and 998 of controversial scope, see re-
cently ALBONICO, 2 Manual § 501 ff.; MARIO GoNZALEZ ALVARADO, Le sucesi6n 
ante el DIP, (Diss., Santiago, Chile, 1944) 95, 99-101. 
74 Colombia: C. C. art. 1012, but restricted by art. 1054, see CocK, Tratado 
de derecho internacional privado ( ed. 2) 204 ff., and by other controversial 
exceptions; see RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ, I D.I.P. §§ 512, 598, CAICEDO CASTILLA, 
2 DIP. 75 §§ 241-243 with an attractive solution. 
75 Denmark: 2 Z. ausl. PR. 866; Revue 1910, so8. 
76 Ecuador: C.C. art. 101:1. 
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Federated Malay States.71 
Norway.78 
Quebec.79 
Peru (with exceptions). 80 
Former practice in German common law and in Prussia.81 
2. All assets are subject to the national law of the deceased 
at the time of his death: 
Belgian Congo. 82 
China.83 
Cuba.84 
Czechoslovakia. 85 
Egypt.s6 
Germany.87 
Greece.88 
Italy.89 
Japan.90 
Mexico.91 
Morocco, French and Spanish.92 
Nether lands. 93 
77 Malay States: One Cheng Neo v. Yar Kwan Seng (I897), Digest of 
Rep. Cas. 1897-1925 ( 1929) 47· 
78 Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580. 
79 Quebec: C.C. art. 7 as construed, see 3 JoHNSON 49, 52. 
80 Peru: C. C. art. 692, see supra n. 54· 
81 Common Law: SAVIGNY 272 ff. 
Prussia: Obertribunal, ro Entsch. I43, 146; (May 8, r865) 6o Striathorst 
20 No. 6, at 66, 67; I REHBEIN 97; FDRSTER-Eccws, 1 Preuss. Landr. (1892) 
6s. 
82 Belgian Congo: C.C. art. ro (wills). 
83 China: IPL. (of 1918) arts. 20, 21. 
84 Cuba: C. C. art. Io, par. 2; BusTAMANTE, I DIP. ( ed. 3, 1943) § 429. 
85 Czechoslovakia: IPL. (I948) § 40. 
86 Egypt: C.C. 1948, art. 17. 
87 Germany: E.G. art. 24, 25, extended to foreign nationals, 91 RGZ. 139 
and unanimous doctrine. 
88 Greece: C.C. art. 28. 
89 Italy: C.C. Disp. Pre!. art. 23; App. Napoli (Sept. 8, I948), Monitore 
(1949) II7 emphasizes unity and indivisibility of the succession. 
90 Japan: IPL. art. 25. 
91 Mexico: argument from C.C. Arg. arts. I2, 14, except domestic assets. 
92 Morocco, French: IPL. art. I8; Spanish: Dahir 1913, art. r6. 
93 Netherlands: Hof Den Haag (Feb. 23, 1942), W. 1942, 327, aff'd H.R. 
(Jan. 8, 1943) W. 1943, no. 202; Hof Den Haag (Apr. 28, 1947) N.J. 1947, 
743; cf. MEIJERs, W.P.N.R. 3494, 3555-&; VA~; BJU.KEL § 138; Official Com-
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Philippines. 94 
Poland.95 
Portugal. 96 
Puerto Rico. 97 
Spain.98 
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Sweden (in relation to the non-Scandinavian countries).99 
Tunis.100 
Treaties: Austria-Poland, 101 Austria-Germany.102 
France-Switzerland.103 
Italy-Switzerland (relating to jurisdiction) .104 
Colombia-Ecuador .105 
With respect to double nationality, apatrides, national 
law divided according to local domicil, religion, race, or 
caste, the general principles apply. It is true that succes-
sion is not necessarily included, even in civil law countries, 
under the personal law. But in the divisions into classes 
ment to the Benelux Draft p. 17 n. 32; DE WINTER, W. I948, 405. The 
Hooge Raad maintains its own lack of jurisdiction to review non-enacted 
law, but certainly does no longer infer from art. 7 Alg. Bep. that im-
movables are subject to lex situs (H.R. (Apr. s, 1907) W. 8524, Clunet 
I910, 285, see the decision of Jan. 8, I943) and is supposed to approve silently 
of the nationality principle. 
94 Philippines: C.C. art. I6, par. 2; SALONGA, Private International Law 
(Manila, I952) 377· 
95 Poland: IPL. art. 28, par. 1. 
96 Portugal: Clunet I9I3 1 1355. 
97 Puerto Rico: C.C. art. u, see EDER, supra n. 24. 
98 Spain: C.C. art. IO, par. 2; Trib. Sup. (June 6, I873) Clunet 1874, 40, 
S2; TRIAS DEBEs, DIP. (I932) I02 ff., (I939) no. 63ff.; 2 GoLDSCHMIDT I64 
(against exceptions to the principle). 
99 Sweden: Law of March 5, 1937, (except within the Scandinavian 
Union). 
100 Tunis: Trib. Tunis (Mar. 3I, IS99) Clunet I9oo, 372; (Apr. 20, I904) 
Revue I905, I 57; SLAMA, Conflits des Lois rei. aux successions ab intestat en 
Tunisie (th. Paris I935) 6I. 
101 March I9, I924, art. 28. 
102 February s, I927, § 3 par. I. 
103 June IS, IS69, art. s, in contrast to the dual system of French conflicts 
law, PERROUD, Clunet 1934, 285. 
104 July 22, 1868; App. Ticino (June 21, 1950) 47 SJZ. 334 no. uS, S 
Schw. Jahrb. Int. R. (195I) 307. 
105 June IS, 1903, art. 23. 
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of persons such as in the now expired Egyptian system, 
succession pertained to the foreign or mixed jurisdictions.106 
3. Mixed systems 
As mentioned earlier in this work, 107 the Swiss law applies 
Swiss substantive law to foreigners domiciled in Switzer-
land and subjects foreign domiciled Swiss citizens to the 
"foreign legislation" with two exceptions: their land situ-
ated in Switzerland is governed by the law and jurisdiction 
of their canton of origin, and "where these Swiss citizens 
according to the foreign law are not subject to the foreign 
law, they are subject to the law and jurisdiction of their 
canton of origin." 
I described the latter provision as an admirable effort 
to avoid collisions regarding Swiss nationals abroad, as 
the statute applies Swiss law to them only if the law of 
the domicil so admits.108 This was in ·conformity with the 
Swiss commentators ;109 in the meantime, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in a dictum formulated the rule expressly to 
the effect that "Article 28 NAG in the case of a foreign 
domicil of Swiss citizens concedes precedence to the con-
flicts rules there in force." 110 This interpretation has been 
challenged recently on the ground that Swiss law should 
always govern when the law of the domicil itself does not 
claim to govern. The practical difference is significant when 
106 Similarly in the treaty United States-Persia of July u, 1928, with 
respect to movables. See Vol. I, 104 ff.; Trib. Consulaire Franc;ais, Cairo 
(June 25, 1948) Clunet 1950, 6o8. On the present complicated law in Israel 
see MAKAROV no. 25; YADIN, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. (1952) 143. 
1o1 NAG. art. 28; Vol. I, 81, us. 
108 I said "prescribes," which word was used in a somewhat related 
provision in Privatrechtl. Gesetzbuch Zurich, § 4 par. 2. 
109 ANLIKER 2; SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 460, 465; VOUMARD 89: "das Recht 
welches das Konfiiktsrecht am Domizil anwendet." 
110 BG. (Nov. 18, 1949) 75 BGE. II 280, 283 ff.: "Wohl riiumt art. 28 
NAG. bei ausliindischem Wohnsitz von Schweizerbiirgern den dort geltenden 
Kollisionsnormen den Vorrang ein." 
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the conflicts rule of the domiciliary state refers to a third 
law.111 The result would be disastrous: 
A Swiss citizen dying domiciled in England leaves im-
movables in England and France. Does the Swiss statute 
mean that the English immovable is governed by English 
law but the French immovable is governed by Swiss law? 
Such far-fetched arbitrariness would not square with the 
comity inspiring the Swiss provision and the analogous 
German solution. 112 
Scandinavian Treaty. The Northern Union of 1933 
calls for the law of the last domicil, if this has been in one 
of the states of the Union during five years; the drafts-
men presumed that during this period the deceased would 
have adjusted himself to his surroundings. Otherwise, the 
national law at the time of the death generally governs, 
with various exceptions for different incidents of the suc-
cession.113 
C. Lex Fori 
I. As principle 
Soviet Russia applies its own law to all but certain 
situations.114 
2. In Favor of Domestic Beneficiaries 
There exist powerful remainders of the most ancient 
conception that foreign inheritance laws should be ignored, 
and foreigners should not inherit. The Code Napoleon 
reserved rights in successions, as a part of "civic rights," to 
111 H. LEWALD in Fragen des Verfahrens- und Kollisionsrechts, Festschrift 
fiir Hans Fritzsche (Ziirich 1952) 171 If., ignoring the dictum by the 
Federal Tribunal of 1949. 
112 Supra 255, 256; see also Louis LucAs, cited infra n. 137. 
113 Scandinavia: Treaty of Nov. 19, 1934, art. x, cf. UnDGREN, 92. Z. 
ausl. PR. 267 If. 
114 LUNTZ, Mezdunarodnoe castnoe pravo (Moskow 1949) 320. 
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French Citizens; aliens could not inherit. Moreover, it 
maintained the droit d' aubaine, jus albinagii, reserving the 
sovereign a part in foreigners' assets before they were 
allowed to emigrate.115 
(a) Reciprocity. One popular modernization of the old 
xenophobia was the requirement of reciprocity for the appli-
cation of foreign inheritance law. This idea116 is incorpo-
rated in the Austrian law of I854,117 requiring equal treat-
ment of Austrian movable estates with domestic estates 
as a condition of applying the national law to the movables 
of a foreigner domiciled in Austria. This exception recurs 
with various limits in modern codes 118 and many treaties. 
(b) Prelevement. After the French Restoration, para-
doxically, the spirit of the Revolution was more felt than 
during the Empire, but the Law of July I 4, I 8 I 9, changed 
the old principle merely to the effect that domestic per-
sons enjoy all rights derived from the domestic statute. 
The French courts are so intensely imbued with the force 
of the Law of I 8 I 9 that in the wide application of this 
prelevement, heirs and legatees 119 of French nationality 120 
may claim so much of the value of assets situated in France 
as to provide them with what they would receive under 
French inheritance law from all French assets and foreign 
movables. The courts regard this rule as a means to 
115 France: C.C. arts. 7z6, 912. 
116 Formerly Prussia: A.L.R.I. 12, 40; Baden, Law of June 4, 1864, art. z. 
117 Austria: Verlassenschaftspatent ( Gesetz iiber Verfahren ausser Streit-
sachen) 1854 § 2.3. 
118 Germany: EG. BGB. art. zs i.f.s. infra n. 130. 
Liechtenstein: Law of Dec. 4, 1911, art. 2 (Austrian rule). 
Mexico: C.C. art. 132.8. 
119 Not the "legataire universe!," or a surviving spouse claiming under 
marital property Jaw; BAUDRY LACANTINERIE ET WAHL, Droit civil, I Suc-
cessions § zo6; MAURY in PLANIOL ET RIPERT, Successions § 38. 
120 They must be citizens at the time of the testator's death, Cass. req. 
(May 10, 1937) Rev. crit. 1937, 677; Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) Rev. crit. 
1947, I4Z· 
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protect a French national 121 who would be heir or legatee 
according to the French law of succession.122 On the other 
hand, the right is accorded against all co-heirs, be they 
foreigners or Frenchmen.123 
Modern French scholars regard this ((eviction de la loi 
hrangere" by the French system of devolution and the 
consequent split in the law of succession 124 with deep re-
gret 125 as a "legislative mistake," strangely aggravated by 
the courts.126 
However, Belgium, 127 the Netherlands, 128 Argentina, 129 
and other countries 130 have enacted provisions on this 
model. The German Code has adopted a more moderate 
but nevertheless cumbersome version, in case the deceased 
121 CHARRON in 4 Foreign Law Series 111; 10 Repert. 280 ff. 
122 Cour Paris (Jan. 6, 1862) S. 1862.2.338. A change of nationality does 
not extinguish this privilege, which brings the clash with foreign laws and 
even treaties to a climax;· DELAUME, "De !'application et de !'interpretation 
des Traites ... dans les relations franco-americaines," Clunet 1953, Nr. 3, 
§ 16. 
123 Trib. Seine (Dec. 16, 1950) Clunet 1951, 906, Rev. Crit. 1951, 302; 
against the text of the Code, see LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 365. 
124 RENAULT, Clunet 1876, 21; NIBOYET, Manuel § 740 bis; ROBERT 
DENNERY, Le partage en droit international prive fran~ais (Paris 1935) 147. 
125 PLAISANT 246 f. discussing the French-Swiss Treaty. 
126 NIBOYET, 4 Traite 685 § 1254; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 416; 
"institution exorbitante et archaique." 
127 Belgium: Law of April 27, 1865, art. 4· 
128 Netherlands: Law of April 7, 1869, art. 1; but in KosTERs' (636-642) 
interpretation the article serves only the case where a Dutch national suffers 
abroad because of his nationality. 
129 Argentina: C.C. art. 3470. ROMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 182, observes 
that also a foreigner, son of a foreigner domiciled abroad, is privileged. 
Even the foreign lex situs of immovables is disregarded, Cam. civ. 2a 
(June 22, 1925) 57 Gac. Foro 98 Nr. 133. 
13° Chile: C.C. art. 998 for intestate succession. 
Colombia: C. C. art. 1054. 
Ecuador: C.C. art. 1056. 
Honduras: C. C. art. 978. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 1024. 
El Salvador: C.C. art. 995· 
Treaty of Lima (1878), arts. 20, 22. (MARTENS, Recueil (2d. ser.) vol. 
161 293). 
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was domiciled in Germany.131 Notably, under all these sys-
tems, nationals may claim their statutory portions, contrary 
to the applicable foreign law.132 
The Chilean Code, article 998, reserves "in the intestate 
succession of a foreigner" the rights of Chilean nationals 
to inheritance, marital portion, and aliments according to 
Chilean law. On the exact scope of this provision, at least 
three doctrines exist.133 In any case, the Code is not con-
tent to maintain forced heirship as a territorial prerogative 
with respect to domestic assets. 
In Brazil, as an exception to the domiciliary law, where 
a foreign domiciled person leaves assets in Brazil and a 
wife or children of Brazilian nationality, these share in the 
inheritance according to Brazilian law, if this law is more 
favorable to them than the foreign law.184 The criticism 
directed against the corresponding provision in the older 
statute on account of its unprincipled invasion into the unity 
of the succession with no hope of foreign recognition, re-
mains valid.135 
These nationalistic relics of old times were sharply 
criticized 136 and expressly rejected in the Hague drafts 
on succession.137 The Report of the Commission of the 
1 3 1 EG. BGB. art. 25, sentence 2. 
132 France: Trib. Seine (Apr. 26, I907) Clunet I907, 1132, 1135. 
Germany: RG. (May 3I, I9o6) 63 RGZ. 356; (Oct. 23, I9II) JW. I9I2, 
22; 24 Z. int. Recht 3 I7; see also OLG. Hamburg (June 15, I906) I8 Z. 
int. R. I46, where, however, German law applied also as lex situs. 
133 Chile: ALBONICO, 2 Manual 117; GoNZALES ALVARADO, supra n. 73· 
134 Brazil: Ley in trod. I942, art. IO § I. 
135 BALMACEDA CARDOSO, 0 Direito lnternacional Privado (Sao Paulo 
1943) ISI. The law of I9I6 had been criticized also because the exception 
could work to the disadvantage of the Brazilian party, see BEVILAQUA, I 
Codigo Civil Commentado, Art. I4. 
136 LAINE, Clunet I906, 990; MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 
6I j BATIFFOL, Traite § 662 If. KAHN, 13 Z. int. R. 342, followed by most 
German writers. 
137 Actes de Ia 3me Conference pour le droit international prive, ( I900) 
58 ff., I22, I30i Draft I9o4, art. 7, see Actes de Ia sme Conf., p. 354; Draft 
I925 art. 5 ibid, p. 283; Draft I928 art. 5, Actes de Ia 6me Con£., p. 406. 
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Sixth Conference, after exhaustive discussion, summarized 
three methods of preferring the lex fori to the foreign law, 
repudiating all of them with the result that: 
( 1 ) A claimant may not invoke a domestic rule more 
favorable to him. 
( 2) Where the forum considers the foreign national law 
of the deceased as violating public policy, the ensuing com-
plications prevail over the equitable considerations favoring 
the foreign law. 
(3) It is absolutely objectionable that the lex situs 
should discard the national law in order to enforce its own 
order of distributing assets situated outside the territory. 
The recent French draft maintains a right to prelevement 
only where a French heir (that is, an heir according to the 
applicable law) is discriminated against solely because of 
his status as an alien.138 
Sometimes it is not clearly acknowledged where the 
obnoxious character of the criticized measure lies. No con-
fusion should be made with similar results reached if the 
domestic law of the forum and a foreign law are in conflict, 
each considering itself competent to govern the same succes-
sion. Also in this situation, a system will try to defend 
itself by using the assets available in its territory.139 This 
may be called a legitimate product of an unfortunate inter-
national conflict. But the prelevement trespasses on a 
foreign law recognized as applicable. 
( 4) Special cases: Although the Hague and French 
drafts as well as the Restatement ( § 612) expressly re-
138 Comite pour Ia Reforme du C.C., Travaux 1949-50, Projet, art. 55; 
1 Am. J. Comp. L. 423; this restrictive interpretation, however, is doubted 
by LOUIS LucAs, Rev. crit. 1952, 69. A similar restrictive meaning has been 
given in Luxemburg to the law of Feb. 29, 1872 by Trib. Diekirch (Feb. 22, 
1900) 7 Pas. lux. 41. 
139 Benelux Draft convention, art. 16 (English translation in I Int. J. 
Comp. L. Q. (1952) 426). 
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serves public policy, it is gratifying that in the judicial 
approach remedial refusal of foreign inheritance law is 
exceptional. 
It was only natural that old French decisions, when civil 
death had been abandoned in France, rejected similar for-
eign punishments 140 or that courts repudiate immoral dis-
positions.141 
A doubtful problem, however, concerns the admission of 
binding agreements concerning inheritance. 
Contractual disposal is recognized as an alternative to 
wills in a few systems, although, for the most part, it 
is prohibited. Even Sweden, conservative of old usages, 
forbids agreements to appoint an heir as well as pacts 
stipulating the succession of a third party.142 No doubt, if 
subjects of a country allowing the appointment of an heir 
by pact use this faculty within their own country, extra-
territorial effect will in principle be accorded in other juris-
dictions, according to their conflicts rules, provided that 
the subsequent succession is governed by the same law.143 A 
pact between German spouses concluded in Germany is 
recognized in France with respect to movables, though 
not an immovable on French territory.144 Opposition, in 
140 See French law of May 31, 1854, (abolition de Ia mort civile) and 
Cass. (Feb. 26, 1873) D. 1873.1.208. 141 Cass. (Jan. 24, 1899) Clunet 1901, 998. 
142 Sweden: Law of April 25, 1930 (on inheritance pacts) § 3; PAPPI!N-
HI!IM, 5 Z. ausl. PR. 306. 
143 England and United States: no case is known, but binding contracts 
to make a will are valid ; see also BRESLAUI!R 194· 
France: BATIFFOL, Traite 657 § 654, against contrary opinions. 
Germany: Old practice rejecting the objection of public policy, see LEWALD 
319; NussBAUM 3 64 If. 
Italy: Cass. Firenze (Dec. 12, 1895) S.r897·4·17. 
Netherlands: Hof den Haag (Nov. 26, 1925) W.u623. 
Sweden: Law of March 5, 1937, Ch. r, § 7: "The question of the binding 
force of an inheritance pact with the deceased or a gift mortis causa is to 
be examined according to the law of the country, whose national the 
deceased was, when the transaction was made." 144 App. Colmar (Feb. 19, 1949) Nouv. Rev. 1949, 222; Rev. crit. 1950, 52. 
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this case, under the theory of public policy seems to dis-
appear. On the other hand, a prohibiting state seeks to 
prevent its subjects from disposing in this way everywhere. 
A pact between French spouses made in Germany is void in 
France. 
Other questions, however, are not settled. In particular, 
whether the former-mentioned parties may transact abroad, 
is controversial. Certain laws exclude pacts in their terri-
tory absolutely. The adequate rule, making recognition 
likewise dependent on the law governing the succession of 
the deceased person, is formulated in modern laws.145 The 
Czechoslovakian statute, 146 however, requires for capacity 
and intrinsic validity compliance merely with the national 
law of the first decedent, in other respects with both national 
laws at the time of execution. 
We shall limit our discussions to wills. Here we shall en-
counter related problems concerning joint wills, renuncia-
tion of future shares, and promises to leave or not to leave 
by will. 
14 5 See preceding notes and cf. 2 BAR 340; KAHN, 2 Abh. 21 8, n. 140 ; 2 
ZITELMANN 965; RAAPE 647. 
Germany: KG. (April 10, 1941) Deutsches Recht 1941, 1611, no. 9: 
Dutch spouses domiciled in Germany concluded a "marriage and inheritance 
contract"; declared void under Dutch C. C. art. 977 If. 
146 Czechoslovakia: PIL. ( 1948) art. 42. 
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Principles 
I. UNITY AND PLURALITY oF SuccESSION 
I. Historical Notes 1 
B ARTOLUS made the territorial scope of inheritance statutes dependent on their wording.2 Later, the jurists discussed the nature of these statutes, to 
ascertain whether they were personal or real or determined 
by the place of death. Alberic de Rosate is credited with 
the merit of having first treated the problem of a unitary 
law of succession in the proper perspective. But lex situs 
for immovables was the prevailing teaching of the statutists, 
although the German "Mirrors"-the Sachsenspiegel and 
Schwabenspiegel-as well as decisions of the Parliament 
of Paris, I392 and I429, together with a host of learned 
writers 3 were partisans of the law of the deceased's domicil 
as a single law. 
A decisive new impulse to create a unitary law governing 
succession came from Mancini who, as president of the 
Institute of International Law in Geneva, on August 3 I, 
I 874, urged universal and total acceptance of the national 
law. In the following period, the weight of the literature 
in all civil-law countries with great energy favored the 
1 Most valuable: FREYRIA, La loi applicable aux successions mobilieres 
(these, Lille 1944) ; see also CouLON, Principes generaux sur Ia devolution 
hereditaire (these, Poitiers 1886, 1889) 35 ff.; for the latest periods see the 
book by DELAUME, supra, bibliography. 
2 BARTOLUS, De Summa Trinitatis VI § 42. 
3 In former centuries among the statutists, FROLAND, BouHIER, and 
BOULLENOIS, as cited by WEISS, 4 Traite 535 ff. 
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national law as the single law of the decedent.4 Most 
statutes, following the model of the Italian Code of 1865 
and the German of I 896, adhered to this system. 
However, opponents have been frequent in France, sup-
porting the traditional split between immovables and mov-
ables.5 During the Hague Conference of 1928, Professor 
Basdevant 6 declared it inacceptable that French land should 
be governed by a foreign law, a view traditionally shared 
by the French courts, 1 and that the national instead of 
the domiciliary law should govern movables. The Swiss 
delegate, Sauser-Hall, also advanced objections against the 
single national law. It was finally adopted by the majority, 
subject to exceptions, but the convention was never ratified, 
largely because of this division of opinions. 
In the common-law countries, learned writers did and 
do acknowledge the theoretical superiority of the single 
law. Practically, however, the contrary firm position of 
the courts is usually regarded as reasonable-it is true, 
without much penetrating analysis of the situations arising 
from the coexistence of several laws governing the same 
succession. This is due to the prevalent attention given 
to probate procedure and the administration of decedent's 
estates, which includes the verification and discharge of 
debts. The problems produced by this system are differ-
ent from ordinary choice of law, and the difficulties involved 
require remedies on a different basis. 
The most acute controversy concerning this problem has 
been developing for a long time in Argentina. The case for 
4 See 2 BAR 304, and WEISS, 4 Traite 543, who was himself a most eloquent 
advocate of the single national law. 
5 There is a long list of French authors of the 19th century. 
6 Comptes-rendus de Ia 6me Conference 277. 
7 Cass. (Dec. 8, 1840) 8.1841.1.56 and many decisions leading to (May 7, 
1924) Revue 1924, 406; (May 23, 1948) J.C.P. 1950.2.5241: irrespective of 
the testator's intention. 
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the single law (of domicil) has been fully pleaded by both 
exegetic explanation of the puzzling code provisions and 
rational appraisal of the contrasting theories. It is the 
prevailing scholarly view that there is a cleft between 
catedra and jurisprudencia, through the exclusive "fault of 
the courts." 8 Velez Sarsfield, the principal author of the 
code, according to his numerous notes, wanted to follow 
Savigny strictly.9 But the code contains so many apparent 
contradictions that the courts may well shift a part of the 
"fault" upon the draftsmen.10 
2. Rationale 
Any legal conception of a hereditary unit is due to an 
advance of legal thought over the primitive separatenes·s of 
assets and rights. The comprehensive bringing together 
of all chattels under the law of domicil, strongly empha-
sized in English law,11 was in itself a lawyerlike achieve-
ment. 
That in so many jurisdictions the process of forming a 
unit out of an aggregate halted without encompassing im-
movables, was caused, of course, by the high importance 
of the land and the political and economic interests of feudal 
8 ROMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 187; see his excellent exposition 151-239; 
before him: MoLINA, El Derecho Int. Priv. (Buenos Aires, 1882) §§ 92, 103; 
WEISS-ZEBALLOS, 1 Manual de Derecho Internacional Privado ( ed. 5, Paris, 
1911) 345; 2 id. 367; 2 VICO ( ed. 1927) 273 ff.; and see the impressive brief, 
published by DR. SANTIAGO BAau£, Regimen sucesorio internacional segun 
Ia ley Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1936). Contra: ALCORTA, 2 Curso de DIP. 
( ed. 2, Buenos Aires, 1927) 388; BIBLIONI, 4 Anteproyecto de Reformas a! 
C. C. Argentino ( 193 I) 26. 
9 Especially art. 3283 is taken as a clear declaration of the law of the 
last domicil. It was so understood by Trib. Seine (Apr. 17, 1912) Clunet 
1913, 175, a foreign tribunal, but the only one to understand correctly as 
DfEZ MIERES, infra n. 10, at p. 20 ironically states. 
10 ALBERTO DfEZ MIERES, Las sucesiones en el Der. Int. Priv., Conferencia, 
21 March 1927 (Madrid, 1927) repudiating the "preposterous" Montevideo 
solution, advocated an accord with Spain with adoption of the unitary law 
as in Spain, but with the domiciliary test as in Argentina. 
11 Lord Chancellor Westbury, in Enohin v. Wylie [1862] 10 H.L. Cas. 
r, II E.R. 924. 
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and modern rulers. This basis of the several laws doctrine 
is intensely emphasized and glorified in France, while Anglo-
American practitioners take the twofold system of their 
conflicts law in stride as the most natural thing. 
There can be no hesitation in conceding the absolute 
superiority of the Roman-Byzantine concept and the re-
fined modern doctrine of "universal succession." 12 It is 
a succession of heirs in the place of the deceased, continuing 
his rights as well as his debts, giving coheirs equal pro-
visions, and including legatees and creditors in a compre-
hensively considered coherent system. Unwise as it was for 
the purpose of a world law to declare at the Hague simply 
that there should be unity of succession, the majority vote 
for this principle is well understandable. 
What we have now is a stalemate with respect not only 
to unity and plurality, but also to connecting factors and 
accessory incidents. Every system in the checkered table 
believes in its own merits. All together have created chaos. 
To be realistic, we must discard once more the subtle 
arguments, pompous phrasing, and disturbing dialectic of 
conflicts philosophy. Must the conflicts rules on inheritance 
really be territorial because of the sovereignty of the states 
over their territory? 13 Must they on the contrary apply 
the personal law of the deceased, because inheritance 
allegedly is still in close relation to personal and family 
relations? 14 Is it true at all that the continental Roman-
12 On the concept of succession in the Italian Code, G. STOLFI, Note sui 
:oncetto di successione, in Riv. trim. dir. e proc. civ. 1949, 535· 
13 Thus NIBOYET, 4 Traite § 1318 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 409 
§ 361. 
14 Thus with special regard to the national law, ANZILOTTI, in Actes de 
Ia 5me Conference 203 ; Comment Benelux Draft p. 17; contra BASDEVANT 
in Actes de Ia 5me Conference 202; and see App. Napoli (Jan. 23, 1924) 
Giur. Ita!. 1924 I 2, 175: Italian citizens may divide foreign assets without 
regard to the national law of the testator, as only property, not status, 
capacity, or family law, is involved. 
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istic laws start from the personal sphere, whereas the com· 
mon law of inheritance is allegedly built upon exclusive 
economic consideration of the assets? 15 A glance at the 
foregoing survey of systems with its shocking variety of 
combinations of "real" and "personal" statutes destroys the 
easy affirmation of any such pretense. History knew these 
ideas and overruled them. 
In fact, all these systems are in force irrespective of 
reasons. Even though the Romanistic principle is sound in 
itself, its application to the divided world is not at all 
natural. When in England the land reform of 1925 
abolished the dualism of descent and distribution to realty 
and personalty, many were expecting an automatic repeal 
of the dualism in conflicts law. Nothing of this sort hap-
pened, which is the more notable since the Anglo-American 
expansion of the lex situs is as extravagant in this field as 
in that of marital property.16 That eight pieces of land 
need eight different systems of liberty or restraint in testa-
tion is bad enough in all jurisdictions of the split law; but 
that even the capacity to make a will and the formalities 
and construction of will are independent in principle in 
every jurisdiction where an immovable is found trans-
gresses the borders of tolerable tradition. 
A slight beginning of consciousness is noticeable. An 
enlightened dissenting vote of a strong minority of the 
Iowa Supreme Court has reminded us that the ancient 
difference between the will of real estate made before a 
court of law and the testament of personal property, per-
taining to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, has vanished; hence, 
a revocation of a will, involving movables and immovables, 
15 Theory of Dicey, much noted on the Continent. Another fruitless debate 
was conducted on the relation of universal succession to the personal law 
between z BAR 306, 6z3, and KAHN, I Abh. 38. 
16 Supra Vol. I, p. 337· 
PRINCIPLES 273 
effective by the law of the domicil, ought not to be ignored 
at the situs of land, merely because its own domestic law 
requires a different mode of cancellation.17 
On the other hand, the Hague, Benelux, and French 
drafts have been influenced by a doctrine of recent French 
writers, strongly narrowing the scope of national law: by 
these it is limited to the designation of the beneficiaries and 
their shares, and excludes administration, liquidation, and 
liability for debts, if not also partition as submitted to the 
lex situs. 
To a critical mind and to a new legislator, the practical 
effects of the two fundamental systems should be decisive.18 
To this end, the results so far discernible will be collected 
here. 
II. PROBLEMS CoNCERNING THE CoNNECTING FACTORS 
I. Party Autonomy 
Sometimes emphasis is laid upon the possibility that a 
person may select the law applicable to his succession by 
choosing his domicil-or for that matter, his nationality-
or by buying land in an advantageous jurisdiction for pur-
poses of succession. This we do not call autonomy of 
determining the law; it is individual freedom itself. The 
dubious French-Italian doctrine of fraus legi facta, fraud 
committed by using a foreign connection with the intention 
of evading the municipal law of the forum, was invoked 
where spouses abroad executed a joint will prohibited at 
17 Dissenting vote by Smith J. in re Barries' Estate (Iowa, 1949) 35 N.W. 
(2d) 658, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1399 at 1407, citing in re Goldsticker's Will ( 1908) 
192 N.Y. 35, and Ellis v. Davis (1883) 109 U.S. 485 (interesting but not 
really a support). 
18 In agreement, SAVATIER, Cours de DIP. (Paris, 1947) 304 § 436. 
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home; but only two French cases to this effect, both a 
century old, are known.19 
A true option granted a testator, however, was once 
generally thought permissible. Some present enactments 
allow it under circumstances. 
The outstanding provision of this sort is embodied in the 
Swiss law, directly intended to aid international relations. 
An alien domiciled in Switzerland is subject to Swiss in-
heritance law; nevertheless he may provide by will that his 
succession should be governed by his own national law 
(called professio juris) .20 It seems settled that by so doing 
the testator may exclude forced heirship granted by Swiss 
federal or cantonallaw,21 although other questions of con-
struction are doubtfuV2 In the prevailing but controversial 
opinion, it is assumed that a Swiss national, domiciled abroad 
in a state recognizing the national (i.e. his Swiss) law of 
inheritance, may choose between the Swiss Civil Code and 
his cantonal law, particularly with respect to any differences 
in determining the forced heirs.23 
In Peru, where domestic immovables are controlled by 
domestic law and movables by the law of the last domicil, 
the former code nevertheless allowed a foreigner to dispose 
at his choice of a "big business enterprise" in Peru under 
his national law 24 and of foreign-situated assets under either 
19 ANDRE TIRAN, Les successions testamentaires en DIP. (1932) I4Z ff. 
at 154, in addition to the long-condemned decisions operating with fraudulent 
though serious change of nationality; cf., supra Vol. I, pp. 507-510. 
20 NAG. art. zz. 
21 SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 468; PAUL FISCHER, 64 Z. Schweiz. R. (1945) 129, 
132. That, as Schnitzer contends, there may be a renvoi from the national 
law to the domiciliary Swiss law, sounds inconsistent with the apparent 
meaning of the statute. 
22 VouMARD, Transmission 51-81 enumerates three theories on the scope of 
the rule and numerous controversies. 
23 See FISCHER, id. 132 against SCHNITZER ( ed. Z) 428, ( ed. 3, 47Z). 
24 Peru: C.C. (185z) art. 694; CARLOS GARcfA GASTANETA, Derecho Int. 
Priv. ( 1930) 244 contended that an analogous rule was to be inferred for 
intestate succession; this seems to mean that the foreigner may write a 
declaration (or only a will?) so disposing. 
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his national law or the lex situs.25 
Conversely, the Decedent's Law of New York,26 con-
tinuing a former provision of the Code of Civil Practice, 
is always satisfied when the New York law is chosen to 
govern an inheritance: 
"Whenever a decedent being a citizen of the United 
States or a citizen or a subject of a foreign country, 
wherever resident, shall have declared in his will and 
testament that he elects that such testamentary dispositions 
shall be construed and regulated by the laws of this state, 
the validity and effect of such dispositions shall be deter-
mined by such laws." 27 
The Treaty between Colombia and Ecuador permits the 
testator to choose national or domiciliary law.28 
Finally, among the peculiar rules with which American 
statutes abound, there is a provision in Maryland that 
where the testator "originally" was domiciled in this state, 
his succession is governed by Maryland law, unless he 
should "expressly declare a contrary intention in his will 
or testamentary instrument." 29 
Apart from these exceptional legal rules, certainly free-
dom to dispose by will depends on the leeway left by the 
law governing succession. Lists of imperative rules in the 
national laws limiting this freedom were collected at the 
fifth Hague Conference. 30 Nevertheless, some eminent 
courts occasionally still separate on the old lines, resorting 
to the presumptive intention of the testator not only in 
25 Peru: C.C. (1852) art. 693; 27 Anales Judiciales de Ia Corte Suprema 
de Justicia (Peru, 1931) 24. 
26 Decedent Estate Law, § 47; cf. Davids N.Y. Law of Wills§ 531. 
27 An analogous provision respecting movables was contained in the 
former C.C. of Mexico, art. 3286. 
28 Art. 18; cf. CocK, Tratado de D.I.P. (ed. 2), 209. 
2 9 Md. Pub!. Gen. L.: art. 93 sec. 344· Nevertheless, this statute applies 
only if the will is submitted in Maryland for original probate. 
30 Documents 1925 p. 89, 185, 358, 502 If.; for France see LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE (ed. 5) 501 § 370. 
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construing his will, which is natural, 31 but also in determin-
ing the applicable law. There are recent examples.82 
2. Concept of Immovables 
The general principle that characterization of things 
connected with land as movable or immovable is referred 
to the law of the place where the land is, has been discussed 
above (Chapter 54). 
Illustration: The granddaughter of the famous writer 
George Sand, married to an Italian, bequeathed the castle 
of N ohant in France with its inventory and an amount of 
money to the French Academy to maintain a memorial for 
her grandmother. The French court, following the French 
law of situs, considered the furniture and the money as im-
movable and therefore subject to French law.33 
31 Also the recent decision Amerige v. Attorney Gen. ( 1949) 324 Mass. 
648, 659, 88 N.E. (2d) u6 (against the rule that a power of appointment 
is controlled by the law of the donor, the perpetuity rule of Massachusetts 
is applied because of the presumptive intention of the donor) is explained by 
the specific nature of the matter, infra p. 352. 
32 England: Re Allen's Est. [1945] 2 All E.R., a most objectionable decision, 
criticized by MoRRIS, 24 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1946) 528. 
France: Cour Paris (Apr. 24, 1913) Clunet 1913, 1276: Mme. Nazare-
Aga, wife of a Persian diplomat, was born in France, educated there and 
did not leave that country. Until near her death she only knew French 
law and usages. Her act was evidently a holographic will according to 
the French C.C. The court refrained from attributing her a French domicil, 
but nevertheless presumed her intention to apply French law and granted 
reserved portions to her children under French law. 
Germany: Bay. Ob. LG. (Jan. 3, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 Nr. 24 assumed that 
the testator may choose the law and in absence of his choice lex situs governs. 
Contra: EcKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 229 Nr. 189. 
Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (July II, 1946) N.J. 1947 no. 66, affirmed 
H.R. (March 21, 1947) W. 1947, 382, applied the law of the Netherlands 
where the testator was formerly a national from birth and had his last 
domicil, because of the particular circumstances of the case. 
Therefore, recognition to an adopted child was refused, The H.R., however, 
expressly stated (Jan. 8, 1943) W. 1943, 202, that autonomy of the testator 
is limited by the applicable law. 
It is interesting that the Kammergericht in Berlin (April 10, 1941) 
Deutsches Recht 1941, 16n, HRR. 1941, 846, had understood the Dutch law 
just as the Amsterdam court did, in the case of a Dutchman long domiciled 
in Germany. 
33 Trib. civ. La Chiitre (July 5, 1910) Clunet 19II, 588. 
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Exceptions are made by the provisions in Chile, Argen-
tina, and Brazil, assimilating movables in a "permanent" 
situation to immovables 34 in foreign countries. The French 
draft, submitting a fonds de commerce, an established busi-
ness, to the lex situs/ 5 applies the same treatment also to 
inheritance law.36 The reporter proposed special contacts 
also for patents, trademarks, designs and models, maritime 
and fluvial vessels, and aircraft, but the committee declined 
to institute so many separate successions.37 
3· Renvoi 
The Hague Convention on renvoi,38 drafted at the Con-
ference of I 9 5 I, is much limited in scope. Nevertheless, it 
affirms the renvoi principle in its oldest and most important 
application, viz., to the conflict between the principles of 
the national law and the law of the domicil. It shows also 
the direction in which further development must be sought. 
Since the first volume of this work 39 called for a sound 
positive stand in construing references to foreign law, world 
opinion has made a highly gratifying progress, leaving 
behind all the sterile negation of renvoi in the universal 
literature. Even the adversaries concede more and more 
"exceptions" to their denial of renvoi. 
True, while the new approach has been initiated in the 
Netherlands, where rejection of renvoi was practically 
unanimous,40 some writers dwell on the old futile argu-
ments, extolling the pretended wisdom of their conflicts 
34 Supra Ch. 54· 
3 5 French Projet, art. 48. 
36 I d. art. 54· 
37 Travaux de Ia Commission de Reforme du Code Civil (1949-1950), 635-
637. 
38 Draft Convention to determine Conflicts between the national Jaw 
and the law of the domicil, Engl. tr. in 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 275, zSo-282. 
39 Vol. I, p. 79 ff. 
4
°KosTERS 135; MuLDER (ed. z) 94; MEIJERS W.P.N.R. 3555-3558; 
HUMANS 157; VAN BRAKEL 66. 
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rules allegedly pointing directly to some internal law. More 
regrettably, a number of delegates, for one reason or 
another, refrained from voting, although it was carefully 
explained that, far from adopting the "theory of renvoi," 
the draft merely offered practical uniform rules indicating 
a specific law applicable, not the supremacy of foreign con-
flicts rules defeating those of the forum. This dreaded 
"theory of renvoi," especially in the form proclaiming total 
renvoi in all situations, may once have been favored by 
writers, but it now exists exclusively in the imagination of 
the anti-renvoyists. What writers of recent times who 
advocate acceptance of renvoi have had in mind has been 
exactly what the draft begins to teach, a sensible construc-
tion of the forum's own conflicts rules, certain complements 
to them, attaining uniformity, and references to foreign law 
just where they are sound. 41 The draft could very well 
call this by its name. The decisive point is whether a court 
insists on the literal or even narrow-minded interpretation 
of its conflicts rules at the cost of reasonableness, or looks 
to the international purpose of these same rules. 
Perhaps it is allowed to hope, despite the remaining 
reluctance of some eminent scholars to abandon their old 
dogmas, that the field may be considered free for an un-
biased discussion of the cases in which renvoi is sound and 
in which it is not. 
We have to review the topic here, because the law of 
succession furnishes the most frequent field for renvoi. Of 
the numerous English cases in point, all but two involve 
succession.42 Apart from the special rules on formal valid-
ity of wills, only two types of conflicts rules are in question, 
41 It may specifically be referred to the writings of MELCHIOR, RAAPE, 
GRISWOLD, and my own, as well as in this respect to PAGENSTECHER (cf., 1 
Am. J. Comp. L. r66). 
42 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 90. 
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the personal law, as tested either by nationality or domicil, 
and the law of immovables as it is a part of a unitary 
governing set of rules or an independent factor. The 
Hague draft deals merely with the first problem. 
The Personal Law 
The draft provides as follows: 
Article I. When the State where the person interested 
is domiciled prescribes application of the national law, but 
the State of which such person is a national, prescribes 
application of the law of the domicile, each contracting 
State shall apply the provisions of the internal law of the 
law of the domicile. 
Article 2. When the State where the person interested 
is domiciled and the State of which such person is a nation-
al, both prescribe application of the law of the domicile, 
each contracting State shall apply the provisions of the 
internal law of the law of the domicile. 
Article 3· When the State where the person interested 
is domiciled and the State of which such person is a national 
both prescribe application of the national law, each con-
tracting State shall apply the provisions of the internal law 
of the national law. 
Article 4· No contracting State is obligated to apply 
the rules prescribed in the preceding articles, when its rules 
of private international law prescribe application in a given 
case neither of the law of the domicile nor of the national 
law. 
Article 5. Domicile, for the purpose of the present Con-
vention, is the place where a person habitually resides, un-
less it depends on that of another person or on the seat of 
an authority.43 
The preference given to the law of the domicil confirms 
the practice of the German, French, and Swiss courts, con-
trary to all opinions still fascinated by the virtues of the 
u Translation by I Am. J. Comp. L. z8o. 
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nationality principle. E. M. Meijers has rediscovered a 
passage of Mancini's work in which the necessary conces-
sions to foreign references to the law of domicil are master-
fully stated. 44 
"Further references" are absolutely inevitable, if "each 
contracting state" has to follow the lead of the two nearest 
involved conflicts laws. The draft has not adopted the 
often repeated proposal that transmission of reference 
should depend on the consent of the two laws to which 
the reference would lead. In fact, such coincidence, desir-
able as it is in the interest of harmony, cannot be required 
for the purpose of renvoi, which in my opinion is simply 
the carrying out of the first and principal reference, that is, 
the reference contained in the conflicts rule of the deciding 
judge. What happens, otherwise, is illustrated by the 
French draft which states: 
"If the foreign law applicable according to the French 
conflicts rules does not consider itself applicable, the foreign 
law, if any, to which this law refers shall be applicable if 
it considers itself applicable, otherwise French law shall 
apply." 4s 
A French critic 46 refutes this doctrine with this illustra-
tion: If an Englishman died domiciled in Greece, and 
Greece refuses to accept the English reference, French 
courts may nevertheless have to apply Greek law, or (not 
very justifiably, in my opinion) English law; that French 
law should be substituted is perfectly arbitrary. 
The favorite examples of the literature would be decided 
with more assurance. 
Illustrations: (i) A Danish national lived and died in 
Brussels, but made his last will in the Nether lands before 
44 MEIJERS, Recueil de lois modernes concernant le DIP. ( 1947) 95· 
45 Art. zo, Engl. tr. by I Am. J. Comp. L. 420. 
46 Louis-LucAs, Rev. crit. 1951 at 409. 
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a Dutch notary. The appeal court of The Hague, m a 
recent decision,47 stated that a Danish court would apply 
Belgian inheritance law without accepting renvoi. Although 
the Belgian court of the domicil would accept the renvoi, 
the Dutch court felt forced by the Dutch legislation to 
apply Danish law. The Dutch legislator has defined his 
view on the applicable law, and foreign rules could not be 
obeyed. 
The Convention would-and in the Dutch case, we hope 
it will-remedy this abstruse alleged legislative situation. 
(ii) An English testator dies domiciled in Italy, leaving 
movable property in Italy. At present, the Italian courts 
reject the reference from the national state, England, to 
the domicil, Italy; hence, they apply the English law of 
inheritance. The English courts follow. In the same case, 
with France instead of Italy, at present, the French courts 
"accept" the English renvoi to the French domicil; the 
English again follow. 
In the future, Italian courts would share the French 
attitude applying their own law of succession; the English 
courts would not have to ascertain the foreign view con-
cerning renvoi and would always apply the law of the 
domicil. Moreover, where assets of an Italian-domiciled 
testator are situated in France, the French courts, thus far 
so adverse to transmissive reference,48 would apply Italian 
rather than English law. 
{iii) A Danish testator, domiciled in Italy, leaves mov-
ables in England and Germany. At present, Danish courts 
refer to Italian law, Italian courts to Danish law; both, 
allegedly, without admitting renvoi. Third states must 
divide according to their principle: England going the 
Italian way reaches the Danish inheritance law;49 Germany 
47 Hof Den Haag (Feb. 23, 1942) W. 1942 no. 327. 
48 Vol. 1, p. 78 n. 33; CHARRON, in 4 Cahiers de Droit Etranger (ed. fr., 
1934) 138 claims that App. Alger (Jan. 12, 1931) Gaz. Pal. I931.1.58I 
contains no true application of transmissive reference; but see BATIFFOL, 
Traite 331 on Cass. (Nov. 7, 1933) S.I934·I·32I, Rev. crit. 1934, 440; Clunet 
1935. 88. 
49 Cf. Re Achillopoulos [1928] Cb. 433· 
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after the Danish model applies Italian law-we are in the 
paradise of no-renvoi. 
In the future, in both jurisdictions, Italian law would 
govern the entire succession, wherever the movables may 
be and whatever court would decide. 
( iv) An Englishman dies domiciled in Boston, Massa-
chusetts. This case has been used as proof that the English 
foreign court theory would break down if both jurisdictions 
involved attempted to apply it.50 The case is expressly de-
cided by the draft to the same effect as in my propositions; 
Massachusetts law, of course, governs. The English court 
theory does not break down but is confirmed if all courts 
adhering to the domiciliary principle adopt it in relation to 
jurisdictions of the nationality principle. Among them-
selves no conflict exists, except when an American court 
would assume a domicil not recognized in England, a dis-
harmony independent of renvoi and remedied by another 
section of The Hague draft. 
If renvoi is entirely rejected, the results are indicated by 
a recent Swedish decision. 
(v) An immigrant to the United States lost his Swedish 
nationality without acquiring another and died domiciled in 
the state of Washington. The Swedish Supreme Court, 
influenced by a review article of Unden, reversed its stand 
and rejected renvoi. Hence, it applied the inheritance law 
of Washington even to Swedish land, against the conflicts 
law of Washington and the inheritance law of Sweden.51 
Reference to Lex Situs 
In the Hague Conference of I 9 5 I, it was instinctively 
felt what is needed. The Italian delegate Perassi criticized 
50 Thus LEWALD, in Festschrift f. Fritzsche (Zurich, 1952) at 170 note, 
using a word used by M. Wolff against universal use of this theory. I 
take the opportunity to direct the author of that critical note to the list in 
Vol. III (1950) p. 593 correcting Illustration (c) in Vol. I, p. 79, where the 
typed manuscript was confused by three misplaced words. 
51 Sweden: S.Ct. Plenum (Feb. 28, 1939) Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1939 I p. 
96, 13 Z. a us!. PR. ( 1942) 843. 
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the result of the draft in Italy: the courts would apply 
Italian inheritance law to the movables of a domiciled Eng-
lishman, according to the uniform rules, but would continue 
to apply English inheritance law to his Italian immovables, 
according to their anti-renvoi doctrine. Sauser-Hall replied 
that this is the consequence of the restriction of the draft 
to the conflict between domicil and nationality. 52 Time and 
again, it is the rejection of renvoi that troubles the solution. 
On the other hand, it creates bad confusion if a reference 
to the situs is treated as if it were an agreement to the 
general conflicts law of the situs. This regrettably has been 
done by the English courts and is the main basis for the 
argument that renvoi leads to a vicious circle. 
It may be recalled that the German Code by Article 28 
of the EG., and its usual construction, 53 concedes that land 
situated in a foreign state is controlled by this state through 
special rules of descent and distribution. Between the 
United States and Germany, therefore, no conflict exists 
where a German testator leaves an immovable in American 
territory. Succession is governed by the law of the situs. 
Neither does a conflict exist in the inverse case, but this 
is due to renvoi; if an American testator leaves an immov-
able in Germany, American conflicts law refers to the 
German law, which renvoi back is accepted in Germany 
( EG., article 27). Hence, all third states, whether pri-
marily referring to American or German law, are likewise 
directed to the German substantive rules. 
Although adopted in the Swedish law on conflicts, this 
expressly stated difference is not shared anywhere else. 
An Italian court of appeals has rejected its very idea.54 
G2 Actes de Ia 7me Conference, 234 ff.; SAUSER-HALL, 8 Schweiz. Jb. Int. 
R. 121 ff. 
53 Supra Vol. I, 342; supra Ch. 65 n. 68. 
54 Italy: App. Napoli (Nov. 8, 1948) Mon. Trib. 1949, 117; see DE 
NovA, Rev. crit. 1950, 351 (Offprint p. 31). 
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But the question, indeed, has never been examined. Where 
a unitary system and a special order of succession conflict, 
which should be granted preference? The German solu-
tion is based on the commonly accepted justification of lex 
situs-the state where the property lies commands respect 
-and warns against insoluble conflict. At the same time, 
this faculty of the situs, in fact, guarantees a uniform solu-
tion for all interested jurisdictions; a vicious circle is 
avoided. 
It is submitted that the same result ought to be reached 
in both jurisdictions, on the one hand, by a reasonable 
construction at the forum of the reference and, on the other 
hand, by acceptance at the situs of the reference, that is, 
renvoi to the situs. We may remember that it is not an 
entirely new suggestion that lex situs may not refer to the 
whole law of the situs.55 
Illustrations: (vi) An American citizen, domiciled in 
England, leaves a house in Norway. At present, Norway 
applies English inheritance law to all assets of the de-
cedent. England and the United States primarily refer 
to Norway, but the English courts accept the Norwegian 
reference back. 56 A French court, if really excluding fur-
ther reference, would probably have to look to "American" 
inheritance law (if they can find one) . 
But why should Norway, on the ground of the domiciliary 
principle in England, insist on the unitary doctrine in the 
teeth of the English system? On the other hand, Norway 
converted to renvoi should not be induced to carry this 
too far. 
55 GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. at 1196. My own suggestion, 4 Int. L. Q. 
at 406, "not understood" by LEWALD, supra n. 50 at x68, was moreover 
preceded by 4 FRANKENSTEIN 306. 
56 Re Trufort (1887) 36 Ch. D. 6oo; Re Duke of Wellington (1947) 
Ch. so6; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 91 sub III accepts just this point among his now 
approved cases of renvoi. 
United States: Restatement § 8, Re Schneider's Estate ( 1950) 96 N.Y.S. 
(zd) 652, much discussed with very questionable positive assumptions. 
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(vii) An American domiciled in England leaves a house 
in Rapallo (Italian Riviera). At present, England refers 
to Italy which refers to the United States which is said 
to refer back to Italy and so forth. 
Here, Italy, as Norway in illustration (vi), is allowed 
to ruin a sensible order of succession by imposing its 
unitary system on the succession of an American citizen, 
domiciled in England. This result will be corrected, when 
Norway and Italy understand that their reference to the 
domicil or national law, respectively, means full abandon-
ment of the treatment of succession, and England and the 
United States understand that they do not refer to the 
unitary systems of succession concerned. 
(viii) A naturalized American citizen, having retained 
Swiss citizenship, dies at his last domicil in Illinois. He 
leaves a bank account in Switzerland and real property in 
Switzerland and New York. Two decisions of the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal 5 7 and the recent decision of the New 
York Surrogate in re Schneider 58 deal with these situations. 
They were to be decided on the ground of the American-
Swiss treaty of I 8 5o, as was recognized by the Bundes-
gericht, although disapproved by the Surrogate, with the 
result that the bank account and the American real estate 
were to be governed by the law of Illinois and the Swiss 
land by Swiss law.59 If no treaty existed, the Swiss courts 
still would be entitled to treat the decedent as a Swiss 
subject 60 and apply the provision of their law of I 89 I that 
succession to Swiss real property of Swiss citizens domiciled 
abroad is controlled by the law of the H eimatkanton. 61 
In either case, the New Y ark court erroneously assumed 
that renvoi to the domicil applied; but its decision together 
57 BG. (Nov. 24, 1883) in re Wohlwend, 9 BGE. 507, 509, 513, concerning 
the bank account; BG. (May 5, 1898) in re Gemeinde Feldis, 24 BGE. I 
312, 319 concerning American and Swiss real estate; App. Bern (March 5, 
1885) 21 Z. Bern J.V. 360: forum rei sitae for immovables. 
58 In re Schneider's Estate ( 1950) 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 652. 
59 See ANLIKER at II5; SCHNITZER, 501; NussBAUM, American-Swiss PIL. 
1951, 21-23, 
60 Supra Vol. I, 81. 
61 NAG. art. 28 (1). 
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with another, likewise objectionable, holding of the Second 
Circuit Court, show nevertheless the changed climate.62 
On the other hand, the reference to lex situs does include 
certain further references. In continental literature it is 
often forgotten what a healthy function in the American 
law is exercised by the references in the statutes of the situs 
to lex loci contractus and lex domicilii for validating the 
form of wills; an analogous recognition of foreign law is 
advisable for capacity to execute a will. These conflicts 
rules of the situs and whatever other foreign validating law 
may be invoked there, deserve application in any court 
applying lex situs. They are part of the "special law" in 
the right meaning of the German article 28 EG. 
It is not suggested, therefore, that lex situs exclusively 
means substantive rules. They are the principal object, 
however. 
Renvoi, as I understand it, is not a mechanical device. 
It serves to carry out the conflicts rule of the forum, and 
must not blindly run into any complications conditioned by 
the coincidence of foreign conflicts rules. Since our con-
flicts rules, commonly and fortunately, fail to explain their 
content, they permit interpretation in favor of a modicum 
of harmony. However, the harmony has to be sought in 
the spirit of the referring rule. This is in the first place 
the conflicts rule of the forum. If it refers to the national 
law in personal matters or in the matter of succession in 
toto, the entire conflicts law of the national state is invoked, 
and its further reference to the lex situs is susceptible of 
adequate application. Exactly the same is true where the 
forum is dedicated to the principle of the law of domicil, 
except that a reference back on the ground of the nation-
ality principle must be eliminated, as the Hague Convention 
has well perceived. 
62 Mason v. Rose (C.C.A. 2d, 1949) 176 F. (2d) 486; criticized by Jerome 
Frank J. dissenting; see also BRAUNSCHWEIG, 31 Boston U.L. Rev. (1951) 74· 
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The Form of Wills1 
I. THE CoNFLICTS SYSTEM 
M ULTIPLICITY of laws establishing forms for wills engenders conflicts particularly discomforting 
because invalidity of a will, discovered after the 
testator's death, is irreparable. 
The present greatest differences of formal requirements 
consist in the varying position of the legislators on public 
testaments, as developed in the civil-law countries from 
Justinian's Corpus Juris; private wills before witnesses, 
peculiar to the common law; self-written (holographic) 
wills after a long history adopted and widely popularized 
by the French Civil Code; and oral (nuncupative) wills, 
derived from various sources. In the United States, many 
variants are represented; aside from the English private 
testaments, written and witnessed, almost half of the stat-
utes admit holographs, although nuncupative wills are only 
allowed in extraordinary emergency situations. 2 
Yet the general public resents even more the innumerable 
small divergences in which the statutes seem to delight. 
How many witnesses for private, or for notarial wills: 
two? three? Two or three, two or five according to cir-
cumstances? Seven? Have the witnesses only to sign or 
also to give "attestation?" Have all solemnizing persons 
1 LoRENZEN, "The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in 
the Conflict of Laws," 20 Yale L.J. (1911) 427; CoNTUZZI, Diritto ereditario 
internazionale (Milano 1908); RABEL, "The Form of Wills," in Symposium, 
6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. (1953) 533· 
2 See ScHOULER § 417 n. 3; r PAGE §§ 386, 395 ff. and Supp. 1950. 
287 
288 INHERITANCE 
to be present all the time? or only at the signature? or 
may they come and sign successively? Must the testator 
sign in the presence of the witnesses or the official? At a 
certain place at the end? Must every step be acknowledged 
in the document? Must a holograph bear date and place, 
or only the date, or neither? Is it void if the date is 
printed? Must a signature carry the name as in the birth 
document, or does a given name, a nickname, pen name, or 
"your father" suffice? 
The "pitfalls" and "hardship" involved in these ruth-
lessly whimsical legislations have drawn attention for a 
century. They have been experienced everywhere, particu-
larly in the case of a change of domicil or nationality after 
the execution of a will. Some legal provisions have been 
especially devised for this case. But the need for a remedy, 
recently felt in the United States, arises also where a testa-
tor disposes of assets situated in several jurisdictions, or 
movables and immovables subject to different systems, 
or assets under general and special rules of inheritance. 
Some, but not very much, satisfaction has been obtained 
by counselor's practice. 
In the civil-law sphere, it is old advice that a will should 
be clothed in the most exacting public form available so 
as to satisfy any law requiring "authentic" testaments. It 
is well-known, however, that formal invalidity is strikingly 
often encountered just in notarial instruments. 
In the United States and elsewhere, advantage has been 
seen in separate wills with respect to every state where im-
movables are left. These wills have to be altered according 
to changes of circumstances or of fancies. They may also 
be construed by different methods. 
A relatively helpful private form may be suggested, 
combining a holographic will with the Anglo-American 
attestations of witnesses, both complying with the most 
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severe standards. I do not pretend, of course, that this 
eliminates all pitfalls. 
r. Basic Tests 
In the curiously involved history of doctrines from the 
twelfth to the eighteenth century, the ancient personality of 
law was replaced by the territorial lex situs of the feudal 
regimes until the personal law came back in the disguise of 
a statutum reale or openly. In this development, the form 
of testaments was from the thirteenth century on a subject 
of controversies in which domicil and lex loci actus were 
often in rivalry. 3 In the nineteenth century, the law of 
domicil as of the time of the death of the testator at com-
mon law and lex loci actus at civil law dominated the choice 
of law for the form of succession to movables. 
At common law, the formal requirements of a will are, 
like all other requisites and the effects of wills, governed 
by the law governing succession. This is the law of the 
situation of immovables, and the law of the testator's 
domicil at the time of his death for movables. The purest, 
unadulterated expression of these rules is to be found in 
the Restatement of Conflicts Law.4 A will affecting im-
movables must observe the domestic law of the place where 
they are situated or else be void.5 A will complying with 
the law of the place of execution, or even with the require-
ments at the testator's domicil at the time of execution 
but not with what is law at the last domicil of the deceased 
3 LAINE, De Ia forme du testament prive en droit international (I908). 
4 Restatement, §§ 249, 306; 4 PAGE §§ 1634, 1638; GooDRICH (ed. 3, I949) 
5I4; Note, I69 A.L.R. ( I947) 554· 
5 Coppin v. Coppin (I725) 2 P. Wms. 29I; Pepin v. Bruyere [I9oo] 2 
Ch. 5o4; [I9o2] I Ch. 24; Will valid under lex situs, though not at domicil; 
De Fogassieras v. Duport (I88I) II L.R. Ir. I23; Murray v. Champernowne 
[1901] 2 Ir. R. 232. 
Canada: In re Howard ( 1924) I D.L.R. I062. 
United States: In re Irwin's Appeal (1865) 33 Conn. 128; 2 BEALE §249·3· 
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-such will is void.6 Vice versa, a will invalid where it 
originated may convalesce at the domicil the testator had 
when he died.7 In a famous criticism, Phillimore called 
this system of compulsion "unwisely, arbitrarily and un-
philosophically" made. 8 
The civil-law tradition, here as in the matter of con-
tracts, detaches the formal elements from the whole trans-
action and treats them in accordance with the maxim, locus 
regit actum. Not in the old Italian school, but since the 
French statutists, this principle was prevailingly observed in 
full rigor, with imperative force. The will had to con-
form to the formal provisions of the law governing at 
the place of execution at the time of execution or be con-
sidered void under the law governing succession. Thus, 
the Grand' Chambre du Parlement of Paris invalidated 
in 1721 a holographic will that the Governor of Douai, 
M. de Pommereuil, had made in that town in the holo-
graphic form of the Coutume de Paris.9 This remained 
the French approach during the nineteenth century. Hence, 
a foreigner could not employ the forms of his home state. 
In the numerous cases of wills made in France by English-
men in the English manner with two witnesses, a manner 
unknown to French law, it happened that the will was 
invalid in England because France was the last domicil/0 
6 Bremer v. Freeman ( 1857) 10 Moo. P.C.C. 306; Moultrie v. Hunt ( 1861) 
23 N.Y. 394; Nat v. Coons ( 1847) 10 Me. 543· 
7 ln re Beaumont (1907) 216 Pa. 350, 65 At!. 799; Blackwell v. Grant 
( 1933) 46 Ga. App. 241, 167 S.E. 333· 
8 PHILLIMORE, Commentaries upon International Law ( ed. 3) vol. 4, 705. 
9 2 LAINE 416. Exactly to the same effect the Parliament of Paris had 
decided analogous cases since 1615. See DuBRUJEAUD, Des conllits de lois 
relatifs a Ia forme du testament sous seing prive (these, Paris 1908). 
10 Bremer v. Freeman, supra n. 6. 
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and was equally void in France, because it was executed in 
France.11 
A third connecting factor is the oldest of all: lex situs 
governing all assets including movable property. As men-
tioned above, this approach obtains in Mississippi, 12 and 
in the Treaty of Montevideo is subject only to the exception 
that authentic wills executed in a member state are recog-
nized.13 
These three basic tests, if standing unrelated, are a 
monument of isolationism. They are inexcusable where the 
ultimate penalty of invalidity befalls an instrument as the 
effect of one of the mentioned variants in the number of 
witnesses, attestation and signing, acknowledgment of pres-
ence, officials in public wills, dates and location of sig-
nature in holographic wills, etc. 
2. Enlargements 
(a) English legislation. Even before the belief of the 
lawyers in the necessity of rigorous formality began to 
decline, the international intolerance shown in our matter 
aroused astonishment. It is well-known how the decision 
in Bremer v. Freeman 14 alarmed the British colony in 
France and led to Lord Kingsdown's Act,15 which created 
a very large faculty for British subjects to testate abroad. 
According to this law, which despite its record for bad 
drafting 16 is still in force, the formal validity of the will 
may derive from the law of the place of execution or that 
11 The line of these decisions, including Cass. req. (March 9, 1853) 
D.I8S3·I.2I7, S.I853·I.2I7, reached to the lower courts in the complicated 
law suit Gesling v. Viditz, Cour Paris (Dec. 2, 1898) D.1899·2.177 and 
Cour Orleans (Feb. 24, 1904) Revue 1909, 900 reversed, see infra n. 23. 12 Miss. C. Ann. 1942, Title I, ch. 1, § 467. See supra 253· 
13 Art. 44· 
14 Supra n. 5· 
15 Wills Act, 1861. 16 See the criticism by MORRIS, 62 Law Q. Rev. ( 1946) 170, I73· 
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of the domicil or ongm. (Section I ) . It is well under-
stood that in addition the law of the last domicil remains 
in an optional function (section 4) . 
This option is granted to British subjects making a will 
concerning "personalty" out of the United Kingdom. When 
executing a will within the United Kingdom, the list is 
strangely narrower (Section 2) . Section 3, declaring a 
change of domicil immaterial, has a much disputed scope; 
in particular it is an unending controversy whether it adds 
anything new for British subjects and whether it applies 
also to aliens.17 
(b) Typical civil law. In the civil-law countries of the 
later nineteenth century, another enlargement took place. 
The lex loci actus lost its mandatory character and per-
mitted the personal law to govern formalities in disposition 
either of movables or, in accordance with the principle of 
unity of succession, of the entire inheritance. Personal law 
to the Continental European mind was in this period the 
national law at the time of executing the will. The old 
test of lex loci actus, thus, was replaced by the option, 
lex loci actus or lex patriae, as early laid down in the Italian 
Code of 1865.18 The German Civil Code of 1896 inverted 
the order: lex patriae or lex loci actus. 19 
In France, two sections of the Civil Code created diffi-
17 For the affirmative: WESTLAKE I2I § 85; DICEY (ed. 5) rule I97; 
BRESLAUER, "The Scope of Section 3 of the Will's Act I86I," 3 Int. L. Q. 
(I950) 343· For denial: FOOTE 30I; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 527; DICEY (ed. 6) 
840. Loss of British nationality after execution of the will is innocuous 
according to Re Colville [I932] I D.L.R. 47 (British Columbia S. Ct.) and 
"probably'' in the English courts, CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 5I8. 
18 Italy: Former C.C. ( I865) Disp. Prel. art. 9, par. I; FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 593· 
19 Germany: EG. BGB. art. II, par. I and some treaties of Germany. 
Similar: Austria: doctrine, s. EHREN ZWEIG, I System des osterreichischen 
aiig. Privatrechts (I95I) uo; China: I.P.L. (I9I8) art. 2I, par. I; Czecho-
slovakia: Pr. I. L. (I948) 43· Japan: Pr. I. L. (I898) art. 26. Poland: 
Pr. I. L. ( I926) art. 5 and 29, controversial. Siam: Pr. I. L. ( I939) art. 40. 
Sweden: L. March 5, I937• ch. I, § 4· 
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culties. Article 999 permits Frenchmen abroad to testate 
by the French form of a holographic will or by local 
authentic testament. The courts rejected certain foreign 
executed wills of Frenchmen 20 but seemed agreed that 
authentic wills did not need intervention of one or two 
official solemnizing persons as the French Code demands. 
The definition should rather be taken from the foreign 
place of execution. Use by Frenchmen in a common-law 
jurisdiction of the private and secret Anglo-American forms 
was therefore admitted,21 a nice legal trick to obviate hard-
ships. On the other hand, foreigners in France were finally 
allowed, despite the categoric rule locus regit actum of 
C. C. article J, to testate in France in their national forms; 
the Court of Cassation announced the facultative, optional 
function of this maxim in a decision of I 909, dealing with 
the will of a foreigner.22 After this was secured, the 
authors went farther in construing article 999 as merely 
"enumerative"; Frenchmen should be able to use any forms 
of the local law, for instance a holographic will in an easier 
form than Article 970 C.C. allows.23 
An analogous development may be noted especially in 
Quebec and Chile. When a domiciliary of Quebec executed 
a holographic will in New York, the old interpretation of 
the Quebec Civil Code, article 7, imperatively required com-
pliance with New York law, which did not know holo-
graphic wills. But the Court of Appeals unanimously, 
and the Canadian Supreme Court by majority, validated 
the will applying Quebec law as the law of the last domicil, 
20 Trib. civ. Lyon, Clunet 1877, 149, without date concerned an Austrian 
oral will. 
21 Cass. civ. (Feb. 6, 1843) D.1843·1.2o8, S.1843.1.209; App. Rouen (July 21, 
1840) S.1840.2.515; Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 6, 1919) Revue 1920, 476. 
22 Cass. civ. (July 20, 1909) D.1911.I.185, S.1915.1.165, Clunet 1909, 
1097, Revue 1909, 900, following the conclusions of the Procureur General, 
Clunet 1909, 1098. 
23 BATIFFOL, Traite 582 ff. § 581. 
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stating renvoi from New York to Quebec, and the Supreme 
Court recognizing that the rule locus regit actum is per· 
missive.24 Article I 8 of the Chilean Civil Code declares 
it necessary that every will be a public and solemn instru-
ment, and article I027 again recognizes a foreign will 
only if it is (written and) "solemn." But the views of the 
commentators and a decision of I 864 rejecting foreign 
holographic wills were superseded by a decision of the 
Supreme Court of I927 recognizing them.25 The Greek 
Code of I830 recognized merely the lex loci actus, but the 
Wills Act of I 9 I I added the lex patriae. 26 
Among the many laws that followed the French lead,27 
an analogous trend toward lex loci actus or national law is 
noticeable, although Portugal insists on the law of the 
place of execution even with imperative force 28 and often 
the required authentic form is more rigorously insisted 
upon. Frequently, the domestic forms must be observed 
also by foreigners, and holographic wills may be excluded 
altogether. In the Netherlands, holographic wills of for-
eigners at the forum may be executed according to the 
24 Ross v. Ross (1894) 25 S.C.R. 307; 2 Q.B. (1893) 413, cf. FALCON-
BRIDGE, Conflict (ed. 2) 154 f., 280; 3 JOHNSON 5· 
25 App. Santiago (June 27, 1864) Gac. Trib. (1864) 436, no. II95; Corte 
Supr. (Jan. 14, 1927) 25 Rev. Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc., 2nd part, I Io6; 
ALBONICO VALENZUELA, EJ DIP ante Ia Jurisprudencia Chilena (I943) I66. 
26 Greece: Law of Feb. II, I83o, art. 6I; Law on Wills of May I7/I8, 
I9II, art. 53 par. I; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 509; C. C. I940, art. II. 
27 Belgium: C.C. art. 999; POULLET (ed. 3) §§ 477 f. 
Belgian Congo: C.C. art. II. 
Bulgaria: Law of Dec. I7, I889, art. 88. 
Cuba: C. C. art. 732. 
Dominican Rep.: C. C. art. 999· 
Egypt: C.C. I948, art. I7 par. 2. 
Haiti: C. C. arts, 8os, 8o6. 
Panama: C.C. arts. 76 5, 770. 
Puerto Rico: C.C. art. I I. 
Spain: C. C. art. 732. 
Venezuela: C.C. art. 879. 
28 Portugal: C.C. art. I9IO ff., 1961, 1965; infra n. 81. Also the old 
bilateral treaties between Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. 
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national requirements, but the Appeal Court of the Hague 
insists that a deposit with a Dutch notary is indispensable.29 
Nevertheless, the most familiar formula of the civil-law 
countries can be stated as referring alternatively to lex loci 
actus or the national law, 30 less often the domiciliary law 31 
of the testator. Sometimes, it is true, in the codes the 
alternatively to lex loci actus is only the code itself.32 
Nationality has been replaced by domicil as the test of 
personal law, for instance, in Brazil.33 However, in France, 
where the law of the last domicil governs succession to 
movables, formal validity is yet subject to lex loci actus or 
lex patriae as of the time of execution. 
(c) Interstate and international unification. Uniform 
state statutes. When the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws was founded in I 892, 
practically their first work was the drafting of an Act re-
lating to the execution of wills. The wording then 34 was 
29 Rb. Den Haag (June 3, 1926) W. II545, N.J. 1928, 1020, affirmed 
Hof Den Haag (Jan. 9, 1928) W. n813; contra MEIJERS, N.J. 1929, 
468; WPNR 3493; BARMAT, De Regel Locus regit actum (Amsterdam, 
1936) 314. 
30 In addition to the citations supra n. 19 and 26, e.g. Ethiopia: BENTWICH, 
4 Int. L. Q. 113; Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI, par. rs. 
31 E.g. Denmark: (App. 30, 1940) U.F.R. 1940, 857, 13 Z. a us!. PR. 828: 
Dane, domiciled in Denmark, testating in France in French form. 
3 2 Colombia: C.C. art. 1084. 
Ecuador: C.C. art. roSs. 
Guatemala: C.C. ( 1877) art. 789. 
Honduras: C. C. arts. ror r, 1012. 
Mexico: C.C. art. 1593 (implicite); State of Morelos: C.C. arts. rs, r6or; 
State of Puebla: C.C. arts. 12, 3127. 
Norway: Law of July 31, 1854, §56. 
33 Brazil: The dominant opinion under the law of 1916 claimed the im-
perative effect of lex loci actus without any distinction; TEN6Rro ( ed. 2) 
336 § 443 against BEVILAQUA and RoDRIGO OCTAVIO, 1 Manual do C6digo civil 
brasileiro (Lacerda ed.) 2 § 356. According to the Introd. L. of 1942 it 
seems that for foreign executed wills the law of the last domicil and lex 
loci actus are optional. 
34 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law, 1892, p. 9· 
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identical with the text agreed upon in I 896 35 and again 
with that promulgated in I9I0,36 as Uniform Wills Act, 
Foreign Executed. Among the many subsequent uniform 
bills, this is a rara avis belonging to the "conflictual" kind. 
Wills executed in a foreign state in a manner recognized 
at the forum or at the testator's domicil should be con-
sidered as if they were executed in the mode of the forum. 
This rule extends to interests in land. 
The draftsmen stated from the beginning in I 892 that 
there was no real reason for the differences of formal re-
quirements in disposing by testament of personalty and 
real estate, "the effect of which has been in many cases to 
defeat the purpose of a testator." Since divergence of the 
laws of real and personal property had been abolished 
in most states, "there would seem to be every reason why 
a similar simplification of the law would be accepted." 
However, the success was limited. The Act has been 
adopted only by thirteen jurisdictions.37 In a new draft 
of Execution of Wills Act, I940, intended to unify the 
municipal formal requirements of wills themselves, the old 
text was inserted with certain modifications as section 7.38 
This broadening of the scope was balanced by changing 
the "uniform" law into a "model law." Although its in-
fluence is certainly notable, in the past twelve years only 
Tennessee has joined the ranks of the adopting states. 
The draftsmen considered their work useful rather than 
necessary. Yet at least the conflicts rule of section 7 con-
cerns one of the numerous points where the local differences 
35 I d. 1896, p. 19. 
36 !d. 1910, p. 144. 
37 Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Wisconsin. Washington re-
pealed its adherence. Kansas and Tennessee acceded to the new draft, see 
on Kansas infra n. 49· 
38 9 U.L.A. ( 1951) 421, 423, inserted in the Model Probate Code §so, 
SIMES, Problems in Probate Law ( 1946) p. 82. 
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are devoid of any territorial, moral, social, or other justi-
fication and plainly apt to irritate the people involved. 
Legal formalities are indispensable, but to allow their local 
shades to disturb otherwise unimpeachable post-mortuary 
dispositions compromises the law. This motive was taken 
up and made the theme of a masterful exposition by Loren-
zen in I9I I.39 
Canadian Uniform Law. The British Act of I86I was 
amended by the Uniform Wills Act in Canada in I929, 
particularly by including alien testators, and increasing the 
list of validating foreign laws.40 But also this Act is in 
force only in two provinces, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 
In Canada, Falconbridge is the eminent advocate of a gen-
erous recognition of foreign forms of testaments. A fur-
ther improved text is due to him.41 
Hague Conferences. It demonstrated a need recognized 
universally at the time, that the Hague Conferences on 
Private International Law beginning in I 893, almost simul-
taneously with the American Uniform Law Commission, 
exactly like the latter started their work with the conflict 
of inheritance laws and were concerned in particular with 
the form of wills. 42 The formula adopted has become 
a model for a few recent laws, although the Draft Con-
vention as a whole has been a failure. 
Scandinavian Convention. The Northern Convention of 
I 934 considers a will formally valid if it complies with 
the law of the place of execution or the law of the domicil 
39 LORENZEN, 20 Yale L.J. (1911) 427· 
40 14 Minutes of the Proceedings, Canadian Bar Ass., 1929 ( 1930) 323, 
332 If.; also printed by MORRIS, 62 Law Q. Rev. ( 1946) at 185. 
41 FALCONBRIDGE, in 62 Law Q. Rev. ( 1946) 328; id., Essays in Conflict of 
Laws, Ch. 23; 34 Proceedings Can. Bar. Ass. (1951) 42-45. 
42 Actes de Ia Cinquieme Conference de Ia Haye ( 1925) 283 art. 6; 
identical Actes de Ia Sixieme Conference de Ia Haye ( 1928) 405 If. Pro jet 
art. 6. 
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or the national law at the time of execution.43 The last 
personal law is omitted as in the Continental Codes. 
The Swiss law of I 89 I can be mentioned here since it 
was enacted at a time when legislative power over private 
law was with the Cantons. It allowed the forms of the 
place of execution, of the Canton of domicil at the time 
of execution or of the death, and of the home Canton. At 
present applied only to international relations, this means 
an option among the place of execution, the domicil at 
either time, and the nationality.44 
(d) J7 arious rules. The existing variety in all other 
jurisdictions is perplexing. Within the United States, five 
or more groups of conflicts rules are distinguishable.45 It 
is highly significant that in most jurisdictions foreign exe-
cuted wills on movables agreeing with the formalities of 
the place of execution, are recognized, either as a privilege 
restricted to formal requirements or as including intrinsic 
validity. The variants include, in addition, the law of the 
enacting state or the domicil at the time of execution or 
both. On the other hand, six states name only their own 
law and the lex loci actus, and eleven states retain exclu-
sively the common-law criterion of lex domicilii as of the 
time of death. 
In the Latin-American countries, even where the French 
Code is not followed literally, the "authentic" form enjoys 
a marked preference, either suppressing holographic wills 
altogether or at least for the use of nationals abroad. As 
on this point, the Codes also vary in combinations between 
43 ("Northern") Convention, concerning Inheritance and Succession ( 1934) 
art. 8, 6 HunsoN, Int. Legislation 947 no. 397, 164 League of Nations Treaties 
Ser. 279. 
44 N.A.G. arts. 24 and 28. 
45 The best survey has been given in the excellent article by HoPKINS, 
"The Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees," 53 Yale L. J. ( 1944) 221, 
254 ff. 
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lex loci actus, national or domiciliary law, respectively, and 
the domestic law. 
Another minimum requirement, that a foreign will should 
be written, recurs also in American statutes.46 
3· The Most Developed Reference Lists 
(a) Texts. The Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, 
1910, stated that "A last will and testament, executed with-
out this state in the mode prescribed by the law, either of 
the place where executed or of the testator's domicil, shall 
be deemed to be legally executed, and shall be of the same 
force and effect as if executed in the mode prescribed by 
the laws of this state; provided said last will and testament 
is in writing and subscribed by the testator." 47 
This text did not specify the domicil of what time was 
deemed decisive. A new draft of 1938 therefore supplied 
a broader option, referring to the domicil either of the 
time of the execution or at the death.48 This version was 
adopted by Kansas. 49 But, without discussion, 50 the Com-
missioners abbreviated the wording, leaving only the domicil 
at the time of the execution: 
"A will executed outside this state in a manner prescribed 
by this act, or a written will executed outside this state 
in a manner prescribed by the law of the place of its execu-
tion or by the law of the testator's domicil at the time of 
its execution, shall have the same force and effect in this 
46 In re Tessini's Est. (1947) 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 904, an Italian testament in 
which the testator declares to be unable to write, was denied probate because 
an agent should have been asked to write for him. 
47 Handbook ( 1910) 144. 
48 Id. (1938) 314 with an appropriate note. 
49 Kansas L. ( 1939) ch. 180 § 45; Gen. Stat. Ann ( 1949) §§ 59-609. 
50 In Handbook ( 1939) 227, the note of 1938 is carried, but the text is 
changed, cancelling the mention of the last domicil. Mr. Barton H. Kuhn, 
Omaha, obliged me by stating that no discussion of the point is noted in the 
files. 
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state as if executed in this state in compliance with the 
provisions of this act." 51 
Probably the old text already meant to refer to the 
domicil at the time of execution, and was silent on the last 
domicil because this was the old accustomed device of which 
no lawyer needed to be reminded. Section I of Lord 
Kingsdown's Act may have been too closely followed. The 
final text expresses what the old wording omitted to specify. 
The formulation this time, it is true, sounds so exhaustive 
that it has been understood by competent interpreters as 
excluding the last domiciJ.52 If so, the common-law rule 
would have entirely yielded to the civilian thought. This 
is unlikely in itself and seems not to have come to the mind 
of the draftsmen. The omission also of lex situs reinforces 
the argument that the draftsmen cannot have intended to 
exclude the old criteria. This interpretation is approved 
by a leading commissioner.53 
Most recently, in an unofficial manner, an extremely 
ample (perhaps all too ample) list has been offered by the 
Commissioners which at the same time, opportunely leav-
ing the narrow framework of a law for foreign executed 
wills, includes nonresident testators: 
"A will is legally executed if the manner of its execution 
complies with the law in force either at the time of execu-
tion or at the time of the testator's death of I) this state, 
2) the place of execution, or 3) the domicile of the testator 
at the time of execution or at the time of his death." 54 
The Hague Draft, article 6, names the law of the place 
of execution, the testator's national law at the time of execu-
51 9 U.L.A. (1951) 423. 
52 Thus BORDWELL, "The Statute Law of Wills," 14 Iowa L. Rev. (1929) 
445; HoPKINS, supra n. 45, at 268 regretting this result. 
53 On the ground of the facts, supra n. so, Mr. Willard Luther, Boston, 
kindly authorized me to state his personal interpretation of s. 7 to this effect. 
54 9 U.L.A. ( 1951) Supp. 1953 (for 1954) p. 48, in commenting on 
Uniform Probate of Foreign Wills Act, 1950. 
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tion or at the time of death.55 The Swiss law, as men-
tioned before, declares sufficient conformity with the law of 
the place of execution, the domicil of either time, and the 
national law. 56 
Also the Argentine Civil Code admits foreign executed 
wills in the form of the testator's residence or nation or 
of the Argentine law. 57 
(b) Comparison: time of validity. It is highly inter-
esting that while common law looked only to the personal 
law as of the time of the death and civil law only to the 
time of the execution, on both sides the distinct trend was 
to let formal validity of either time suffice. Lord Kings-
down's Act and the American Uniform Law added the time 
of execution; the Hague Draft and, before it, the Swiss 
Act added the time of death. The two great groups 
joined, but most laws are lagging, and expressions are 
sometimes defective. In South Africa, for instance (ad-
mitting lex loci actus and "domicil"), as recently reported, 
the two only decisions held opposite views on the formal 
validity of a will conforming only to the law of the last 
domicil.58 In particular, it is surprising 59 that the German 
Code, followed by other codes, 60 fails even to make the 
55 Actes Sixieme Conf., ( 1928) 405 ff., art. 6. 
56 N.A.G. art. 24. 
57 Argentina: C.C. art. 3638. 
58 Re McMillan's Estate (1913) T.P.D. 198 (invalidity); ex p. Estate 
Abbott (1950) (3) S.A.L.R. 325 (validity); see ELLISON KAHN, "Recent 
Cases in South African P.I.L.," 4 Int. L.Q. (1951) 397; the author advocates 
validity also according to the common-law test. 
59 The older German literature was divided. But in Austria, WALKER 
(ed. 3) p. 1805, against THOL and STOBBE, stressed the awkwardness of ex-
cluding the law governing the succession, invoking Savigny's dictum, p. 312, 
that the testament is legally to be considered as executed at the moment of 
death. 
60 Germany: E.G. art. 24. 
Czechoslovakia: Priv. Int. L. § 3· 
Egypt: C.C. art. 17. 
Japan: Pr. Int. L. art. 26. 
Siam: Pr. Int. L. art. 39· 
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exception in favor of the last nationality that it states in 
the matter of capacity of willing; as has been pointed 
out, where an English lady writes a holographic will in 
London, and later acquires German nationality by marriage 
and dies, her will remains invalid. 61 
Law of Place of Execution. The common-law rule has 
since Lord Kingsdown's Act been very largely enriched by 
considering the lex loci actus. Familiar to the predecessors 
of the English scholars, this is justly recognized as the 
most appropriate source of formal validity. Most Ameri-
can statutes and the great majority of all other laws are 
now united under this old rule. 
Law Governing Succession. On the other hand, again 
uniformity is in the making, when the American statutes, 
unfortunately often silently, retain validity under the law 
of the domicil at the time of death and civil-law statutes 
add this reference to their lists, as the Hague Draft, 
Switzerland, Italy, and Greece. 
The Law of the Enacting State. The American Uni-
form Law, Lord Kingsdown's Act, and a considerable 
number of American and foreign statutes include "this 
law," i.e., the law of the enacting state, in their lists, 
which may be, but need not be, identical with the last 
domiciliary or national law. The reference covers the 
cases where assets are situated at the forum, while the 
other local contacts may be foreign; for instance, it obvi-
ates any hard proof of compliance with the law of the 
place of execution. 62 In systems tending to a strong terri-
torialism, this is a natural device. Another unsuspected use 
may appear in the following situation. An American citizen, 
formerly domiciled in Tennessee, takes a new domicil in 
61 M. WOLFF, D.IPR. (ed. 3) 198, following LEWALD, IPR. 316 f. § 381. 
62 /n re Hart's Estate (1936) 6o Misc. xo8, 289 N.Y.S. 731; (1937) 250 
/\pp. Div. 753, 295 N.Y.S. 765. 
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Cuba (or The Netherlands, Japan, etc.), executes there 
a will conforming to the law of Tennessee, i.e., the Model 
Probate Code, with two witnesses, and dies there. An 
American domiciled abroad is no longer a citizen of a 
particular state ;63 the United States has no substantive law 
of succession for him. The domicil and the place of execu-
tion refuse recognition. But the court of Tennessee and 
others, if not demanding more exacting formalities, may 
admit the will to probate under "this," their own statute. 
This, however, would be a probate judgment, not rend-
ered at the last domicil, that would probably have no effect 
outside the state except as to the assets of Tennessee. The 
only real remedy would be a substantive all-American rule 
applicable by any foreign court that looks to the national 
law. Americans abroad are a new event in American law-
making. 
Domestic Wills. The American official text and many 
others are merely concerned with foreign executed wills. 
A considerable number of states, indeed, insist on their 
own formalities for domestic executed wills. This occurs 
not only with respect to the subjects of the forum and to 
domestic immovables but ((locus regit actum" is likely to 
be applied to all assets in the imperative meaning when 
the will is executed at the forum. French practice and 
the German Code have advanced to a general option between 
the lex loci actus and the personal law. This development 
is followed in many other countries 64 but needs general 
acceptance. 
The Personal Law of Other States. Comparing the 
advanced lists in the Model Law and the Hague Draft, a 
striking parallel is revealed with the likewise remarkable 
difference that here domicil, there nationality, is the only 
63 Vol. I, I34· 
64 Spain is doubtful; see z GoLDSCHMIDT ZS3· 
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criterion for the personal law. Most draftsmen do not 
even think of the connecting factor in the other half of the 
world. An exception is made by the Scandinavian Conven-
tion which had to consider the nationality principle in 
Sweden and Finland and the age-old domiciliary law of 
West-Scandinavia for their mutual relations, and more 
effectively, by the Swiss law in consideration of the split 
in the Cantons. It is the solitary merit of Argentina to 
have spontaneously remembered the division of the conflicts 
rules in the Western hemisphere. Of course, the C6digo 
Bustamante considers this contrast in its peculiar way. 
There is an interest of harmony involved in this question, 
but also a certain practical effect. 
Suppose a Frenchman, domiciled in England, executes in 
Portugal a holographic will according to the French Civil 
Code, Article 970. Valid under French law (C.C. Article 
999), the will is invalid in Portugal. 65 In an American 
Court such as New York, neither lex loci actus, nor domicil 
of any time, nor "this" law justifies recognition. But all 
jurisdictions looking to the national law must hold the 
will valid by a kind of renvoi neglected in the discussions. 
Should not England and the United States join them? 
On the other hand, suppose a Cuban, domiciled in 
Detroit, on a trip to Louisiana executes there a will with 
two witnesses conforming to Michigan law. Michigan and 
Louisiana (under the Uniform Law) consider the will 
valid, although Louisiana requires three to five witnesses. 
Should it not he valid also in Cuba or Germany or Japan? 
Change of Personal Law. As it seems, section 1 of Lord 
Kingsdown's Act refers also to the case of a change of the 
testator's domicil between execution and death, although 
section 3 deals with the same case and only with change. 
65 Portugal: infra n. 81. 
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The American statutes recognizing the domiciliary law at 
either time are drafted with a particular view to the testa-
tor's change of domicil. But a German provision only by 
an irrational exception preserves the validity of the will 
of an alien who becomes a naturalized German, if the will 
is valid under the former national law and the law of the 
place of execution, yet conforms with German law (E.G. 
BGB. art. 24 al. 3). 
Proposal: A will is legally executed if the form of its 
execution complies with the law in force either (I) in the 
enacting state at the time of his death, ( 2) at the place of 
execution at the time of the execution, or ( 3) at the domicil 
or in the national state of the testator at the time of execu-
tion, or at the time of his death. 
II. RESTRICTIONS 
I. In Favor of Lex Causae 
The theory that the rule locus regit actum depends on 
the consent of the alex causae" 66 obtains a particular place 
where the form of wills is tested under the law of the place 
of execution. 
Around I 900, with special regard to wills, an author 
asserted that the theory giving superiority to the lex causae, 
which in this case is the law governing the succession, was 
not only the prevailing but the common view.67 In the 
same vein, the first drafts of the Hague Conference from 
I 892 inserted a clause restricting the application of lex loci 
actus to the condition that where the national law governing 
66 Vol. II, p. 495, to which the reader may be referred. 
67 CONTUZZI, Diritto ereditario internazionale ( 1908) 510 If., citing AssER, 
BAR, DESPAGNET, DUGUIT, DURAND, FOELIX, HAGGE, LAURENT, NAPOLITANI, 
and FIORE. 
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a stipulation of a will requires a certain form, the will 
cannot be made in another form. 68 
Although this view has since shrunk to a small minority 
of opinions,S9 the recent French draft declares its adherence 
to the dependence of lex loci actus on the lex causae/0 and 
the reporter, Niboyet, wanted also the application to testa-
ments ;11 the Benelux International Private Law in fact 
carries this application by stating that a legal act is valid 
respecting its form if it satisfies the respective conditions 
of the country where the act is accomplished, "except where 
the nature of the act or the national law of the person 
accomplishing it opposes (this effect)." 72 The Nether-
lands, moved by their famous prohibition of foreign exe-
cuted private testaments to Dutch nationals (to be dis-
cussed presently), also initiated the first Hague Drafts. 
This doctrine results in the extraterritorial effect of pro-
hibitions by the national law or whatever else may be 
in other legal systems the lex causae. 
The problem has occupied the attention of the courts in 
connection with the following legal provisions. 
(a) French Code Civil, Article 999: A Frenchman in a 
foreign country may make his testamentary dispositions by 
act under private signature as prescribed by article 970 
or by authentic act in the forms used at the place where 
this act is executed. 
The significant history of interpreting this section has 
68 Actes 1893, p. 29, art. 6 par. 2; Pro jet transactionnel, basis for the Con-
ference of 1904, Documents (1904) 166, art. 2 par. 2; see for the first drafts 
on this point 2 KAHN, Abh. 225 If. 
69 See for the majority view LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE §§ 314, 367; BATIFFOL, 
Traite § 579; and the almost uniform German doctrine, infra n. 76; see also 
KG. (June 6, 1940) JR. 1940, 1372, HRR. 1940, uo8. 
1° Commission de Reforme du C.C., Travaux 1949-so, 673 If. Projet art. 
59· NIBOYET, ibid. at p. 672 claimed that the German law was to the same 
effect, strictly contrary to the facts. 
11 Art. 69 of the French draft of the subcommittee. Travaux ibid. 673 If. 
12 Benelux draft ( 1951) art. 23. 
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been mentioned above. The result is that a French testa-
tor abroad may use even a holographic will in the local 
form not agreeable to article 970 of the French Code Civil, 
and oral wills according to Austrian, Swiss, or Scandinavian 
laws, or the American statutes permitting nuncupative wills. 
The French lawyers deservedly acknowledge the need of 
international security of transactions for an unchallenged 
operation of local form applied in executing wills. 
(b) Netherlands Code, Article 992. The Dutch provision 
runs in categoric terms. 
In contrast to the Frenchman, the Dutchman abroad 
testates invalidly in any local form, except in "authentic" 
form which, moreover, requires the intervention of a public 
official, irrespective of the foreign local conceptions. It 
suffices, however, as the Hoogeraad inferred from history 
and reason of the provision, that a foreign holographic 
will be deposited with a foreign public authority.73 
The Dutch learned writers are scarcely inclined to charac-
terize this provision as a rule of status, restricting capacity. 
They state in an entirely correct appraisal, a formal re-
quirement sanctioned by nullity, and naturally enforced 
within the prohibiting state on the grounds of public 
policy.74 They seem divided, however, with respect to the 
international effect. Is this effect merely prevented by con-
trary public policy of the foreign court or by the rule locus 
regit actum itself? In other countries, notably eminent 
French and Italian writers, on the contrary, for a long time 
acknowledged a binding international force of article 992 
on two theories: either on the ground of the mysterious 
notion of "formes habilitantes," which constitute not a form 
73 H.R. (Jan. 6, 1927) W.n623; N.J. 1927, 266; OFFERHAUS 708 ff.; that 
the deposit may be made abroad, against what modern writers had to con-
clude from H.R. (Dec. 18, 188s) W.5252. 
H See ultimately VAN BRAKBL § 150, 
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nor an incapacity, or by characterizing the prohibition 
directly as incapacitating the testator to execute a private 
will in a foreign country. Hence, the Dutch national per-
sonal law would be applicable in all courts under the nation-
ality principle.75 The great majority of authorities 76 have 
recognized the obvious truth that the formation of wills in 
oral, written, or authentic expression pertains to "form," 
and the domestic forms are open to foreigners; prohibitions 
such as the Dutch have to yield to the rule locus regit actum 
in the other countries. The Dutch rule is felt to imply 
repudiation of the reliance put on the local legal system, 
75 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Jan. 9, I937) Pas.I937.2.56, Clunet I938, 
367, Revue crit. I938, 470; SATTER, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. I9: holographic 
testament made in Belgium declared void; (June 20, I93I) Rev. trim. Inst. 
beige de droit compare I932, 56; 2 DE Vos 947 ff. 
France: Cour Paris (May 7, I897) Clunet I897, 8I7; Trib. Seine (Aug. I3, 
I903); Clunet I904, I66; (Feb. I9, I927) D.I928.2.33, Revue I928, I02; 
LAINE, 2 Introduction 329 ff.; id., Revue I907, 833 ff.; WEISS, 4 Traite 635; 
VALERY, 1238 § 882; BARTIN, 3I Recueil 576; cf. DESPAGNET § 378 his. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. I7, I9I2) J.W. I9I3, 333, Leipz. Z. I9I3, 774 (over-
ruled with respect to marriage Apr. 6, I9I6) 88 RGZ. I9I; OLG. Karlsruhe 
(Dec. I3, I9I9) 40 R-OLG. I59· 
Italy: App. Genova (Aug. 4, I89I) Clunet I893, 955; Cass. Torino (Apr. 12, 
I892) Clunet, I894, 1083 ; FIORE, 2 Delle Disposizioni Generali sulla Puhhli-
cazione, applicazione ed interpretazione delle leggi (ed. 2) 385 ff. 
76 Belgium: Poullet ( ed. 2) 557 ff. §§ 478 f. 
France: Cass. civ. (June 29, I922) D.I922.I.127, S.I923.I.249; for the case 
of a Dutchman: Orleans (Aug. 4, I859) D.I859.2.I58, S.I86o.2.37; cf. Aix 
(July II, I88I) S.I883.2.249, Clunet I882, 426; Trih. Seine (March 23, I944) 
S.I944·2·44· ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 2) § 206 his. NIBOYET, Manuel 665 
§ 542 and Revue I928, 105; cf. id., 3 Traite 352 § 953; 363 §956; LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 272 §256. BATIFFOL 311 ff., 584 § 582; 670 § 667. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (May 2, I9I7) 72 Seuff. A. 3I3; RG. (Apr. 6, 
I9I6) 88 RGZ. I9I (dictum); (June 22, I93I) I33 RGZ. I6I at I63; 
KG. (Feb. IS, I934) IPRspr. I934, No. 7I: "the local form suffices always." 
KAHN, I Abhandl. 43; 2 id. 226; KIPP in I WINDSCHElD, Pand. 54 I; PLANCK, 
Art. 11 n. 4; NussBAUM 89 ff.; NEUNER, Der Sinn 3I; LEWALD 83, 86, 3IS.-
Contra RAAPE, Komm. I7I, 686 setting E.G. art. 24 over E.G. art. II. 
With comparative research: FRAGlSTAS, 4 Z. ausl. P.R. ( I930) 934· 
Italy: Cass. (July 6, I926) Foro delle Nuove Provincie ( I927) I 296, 
cit. by FEDOZZI (ed. I) 585 n. 4· (Oral will made in the Austrian time, 
recognized) ; BUZZATl I 59, 423, 393; DIENA, Sui limiti alia applicazione del 
dir. straniero (also in Studi Senesi, vol. IS) 25-30. 
Switzerland: SCHNITZER (ed. 3) 479· 
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warranted by locus regit actum, "one of the most benefi-
cent rules of private international law." 11 
Evidently, this is the only reasonable and systematically 
fitting conception. Yet, can it be justified by the popular 
idea that just the law of the forum has its own privileged 
characterization of form? Such a prerogative is wholly 
unfounded in an international give and take. There as 
always, the nature of the rule is molded by the common 
theoretical conviction, in this case the more easily so, since 
even the Dutch dominating opinion coincides so far. A 
singular deviation of one statute is irrelevant. Not the 
law of the forum but the reasonable and internationally 
accepted concept of form grants the result that every state 
may permit and in fact, in the absence of any local prohibi-
tion, permits the Dutch national the use of its own forms. 78 
(c) The Dutch provision applies also in the former and 
present Netherlands colonies.79 In Latin America, restric-
tions of the French type are numerous.80 Portugal, where 
lex loci actus is the only validating law, does not recognize 
private testaments at all, wherever executed; the conse-
77 LAINE in Actes de Ia Troisieme Conference de Ia Haye ( I904) at 129; 
WALKER 809. 
78 FEDOZZI (ed. I) 588 ff. starts with the acknowledgment that the Dutch 
rule "e indubbiamente relativa alia forma," but he considers the question not 
one of characterization but as a conflict of conflicts rules (on form). Hence, 
not the Italian characterization but the Italian conflicts rule would be the 
decisive element. This is not a valid contrast! It is just the content of 
the Italian conflicts rule that is in question; it is found by characterizing a 
concept, part of the rule, viz. the "form." 
GEMMA, Propedeutica al Dir. Int. Priv. (Bologna I899) III ff. agrees 
because he wants to favor holographic wills, the simplest and most suitable 
expression of the testator's intentions. But many legislators mistrust these 
wills. This kind of policy, in my opinion, is to be left to the individual 
municipal laws. Although some writers have approached Gemma's method 
to my own, only the results are kindred. 
79 Neth. Indies: C.C. art. 945· 
Surinam: C. C. art. 972. 
Cura~:ao: C. C. art. 97I, dealt with in KG. Berlin (Feb. IS, I934), IPRspr. 
( 1934) nr. 7I. 
80 See supra 306. 
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quences are absurd.81 The attitude of other states to these 
prohibitions and those of oral wills 82 is naturally negative 
because of the effect of the independent rule, locus regit 
actum. 
Wills of Minors. According to the Austrian, Span-
ish, and German Codes, a minor of a certain age may exe-
cute a will but may not use holographic forms, 83 or must 
testate orally in court.84 In these cases the restriction of 
available forms clearly serves the protection of minor age. 
Therefore, a part of the doctrine resorts to the personal law 
and holds a holographic will void, wherever made, 85 
whereas in another view form remains form without regard 
at whose protection it aims.86 
It would seem, unfortunately, that in the country where 
such a provision is in force, it is meant to apply also to 
wills executed abroad.87 However, the undoubted fact that 
the voidness attaches to the use of a certain form and not 
to incapacity to will, must work for validity in all other 
countries recognizing the lex loci actus in this respect. 
Only jurisdictions with a similar public policy may be 
exempted. 
The situation, hence, is identical with the foregoing 
81 Portugal: C.C. art. 1910 ff., 1961, 1965. Sup. Ct. Lisbon (May 28, 1912) 
Revue 1913, 220: The holographic will of a German executed in Lisbon and 
recognized as valid by a German court is declared ineffective; App. Lisbon 
(Jan. 23, 1917) Clunet 1920, 278. 
82 BUZZATI 401; FEDOZZI (ed. 1) S84-
83Germany: BGB. § 2247; law of July 31, 1938 (Testamentgesetz) § 21. 
Spain: C. C. art. 688 par. 1, cf. 732 par. 3· 
84 Austria: A.BGB § 569; former Prussian ALR.I IZ § 17. 
85 Austria: EHRENZWEIG, Z SYSTEM (ed. z, 1937) 4II; former Pros-
sian Code: DERNBURG, 3 Pr. Priv. R. § 104 Nr. 7· 
Germany: NEUNER, Der Sinn 35-38; RAAPE, Komm. 642 resorts to public 
policy. 
86 Austria: WALKER 916. 
Germany: PLANCK, 5 Komm. § 2247, z; z BAR 30 n. 24; CROME, 5 Biirg. 
R.54; KAHN, 2 Abh. Z3Z; LEWALD, Questions 108. 
81 Contra KAHN I.e.,· ScHNITZER 48z holds a holographic will made by a 
twenty-year-old German in Switzerland valid in both countries. 
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cases (a) and (b) and makes us wish in the same manner 
that the statutes should not try to rule beyond their ter-
ritory. 
2. In Favor of Lex Situs 
A German national having executed a holographic will 
in Germany leaves land in England. Lord Kingsdown's 
Act does not validate wills on immovables, even if it should 
be taken as including alien testators. According to prevail-
ing German opinion the will is valid in Germany under the 
lex loci actus, E.G. article I I, para. I, sent. 2, also with 
respect to English land, though it is invalid in this regard 
in England under the Wills Acts. Raape, whose dissident 
theory is that lex causae overrides the local law in deter-
mining formal validity, suggests that, since E.G. article 28 
concedes English land to be governed by English law, the 
succession to this immovable is to be treated as intestate 
also in German Courts.88 This general favor given the lex 
causae is inacceptable, but another specific restriction of 
lex loci actus should be inferred from the yielding of 
German inheritance law to the English, E.G. article 28. 
Assuming that this concession is an exception to all German 
law involving this succession and comprehending formal 
validity as well as other requirements of a will, locus regit 
actum is put out of function. 
III. OPERATION OF THE RULES 
I. The Concept of Form 
As shown above, in discussing delimitations between 
formal validity and capacity, it is practically settled that 
the concept of form is the same as in the matter of mar-
riage and contracts, 89 but independent of any deviations in 
88 RAAPE, Komm. 173; IPR. 138, followed by ZEUGE 58 ff. 
89 Vol. I, pp. 207, 214-216, 236; Vol. II pp. 496-498. 
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particular systems. Greek requirements of an orthodox 
marriage and Dutch prohibition of a foreign private will 
are analogous deviations. Form in all these matters is 
the natural concept of external expressions of a person's 
volition. 
The requirements for the form of wills refer to a cer-
tain time : the time of the execution of the will or the time 
of the death or both. Lex loci actus aims exclusively at 
the time when the will is made; subsequent events or 
changes of law are irrelevant. In no case, formalities pre-
scribed for a time after the death for the purpose of carry-
ing out a will are pertinent to the applicable law, e.g., 
recording of the will requested in New York or in France, 
Poland, etc.90 
Language requirements are important. It deserves men-
tion that in many countries foreigners are allowed to use 
the local public forms in their own language with adequate 
safeguards. 91 
Form, of course, must be distinguished from the eviden-
tiary value of a document which, in general, is that accorded 
at the place of execution.92 
2. Renvoi 
The faculties granted in greatly increasing number to find 
a law under which a will turns out to be formally valid, 
90 N.Y. in re Wizelhole's Estate ( 1941) 176 Misc. IOO, 26 N.Y.S. (zd) s86. 
France: Cass. (Apr. 13, 1897) D.I897·I·3S7; S.I897·I-40I. 
9 1 Argentina: C. C. art. 663. 
Cuba: C. C. art. 688 par. 4· 
France: Cass. req. (Aug. 12, 1868) S.x868.1.405; (Aug. 3, 1891) S.1892.1. 
566; TRASBOT in 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT § 566; the notary joins a French 
translation, the witnesses must know both languages. 
Germany: Law of July 31, 1938 (Testamentgesetz) §§ 18, 19. 
Spain: C.C. art. 688 par. 4; cf. 2 GOLDSCHMIDT 253· 
Uruguay: C.C. art. 799· 
Venezuela: C.C. art. 863. 
Note, Clunet 1954, 612. 
92 SAVATIER 308 § 441 against confusion in Cour Paris (July 3, 1946) Gaz. 
Pal. 1946.2.147· 
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contain an equal justification of renvoi,98 as Griswold has 
perceived. In most American states, as mentioned above, 
a will executed in the form of the place of execution is pro-
bated at the domicil as well as at the situs, and this refer-
ence entails further references elsewhere. 
Illustrations. (i) Where an American, domiciled at death 
in the United States, while in Paris executes a will on his 
Cuban real property on a typed paper with two witnesses 
and the clauses of his home state, the will is good in Cuba, 
France, Germany, etc., as agreeable to the national law, 
though not by lex loci actus; it is also good in all American 
states and England, because it is valid at the last domicil. 
( ii) Where a Portuguese devises his land situated in 
Massachusetts by a holographic will in France, a court in 
Maryland would refer to Massachusetts, which refers to 
France. 
Obviously Portugal Is wrong in applying domestic 
narrowness. 
(iii) In the case Ross v. Ross,94 where a testator 
domiciled in Quebec made a will in New York in the holo-
graphic form agreeable to Quebec but not New York law, 
under the optional principle of locus regit actum the will 
was held valid in Quebec, on the ground of Quebec conflicts 
law. But it was held at the same time that if Quebec 
should imperatively require validity under New York law, 
renvoi from New York to the Quebec domicil would be 
accepted. This is consonant with the British court practice.95 
3· Defective Formality 
As stated in the case of a defective marriage celebra-
tion, 96 if the validity of an act depends on its compliance 
93 GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1938) at 1191, 1201. For FALCONBRIDGE, 
Conflict of Laws (ed. z) 154, this is only "a special indulgence shown in point 
of formalities." 
94 Ross v. Ross ( 1893) Que. Q.B. 413; ( 1894) zs S.C.R. 307; 3 JoHNSON 
89-94· 
95 See also GRISWOLD [.c.,· in re Martin [1900] P. ZII. 
96 Vol. I, p. zz9. 
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with the formal requirements of a certain law, the effect 
of noncompliance is determined by the violated rule. 
Illustration. An Italian was naturalized in the United 
States. Because he voluntarily acquired the new citizen-
ship, he lost his Italian nationality. His will executed in 
New York (where he died domiciled) in holographic form 
without witnesses would have sufficed to Italian law which, 
however, was no longer competent. Since it was void under 
the lex loci actus and patriae, it was void also in Italy; a 
previous Italian will which should have been revoked re-
mained in force.97 
Where parties to a contract fail to comply exactly with 
the forms of both the lex causae and the lex loci contractus, 
a party may invoke the law that gives the act the more 
favorable treatment.98 A corresponding principle must 
obtain here. 
In Germany three theories were expressed in connection 
with a case where in 1928 a German executed a will 
in Davos, Switzerland, before a notary who called in the 
witnesses later than prescribed. The form sufficed for 
German law. A court held according to Swiss law that the 
will had been open to attack but in the absence of any attack 
was valid.99 The authors believing in the superiority of 
the German lex causae reached the same result on different 
grounds.100 The majority, however, declared for the "milder 
form." 101 The last view is justified by the free competition 
between lex loci contractus and national law in the German 
conflicts law. 
97 Trib. Bari (Feb. 4, 1949) 72 Foro Ita!. (1949) I.III4· 
98 Vol. II, p. 513 f. 
99 LG. Naumburg (Nov. 28, 1929) IPRspr. (1930) 183 Nr. 90. 
100 NIEMEYER 114; RAAPE, Komm 184; LIEBETRAU 41. 
101 HABICHT 91; NIEDNER 35; WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 2) 107; WALKER 231; 
I FRANKENSTEIN s6r, 4 id. 466. Cf. supra Vol. I, p. 229, II p. 513· 
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IV. ]OINT WILLS 
In the past, widespread usage permitted the execution 
of one testament for two testators. This is still allowed 
in some countries for spouses or for a couple engaged to 
marry and spouses.102 Within England validity may be 
assumed under equity principles. 103 
The probably prevailing American doctrine 104 recognizes 
that two wills may be joined in one document and considers 
that all wills can be revoked but a connected agreement can 
be enforced against the estate and possibly the beneficiaries. 
By way of construction it is often argued that, though both 
wills are revocable until the first death, they are presumed to 
be correspective, so that after one testator dies the other is 
bound.105 Although the California Probate Act of 1931, 
§ 23 states: "A conjoint or mutual will is valid but it may 
be revoked by any of the testators in like manner as any 
other will" and as late as 1948 the revocability was stressed 
to some degree, decisions of 1949 and 1950 joined the 
common opinion, basing irrevocability upon the agreement 
underlying the joint will that would be broken if the sur-
vivor revoked his own will, "at least where he accepts the 
benefits under the deceased's will in his favor." 106 There 
102 Austria: A.BGB. § 1248; Germany: Law of July 31, 1938 Testa-
mentgesetz § 28; Spanish fora) laws of Aragon, art. 17, 2° and 3° Apendice 
al C.C.; Navarra: LACARRA, 2 Institutiones de Derecho Civil Navarro (1932) 
Vol. 2 105· See CONTUZZI, DIP. 566; 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 254· 
108 England: see BRESLAUER 189. 
104 r PAGE§§ 102 If.; Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. (1948) 681-684. 
105 Thus in Illinois: Curry v. Cotton ( 1934) 356 Ill. 538; Peck v. Drennan 
(1952) 4II Ill. 31, 37• 
106 Brown v. Sup. Ct. ( 1949) 34 Cal. (2d) 559, 212 Pac. (2d) 878; the 
decision overruled Lynch v. Lichtenthaler (1948) 85 Cal. App. (2d) 437, 193 
Pac. (2d) 77, which required an express renunciation of revocation in the 
agreement, and also emphasizes against Shive v. Barrow ( 1948) 88 Cal. 
App. (2d) 838, 199 Pac. (2d) 693 that "the devisee or legatee cannot be 
prevented from enforcing the contractual obligation." See also Chase v. 
Leiter ( 1950) 96 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 215 Pac. (2d) 756 favoring the trans-
formation of joint tenancy into community property by a joint will. 
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is no doubt that probate both times will be granted where 
both wills have not been revoked. 107 
Most countries prohibit the junction entirely. Within 
these jurisdictions, as a rule, 108 such wills cannot be validly 
executed, and for this reason are nowhere recognized so 
far as locus regit actum presides. Are such testaments, 
however, internationally to be recognized, when executed 
by nationals of a country allowing them and in a territory 
allowing them? Are joint wills which are prohibited where 
they are made, nevertheless recognizable elsewhere under 
the law of domicil or nationality? These questions are 
much debated in Europe. 
I. In one opinion, the joining of the wills is a mere 
incident of form, subject to locus regit actum.109 Thus, an 
authentic joint will of French spouses, invalid if made in 
France, was held valid in a French court when made in 
Batavia, and a joint will executed and probated in Tennessee 
107 In re Johnston's Est. ( I945) 53 N.Y.S. (2d) 2I2. 
108 E.g. France: C.C. arts. 968, I097; Italy: C.C. (old) 76I, (new) 589; 
Netherlands: C.C. art. 977 ff.; Portugal: C.C. art. I753; Spain: C.C. art. 669; 
Argentina: C. C. arts. 3612, 36I8; Brazil: C. C. art. I63o; Guatemala: C. C. 
84I (like Spain); Venezuela:. C.C. art. 835. 
109 England: In re Cohn [I945] Ch. 5 without hesitation; respecting a 
German will. 
France: Cass. Civ. (June 23, I8I3) S.I8I3.I.380 and continued practice; 
(Feb. 25, I925) D.I925.1.I85, Trib. Mulhouse (Jan. I9, I9SO) Rev. crit. 
I95o, 668; WEISS, 4 Traite 656, note; BATIFFOL, Traite 67I ff.; IO AuBRY 
ET RAU 612; TRASBOT in 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 546, contra COLIN ET CAPITANT, 
3 Cours § I7 58 ff. 
Germany: 2 BAR 329; 2 ZITELMANN I 54· 
Netherlands: VAN BRAKEL I95 § ISO· 
Argentina: Cam. Civ. 2a Cap. Heger, Christensen v. Johannsen, Christen-
sen (Nov. I6, I948) Jur. Arg. I948, IV, 54I; 9 MACHADO, Commentari6 del 
c. c. 457 ff.; 9 LLERENA, c. c. Arg. s8 n. I; MoRENO, I Obras Juridicas 
(Buenos Aires I883) 254; NIELSEN, Jur. Arg. I948, III, doctrina p. 6o. 
Chile: ALB6NICO, DIP. ante Ia Jur. Chi!. I67. 
Portugal: S.Ct. Lisbon (July I3, I923) Revue I924, 257: Portuguese spouses 
in Brazil before the Brazilian prohibition. 
THE FORM OF WILLS 3I7 
was recognized in Louisiana.110 No offense is seen to the 
domestic public order despite the prohibition by the law of 
the forum. 
2. Another view looks to the restriction of personal 
freedom that may affect the surviving spouse contrary to 
the public policy of the prohibiting state. The Italian 
courts have radically rejected all joint wills, mutual or re-
ciprocal or not, and wherever and by whomever made.111 
The Civil Codes of Spain and Cuba declare expressly in-
valid a joint will of a national executed abroad.112 
3· In a third theory, the court of a nonprohibiting state 
should distinguish whether a joint will is only a document 
of two independent wills-in which case recognition should 
be due either under the law of the place of execution or 
according to the national law of the parties-or is intended 
to bind the survivor-which ought only be permitted by 
the law governing the individual succession.113 
4· Finally, it has been suggested that foreign joint wills 
of Frenchmen are valid, because the French doctrine em-
phasizes their formal character, and Italian joint wills are 
always void, since the Italian doctrine is apprehensive of 
possible irrevocability .114 
The last opinion is inacceptable as it gives preponderance 
to the lex causae over the rule locus regit actum. The first, 
11° France: Caen (May 22, 1850) S.1852.2.566. 
Louisiana: Moore v. Exec. Com. ( 1930) 171 La. 191, 129 So. 920. 
Chile: ALB6NICO, DIP. ante Ia Jur. Chi!. 167 (despite the prohibition by 
C.C. art. 1003). 
111 France: 6 LAURENT 535; SURVILLE 307 § 193 and many others. 
Germany: RG. (April 24, 1894) 5 Z. int. R. 58. 
Italy: Cass. Flor. (Nov. 9, 1896) Clunet 1902, 175; Trib. Benevent 
(March 25, 1934) Rivista 1935, 420, deals only with Italian spouses having 
willed at a place where this was permitted. 
Spain: T.S. (Feb. 13, 1920). 
112 Art. 733· 
113 Italian writers and decisions cited by CoNTUZZI, 532 If; KAHN, 2 Abh. 
23 5; see also ScHNITZER ( ed. 3) 484. 
114 Lewald, Questions, 100 If.; M. WOLFF, D. IPR. ( ed. 3) 230. 
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the French view, neglects the essential ground of their own 
prohibition; Italy, again, neglects the cases of noncorre-
spective wills, but also of wills that may have developed 
such effect but in fact did not because no spouse wanted 
revocation, the normal situation faced with joint wills in 
the United States. 
Accepting the third theory, we may think with Kahn that 
formalities are prescribed for many reasons and all covered 
by the necessary international force of the law of the 
place of execution; but that the effects of irrevocability and 
reciprocity are a matter of the substance and depend on 
the law governing succession. 
This, it would seem, would also suit the American con-
ceptions. 
CHAPTER 68 
Substantive Requirements of Wills 
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
CAPACITY of a person to make a will at all is dis-tinguished from the right to dispose of assets free 
from restraint, which will be discussed separately. 
The importance of this topic has been greatly diminished 
by the emancipation of married women. But the great 
differences in fixing the age at which juvenile persons may 
leave property by will, which varies from full age as in 
common law down to I 2 years, according to sex, married 
status, and country, produce some conflicts.1 Mental in-
competence, prodigality, and undue influence raise well-
known conflicts and questions of evidence. 
The doctrine is split into three systems. 
I. Law of Succession 
At common law, capacity as an incident of the formation 
of a will is governed by the same law governing individual 
succession. This approach is congruous to the common-
law treatment of formalities and, in fact, appears in old 
English decisions and in Beale's teaching: capacity is con-
trolled by the lex situs respecting immovables 2 and by the 
1 E.g., Spain C. C. art. 663, 1°: IS years; Germany Wills Act § I par. 
2: r6 years; England: 2I years; United States for bequests r8 years, for 
devise 2 I years, or no difference. 
2 England: Coppin v. Coppin (I72S) 2 P. Wms. 29I, 24 E.R. 725; Re 
Hernando, Hernando v. Sawtell ( r884) 27 Ch. D. 284. 
United States: Restatement § 249a; Carpenter et al. v. Bell et al. ( I896) 96 
Tenn. 294, 34 S.W. 209. 
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law of the domicil at the time of death 8 . respecting 
movables. 
In the United States, the principle that the law of the 
last domicil governs capacity to dispose of personal prop-
erty, is confirme<I in case ancillary probate is granted upon 
the theory that a previous grant of probate by the court 
of the last domicil is conclusive. Such recognition is at 
times extended by the court of situs of immovables, and 
even a probate by a nondomiciliary may be held conclusive.4 
An analogous reference to the national law as of the 
time of death is not entirely alien to civil-law authorities.5 
Accordingly, the lex situs as of the time of death applies to 
every asset under the Montevideo Treaty. 6 
Once, Theobald wondered whether it was not a "ridicu-
lous idea" that the testator's ability should depend on a 
domiciliary law unknown to him at the time of executing 
his will. 7 It is now generally felt that a change of domicil 
or nationality after the execution should not invalidate a 
will valid when it was made.8 Hence, it has been sought 
to adopt the common-law rule to the effect that the law of 
the last domicil merely determines whether the testator 
had capacity at the time of execution.9 An identical sug-
3 In the goods of Maraver ( I828) I Hagg. Eccl. 498; DICEY rule I79· 
United States: STORY § 468; Shute v. Sargent (March I7, I893) 67 N.H. 
305, 36 At!. 282; Woodward v. Woodward, 2 BEALE Cases 794; Restatement 
§ 306 b.c. 
Quebec: C. C. art. 6. 
4 See infra 4 I 9 ff. 
5 Austria: for immovables, EHRENZWEIG I I (I95I) I2I. 
Germany: EG. BGB., arts. 7 and 24, have been construed to this effect 
by 4 FRANKENSTEIN 419; RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. (ed. 3) 266; ARNDT ln ERMAN, 
BGB. Komm. (1952) art. 7, n. 3a. 
Spain: LASALA LLANAS 252, comment to art. 128. 
6 Art. 44· 
7 THEOBALD, On Wills (ed. Io) (Morris) 3· 
8 BUSTAMANTE, 3 DIP. (ed. 3, I943) I44 against RODRIGUES PEREIRA. 
9 4 BURGE (ed. I) 58o; in his example, capacity at the time of execution 
was lacking if judged under the law of the last domicil. 
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gestion has most recently and surprisingly been made rela-
tive to German Iaw.10 
2. Personal law 
Civil law has traditionally classified capacity as a matter 
of the personal law, which extends to the making of a will.11 
This, again, implies an exclusive view to one moment, the 
time of the execution.12 In this order of ideas, the German 
Code provides an exception for a testator who was an alien 
when he made a will and had not reached the age prescribed 
by his national law, but later acquired German nationality 
and was of full age under German law at death/3 That 
this exception should be enjoyed only by naturalized sub-
jects of the forum, has been criticized as well as advocated.14 
In England, Lord Kingsdown's Act would provide a cor-
rection, if it were considered applicable not only to form 
but also to capacity, which remains controversial.15 But 
recent writers, despite this possibility, think that a will 
10 NEUHAUS, "Die Behandlung der Testierfahigkeit im deutschen IPR.," 
18 Z. ausl. PR. (1953) 651,656. 
11 Quebec (domicil): C.C. art. 835, c/. 3 JoHNSON 66, 69 f. (also for 
immovables). 
Austria: A. BGB. § 575· 
Czechoslovakia: IPL. § 41. 
France: 10 Repert. 520. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 7· 
Italy: C. C. 1942, Disp. Pre!. art. 17; MoNACo, Manuale 565 against SCERNI 
6s. 
Poland: IPR. § 29. 
Siam: PIL. art. 39· 
Spain: C. C. art. 9· 
Sweden : PIL. § 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7 par. 4 (for Swiss nationals). 
Argentina: (domicil) C.C. art. 36, 45, 36n; 3613. C6digo Bustamante: 
{personal law) art. 144. 
12 WEISS, 4 Traite 671 n. 3; 10 Repert. 522 no. 140. Argentine C.C. art. 
3613 expresses this contrast to "intrinsic" requirements art. 3612. 
13 EG. BGB. art. 24 par. 3, sent. 1, phrase 2; Testamentsgesetz July 31, 
1938, §§ 2, 33 par. 2. 
14 Criticism by LEWALD 307; Contra: WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) I97· 
15 See WoRTLEY, Recueil 1947 II at 68, and cited authors. For negation: 
CHESHIRE (ed. 5) 68o; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 464. 
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cannot be validly executed by a person lacking capacity 
at the time of execution. The applicable law in this view 
is necessarily the law of the domicil at the time of execu-
tion.16 
3· In the variety of solutions, usual in conflicts law, while 
some English writers state the common-law rule that the 
domiciliary law of the time of death governs 17 and prefer-
ence goes to the time of execution, there are those who 
advocate cumulating both requirements,18 but it was stated 
long ago that modern private laws are loath to invalidate 
a will only because of an incapacity subsequent to execution.19 
4· It is submitted that a fourth solution is available: vel in-
stead of et-why not recognize a will made by a testator 
considered capable under his personal law either of the time 
of execution or at his death, in the latter event on the 
ground that he chose to let his will stand? 
Assuredly, provisions recognizing foreign inheritance 
laws should be construed as including capacity to testate. 
Illustration. A mentally insane person executes a will in 
a lucid interval. If he is a German national, he has no capac-
ity under BGB. § 7, although he can dispose of his English 
immovables according to English law. The German statute 
subjecting English land to English inheritance law (EG. 
BGB. article 28) ought to be interpreted as derogating from 
EG. BGB. article 7.20 
II. OTHER SuBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS 
The above mentioned conclusive force of a foreign probate 
judgment, if recognized, includes not only mental incapacity 
16 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 520; MORRIS in DICEY (ed. 6) 819 and new rule 179; 
GRAVESON (ed. 2) 240 would prefer this rule. 17 GRAVESON (I.e.) who invokes In the Goods of Maraver (1828) I Hagg. 
Eccl. 498. 18 NIBOYET, 4 Traite ( 1947) § 1340. 19 KAHN, 2 Abh. 204 n. 33· 
20 Quite as proposed supra 292, n. 19 respecting the rule on form, EG. art. 
II. 
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but also undue influence, 21 fraud, and presumably all legal 
causes of lack of consent. It does not include the testator's 
power of disposal.22 Apart from this exceptional element, 
the law of succession governs. 
Civil-law statutes, reserving the personal law as the test 
of bodily and mental capacity, distinguish invalidity because 
of error, fraud, duress, immorality, or illegality.28 
The area, thus differently described, is governed by the 
common principle that the law of the succession controls. 
In consequence, the technical effects of failure to comply 
with the intrinsic requirements of wills-nullity, relative 
nullity, voidability by action, collateral attack-are specified 
by the same law. This principle also furnishes the natural 
basis for all causes of restraints on alienation by will to be 
discussed hereafter. 
Foreign laws are inclined to deny all effect to laws that 
govern succession if an essential requirement, not relating 
to form or capacity, of the governing law is missing.24 
Illustrations. (i) A Swiss citizen, domiciled in France, 
left a son whose legitimacy was contested. An English court 
referring first to French and further to Swiss law, followed 
a Swiss decision acknowledging the share of the son; this 
was not on the ground of res judicata, but because the force 
of the last domicil (in France) was expressly recognized. 25 
(ii) A testator, domiciled in Ireland, set up a testamen-
tary trust, disposing that a leasehold on English land should 
be converted into money. The English accumulation law, 
the lex situs, prohibiting extension of the limitation beyond 
21 E.g., Crippen v. Dexter (r859) 79 Mass. (r3 Gray) 330, cf., Hopkins 
s, 53 Yale L. J. at 229-23 I; Mass. Ann. L. ( 1933) § 192, ro. 
22 The Hawaii decision cited by PAGE 7II n. 4 does not fit. 
23 Thus expressly, Argentina C.C. art. 3617 and Czechoslovakia, P.I.L. 
§ 41 name both categories but treat them equally. 
24 KAHN, 2 Abh. zo8. 
25 In re Trufort [1936] Ch. D. 6oo. 
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a certain period, made the trust invalid with respect to the 
leasehold.26 
The treaty between Austria and Germany of 1927, 
however, calls only for the national law of the deceased 
at the time of execution. 
III. RESTRAINT oN PowER OF DISPOSAL 
1. Law of Succession Governs 
The rule that the law governing a succession decides 
whether the testator had the power of disposing in the 
manner he did, is well settled.27 The same law determines 
the reasons and form of disinheriting a relative, including 
a deprivation bona mente, benevolently protecting his in-
terests. The forum will not raise an objection of public 
policy against a system of legitimate portions or forced 
heirs different from its own. Usually, not even when the 
domestic law gives full liberty to the testator is a foreign 
restriction rejected. 28 Neither is a foreign unlimited dis-
posal normally challenged as subject to domestic restraint/9 
26 Treke v. Carberry (1873) L.R. 16 Eq. 461. 
27 England: In re White [1941] Ch. 200, 1 All E.R. 216,360. 
United States: STORY §§ 445, 475; Restatement § 201, 2 BEALE § 249.1; 4 
PAGE 713 n. 5 and Suppl. § 1643; Note 91 A.L.R. 491; GooDRICH 512 § 168. 
France: Constant practice and modern literature, see BATIFFOL, Traite 655 
§ 651. 
Germany: BAY OLG. Dresden (June r6, 1914) 37 Siichs. Ann. 92; Bay. 
Ob. LG. (Oct. 12, 1917) 27 Z. int R. 377· 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1943) 69 BGE. II 362; (June 27, 1946) 72 
BGE. III 104. The legal sources are contradictory respecting the application 
of the cantonal statutes on forced heirship of brothers and sisters and of their 
issue. See discussion in Trib. Cant. Vaud (May 5, 1939) 36 SJZ. (1939/40) 
193 No. 35 and cf., citations supra Ch. 66, n. 20-22. 
28 England: In re Trufort (1887) 57 L.J. 36 Ch. D. 6oo (Ch.) 1135; 
Enohin v. Wylie ( 1862) xo H.L. Cas. x, 138 R.R. 1, and others; 6 HALSBURY 
(1907) 226; Dicey (ed. 6) 829. 
United States: Ennis v. Smith (1853) 14 How. 400. 
29 Denmark: Copenhague (Aug. 6, 1903) Clunet 1905, 1099: Father 
domiciled in London disinherits his son respecting Danish assets. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 26, 1911) JW. 1912, 22, 24 Z. int. R. 317, Revue 1914, 
262 rejects expressly application of public order (EG. art. 30); RG. (March 4, 
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF WILLS 325 
although contrary views have sometimes been expressed in 
Europe under the theory of public policy.30 
Illustrations. (i) A New York testator excludes his son 
from land he leaves in France. Since French law applies 
(according to both laws involved), the devise is reduced. 31 
Italy, on the contrary, would apply New York law, and 
New York would accept the renvoi back. 
(ii) Thornton, a British subject, domiciled in France, 
made a will in England in English form, disregarding the 
reserve portions of French law. The English court in 1824 
directed the property to be distributed according to the 
French law of intestacy.32 
(iii) A Frenchman domiciled in the United States may 
dispose of his personalty in France free from French re-
strictions. 33 
The numerous statutory exceptions by prelevement in 
favor of the domestic law, in some codes with extreme dis-
regard of foreign control of assets (mentioned in chapter 
64), are particularly undesirable in this matter. 
In the United States, a line must be drawn between dis-
tributive shares and family allowances, which should not 
be confused as they sometimes are. In an increasing number 
of statutes, both categories appear side by side. A sur-
viving widow, or as the statutes may state instead, a sur-
1915) 8 Warn. 1915, p. 455 applies American law without mentioning 
art. 30; RAAPE, Komm. 736; cf., PETER KLEIN, 13 Z. int. R. 87; NIEMEYER, 
IPR. 16, 
Spain: 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 256 refers to the freedom of testation in Navarra, 
Cortes de Pamplona of 1688, for excluding a public policy objection. 
3° France: App. Poitiers (July 4, 1887) S. 1888.2.194; Trib. Grasse 
(May 3, 1926) Clunet 1928, 1022. 
Germany: KEIDEL, Clunet 1910, 265; HABICHT 195; RAAPE Komm. 
31 Trib. Seine (July 13, 1910) Clunet 1911, 912; Cass. civ. (Apr. 4, 1881) 
s. 1883.1.6 5· 
32 Thornton v. Curling (1824) 6 Sim. 360. Not affected by Lord Kings-
down's Act, according to Cheshire ( ed. 2) 530. Identical solution in France: 
Trib. Seine (July 13, 1910) Revue 1912, 414, Clunet 1911, 912 (American 
domiciled in France). 
33 App. Lyon (Feb. 3, 1932) Clunet 1932, 930. 
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vtvmg spouse, may have a statutory intestate portion of a 
third, a half, or all the estate, which is frequently not 
barrable, but subject to election as against benefits under 
a will; at the same time, the spouse and minor children 
may have an emergency allowance for the time of the 
administration or a period following the death, with priority 
to the legatees or even creditors. Also, homestead exemp-
tions combine with these two types of provisions. 
As the Restatement seems to suggest, only the first kind 
of provision, if mandatory, falls strictly under the restraint 
depending on the law of succession; 34 this characterization, 
however, is certain and justified. 35 
Change of the personal law is treated accordingly. Where 
a Dutch woman at home appointed her husband as sole 
heir, except for the legitimate rights of her children which 
amounted to three fourths of her estate, and subsequently 
acquired domicil in England, the husband was awarded the 
whole inheritance. 36 
Conversely, an English mother acquires a statutory heir-
ship by the fact that her daughter dies domiciled in France, 37 
and an Englishman, acquiring a domicil in the English sense 
in Switzerland, becomes subject to the forced heirship of 
relatives who may or may not include, according to the 
canton of the last domicil, brothers and sisters or their issue. 
United States. In the United States, the principle is 
34 Restatement § 301 compared with§ 461. 
35 MARSH, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws (1952) 137-141 shows the 
quasi unanimity of the courts to this effect. His own reason for approaching 
the nonbarrable share to marital property because of related policies ( p. 
136) would lead to a theory similar to that of NEUNER, Der Sinn 66; and 
5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 190; but in fact the reasoning is not convincing, the 
share is as much an inheritance right as any other. 
36 In re Groos [1915] 1 Ch. 572, Clunet 1915, 686, Revue 1919, 595· 
Accord: Germany: RAAPI!, IPR. 269; Netherlands: H.R. (June 27, 1918) 
Clunet 1919, 426. 
37 Trib. Seine (June 14, 1901) Clunet 1901, 8oS. 
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said to be the same.38 Lex situs, of course, governs at the 
time of the death without regard to any previous domicil.89 
2. Family Provision Acts 
In the type of British statutes, first adopted in New 
Zealand, tempering the sheer freedom of disposition of 
the common law, the next relatives of the testator are en-
titled to a share not fixed by law but left to the discretion 
of the court, comparable to the portio debita as developed 
in the practice of the Roman tribunal of the centumviri. 
In Great Britain 40 and some Canadian provinces/1 as 
also in one recent Australian decision, 42 this right is con-
nected with the succession and is granted only at the 
last domicil of the testator 43 without regard to the situa-
tion of the assets and the beneficiaries.44 The conflicts rule, 
hence, is almost the same as above described, although it 
is regretted that the English court has no jurisdiction to 
grant maintenance, if the testator died domiciled abroad. 
In other British jurisdictions, however, the emphasis 
lies on the territory rather than on the domicil; the court 
may vary the will only with regard to domestic land and 
38 4 PAGE§ 1640. 
39 Atkinson v. Staigg (188z) 13 R.I. 725; Staigg v. Atkinson (1887) 144 
Mass. 564, IZ N.E. 354· 
40 Great Britain: Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, amended by 
Intestate's Estates Act, 1952, sec. 7· 
41 Ontario: Dependents' Relief Act, R.S.O. 1937, c. 214. 
Alberta: Widow's Relief Act, R.S.A. 19ZZ c. 145; Re Corlet (Alta.) [1942] 
3 D.L.R. 72, z W.W.R. 93· 
Quebec: Pouliot v. Cloutier (1944) 3 D.L.R. 737, 740, [1944] S.C.R. ZS<J. 
Manitoba: The Wives and Children's Maintenance Act R.S.M. 1940 c. Z3S 
(at the husband's lifetime) does not apply to persons resident in another 
province, Smith v. Smith (Man. 1953) 3 D.L.R. 68z. 
42 Australia: Scholl J. in Re Paulin [1950] Viet. L. Rep. 46z; FLEMING, 
4 Int. L. Q.·Z39· 
43 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict (ed. z) 656 If. 
44 DICEY (ed. 6) 556, 889. 
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all movables, and this can be done also by a court not at 
the last domicil.45 
Also in the United States, the statutory allowances for 
support of the widow and children are not susceptible of 
a uniform characterization. In a number of instances, ter-
ritorial limits are expressed or implied in the statutes, as 
when the domicil of the husband or even that of the widow 
must be in the state administering the statute or the benefit 
is due only out of property left in the state.46 However, 
in some cases, the domiciliary statute or at least a judgment 
of allowance has been given extraterritorial effect in other 
states by enforcement on personal property!7 
The Restatement has made a courageous attempt to 
regulate on these advanced lines the conflict of these 
statutes!8 It would seem that this maintenance of the 
surviving spouse, as in France the pension alimentaire of 
the surviving spouse, 49 and many provisions of support 
imposed on decedent's estates in other countries, rests on a 
legal obligation not itself of the nature of inheritance. 
3. Restraint on Liberalities to Certain Persons 
(a) Mortmain statutes prohibiting or subjecting to 
special authorization benevolence to charitable and other 
corporations, are here set aside; they concern the capacity 
of beneficiaries only. 50 Those restrictions that contain a 
45 New Zealand: In re Roper [1927] N.Z.L. Rev. 731· See BROWN, 18 
Can. B. Rev. 456. 
Saskatchewan: Re Ostrander [1915] 8 W.W.R. 367; Re Elliot [1941] 
2 D.L.R. 71; Re Herron Est. [1941] 4 D.L.R. 203. 
46 DAINOW, "Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada," 
36 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1938) 1107. Some American material is collected by 
ATKINSON, 3 Am. L. Prop. 749 n. 8, the survey by BORDWELL, "Statute Law 
of Wills," 14 Iowa L. Rev. ( 1929) 194 ought to be renewed. 
47 Note, 13 A.L.R. (2d) 973-980. 
48 Restatement§§ 302, 461. 
49 MrLHAUD, Clunet 1896, 495, 501; WErss, 4 Traite 584, note, differs only 
in selecting the law of the creditor instead of that of the debtor. 
50 See BRESLAUER, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 432-435, and supra Vol. I, p. 164 f. 
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protection of the testator's family, however, apply only 
as a part of the law governing the succession. As it was 
said in the New York leading case : "The prohibition oper-
ates upon the testator's capacity to give rather than upon 
the power of the legatee to take." 51 Of course, the charter 
and general law of the corporation have to be consulted 
at the same time. 
It deserves mention that also these prohibitions may be 
restricted to the assets found in the territory. Thus, a 
well-known California statute provides that no devise or 
bequest to any charitable or benevolent society shall exceed 
one third of the estate left by the testator to his legal 
heirs, and that foreign wills are subject to this restriction.52 
Thereby, a gift is limited so far as property is located in 
California, and not limited elsewhere; a court of another 
state dealing with assets situated in its territory on a differ-
ent ground ignores 53 and a court of the domicil corrects 
the distribution reached in California. 54 Thus, another case 
of several masses to be separately distributed is formed. 55 
(b) ((Special Incapacity," it has been said, is constituted 
by the much debated prohibitions, contained in the French 
51 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain ( 1871) 43 N.Y. 421, 433· To the same 
effect Healy v. Reed (1891) 153 Mass. 197; Trustees of Amherst College v. 
Ritch (1896) 151 N.Y. 282, 45 N.E. 876. The statute was not applied in 
Crum v. Blits ( 1 88o) 47 Conn. 592, the testator having been domiciled in 
Connecticut. Cf., supra Vol. I, p. 165 and n. 195; BRESLAUER id. 434 f.; 
STUMBERG (ed. 2) 415. 
Accord: Germany: OLG. Frankfurt and RG. (March 9, 1891) 46 Seuff. 
A. 418 j LEWALD 308 § 374· 
On France see Vol. I, 165 and n. 193. 
52 California: Probate Code 1931, § 40. Foreign situated property be-
queathed to charity must be considered, In re Dwyer's Est. (19II) 159 Cal. 
68o; followed by Decker v. Vreeland (1917) 220 N.Y. 326, us N.E. 989. 
53 Johns Hopkins University v. Uhrig ( 1924) 145 Md. u4, 125 Atl. 6o6, 
upon the statute mentioned supra 256. 
54 Whalley v. Lawrence's Est. ( 1919) 108 Atl. 387. 
55 On the position of third states, Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust 
Co. (1943) 384 Ill. 148, 51 N.E. (2d) 140, Comment, 21 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 268, 
states that a restriction by the domicil is recognized, one made by another 
state is not. 
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Code and others following it, on gifts to witnesses to the 
will, the guardian, the physician and minister taking care 
of the decedent in his last illness.56 In the constitutional 
Declaration of Rights of Maryland, the list of persons to 
whom gifts cannot be made without sanction of the legis-
lature, in addition to religious orders and denominations, 
includes a minister, public teacher, or preacher of the 
gospel.57 Recent French doctrine acknowledges that such 
prohibitions are not really concerned with incapacity of the 
testator to give or of the donee to take, but are simply a 
part of the law of succession, protecting the family.58 
4· Gifts Impairing Legitimate Shares 
In many jurisdictions, a statutory portion gives rise to 
a claim against persons who received gifts inter vivos from 
the testator depleting the assets available at his death. 59 
Such claims are considered based on obligations ex lege 
and therefore have been classified outside the conflicts rules 
on succession.60 A contrary opinion, however, prevails.61 
The attacks against gifts preceding death are a necessary 
complement to the protection awarded under the statutory 
rule of succession. 
56 France: C.C. art. 907 ff. and similar provisions of other codes, see 2 
KAHN Abhandl. 208 ff., recently, e.g., Venezuela, C.C. art. 814. 
57 Maryland: Const. § 38. 
58 Trib. Nice (Dec. 28, 1903) Clunet 1904, 713; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIBRE 
(ed. 6) 419 § 369 j TRASBOT in S PLANIOL ET RIPERT 265 j this replaces the 
older reference to the personal law of the beneficiary, 2 BARTIN, 2 Principes 
§ 241, 10 Repert. 521, no. 136 ff. 
59 On the generally scant protection of the surviving spouse in the United 
States, see Note, 40 Georgetown L.J. (1952) 109. 
60 2 ZITELMANN 998; see also DEMANGEAT, note in I FOELIX 218 note (a). 
61 Germany: 2 BAR 335i HEDEMANN, 23 Z. int. R. 229j RAAPE, Komm. 652. 
France: BATIFFOL 656 § 654. 
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5. Future Interests 
A difficult question arises from the various provtswns 
directed against the creation of future interests by will. 
At common law and by the statutes against suspension of 
the power of testation and those against grants in perpetuity 
in the narrower sense, the testator is limited in the free-
dom of disposing of the future of his estate. The radical 
principle of the French Revolution, adopted in the Code 
N apolion (article 896) and many Latin codes, did away 
with all feudal, rural, or fiduciary ties that would fetter 
the inheritance beyond the immediate successors. The 
German Code, on the contrary, brought the universal 
fideicommissary substitution to perfection; the pandectistic 
doctrine permitted charging of a beneficiary with delivery 
of his grant to future or conditional donees, whereas the 
Code made the first grantee and the subsequent takers all 
full heirs with temporary ownership. But at the same time, 
the period within which remaindermen may inherit is 
restricted in a manner comparable to the rules against 
perpetuity. 
The starting point for forming conflicts rules on this 
matter is naturally the law governing succession. If this 
law rejects the limitation of a devise or bequest, the result 
ought to be accepted everywhere, for this is the purpose 
of establishing a governing law. The gift is either void 
in toto or the restriction is cancelled. Where, however, 
the law of the succession allows the testator's disposition, two 
obstacles to its extraterritorial effect may be encountered, 
although by no means generally occurring.62 
The French and Italian courts usually operate with a 
62 Z PONTES DE MIRANDA 338 states that, despite Brazilian C.C. art. 1734, 
which applies of course to Brazilian-governed successions, the provisions of 
a foreign inheritance law relating to substitutions are fully applicable; he 
enumerates twenty-four problems so involved. 
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wide concept of public policy. The principle of "equality" 
among the beneficiaries from which the prohibition of 
fideicommissary substitutions derived, has been opposed 
to any discrimination among successors.63 Another ap-
proach, more emphasized in recent times, counteracts the 
law of succession by supporting the lex situs.64 As a con-
sequence, the ban on tying up assets is not applied to mov-
ables situated abroad.65 
Illustrations. (i) A Belgian national, domiciled in Switzer-
land, executed a valid Swiss will, leaving his daughter as 
universal legatee for life and his brothers or their issue as 
remaindermen. The daughter died domiciled in France, 
leaving a will appointing the Salvation Army as heir. The 
heirs of a brother of the testator sued for his share accord-
ing to the original will. Their claim was dismissed on the 
ground of public policy.66 Lex situs would have worked 
more satisfactorily. 
(ii) Where under German law an heir is charged with 
an executory estate, passing title at his death to a reversion-
ary heir, assets situated in Italy would be considered in an 
Italian court not as bound by the substitution but as a part 
of his free estate.67 
Should such exceptions based either on an extreme public 
policy or a preference for the domestic situs be followed in 
jurisdictions recognizing larger testamentary freedom? The 
German Reichsgericht once answered in the negative.68 A 
fideicommissary substitution, valid under Roman law at the 
63 France: see citations in KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 271 f. 
Italy: FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 6oo; PACCHIONI 321. 
64 France: Cass. civ. (June 24, 1839) D. 1839-1.257, S. 1839·1·57; req. 
(March 27, 1870) S. I87I.1.91. 
Italy: FIORE, Sull'articolo 8 delle Disp. Prel., in Giur. ItaL 1901. IV. 193, 
202, 208. 
65 Cour Paris (Aug. 7, 1883) Clunet 1884, 192. 
66 Trib. Seine (July I, 1949) Nouv. Rev. 1949, 219. 
67 See authors supra n. 6o. 
68 RG. (April 14, 1893) 4 BOLZE 4 No.8. 
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testator's domicil, was extended to movables in Alsace not-
withstanding the French law there in force. It is true that 
public policy had minor influence in this case, as Alsace was 
within the country. Nevertheless, neither the state con-
trolling the entire succession nor another state following 
the same policy of freedom of testation has a compelling 
reason to bow before a diverse policy of lex situs if the 
treatment of the assets by the latter can be somehow 
corrected. 
In the United States, the exclusive law of succession has 
been subjected to concessions to local interests, although 
on the other hand local prohibitions have been sacrificed 
in favor of charitable and other purposes. The most re-
markable deviation, dispensing with the New York rules 
against remoteness of vesting interests in order to save a 
trust from invalidity, will be discussed below.69 
69 Chapter 75· 
CHAPTER 69 
Effect of Wills 
l. CoNSTRUCTION 
1. Concept of Construction 
I N common law the terms construction and interpretation of ambiguous texts are often interchangeable, the first 
term including the latter.1 More specifically, it has 
been thoughtfully suggested that interpretation should mean 
the ascertainment of the real intention of a declarant and 
construction the use of canons, maxims, or rules, established 
by law or judicial decisions, in order to clarify the effect 
of a declaration or to protect an act from invalidity.2 
This differentiation corresponds to a German distinc-
tion: The rules of interpretation concern factual ascertain-
ment of intention, including presumptions where an inten-
tion is deemed to exist and only its expression is ambiguous. 
The rules stating what should be the legal effect in the 
absence of a presumptive intention are called suppletive (in 
a narrow sense), complementary to the declaration. Much 
theoretical thought has been devoted to this undeniable 
difference. 3 
Nevertheless, earlier in this work it has been submitted 
that only one reliable conclusion can be drawn in conflicts 
1 Matter of Costello (1933) 147 Misc. 629, 265 N.Y.S. 905. 
2 HEILMANN, "Interpretation and Construction of Wills of Immovables in 
Conflict of Laws, involving Election," 25 Ill. L. Rev. (1931) 778; RHEINSTI!IN, 
Cases and Other Materials on Succession ( 1947) 482 f. 
3 See DANZ, Die Auslegung der Rechtsgeschiifte, (ed. 3, 1911) and the 
commentaries to BGB. §§ 133, 157; ENNI!CCARUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 Biirg. R. 
§§ 192, 193· 
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law from any such distinction, namely the contrast between, 
on the one hand, the true, veritable, expressly or tacitly 
declared intention of the declarer, and, on the other, inten-
tion implied either in fact or in law.4 The same approach 
is suitable to the construction of wills. This favorite sub-
ject of lengthy discussions forms an oversized body of rules 
in English law and an extremely intricate network of subtle 
considerations in American courts, and produces plain con-
fusion in conflicts law. 
The core of the matter involves the frequent legal rules 
created by judicial practice or enactments, which state pre-
sumptions for the content of ambiguous words in a will, 
such as "my children," "my issue," "heirs"; the codes pre-
scribe whether this expression includes illegitimate or 
adopted offspring, and stepchildren. There are innumer-
able rules of this category. If a coheir or a legatee dies 
before the testator, the statutes either attribute this por-
tion to the same class of beneficiaries or cancel it. Or a 
devise by a husband to his wife is deemed to be in lieu of 
dower, et cetera. Many so-called rules of construction 
had the important function of correcting antiquated law. For 
instance, the English Statute of Wills 1837 (s.24), often 
copied in American statutes, extended the effect of wills 
to after-acquired property by providing that the will is 
"to be construed as if it had been executed immediately 
before the death of the testator unless a contrary intention 
appears in the will." 
These rules are called interpretative, because they yield 
to any sign of a contrary intention of the testator; or at 
least to rebuttal; but when nothing indicates the true inten-
tion, the same rule is suppletive. Treatment in conflicts 
law must be always the same. We may state that all legal 
4 Vol, II, p. 530. 
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rules subsidiary to an intention ascertained by facts are 
to be deemed complementary rather than merely "inter-
pretative." Among other consequences of this proposition, 
we ought not to differentiate between presumed (as opposed 
to tacitly declared) intention and legal effects, 5 or expect a 
court of the situs to look to a stereotyped meaning of cer-
tain words of the legal language of the situs as long as the 
inquiry still turns upon the actual intention of the testator, 6 
-and this, I dare say, even though the lawyer writing the 
will has chosen terms that he presumed to reproduce the 
testator's wish. And if we look to a foreign legal definition 
of a term used by will, we should not believe that we apply 
the foreign law.7 
The purpose and nature of construction of wills have 
changed in history. The bulky English canons are partly 
due of course to the old endeavor to facilitate the task of 
juries. In recent times, their effect was often unhealthy, 
introducing an element of judicial discomfort, until finally 
some courageous decisions opened the gate to free inter-
pretation. An English writer says of this body of law: 
"Much of it has become unreasonably technical, but 
it is still applied, presumably in the interest of uniform-
ity and certainty, though its effect is not infrequently 
to defeat what seems to the lay mind to have been the 
actual intention of the particular testator." 8 
How often was it held that "my money" in a testamen-
tary gift always meant currency and never securities-this 
writer once experienced one of these decisions of the Court 
of Appeal which finally in 1 948 Lord Atkin in the House 
5 STUMBERG, 419, 4zz, distinguishes intention, stated by operative facts and 
rules, from legal effects. 
6 Thus, apparently, ATKINSON in 3 Am. L. Prop. 749· 
7 Vol. II, p. 534· 
8 PARRY, Succession (ed. 3) 103 citing Lord Romer in Perrin v. Morgan 
[1943] A.C. 399· 4ZO ff. 
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of Lords called "absurd"; "the ghosts of dissatisfied testa-
tors" would from now on be considerably diminished. So, 
"money" has now "no fixed meaning"; 9 it is a "cardinal 
rule" that the court "has to sit in the testator's armchair." 10 
The same current, fortunately, breaks through the over-
lapping lines of American decisions. What is now tanta-
mount to an almost universal view was expressed by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 19 52, urging that the intention of 
the testator is to be ascertained from the entire will and 
a strict technical construction of certain language is not 
warranted. 11 The New York courts are indefatigable in 
asking for such free interpretation.12 
Conflicts law should finally take note of this development 
and further it. There are many fixed interpretations that 
are not even meant to transcend the domestic sphere. 
2. Universal Principle 
(a) In the first place it would seem, in spite of all 
traditional canons and presumptions, that respect is paid 
everywhere to the intentions of the testator, as they appear 
in the light of the entire document and of all "external" 
circumstances. It is very important not to resort to any 
petrified presumption at this stage of judicial investigation. 
Where tlie true intention is ascertained, there remains 
merely one question. In the Romanistic tradition leading 
9 Perrin v. Morgan [1943] A.C. 399-H.L., 408 per Viscount Simon, Lord 
Chancellor, 414 f. per Lord Atkin. 
10 Ibid. 420 per Lord Russell of Killowen. 
11 Kiesling v. White ( 1952) 411 Ill. 493, 499· 
12 See the New York Digest index. The same careful search of the testator's 
intention appeared in an older case, New York Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. 
Viele (1899) 161 N.Y. u, affirming 22 App. Div. So, 47 N.Y.S. 841. The 
courts discuss what 4 FRANKENSTEIN 470 missed on the ground of an in-
complete private report in II Z. int. R. 105; they used free individual in-
terpretation of the words "lawful issue" in the will of an American lady 
living in Germany. 
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to this free interpretation as well as in the English courts/3 
interpretation is limited by the condition that the result is 
not inconsistent with the expression used: the court may not 
substitute a stipulation not expressed by the testator.14 
Only most recently has it been sometimes suggested that 
the court should exercise a bolder discretion: the power to 
correct the will by an equitable decision/5 American courts 
very firmly put presumptions and precedents behind the 
interpretation of the will in the instant case; thus, in the 
primary objective of investigation, all courts concur.16 Con-
flicts arise only where the search for the intention in fact 
ends without result. 
An obvious application is made when common-law courts 
look to a foreign law for explanation of technical terms 
peculiar to this law.17 This is done everywhere, and no true 
application of the foreign law is implied. 
(b) From this it is a close step to a consideration of 
foreign law without applying it in any sense. The testator 
may expressly or tacitly have contemplated such considera-
tion, which the forum observes for the limited purpose of 
13 See Mr. Justice Holmes in Eaton v. Brown ( I904) I93 U.S. 411; "The 
English courts are especially and wisely careful not to substitute a lively 
imagination of what a testatrix would have said if her attention had been 
directed to a particular point for what she has said in fact." 
Germany: A.G. Miinchen (Dec. 29, I927) IPRspr. I928 Nr. 58. 
Switzerland: 64 BGE. II I86. 
14 Matter of Watson ( I933) 262 N.Y. 284, I86 N.E. 787: the court has 
no power to change a clause. 
15 To this effect the tentative draft of a law on inheritance for Israel. 
16 United States: Purl v. Purl (I921) Io8 Kansas 673, I97 Pac. 185; 
4 PAGE 70I. 
E.g., Germany: RG. (March I3, I924) Leipz. Z. I924, 74; RAAPE 643; 
4 FRANKENSTEIN 471. 
17 England: In re Price [I900] Ch. 442, 452; Studd v. Cook ( I883) 8 App. 
Cas. 577. 590; Re Miller [I9I4] I Ch. 516; Re Manners [I923] I Ch. 220; 
Dicey (ed. 6) I83 at 833; Chia Khwee Eng v. Chia Poh Choon [1923] 
A.C. 424; Re Allen's Est. [I945] 2 All E.R. 264. 
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construing his actual intention.18 As if considering contracts, 
English courts speak outright of the "proper law" of a 
will, 19 and an intention expressly declared 20 or presumed.21 
The presumption refers to the law of the testator's domicil 
at the time of the execution.22 
These are exaggerated formulas, usual when judicial pre-
sumptions are stiffening into legal rules. We have to replace 
the "presumptive" by a "tacitly expressed" intention and 
instead of inventing a "proper law" of the will give due 
regard to the law to which the testator seems to have looked, 
amid all circumstances of the case. In this manner, a 
sound and universally acceptable rule is in the making. 
When a Swedish woman died domiciled in Massachusetts, 
the Swedish Supreme Court assumed "without an express 
provision by the testatrix" that she left certain assets to 
her husband, which would have been his separate prop-
erty by force of the Massachusetts law. As the Court said, 
not only the text but also all other circumstances, particularly 
the law of the country involved, are to be considered.23 
From the form of a will, a reference to the content of a 
law may be drawn 24 or not drawn.25 
Exception. In American practice, as the Restatement 
18 STORY § 479 j DICEY (ed. 5) comment on rule I96 j WESTLAKE (ed. 7) 
§ IZ3 i.f. j SCHMITTHOFF ( ed. I) 234· 
France: NIBOYET, 4 Traite § I34Ii LERERBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 37Ii 
BATTIFOL, Traite 672 § 668; but there is no judicial authority. 
Germany: OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. I7, I898) 9 Z. int. R. 3IO. 
19 Bradfort v. Young (I88s) 29 Ch. D. 6I7i Trotter v. Trotter (I828) 
4 Bli. (N.S.) 502, 505. 
20 Solicitor General dictum in Anstruther v. Chalmers ( I826) 2 Sinn. I, 4-· 
21 Eve J. in re Cunnington [I924] I Ch. 68, 72; Briton, domiciled in 
France, will made in England in English form: "the will ought prima facie 
to be construed according to French law." 
22 SCHMITTHOFF 234: particularly if it is identical with the last domicil. 
23 H.D. (Feb. 25, I939) N.J.A. p. IOI, I3 z. ausl. PR. 844; on another 
point of the decision, MICHAEL! 245· 
24 France: App. Paris (April 24, I9I3) Clunet I9I3, I276. 
25 Germany: OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. I7, I898) 9 Z. int. R. 3IO. 
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§ 2 5 I (I) clarifies the law, interpretation is not free where 
an interest in land is devised and certain words are used, 
having an "operative effect irrespective of the intent of 
the testator." This exception may be, apart from tradi-
tion, justified by the need for certainty in real property 
transactions. However, a doubt in the usefulness of such 
formalism is confirmed by its application. In the very 
example adduced by the Restatement, a devise of land 
in Y to "the children of A" is frustrated in the person 
of A's adopted son because "children" in Y means legitimate 
children by birth, although the adoption was made in X 
with full effect. The court thus would consider neither the 
intention of the testator nor the extraterritorial effect of 
the adoption nor the status of the child according to the 
law of its domicil. Certainty here conflicts with justice. 
3· Conflict of Rules 
Where the testator's factual intention is not discoverable 
and a set of legal rules must be applied in a subsidiary 
manner, no agreement has been reached on the choice of 
this law. 
(a) An old and widespread opinion resorts to the law 
governing the succession.26 The lex situs 27 for immovables, 
the law of the last domicil 28 or nationality 29 for movables, 
26 CHESHIRE ( ed. 2) 533 (but see infra n. 32) ; DICEY ( ed. 5) rule 196; 
STUMBERG (ed. 2) 423 n. 34; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 421 § 377; but 
see STORY §§ 473, 479 a-f. 484. 
27 England: HALSBURY, Laws of England (ed. 2) 242. 
United States: Jennings v. Jennings (r871) 21 Ohio St. 56; Staigg v. 
Atkinson ( 1887) 144 Mass. 564, 12 N.E. 354· 
28 England: Trotter v. Trotter ( 1828) 4 Bligh (N.S.) 502; but the ex-
ceptions for the law intended by the will are much emphasized, see Re 
Allen's Est., supra n. 17. 
United States: see cases in 4 PAGE 707 § r 6 3 9· 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Apr. 2, 1925) Revue 1926, 405 (currency of 
legacy); Cour Paris (May 29, 1948) J. C. P. 1950 II 5241, Rev. crit. 1950, 197, 
affirmed by Cass. civ. (Nov. 13, 1951) S. 1952.r.r89, Rev. crit. 1952, 323. 
29 Germany: R.G., Leipz. Z. (1924) 741. 
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respectively, furnish the rule of interpretation or invali-
date the clause or the will. 
This approach is favored by eminent authors, some of 
whom would have this the exclusive method.30 The reason 
most advanced is that it is the law "with which the ordinary 
person is most familiar." 31 
(b) Another part of the authorities, continuing the direc-
tion toward the proper law of succession, presume that the 
testator in an ambiguous clause may have had in mind the 
law of his domicil at the time of the execution.32 This, of 
course, is a rebuttable presumption. 33 
This view, primarily intended only for personalty, easily 
extends to immovables, provided that lex situs "has the last 
word" for allowing the creation of rights.u Indeed, the 
Restatement calls for the law of the domicil at the time 
when the will was made, with respect to movables ( § 308) 
as well as to immovables except in the case of legally fixed 
words ( § 25 r). This is a considerable progress in approach-
ing several successions, especially when a single will dis-
poses of both real and personal property. However, such 
30 HENNING, 41 N.S. Am. L. Reg. 6z3, 7IS, approved by GooDRICH (ed. 3) 
376. 
31 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 563. 
32 Eng)and: WESTLAKE ISS §u3; DICEY (ed. 6) rule IS3; CHESHIRE (ed. 
4) s6z, s6s. 
Canada: Ontario H. Ct.: Re Bassette [I94z] O.W.N. Z7S, [194z] 3 D.L.R. 
207, FALCONBRIDGE 464. 
Quebec: 3 JoHNSON 64. 
United States: Staigg v. Atkinson (I8Sz) 13 R.I. 72s; in re Chappel's 
Estate (I923) I24 Wash. uS, 2I3 Pac. 6S4, with rationale, citing Story in 
Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. (32 U.S.) 4S3; Palmer et al. v. Crews (194S) 
203 Miss. So6, 35 So. (2d) 430, 4 A.L.R. (zd) 4S3; "royalties" of oilwells in 
Louisiana and Mississippi did not include other oil interests, according to the 
law of the domicil in Texas. 
France: Trib. Seine (March 9, 1S9s) Clunet 1S9s, 62S; cf., the authors 
cited supra n. IS; DELAUME, Rev. crit. I9SO, I99· 
33 In re Cunnington [I924] I Ch. 6S. 
34 England: Nelson v. Bridport ( 1S46) S Beav. S47, S70 per Langdale, 
M.R.; Lord Nelson was not allowed by Sicilian law to acquire land devised 
to him under English law. 
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a role of the domiciliary law purely as a device of mind-
reading is quite arbitrary. 
(c) More isolated opinions point to the law giving valid-
ity to the will, 35 the domicil of the beneficiary, 36 or look for 
combinations. 37 
Illustration. A mortgaged land is devised to a legatee. 
Where there is no clue to the intention of the testator, is 
the legatee entitled to demand that the secured debt be 
paid out of the general personal property? This question 
has been much discussed in England because the law was 
changed; the claim formerly granted is now denied; the 
cases are therefore antiquated.38 It has been concluded 
that the legatee has only the rights given him by the lex 
situs. 39 However, in another view, this question of construc-
tion must be answered according to the law of the domicil 
as of the time of execution, following the presumed inten-
tion of the testator.40 
This example shows that no certain solution of the choice 
of law problem is feasible, if we work with so elusive a 
criterion as "presumptive" intention. Where no actual 
intention can be verified, the applicable law must be the 
law governing the succession, not because the testator is 
supposed to have had it in mind, but simply because it is 
in charge of the situation! 
The advantage of a common criterion for a plurality of 
successions could be maintained, if the situs were to recog-
nize, by renvoi, the prerogative of the domicil, in the line 
35 Cf., DICEY (ed. 6) 833. 
36 4 PAGE 708 n. S· 
37 E.g., WESTLAKE ISS j CHESHIRE (ed. 4) S6S j BRESLAUER, 27 Iowa L. 
Rev. at 429 ff. 
38 See in particular FALCONBRIDGE 4SI, 480; Locke King's Act 1854, 
amended I867, I877; Adm. of Est. Act 192s, sec. 3Si Ontario: Wills Act 
R.S.O. 1937 c. 164, Rev. Stat. I950, c. 426, sec. 37 (I). 
39 WESTLAKE § II8. 
U.S.: Restatement§ 490; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 42S ff. 
40 Maxwell v. Hyslop, L.R. 4 Eq. 407; Higinbotham v. Manchester (I93I) 
II3 Conn. 62, 1S4 Atl. 242, 79 A.L.R. 8s; 4 PAGE 732 § 16s2. 
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of the improved doctrines of formal requirements and con-
clusive probate judgments. 
However, the conclusive effect of judicial construction 
of a will is doubtful in this country.41 
4· Transposition 
A will may be executed in the technique of one system 
and finally governed by a law of another system. The 
testator may have preferred his former habits to the usage 
of his domicil, he may after execution change his domicil 
or nationality determining the applicable law, or he may 
dispose of his several successions by one will. Here, more 
than an ordinary construction is needed: something like 
the transposition of a piece of music to a different key. 
Through renvoi to the law of domicil and that of the 
situs, continental courts have had not seldom to adapt 
American wills with their particular technique into the 
structure of a civilian legislation.42 A sole residuary legatee 
in American terminology is understood as universal legatee 
in France, and both are sole heirs in the German parlance. 
An executor may not be allowed all the powers attributed 
by the will. Future interests, if vested, must be assimilated 
to a German N acherbschaft or N achvermachtnis and if 
::ontingent, conceived as conditional legacies. Creation of 
:1. trust fund or a foundation-possible in some countries, 
while not in others-has to be converted into a type of the 
forum or considered void. 
A good operation of this kind will save a maximum of 
the testator's intention. But regard to the exigencies of 
41 See Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1950) 504 and infra Ch. 71. 
42 In the Institute of Berlin during my directorship, this was a frequent 
subject of advice to courts and tax authorities. See the article by RuDOLF 
MOLLER, 7 Z. ausl. PR. (1933) 8o8, 816. See also on the subject LEWALD, 
Questions 115-118j M. WOLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 87; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 471-474· 
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the governing system cannot always obviate the results that 
must be reached when the forum applies the foreign law. 
II. REVOCATION 
A testator may, by his intentional act, rescind a will. 
The formal requisites vary: physical destruction of the 
document or of parts, repeal by a new will, tacit revocation 
by contrary dispositions, etc. Anglo-American law developed 
in addition an annulment ipso facto, by certain events/3 
also called revocation, although originally the will simply 
expired when the testator married and had a child, or a 
testatrix married, or had a child after the execution 
of the will. While the statutes formed variations of these 
causes and added divorce, in more recent times many pro-
visions directly granting hereditary shares to posthumous 
and pretermitted issue have superseded the destruction of 
the will. Marriage of women has no effect any more, since 
they may have separate property and capacity to testate; 
and marriage of a bachelor usually breaks his will only 
under certain conditions; the legal presumption is rebuttable 
by such facts as express declaration to the contrary, settle-
ment in favor of the widow, or other provisions for her 
benefit. Actually, the statutes making divorce a ground for 
"revocation by implication" are still the most practical of 
this decaying institution and in American courts the most 
rigorously applied in spite of counterevidence.44 
Divorce and separation of spouses are causes of presump-
43 England: GRAVESON (ed. 2) 250 ff. 
United States: ELIZABETH DuRFEE, "Revocation of Wills by Subsequent 
Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator," 40 Mich. L. 
Rev. (1940) 406; SIMES, Model Probate Code 83-84. 
44 ELIZABETH DURFEE I.e. at 412, 415 ff. 
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tive revocation in a part of the civil-law countries by rules 
of subsidiary function, 45 in others not. 
Formal validity of a voluntary declaration of revocation 
is assimilated to execution of wills by a few of the American 
statutes that give liberal options of foreign forms or liberal 
statutory interpretation.46 Usually, 47 however, and even in 
the Execution of Wills Act of 1940, revocation is forgotten. 
Hence, the law of succession, especially the law of the situs 
of land, applies rigorously.48 When a domiciliary of Illinois 
made a will and revoked it by writing "void" over the dis-
positions, the Illinois court recognized the revocation, but 
the court of Iowa as situs of land, by five against four votes, 
refused probate, although Iowa does probate the wills 
executed at the domicil.49 This decision, as the dissenting 
judges said, perpetuates "an anomalous and confusing legal 
situation." 
In civil law, the references to foreign law-of the place 
of execution or the domicil as of the same time, or also the 
domicil at death-are usually broad enough to embrace 
revocation by a new will or other declaration.50 
45 Revocation by force of law is distinguished, e.g., in the case of 
pretermitted children, from revocation by act, e.g., in Venezuela, C.C. art. 
9SI, 990. 
46 Supra, Ch. 67 I; Okla. St. Ann. 1938 tit. 84 §§ 71-73; Utah C. Ann. 
I943, § IOI.I-I4i Re Traversi ( 1945) 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 453· 
47 ATKINSON, 3 Am. L. Prop. 750. 
48 Restatement §§ 250, 307; In re Kimberly's Estate ( I913) 32 S.D. I, I4I 
N.W. I08I. 
49 In re Will of Barrie (1946) 393 Ill. III, 65 N.E. (2d) 433; First 
Presbyterian Church of Sterling, Illinois v. Hodge ( 1949) 240 Iowa 43 I, 3 5 
N.W. (2d) 658, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1399, annot. I4I2. In Matter of the Estate of 
Nora Gardner Lufkin (1933) 32 Haw. 826, where a Californian holographic 
will was revoked in Hawaii by another holographic will, invalid under the 
Hawaii statutes, the court recognizes the first and rejects the second, leaving 
uncertain whether the law of the place of execution or the new domicil 
decides. 
Canada: Re Busslinger (Alta. I952) 6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 408 and cited 
precedents. 
50 Expressly e.g., China: P.I.L. art. 26 par. 2; Czechoslovakia: PIL. § 43· 
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For cancellation by force of law, and for all substantive 
requirements, in any case, the views are divided. 
(a) Law of Succession: Whatever happens to a will 
after its execution may be considered under the law ulti-
mately controlling the succession. American courts incline 
to this view; they submit revocation in any sense to the lex 
situs 5 1 or lex domicilii as of the time of death, 52 respectively. 
Events that have not effect mortis causa are unimportant. 
The same approach is taken in Continental courts, where 
the last national law of the decedent governs.53 
(b) Effect Inter Vivos. The English courts are of a 
contrary opinion, connected with their wrong characteriza-
tion of a revocation of a will (at least of a British subject) 
by subsequent marriage as an incident of marriage. 54 Any 
revocation of a testamentary disposition of movables is held 
to be governed by the law of the domicil at the time of the 
revocation.55 If it is valid at such time, there is no will 
left. 56 
The Court of Appeals in New York makes use of a 
statute allowing revocation by holographic will made in a 
state where it is effective; if the revocation is made by can-
51 Restatement § 250; In re Patterson's Est. ( 1923) 64 Cal. App. 643; and 
see cases in Note 9 A.L.R. ( 2d) 1414. 
Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Mo. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 16; 
Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Comp. ( 1946) 394 III. 452, 68 N.E. (2d) 
892, I69 A.L.R. (1947) 545· 
52 Restatement § 307, GOODRICH (ed. 3) 519; WOLFF, P.I.L. § 569; In re 
White's Will (1920) 112 Misc. 433, 183 N.Y.S. 129; In re Smith's Est. (1940) 
55 Wyo. x8x, 47 Pac. (2d) 677; cases in 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1412, 1430. 
53 France: App. Bordeaux (Aug. 5, 1872) S.x872.2.269; App. Alger 
(Apr. 14, 1908) Clunet 1909, 489, Revue 1909, 232, (marriage of a German 
wife with an Italian, revocation) ; VALERY 1246; BATIFFOL, Traite 673 § 669. 
Germany: 2 BAR 239 tr. 832; 2 ZITELMANN 967; LEWALD 318 § 386. 
Italy: FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 615. 
54 In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [1900] P. 2II, Vol. x p. 375 and 
n. 181-183• 
55 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 540, 542. 
56 DICEY (ed. 6) 835. 
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cellation valid under the law of the testator's domicil at the 
time, it is considered effective also in New York. 57 
Illustrations. (i) Revocation effective in state X where 
made, ineffective in state Y where the testator dies. 
A testator domiciled in Washington, D. C., was divorced, 
which would cancel his will under the District law, but later 
moved to California and died there. The will was con-
sidered not revoked, following the view supra (a). 58 Accord-
ing to the English theory, the will would have remained 
revoked.59 
( ii) Revocation ineffective in state X, effective in the 
last domicil Y. 
A Dutch married woman married in the Netherlands 
where the will remained intact and died domiciled in Eng-
land. The will was held effective in England; 60 in an analo-
gous American case, the will was held revoked.61 
(iii) A German woman, who became Italian by marriage, 
bequeathed her assets to her Italian husband. After annul-
ment of the marriage, restoring her German nationality, 
the will was held void by a French court, under German 
inheritance law, BGB. § 2077.62 
( iv) A case involving an implied revocation by execut-
ing a new will came recently for the first time to the French 
Court of Cassation. The court denied the intention of the 
testatrix, domiciled in France, to revoke her French will 
by executing a second Argentine testament, rejecting the 
application of the Roman and Argentine presumption that 
57 Re Traversi's Est. ( 1946) 189 Misc. 251, 64 N.Y.S. (zd) 453: dissenting 
opinion in re Barrie's Est. (I950) supra n. 49, 9 A.L.R. (2d) at I414. 
58 Re Patterson's Est. (1924) 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac. 374, 266 U.S. 594· 
59 DICEY, rule 185 Ill. I. 
60 In the goods of Groos [1904] P. 269; see In the goods of Reid ( 1866) 
L.R. I P.&D. 74· 
61 Matter of Coburn's Will ( 1894) 9 Misc. 437, 30 N.Y.S. 383. 
62 App. Alger (Apr. 14, 1908) Clunet I9091 489. 
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testament posterius rumpit prius.63 The decision agrees 
with the principles.64 
It might be asked at what time a will is deemed revoked 
if both laws annul it. Logically, in the American view the 
effect occurs at death and in the English at the time of the 
destructive event. The first approach makes it possible for 
the testator to confirm the will or at least re-execute it,65 
which is much more consonant with the modern transforma-
tion of revocation by law. Another connected problem 
arises when the law between the event and the death 
changes; the American decisions have taken a special atti-
tude in such cases, more favorable to the time when the will 
was executed. 66 Still another phase of this question is illus-
trated by the following Canadian case. 67 
( v) A man domiciled in Quebec made a testament and 
afterward married a woman at whose desire they estab-
lished their home from the start in Ottawa, Ontario, where 
he died. Under Quebec law his will in favor of his mother 
and sister was valid, although the widow received half of 
the community property. In Ontario the will was revoked 
by the marriage, and the widow and child inherited the 
entire assets. The Ontario Court, following the English 
approach, considered the will as definitively revoked at the 
time of the marriage. The Quebec court evidently would 
recognize the result, but only because the law of the last 
domicil governed. 
There is no doubt that the law of the succession ought 
to determine these effects. 
63 Cass. civ. (Nov. 13, 1951) supra n. 28; cf., Argentina C.C. art. 3827. 
64 Contra the annotation ibid., with a criticism that may rather be addressed 
to the imperfection of present conflicts law. For a similar case, see In re 
Estate of Wayland (Prob. Div. 1951) [1951] 2 All E.R. 1041: testator executed 
an English and a Belgian will, the court searches for the intention, separates 
the wills, and concludes against revocation. 
65 WARREN, Cases on Wills, 315 n. 
66 Note, 34 Harv. L. Rev. (1921) 768. 
67 Seifert v. Seifert (Ont. 1914) 23 D.L.R. 4401 32 O.L.R. 433· 
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III. ELECTION 
A much developed doctrine of "election" in Anglo-
American law deals with the cases where the beneficiary 
of a devise or bequest enjoys, as an effect of the same death, 
a benefit by the will or ab intestato or against the will or 
by marital property law. According to the facts and the 
legal situation, he may be entitled to both rights or have to 
choose between them. 
The traditional cases of the doctrine are those where the 
testator gives property not belonging to himself but other 
property to the owner, and where his will fails but his 
intention is protected. If in the latter case the will is valid 
under one law and invalid by another, the purpose of the 
testator is carried out by putting the enriched beneficiary 
or intestate successor to election: he has to choose between 
his interests granted by the will and the benefit obtained 
against the will, releasing his right to the surplus to the 
disappointed person. The courts involved, according to the 
Restatement, have to co-operate.68 
The present conflicts doctrine tends to state that election 
depends on the law governing the succession,69 with respect 
to immovables 10 as well as to movables. However, Ameri-
can decisions are vastly divided.11 
Occasionally, the erroneous idea of applying party auton-
omy has misled courts to invoke a law presumptively intended 
by the testator.72 Doubts. arose sometimes about the rights 
of a widow to dower, granted her in many jurisdictions (by 
68 Restatement§ 252, apparently a uniform substantive rule. 
69 WESTLAKE 125; CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 566-570; DICEY (ed. 6) 834; BEALE 
§253.1; GooDRICH (ed. 3) 121 § 170; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 424· 
70 England: De Nicols v. Curlier [1898] I Ch. 403, 413; [ 1900] A. C. 21-
H.L. 
United States: Restatement§ 253, Notes, 22 A.L.R. 437; 79 A.L.R. 103, 105. 
71 Note, 105 A.L.R. 271, lists "seven views." 
12 Thus Re Allen's Est. ( 1945) supra n. 17; contra MoRRIS, 34 Can. Bar 
Rev. 528; id. in DICEY ( ed. 6) 834. 
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the old rule or by presumption) only when she did not take 
under the will of the husband; but in the general opinion, 
any question still of practical interest, about dower or the 
more recent legal shares substituted for dower, depends 
on the character of the right granted by the situs. 73 
The "singular tenderness" shown by English courts to-
ward English heirs in adjudging benefits 74 has not been 
imitated in the United States.75 
The interesting aspect of this situation is the relationship 
between the state laws confronting the beneficiary. 
(a) In state X, a surviving spouse has an intestate por-
tion if he does not take under the will. But there is land 
in Y and the testator was domiciled in Z, where no con-
ditions attach to the taking of testamentary gifts, even 
though no respective in.tention of the testator is perceivable. 
The Canadian Supreme Court held that the surviving 
spouse may claim his testamentary rights in states Y and Z, 
under the legal requirements prevailing there, so as not to 
be bound by the provision in X.76 The restriction on the 
will by a statute of election, thus, presupposes that the 
enacting state is that controlling the succession. 
(b) If the testator owns land in several states·, it would 
follow logically that election could be exercised in each state 
73 United States: In Staigg v. Atkinson ( 1887) 144 Mass. 564. Holmes, 
then judge of the Massachusetts court, did not specify whether he applied 
Minnesota law, not imposing election between dower and a legacy of per-
sonalty, qua lex situs or lex domicilii as of the time of the execution of the 
will. But see 8TUMBERG (ed. 2) 424 ff.; HEILMAN (supra n. 2) 797· 
Canada: Re Elder [1936] 3 D.L.R. 422, 2 W.W.R. 70: the right to dower 
and election in lieu of will in Manitoba land was subject to election accord-
ing to Manitoba Dower Act, C.A.M. 1924, c. so, although the husband was 
domiciled in British Columbia. 
74 DICEY (ed. s) 975; Brown v. Gregson [1920] A.C. 86o- H.L. against 
ln re Ogilvie [1918] 1 Ch. 482, 502, see MoRRIS in DICEY (ed. 6) 558; cf., 
CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 568; }ARMAN, Wills 552. 
75 GoODRICH 521 § 170. 
76 Pouliot v. Cloutier [1944] 3 D.L.R. 737, S.C.R. 284. 
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without regard to the others.77 This awkward result is 
usually corrected by the courts; they consider the choice 
first made in one state as binding under the theory of 
waiver or estoppel.78 Where the estate contains· movables 
and immovables, the same rule obtains. 79 
(c) A special case, however, exists if taking against the 
will at tfie domicil depends on election. It is controversial 
whether such taking has universal effect and operates even 
at the situs of immovables. 80 The affirmative answer means 
another slight progress towards unity of succession. 
Courts of civil-law countries will recognize these rules of 
the common-law courts, if, according to their own choice of 
law, a common-law statute governs the succession. The 
construction of a will executed under American or English 
conceptions may be influenced thereby. 
IV. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT 
Another Anglo-American institution has some analogy to 
the Romanistic substitutio pupillaris and quasi-pupillaris 
with the difference that a Byzantine father wills in advance 
for his son, but the English son wills for his late father. 
In civil law this is a singular exception to the basic require-
ment for a will that it must be declared by the testator in 
person. At common law, the testator may empower a 
beneficiary to dispose of assets of the inheritance by deed 
or will.81 
77 Van Steenwyck v. Washburn ( 1883) 59 Wis. 483, 17 N.W. 289. 
78 England: Douglas-Menzies v. Umphalby [1908] A.C. 224. 
United States: 4 PAGE 730. 
79 Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, supra n. 77; Lindsley v. Patterson (Md. 
Sup. Ct. 1915) 177 S.W. 826; see GooDRICH 521 § 170. 
80 Pro: Coble v. Coble (1947) 227 N.C. 547, 42 S.E. (2d) 892; Note, 105 
A.L.R. (1936) 271; contra: Bish v. Bish (1943) 181 Md. 621, 31 Atl. (2d) 
348; Seaton v. Seaton ( 1945) 184 Va. 180, 34 S.E. (2d) 236. 
81 }OHN MuLFORT, "The Conflict of Laws and Powers of Appointment," 
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( 1939) 403; 4 PAGE § 1649; 2 BEALE §§ 284.1, 236.1; 
150 A.L.R. 521; FALCONBRIDGE 455 ff. 
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With respect to immovables, lex situs, of course, decides 
the entire issue. 82 The optional contacts affording formal 
validity are specially determined in English law.88 
Where immovables are in the inheritance, the dominating 
idea of this institution asserts itself. The assets come 
from the donor and are further transferred by his will 
and left by him, though through the medium of the donee. 
Hence, the law of the donor's last domicil governs not 
only the validity and construction of the original provision, 
but also the exercise of the power. American courts, hence, 
generally require that the power be exercised-where the 
donor has not specified the form of exercise-by a will 
complying with the formalities of the donor's domicil: so 
many witnesses as required there, 84 but not so many as 
obligatory at the donee's domicil, 85 etc. Yet a contrary 
intention of the donor, inferred from circumstances, has 
been given effect.86 The capacity of the donee must only 
satisfy the law of the donor's domicil; 87 undue influence is 
determined likewise,88 as also revocation.89 
Next to the tax problems 90 that are in the foreground, 
the question whether the donee's forced heirs may claim 
rights is outstanding. Again, merely the persons entitled 
to a share in the donor's estate have rights.91 
82 2 BEALE §§ 234.1, 236.1. 
83 See DICEY (ed. 6} 845 ff. 
84 As in England: In re Scholefield [1905] 2 Ch. 408. 
85 Adger v. Kirk (1921) 116 S. Car. 298, 108 S.E. 97· 
86 Amerige v. Att. Gen. (1949) 324 Mass. 648, 6591 88 N.E. (2d) 126, 
supra Ch. 66; but see Survey 1950 at 53 on other decisions of the same 
court. 
87 Matter of the Will of Stewart (N.Y. 1845) 11 Paige 398. 
88 In re Harriman's Est. (N.Y. 1926) 217 App. Div. 733, 216 N.Y.S. 842. 
89 Velasco v. Coney [ 1934] P. 143; Note, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1202, 1291; 
MULFORT, supra n. 81, at 421 n. 101 against the criticism 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 
(1934) 279· 
90 GRISWOLD, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 
Harv. L. Rev. ( 1939) 929, 967. 
91 Restatement § 234. 
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In England, however, the distinction between general 
and special powers, familiar to this country in other re-
spects, enters. If the original testator does not indicate 
the specific persons in favor of whom the power should be 
exercised ("special powers") but has left their designation 
to the donee, the donee is deemed to act on his own prop-
erty so that his own domicil controls the exercise.92 A will 
conforming to the Will's Act, 1837, is always in proper 
form to exercise a power given by an English testator if 
exercisable by will.93 
These delicate rules, roughly sketched above, are decisive 
also in Continental courts, if they belong to the law govern-
ing the donee's succession. 94 
92 As to capacity: Puey v. Hard ern [1900] 2 Ch. 339; Re Walker [1908] 
r Ch. s6o. 
93 DICEY (ed. 6) 851. 
94 4 FRANKENSTEIN 493-496, SCHNITZER (ed, 3) 471. 
CHAPTER 70 
Scope of the Law of Succession 
I. IN GENERAL 
T HE variety of conflicts rules has influenced the domain controlled by the law of succession. An essential 
characteristic and outstanding advantage of the uni-
tary system is provided by its wide radius extending not 
only to all assets but also to all debts of the decedent and of 
the estate.1 But at common law, the sphere of the law 
governing succession is limited to the problems of "descent 
and distribution" in contrast to "administration" of the 
estate.2 Another exclusion of problems from the law of 
succession under the theory of territorial law is contemplated 
by a most recent French doctrine.3 
The common ground of these groups, the scope of "dis-
tribution," is comprehensive enough. It includes the source 
of succession: will, contract, or intestacy, with all incidents 
such as validity and revocation of wills and the acts leading 
from the death of the deceased to the acquisition, though 
not the delivery, of the benefits. To quote the Hague draft 
of I 9 2 8, the national law of the deceased governs: 
(Sec. I) The designation of the beneficiaries, the order in 
which they are called, the shares attributed to them, their 
obligation to bring in advancements, partition, legitimate 
parts, (sec. 2) the intrinsic validity and the effects of testa-
mentary disposition. 
1 E.g., NUSSBAUM 351; WOLFF, D.I.P.R. (ed. 3) 228. 
2 E.g., DICEY (ed. 6) 535; GOODRICH (ed. 3) 507. 
3 E.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIE:RE (ed. 6) § 362; devolution is subordinated 
to the law of property (ed. 5) 320, § 256. 
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In this enumeration partition is a controversial point. 
In any case, beyond this the law of succession may or may 
not govern marshalling of assets, liquidation, ascertainment 
and payment of debts, and actual satisfaction of the heirs, 
legatees, and other beneficiaries. 
We shall analyze the first, narrower, group of problems· 
in this and the following chapters, principally as a task of 
classification of subjects in conflicts law. In the meaning of 
the traditional Romanistic system, of course, this exposition 
has an equal bearing on most of the matters pertaining to 
what is called administration of decedents' estates at com-
mon law. 
II. DELIMITATION OF THE ScoPE 
I. Status of Beneficiaries 
In the inchoate "general rules" that modern authors 
seek to establish in conflicts law, we find two separate topics 
which seem to this writer to form only one: the so-called 
incidental 4 or preliminary question and the requirement 
that a beneficiary must be able to share in the inheritance 
(capacity to enjoy rights) and not only that he be able to 
accept or renounce a part (capacity to act or dispose). 
The opinions are divided on both subjects, which they 
should not be. 
(a) The incidental question. If a "spouse," a "husband" 
or "wife" is called to succeed, by intestate or testate devolu-
tion, no court should be in doubt that the law applicable to 
determine whether a marriage exists, is defined in the con-
flicts rules of the forum on marriage and divorce. It would 
be too absurd to have two or more yardsticks in the same 
court for stating whether an identical marriage ceremony, 
4 This term, instead of "preliminary," was proposed by M. WOLFF and 
accepted in England. 
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an annulment, or a divorce is recognized.5 Even though 
a marriage celebrated at the forum is considered invalid at 
the domicil or by the national law of a party, the court is 
bound to consistency by the law of the forum.6 
More doubt seems, at first blush, justified where testate 
or intestate succession is offered to the "children" or "issue," 
or also to the legitimate, recognized, or adopted children. 
Although the dominant opinion is that the normal conflicts 
rule of the forum defines the appropriate status of an in-
dividual claimant, an opposite doctrine stresses the circum-
stance that the law of succession predicates the status in 
question and therefore designates the persons benefited. 
The first opinion has been almost a matter of course in 
Anglo-American conflicts law.7 It is true that the English 
decisions on questions of legitimate birth and legitimation 
relevant to ascertaining benefits in English governed suc-
cessions have caused much doubt; but the doubts refer to 
the structure of the English conflicts rules on legitimacy 
and illegitimacy and do not warrant a conclusion that Eng-
lish rules apply because the succession is governed by Eng-
lish law.8 In the United States it is said that whether a 
child is legitimate "relates not to descent or distribution but 
to his status." 9 Likewise, the French courts use their 
regular tests to decide not only whether a person is a 
5 RAAPE, so Recueil 1934 IV at 493· 
6 Supra Vol. I, p. 235. 
7 CHESHIRE ( ed. 4) 91; MORRIS, 54 L.Q.R. 6II; 62 id, 89; in DICEY ( ed. 
6) 676; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict 166. M. WoLFF, P.I.L. §§ 196-200, however, 
expounds arguments pro and contra. 
8 This subject has been thoroughly investigated by LIPSTEIN, Legitimacy 
and Legitimation in English Private International Law, in Festschrift fiir 
Ernst Rabel ( 1954) 6u-630. On complications in Australia, see FLEMING, 
1 Int. Comp. L. Q. ( 1952) 67. 
9 Note, 73 A.L.R. 941, 943· 
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"spouse," 10 but also a legitimate or natural child,11 a child 
of a putative marriage, 12 or an adopted child.13 In the same 
manner, courts decide likewise when full age is attained.u 
This is the prevailing view/5 although the contrary argu-
ment has been presented in impressive reasoning 16 and has 
also been adopted by two Anglo-American authors/7 
A different approach may be taken with respect to a 
declaration of death, as the following case 18 illustrates. 
A father died early in 1905; his son was three times declared 
dead: ( 1) in Vienna, the day of death being fixed on Jan-
uary 8, 1898; (2) in Leipzig as of December 31, 1905; 
and (3) in Dresden, dating the death on January 8, 1895. 
It appeared that the father was a millionaire, and the son's 
minor child had repudiated the son's succession with the 
assent of the orphan's court. The court in Dresden, appar-
ently as probate court, could rely on its own statement of 
10 Trib. Seine (Jan. 17, 1924) Clunet 1925, 401; Revue 1925, 226: French 
lex situs, but common law marriage and marital property system of New York. 
11 Cour Paris (March 22, 1924) Revue 1924, ss8; (Feb. ro, 1943) Nouv. 
Rev. 1944, 140, J.C.P. 1943 II 2438; (July ro, 1946} J.C.P. 1947 II 3392. 
12 Cass. (Jan. 6, 1910) Clunet 19II, 214; Cour Paris (Dec. 31, 1925) Gaz. 
Trib. 1926.2.306. 
13 Contra: for the law of succession, Cass. req. (Apr. 21, 1931) D. 
193r.r.s2, S.I931.1.377, Revue 1932, 526, much criticized, see BARTIN, Clunet 
1932, s; BATIFFOL, Revue 1934, 634, Traite 66r par. 658; disavowed by 
Cour Paris (July 10, 1946) G. Pal. 1946, II 141 on the report of FI!CHI!, Av. 
gen., p. 142, J.C.P. 1947 II 3391. 
Cf., RAAPI!, so Recueil I934 IV 493. so6. 
14 Woodward v. Woodward (1889) 87 Tenn. 644, BEALl!, 2 Cases 794· 
15 France: MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III at s6o; SAVATIER, J.C.P. 1947·2.3392, 
Cours 309 § 441. Contra DESPAGNET 1046. 
Germany: KAHN, I Abh. 22 ff.; LEwALD 300 and in Questions 74 ff.; and 
especially RAAPE, Komm. 653, IPR. 68; see Recueil 1934 IV 485 ff. 
Italy: DIENA, rs8 Arch. giur. 374, 420 ff., commonly followed. MoNAco, 
Efficacia r 90. 
16 MELCHIOR 246 ff.; WENGLER, 8 Z. ausl. PR. 206 ff.; OLG. Karlsruhe, 
IPRspr. 1931 no. 96. 
17 LoRI!NZI!N, Cases (ed. 2) 794 n. 62; WELSH, Legitimacy in the Conflict 
of Laws, L.Q.R. 1947, 6s. 
18 BARING, "Dreimal fiir tot erklart," ro Zentralblatt fiir Freiwillige 
Gerichtsbarkeit und Notariat ( 1909/ro) 630. See on the doubts regarding 
the international treatment of absentees, Vol. I, p. 162, r64·167, 
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facts, irrespective of the son's personal law in former 
proceedings. 
(b) Capacity of beneficiaries. With as little doubt as 
the independency of the conflicts rule on family status is 
observed in the common law courts, the contrary view is 
held in the same courts with respect to the capacity of per-
sons to be designated or appointed as heir, devisee, or 
other beneficiary. The law governing the succession has a 
very firm position, just because it determines the devolu-
tion. Not only is devise of land in the exclusive province of 
lex situs also in this repect,19 but the decedent's domicil 
rather than the domicil of the legatee defines the latter's 
capacity to receive movable property. In England, this 
view has been laid down in the case of two persons dying 
in a common disaster, an air raid on London.20 Under the 
ancient rule, however, that minors not only lack capacity 
personally to accept but even capacity to acquire legal 
estate in land, the English courts use an optional test; full 
capacity of the minor according to the law of his own 
domicil at the time when he reaches full age, suffices.21 
In civil law, the situations where a beneficiary's existence 
at the decisive time is in doubt have been constantly debated. 
An heir must be "in being" at the death of the decedent, 
or, the law of succession allowing substitutions or future 
interests, during the period of the rule of perpetuities, or 
19 United States: Restatement § 249 comment a; Starkweather v. American 
Bib!. Soc. (1874) 72 Ill. so; 2 BEALE§ 249-4i 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 415. 
20 England: Re Cohn [ 1945] Ch. 5; it is true that mother and daughter 
killed in London in an air raid were not only domiciled in but also nationals 
of Germany; hence their personal law was German under both systems. 
On the principle see WOLFF, P.I.L. (ed. 2) 577 § 550. 
United States: Restatement § 306 comment b. 
21 Re Hellmann's Will ( 1866) L.R. 2 Eq. 363. An English will contained 
legacies to each of the two children of a German, who were of full age by 
German law, but minors under English law; In re Schnapper ( 1928) Ch. 420 
announced the rule definitively. On the reformed functioning of the other 
disabilities of a minor see JARMAN, Wills (ed. 8) 114. 
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within an analogous period, as e.g. established in the Ger-
man Civil Code. Is a child en ventre sa mere "in being"? 
Originally the answer was negative everywhere, and there 
are remainders of this view in actual rules. The Roman cor-
rected it: nasciturus pro jam nato habetur quomodo de com-
modo eius agitur. This rule is textually maintained in most 
jurisdictions of the United States: the child en ventre "will 
be treated as living or born or surviving where such a con-
struction will be to his benefit." 22 Modern codes even con-
sider the embryo simply as a person under the (( condicio 
juris" that it be born subsequently.23 
The older doctrine applied the personal law of the future 
person.24 But more recent writers emphasize that the exist-
ence of the beneficiary is a condition of the devolution, and, 
therefore, depends upon the law of succession.25 
Most discussed and striking are the cases of com-
morientes, that is, of two persons dying in a common disaster 
or otherwise, so that it cannot be ascertained who died 
first. For these cases, different presumptions have been 
developed in the various laws, but in some jurisdictions 
there is no presumption and therefore no evidentiary sub-
stitute favoring one or the other group of claimants.26 
England formerly had no presumption, but from 1926 it 
22 Note, 48 Harv. L.R. ( 1935) at IZ35, with just criticism of the "startling" 
House of Lords decision, Elliot v. Joicey [1935] W.N. 43 [1935] 79 Scot. J. 
144· 
23 E.g., Swiss C.C. art. 16, par. 2, cf., RABEL, 4 Rhein. Z. (1912) 167 ff. 
24 SAvrGNY 283 §§ 377, 385; LAURENT, 6 Dr. Civ. § 203 ff.; WEiss, 4 Traite 
553, 574· 
Spain: C.C. art. 9, 745 cf., 30; 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 2 58. 
25 2 BAR 314 (tr. 807); DrENA, 58 Arch. giur. 376, 401; FIORE, 4 D.I.P. 
(French tr.) §§ 1417, 1420 in case of a single law of succession; PILLET, 2 
Traite 382; BATIFFOL 662 § 66o; NrBOYET, Manuel 728; ARMIN JON, 3 
Precis § rz8; LEWALD 297 § 362; Paris (Apr. 8, 1938) Clunet 1938, 1038. 
26 Vol. I, p. 167 f. and the German controversy, p. 167 n. 24. The start 
to establish a uniform law, Convention on declaration of death of Missing 
Persons, Lake Success, April 6, 1950. U.N. Pub!. 1950, V r, 3 Rev. Hell. (1950) 
391, was not felicitous. 
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has been presumed that the younger person survived, and 
in 1952 the law of 1925 in application to husband and wife 
was repealed. 27 
Supposing that a father and his son are killed in an 
airplane crash, in one system the son, in another the father 
is deemed to have survived temporarily and to have trans-
mitted his share in his own succession, while in modern 
statutes considering all presumptions arbitrary, neither in-
herits from the other. Bar suggested that the law of each 
succession should apply its own method. 28 Weiss concluded 
that no presumption should apply,29 and Pillet pointed to 
the law of the place of the misfortune.30 In this unresolved 
state, the question still remains in Quebec.31 
Corresponding to the division of writers, some statutes 
respectively determine "capacity" to inherit by will or ab 
intestato according either to the personal law 32 or to the 
law of succession.33 Also cumulation of both laws has been 
tried.34 
(c) Rationale. It may be assumed that many writers 
who have taken sides for one or the other contact in all 
these questions are nevertheless not adverse to a distinc-
tion, which cuts through and corrects the usual antithesis.35 
27 Intestate's Est. Act 1952, Part I and First Sched., amending Adm. of 
Est. Act 192 s, sec. 46 ( 3). 
28 2 BAR II3 (tr. 805); II3 LEWALD, Questions 63. 
29 WEISS, 4 Traite 578; followed by BERKI 74; Cod. Bustamante, art. 29. 
30 PILLET, 2 Traite 362, § 577 in order to have a law common to both. 
31 3 JOHNSON 72. On various recent attempts see Note, Rev. crit. 1954, 235. 
32 Brazil: L. Introd. art. IO § 2. 
Sweden : Int. Est. L. § 9· 
C6digo Bustamante: art. 152. 
33 Treaty of Montevideo art. 45 (b). 
34 Poland: P.I.L. art. 28 par. 2. 
Austro-German Treaty § I. 
2 PONTES DE MIRANDA § IO. 
35 Most clearly, FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws sS:z, criticizing the Aus-
tralian decision In re Williams [1936] V.L.R. 223 (cf., DICEY (ed. 6) 509 
n. 6 5) separates the question of succession and the question of status. 4 
FRANKENSTEIN 359 ff., 38I ff., dissatisfied with the alternative dividing the 
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Where an inheritance law eliminates the appointment of an 
uincerta persona" it eclipses the personal law. Likewise, 
how could the personal law of a child decide alone whether 
it is an heir in a foreign succession? How can the law of 
the succession determine alone whether A is a legitimate 
child of B, both subjects of a different jurisdiction? If 
it is correctly stated that the existence of an heir is a 
requirement for his acquisition, established by the law 
governing succession, does it follow that his personal law 
is totally excluded? 
No cumulation of the two laws, of course, is desirable. 
They have rather to divide their domains. 
The law governing the individual succession-not the 
lex fori or the law applicable to family matters-defines 
the category of intended beneficiaries. This is usually not 
done by express exact description and only exceptionally by 
implicit exclusion of certain classes, as when English land 
law understands by "lawful issue" only children born in 
wedlock.36 Thus, commonly what is meant by such terms 
must be explained from other sources. It is quite true that 
no state need have an adopted child forced upon it as heir.87 
But this is no answer to our question. 
Sound construction of the rule of inheritance needs com-
plementation by a relevant set of other rules, and certainly 
not by the domestic law of the forum. The question, thus, 
is whether the conflicts rule of the state whose law governs 
the succession or the conflicts rule of the forum ought to 
apply. As seen above, the answer supported by the great 
weight of authority is in favor of the view that the forum 
literature, suggests a distinction between the calling by the law of succession 
and ability to receive the offered gift, which would be governed by the 
personal law. 
36 Supra Vol. I, p. 654. 
37 Hood v. McGehee ( 1915) 237 U.S. 611; Restatement §§ 142, 143; 2 
BEALE 427 § 142 j § 305.1. 
INHERITANCE 
apply its own conflicts rule. Unity of the personal law at 
the forum prevails over unity of the succession. 
Illustration. Suppose two orthodox Greeks domiciled in 
Greece were married in Belgium before an orthodox priest, 
validly under Greek, invalidly under Belgian law. One, 
dying, left land in England, Belgium, France, and Germany. 
The status of marriage is determined 38 according to Greek 
law in all courts in which the rule locus regit actum is op-
tional, except the Belgian, and in the latter according to 
Belgian law. This is done, although France and Belgium, 
by normal conflicts rule, and Germany, because of EG. art. 
28, recognize that the lex situs governs succession in Belgium, 
France, and England. Likewise, irrespective of the lex 
situs, English and American courts consider the marriage 
invalid according to the imperative principle, locus regit 
actum. 
As furthermore submitted in the first volume of this 
work with special regard to adoption, 39 there may be a con-
siderable variance in defining the class of persons called to 
share in the inheritance. "Adoption" may mean anything 
between full status of legitimacy and mere educational 
rights. If "adopted" children are admitted without quali-
fication by the inheritance law, the effect of adoption on 
succession for either party of the adoption is indicated by 
the whole law of the state that according to the conflicts 
rule of the forum governs the adoption. 
The problem of capacity, as represented by the require-
ment of personal existence, is not different. 
Notwithstanding the evident trend toward the law of 
succession, the simple contention that it governs capacity 
to take is theoretically untenable and practically inade-
quate. It has been said that the problem does not concern 
capacity in the true meaning at all, but a requirement of 
38 Vol. I, pp. 233-236. 
39 Vol. I, pp. 653-658. 
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the succession. But being a requirement, capacity is never-
theless what it is. Why should the personal law not serve 
as usual to determine status once and for all? And whether 
there is a person certainly concerns status. A person should 
not be deemed living for one succession and dead or having 
never existed for another, possibly at the same court and 
in a split succession to the same decedent. He should not 
be considered continuing his marriage and being a decedent 
simultaneously. The Restatement and a part of the modern 
writers are clearly wrong in extending the law governing 
succession to such points. Practically, how can the law of 
the last domicil of a testator decide whether a remainder-
man twenty-one years after the death or twenty-one years 
after another measuring period of life, is validly declared 
dead? 
Whether a certain beneficiary or the member of a cer-
tain class of beneficiaries fulfills the required condition, 
should be decided by his own personal law. 
Devolution to future persons, such as children not yet 
conceived, if permitted by the inheritance law, is best con-
strued so that their right, vested or contingent or what-
ever its nature, is acquired at once but materializes only 
under the condicio juris of their future conception and 
birth.40 This corresponds exactly to the laws to be applied. 
The origin of the right is in the death of the decedent, 
its realization in the birth of the beneficiary. 
Of course, especially in this case, not much may be left 
to the personal law. Some codes, such as the German and 
the Argentine, declare in the course of their specific deal-
ing with inheritance that a conceived child has capacity to 
40 Italy: Cass. (Dec. 14, 1945) Foro Ital. 1944-46 I 289; (Aug. ro, 1949) id. 
r 949 I 90 5 ; accord by the literature cited in the notes. 
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inherit but one not yet conceived has not, 41 while other codes 
regulate the matter as one of general capacity of persons.42 
This insertion of a provision into a subdivision of a code 
does not mean much. But the German Code makes it a 
principle that a nasciturus, after being born, is retroactively 
immediate successor of the decedent, and that nonconceived 
children can merely be substitute heirs from birth on 
( N acherben). Where the structure of the system of suc-
cession thus necessitates an extension of its rules to foreign 
beneficiaries, a question of legal technique is involved. In 
the mentioned case, the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch, § 2 I o I, 
provides that an appointment of a person not yet conceived 
at the testator's death is to be understood presumptively 
as an appointment as substitute heir after the legal heirs; 
if this does not agree with the testator's intention, the 
appointment is void. These are clearly rules of succession.48 
Insofar as the conflicts rules of the forum obtain, of 
course, one more difference in the treatment of the same 
succession appears in consequence of the variety of tests 
for the personal and family law. Additional differences of 
classification from forum to forum-e.g., whether legitimacy 
involves the status of the father or that of the child-
however might be avoided. 
(d) Public policy of the forum has been urged in coun-
tries excluding adulterine and incestuous children admitted 
by the law of succession.44 Natural or not recognized chil-
dren without such stigma have been allowed foreign-derived 
41 Germany: BGB. § 1923 par. 2. 
Argentina: C. C. art. 3290. 
42 E.g., Switzerland: C.C. art. 31 par. z. 
43 Both personal and inheritance laws support the New York decision 
assuming civil death of a man convicted for murder, Matter of Lindewall 
(1942) 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E. (zd) 907, annotated 17 St. John's L. Rev. 46; 
only the place of the conviction was discarded. 
44 France: Trib. Seine (Aug. 13, 1894) Clunet 1895, 95· 
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benefits superior to the French equivalent. 45 On the other 
hand, where the foreign law denies natural children any 
share, a domestic substitute has been allocated.46 
(e) Unworthiness. Loss of benefits from an inheritance 
by tort is naturally in the domain of the law governing 
succession.41 But public policy has been urged.48 On the 
other hand, a Federal Circuit Court admitted an heir who 
killed the decedent and was convicted for manslaughter in 
Kansas, because the court found that the Oklahoma statute 
presupposed a killing in Oklahoma; 49 this, of course, is a 
singular method of applying the statute governing succes-
sion. Nor is there necessity to favor delinquents by cumulat-
ing both laws in principle. 50 
(f) Corporations. It should be even more certain than 
for individuals that the existence of corporations is deter-
mined by their personal law and the law of successions as 
such has nothing to do with it.61 Lex fori, of course, 
may deny recognition to a foreign-created corporation. 
For acquisition by will, however, the common trend to 
require the consent of both the personal law and the law of 
succession has been noted in Vol. I, pp. 164 £.52 
2. Marital Property 
The relationship between the marital property system 
applicable to the estate and the law of succession has been 
45 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 23, 1924) D. 1927.2.21. 
46 France: Paris (March 22, 1924) Gaz. Pal. 1924.2.148 with the correction 
by BATIFFOL, Traite 66o par. 658. 
Germany: cf., Vol. I, p. 622 n. 63. 
47 2 BAR 316; KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 2II; 2 ZITELMANN 941; PILLET, 2 Traite 
383; NUSSBAUM 351 n. 3; BATIFFOL, Traite § 665; SCHNITZER 495· 
48 In re Hall [1914] P. at 5·; WEISS, 4 Traite 579; DESPAGNET par. 365; 
and others. 
4 9 Harrison v. Moncravie ( 1920) 264 Fed. 776. 
50 Thus BATIFFOL 663 n. 1 and cited authors. 
51 
"This is entirely undisputed today," 4 FRANKENSTEIN 386 and n. 136. 
See recently Swiss BG. (May 16, 1950) 76 BGE. III 6o, 65. 
52 Add Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Catholic Charities (1948) 
141 N.J. Eq. 170, 56 Atl. (2d) 483, 489. 
INHERITANCE 
explained earlier.53 The discussion included the difficulties 
and hardships arising because the municipal statutes pro-
vide for the surviving spouse or the widow either by marital 
or by inheritance law and the conflicts rules combine the 
systems so that the survivor may happen to take both or 
none of the benefits. Recently a valuable study added a 
very comprehensive analysis of the American statutes. 54 
But so long as the draftsmen of marriage settlements and 
wills and the legislators of statutes on matrimonial property 
or inheritance persist in ignoring the conflicts problems, 
little help is in sight. 
3· Donatio mortis causa. 
A gift by the decedent in his lifetime, made conditionally 
in case the donee survives him, has a hybrid nature. Ac-
cordingly, opinions are sharply divided on the characteriza-
tion of this transaction: does it belong by its origin to 
contracts inter vivos or by its effect to acts mortis causa? 
(a) Act inter vivos. The Anglo-American approach is 
in favor of construing the entire transaction as a contract 
inter vivos. In the English case of Korvine's Trust, the 
question was squarely asked whether a gift upon death 
by a donor domiciled in Russia of movables situated in 
England was a gift, subject to lex situs, or concerned suc-
cession, subject to the law of the last domicil. The court 
applied the English law of the situation, 55 in accord with 
the common opinion,56 also in the United States, where the 
53 Vol. I, pp. 374-382. 
54 HAROLD MARSH, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws ( 1952) with dis-
cussion of the conflicts difficulties, at 130 If., 225 If. 
55 In re Korvine's Trust [1921] I Ch. 343· 
56 FALCONBRIDGE 565; see also GRAVESON (ed. 2) 214. 
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place of actual delivery is accentuated. 5 7 
However, a deeper analysis of the contract of donation 
and its performance by delivery, in view of the condition 
inherent in both acts, may show this classification over-
simplified. A more recent decision applied the law govern-
ing administration: 
In re Craven's Estate 58 a lady domiciled in England had 
shares and money in a bank in Monte Carlo, Monaco. On 
July IS, I9JS, facing a dangerous operation, she told her 
son he should have the shares and bank balance transferred 
to his name, to keep them in case of misfortune happening 
to her. The son wrote on her behalf, and the bank acted 
accordingly. She died on the 2oth. An expert witness stated 
in the law suit that under the French Code (article 93 I), 
in force in Monaco, a gift must be made in a public instru-
ment, or by certain so-called "indirect" methods allowed by 
the practice, which were missing in the case. But the judge, 
approaching the question as an incident of collecting the 
assets in the course of the administration, resorted to Eng-
lish law. Hereunder the peculiar elements of a donation 
mortis causa-a special institution of common law-were 
assembled, 59 since the requirement that the donor must 
57 Emery v. Clough (1885) 63 N.H. 552; and the cases cited 4 PAGE 734 
par. 1655. The case cited as contrary, Gidden v. Gidden ( 1936) 176 Miss. 
98, 167 So. 785, in reality holds the gift ineffective because delivery of the 
negotiable warehouse receipt was omitted. 
58 Lloyds Bank v. Cockburn [1937] Ch. 423, [1937] 3 All E.R. 312, "better 
report" (FALCONBRIDGE 564) in 53 T.L.R. 694 ( 1937). 
~ 9 See ATKINSON, Wills 156, and the older English cases in RANKING (ed. 
18) 145 If. It is a special institution distinguished from gifts inter q,iq,os and 
still considered revocable, not only conditional on the precedent death of the 
donor. In France, art. 893 C.C. permitting only gifts inter q,iq,os and testa-
mentary disposition is referred by the courts just to the old law of revocable 
donationes mortis causa so that irrevocable gifts under the condition of 
survival of the donee are recognized. Cass. req. (May 14, 1900) D. 1900.1.358, 
S. 1905.1.438; COLIN ET CAPITANT, (ed. 3) (1929) 796. There is no hint 
in the report that the mother reserved revocation. 
INHERITANCE 
part with the dominion of the right was evidently fulfilled 
at the situs, Monte Carlo. 
Falconbridge criticizes the application of the English 
characterization as gift inter vivos; Monaco law should 
have controlled the entire transaction.60 In fact, the ques-
tion was not one of administration but one preliminary to 
administration.61 But what law governs a gift inter vivos 
is highly controversial. Mother and son were domiciled in 
England and British subjects; they met in Paris, because 
the mother had fallen ill there. English law applied prop-
erly to the contract. The transfer of the bank account and 
the securities in Monte Carlo was subject to the local law. 
Yet, although no valid cause for a transfer existed under 
that law, the cause did exist under the English law, sufficient 
for any court, also in Monaco. 
In an analogous New York case, a resident of France 
gave a friend a check on a bank in New York, asking him 
to deliver the check to the drawer's sister in New York. 
The drawer died "before the check was presented for pay-
ment," though presumably after delivery to the payee. The 
surrogate considered that "the original transaction" was 
in France and the gift was void under French law.62 
Indeed, the operative facts of the gift are determined 
by the local law. This is the law governing the obligatory 
contract of donating, if it can stand alone-as, e.g., a 
promise in notarial form, 63 made and accepted. The law of 
6° FALCONBRIDGE, ibid. HELLENDALL, 15 TuJ. L. Rev., uses the case for con-
fused ideas on characterization. 
61 HELLENDALL, 16 Can. Bar. Rev. ( 1938) 143 objects to FALCONBRIDGE 
that the question whether the assets were a part of the inheritance, regarded 
the English administration rather than the lex situs. This begs the question; 
see infra Ch. 70. 
62 In re Bloch's Est. ( 1945) 186 Misc. 105, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 57· Facts and 
decision seem doubtful. See on the check phase supra Ch. 63 pp. 229, 233· 
63 Sloan Adm. v. Gertrude Jones (1951) 192 Tenn. 400, 241 S.W. (2d) 
506. A third law, that governing marital property, has been held superior in 
King v. Bruce (Texas 1947) 201 S.W. (2d) 803; Texas spouses could not 
change community property into severalty by transferring to and disposing 
of it in New York. 
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the situs controls the type of the right granted and the 
transfer of possession and title and accordingly the per-
formance that may be necessary to make the promise action-
able. However, what is needed to exclude the asset from the 
inheritance is naturally an incident of the law of succession. 
(b) Act affecting succession. The modern civil law 
doctrine 64 enumerates donatio mortis causa, or all trans-
actions 65 conditioned on death, among the incidents of the 
law of succession. The Italian courts followed this develop-
ment; although the Codes of I 93 8 and I 942 merely pre-
scribed that the "national law" of the donor governed,66 
the Italian highest court in 1947 made it clear that the 
institution belongs to inheritance law 67 and therefore the 
national law as of the time of the donor's death is meant.68 
In favor of this classification, it has been argued that 
the law of succession must control for the safeguard of the 
legitimate portion.69 But in the modern systems special 
attack is provided against gifts damaging the funds avail-
able for forced shares, and these remedies belong to the law 
of succession irrespective of the characterization of gifts. 
In fact, total enrolment of this type of benefaction into 
• inheritance law goes too far. That not only the form, 70 
64 France: PILLET, Traite § 945; AumNET 5 Rep. 64I no. 25. 
Germany: RAAPE 653; M. WoLFF D. IPR (ed. 3) 229; Bundesfinanzhof 
(Sept. 20, I951) IPRspr. I95o-5I, 245 No. III (confused reasoning). 
Colombia: I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 84I. 
Egypt: C.C. I948, art. I7 par. I for the content and effect, art. I7 par. 2 
for the optional form. 
Hague Draft: art. 6, 7· 
C6digo Bustamante: arts. I46 ff. 
Scandinavian Convention: arts. 9·I2. 
German-Austrian Treaty, art. II §§ 5, 6. 
65 For the treaties see PLAISANT 263. 
66 Italy: C.C. Disp. Pre!. art. 24; Cass. (June 9, I941) Giur. Ita!. 1941 I 
I, 78o; Trib. Torino (July 28, I948) id., I949 l2, 273· 
67 Cass. (Feb. Io, 1947) Foro. Ita!. I948.I.636. 
68 BARTOLOMEI, note ibid. Disp. Pre!. art. 23. 
69 BATIFFOL 656 par. 654. 
7
° France: Cass. (June 29, I922) S. 1923.1.249. 
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but also the other requirements, are those of contracts, is 
certain; the gift may exist at least until the death. We 
conclude that it is in the province of the law of succession 
to decide whether the donated assets are parts of the 
estate. This law may prohibit a condition of survival in 
order to protect the form of wills more effectively, but if 
it recognizes perfected gifts, it is in the province of the 
law of property to state whether the gift is perfected. 
Where land is the object and the law of succession estab-
lishes a separate system for immovables, the problem is 
simple. 
Illustration. Garda de la Palmira, of Spanish nationality, 
a long-time resident of Paris, died, leaving French immov-
ables and movables and immovables in Spain. His daughter 
claimed a quarter share, under a gift by the father in her 
marriage settlement made at a notary in Rome. The tribunal 
of first instance held the gift void under old Spanish law. 
The French Court of Cassation applied French C.C., 
article 1082, authorizing parents to dispose of their free 
portions in favor of children. "Succession as well as gift 
fall under the French lex situs ( C.C. art. 3. par. 2) ." 71 
4· Life Insurance 
It depends on the contract with the insurer and, if this 
allows beneficiaries to be designated, on the use of such 
clause, whether the debt is a part of the estate or not. In 
case the debt is not created for the benefit of the heirs as 
such (not individually to them) or the personal representa-
tives, the proceeds remain outside the succession. 72 From 
this rule, the New Zealand statute deviates, in barring the 
creditors of the estate from any life insurance.78 On the 
71 Cass. Civ. (Apr. 2, 1884) Clement 1885, 77· 
72 E.g., OLG. Kolmar (Dec. 10, 1912) Els. LZ. 1931, 576. 
78 On the conflicts aspects, FALCONBRIDGE 573· 
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other hand, some fiscal laws extend estate taxes to all life 
insurance benefits, which is a deterrent but otherwise does 
not affect the normal rule. 
A testator permitted to change the beneficiary may validly 
exercise this right at a time when he is a subject of a juris-
diction not offering this choice ;74 his right to change had 
"crystallized at the time of the issue of the policy." 75 
III. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE To TAKE EsTATES 
In the municipal systems, usually the state-crown or 
fisc-or a body designated by the state may claim an estate 
that lacks any testate or intestate successor. But this right 
is based on two different theories. Either the state exercises 
the old jus regale of occupying ownerless property-bona 
vacantia, escheat; this is the doctrine of the common law, 
most American statutes, Austria, France, Belgium, and the 
majority of Latin-American countries. Or the last class in 
the order of intestate descent calls the state as heir, jure 
hereditario, as in Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.76 
The conflicts rules tend to follow the domestic character-
ization. Thus, in the first group it has often been taken for 
granted that every state should act according to its own 
principle. Notably in France, almost all courts 77 and 
74 1n re Baeder and Canadian Order of Chosen Friends (Ontario 1916) 36 
OLR 30 [1916] 28 D.L.R. 424. 
75 FALCONBRIDGE 573· 
76 In Brazil the former lntrod. Law art. 14 left a doubt on the nature of 
the state's right, cf., BEVILAQUA (ed. 3) 398 f.; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 307. 
The law of 1942 is silent but the common opinion is for the right to bona 
vacantia. This view has spread and finds some adherence even in respect to 
French and English law; see E. J. COHN, 17 Mod. L. Rev. ( 1954) 38I. 
71 C. Paris (Nov. 15, 1833) S. 1833·2.593, D. 1884.2.2; Cass. civ. (June 28, 
1852) D. 1852.1.283, S. 1852.1.537: C. Paris (Jan. 20, 1923) Gaz. Pal. 
1923.1.228; 10 Repert. 540 n. 72. 
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writers 78 have constantly permitted the French fisc to 
occupy heirless inheritances irrespective of the domicil or 
nationality of the deceased. This was suggested either by 
a formerly unconscious and later conscious characterization 
of the state's right according to the lex fori, or by an im-
perative application of the lex situs. Accordingly, assets 
situated abroad are not claimed at all.79 But if "every court 
proceeds according to its own lex fori," 80 another state 
may well occupy the assets of a foreigner, such as a French-
man, and simultaneously appear as heir for foreign-situated 
assets of his own subjects when the situs agrees. 
Even in view of this doctrine, it is certain that the estate 
must be without a successor according to the law governing 
succession and that the inheritance law of the forum as such 
is of no importance; 81 the domestic law determining the 
nature of the state right would be that of the situs of the 
assets. 
With more effort to conciliate the two kinds of state 
rights, a widespread method makes the outcome dependent 
on the law applicable to the succession. If assets are in 
state X and the conflicts rule of X calls for the inheritance 
law of state Y, the law of Y appointing the state of Y 
(or any third state Z) as heir is obeyed in X. Only where 
the rule of Y is found to follow the doctrine of bona 
vacantia, would the forum in X prefer its domestic fisc. 
7 8 WEISS, 4 Traite 580; NIBOYET, Acquisition 2 56-28 I; MANUEL § 83 9; 
4 Traite 29I § 1173; 777 § I325; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, by MAURY AND 
VAILLETON I93 par. I58 (still speaking of qualification by lex fori but also 
of the political and regalia nature of the territorial right) ; IO Repert. 540, n. 
73· Noteworthy the contrary opinion of C. Paris (Dec. I3, I90I) D. I902.2.I77 
and CoLIN, note ibid. 
79 App. Tananariva (Madagascar, June 30, I909) Revue I9IO, 88I. 
80 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, 4 Traite (former ed.) §I 58. 
81 See the exposition of LIPARTITI, L'acquisto delle eredita vacanti, I29 
Arch. giur. ( I943) I and § 9, against other Italian authors who contend that 
foreign public law is not included in the reference to foreign law of succession; 
on this point see also supra Vol. II, pp. 565 f. 
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In this manner, the English courts found that the Austrian 
code 82 and the Turkish law as of I 9 r 5 83 shared the theory 
of the British law, and the Crown could take assets situated 
in Great Britain as ownerless. Again, by the same method, 
it was found that the Spanish state on the contrary is con-
sidered to be ultimus heres. 84 
This view has been followed in courts of both groups 85 
and by Wharton. 86 True, the German theory implies that 
there is no privilegium occupandi as respects American 
assets left in Germany, which remain ownerless to anybody's 
occupation. But this would not be followed. 87 Nevertheless, 
extension of state power, however qualified, over the borders 
of another state encounters rejection in many cases. Such 
opposition may not only come from the state of the situs. 
A decision of the Reichsgericht dealt with the estate of a 
82 In re Barnett Trust [I902] I Ch. 847, Clunet I9Q4, 4I5. 
83 In re Musurus [I936] 2 All E.R. 1666, criticized 61 L.Q.R. (I945) 440. 
Canada: In re Hole Est. (I948) 56 Man. L.R. 295; 27 Can. Bar Rev. 
( I949) 225· 
84 In re Maldonado [I953] 2 All E.R. 300; the method has been criticized 
by LIPSTEIN, Cambridge L.J. ( I954) 22, because there is no difference other 
than in the name between the claims of the state. 
85 Austria: WALKER 923 n. 59· 
Austria-Poland, Treaty of March I9, I924; SATTER, Note to OGH. 
(June 8, I932) I Giur. Comp. DIP. 30I. 
Austro-German Treaty of I927, § 4· 
Belgium, Cass. (March 28, I952), Rechtsk. W. 195I-52, I599• Rev. crit. 
I953, 132, concerning Swedish law, states that the Belgian ordre public is 
not affected. 
Germany: NIEMEYER, I3 Z. int. R. 38; NussBAUM 356; WOLFF, D. IPR. 
(ed. 3) 227 n. 4· 
Italy: Min. Relazione to R.D. Oct. 26, I939, n. 1586; Cass. Roma (Aug. 20, 
I900) Annali giur. it. I900, I SIS; Cass. Torino (March u, 1922) Giur. 
Ita!. 1922 I 407. 
Poland: IPL. art. 3 I. 
Spain: 2 GoLDSCHMIDT 260. 
Switzerland: N.A.G. art. 28; SCHNITZER 463. 
Spanish-Greek Treaty of Sept. 22, 1903, art. 16: lex situs for immovables, 
national law of the decedent for movables. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 57· 
86 WHARTON§ 603; see WoERNER§§ 134 ff. 
81 See M. WOLFF, D.IPR. (ed. 3) 57 § 13-4(a); cf., RG. (May 16, 1940) 
166 RGZ. 395· 
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Russian emigree who was stateless under the former Ger-
man rule that stateless persons were subject to their former 
national law. The court discarded the Soviet inheritance 
law, terming it a noninheritance law, because this law re-
stricted private succession so radically just to make place 
for succession by the state, closely resembling a right of 
escheat. A right of the situs was therefore denied, and the 
estate turned over to the normal order of distribution.88 
Under these circumstances, a third thesis has appeared, 
to the effect that even in the jurisdictions construing their 
own privilege at home as a hereditary position, for the 
purpose of conflicts law the taking should be restricted to 
assets found in the territory. Following this lead, the Hague 
drafts recognize the national law of the deceased merely 
in favor of private beneficiaries, excluding the state and the 
corporations designated by it. 89 This approach saves ex-
amination of the nature of a foreign claim and eliminates 
claims practically defeated by an opposed lex situs. A recent 
American suggestion is in virtual agreement.90 
In the relationship among common law jurisdictions, of 
course, only the question which state may exercise the right 
of escheat arises, and its decision depends on the situation 
of the assets. 91 
88 RG. (May 16, 1940) 166 RGZ. 395· 
89 Hague draft convention on succession 1904, art. 2; 1928, art. 4· This 
model has been followed in some recent drafts, among them the Rumanian 
Civil Code art. 38 (the Code never entered into force). However, here the 
case is included where the relatives sharing under the national Jaw of the 
deceased are not endowed with intestate rights by the Rumanian law. This 
seems a curious anticipation of Soviet mentality. 
90 jOSEPH MORSE, "Characterization, Shadow and Substance," 49 Col. L. 
Rev. 1027, 1038. 
91 Connecticut Mutual Life v. Moore ( 1948} 333 U.S. 541. 
CHAPTER 71 
Acquisition of Inheritance Rights 
I. DEVOLUTION 
r. Principle 
M UNICIPAL Systems. The doctrine of common law contains two different systems of transmitting the 
decedent's assets. As the principle has remained 
in most jurisdictions of the United States, real estate is 
vested in the "heirs" from the decedent's death, whereas 
personal property first goes to the probate court, which in 
turn confirms or appoints the personal representative; only 
after administration is finished is the net surplus distributed 
to the beneficiaries. 
In England since the Transfer Acts started in r897 1 real 
property shares the treatment of the rest of the estate. 
Some American statutes have adopted the same regulation; 
most statutes provide the personal representative with im-
portant powers of sale, possession, income, or distribution 
of land, without disturbing the direct passing of the title 
to the heirs. 
However, the variety of the statutes is so great and the 
desire for more uniformity so strong that the Model Pro-
bate Code could state the principle, a person's real and 
personal property passes to the persons to whom it is de-
vised by his last will or it devolves by intestate succession, 
though subject to the possession of the personal repre-
sentative.1 
1 SIMES, Model Probate Code § 84. 
375 
INHERITANCE 
In the ancient family organization, by the death of the 
father and the leader, the descendents who were thereby 
freed from his power-sui heredes, yvqULot1 etc.-became 
actual instead of latent co-owners. When the property 
system hardened, this heirship was transformed into auto-
matic-uipso iure"-succession to the decedent's owner-
ship. The pure spirit of feudal law would have insisted on 
the exclusive effect of new enfeoffment. 
This principle, known in medieval and dynastic applica-
tions under the slogans: le mort saisit levi/, or le roi est mort, 
vive le roi, survives in the French group of legal systems 
principally with respect to the oldest group of "heirs," those 
ab intestato, and in the German Code and its group as the 
general rule, because it is the simplest method of transfer. 
In Rome successors outside the "house," whether intestate 
or appointed by will, the heredes extranei, including col-
lateral relations, did not acquire ipso iure. The beneficiaries 
were "called" ( delatio), and had to acquire the legally 
offered position by acceptance, viz. formal ( cretio) or in-
formal express declaration (aditio) or conduct (pro herede 
gestio). This is in substance the general system in many 
countries. 
Conflicts rule. What system governs the transfer of an 
estate, according to a view commonly taken for granted, 
depends on the law governing the succession. This is so 
universally settled that attention is required only by an in-
cisive exception, that French decisions endeavor to consoli-
date. They dwell on the necessity of exempting a series of 
incidents from the law of succession and submit them to 
the law of the situs.2 This discussion involves mainly the 
2 Most informative on the division of opinions in France in recent times, 
has been to me the subtle (though by no means convincing) monograph: 
ROBERT DENNERY, Le partage en DIP (Paris 1935). NIBOYET, who had much 
in common with the emphasis on territoriality, seems to have gained a critical 
and constructive view in his Treatise, vol. 4· 
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transfer of title and possession, undivided ownership of 
coheirs and partition, but affects fundamentals. This theory, 
indeed, exercised through the French delegates to the Hague 
Conference of 1928, influenced the fate of the Hague con-
vention draft. Although the scope of the draft, article 1, 
does contain "partition," to the regret of some pres·ent 
French authors, everything concerning the practical handling 
of the inheritance or exceeding the ascertainment of the 
beneficiaries and their participation, especially all relations 
with the creditors or even all "third persons," was excluded 
and left to the extremely varied national systems. This 
would have been understandable in part, if Anglo-Ameri-
can doctrines had been taken into decisive consideration; 
as it was, an inter-European codification decapitated itself 
for the sake of a questionable theory. 
Let us recall here merely the elementary phase of the 
problem. 
It is no exception to the principle of the law governing 
succession at all that lex situs is itself the lex successionis 
in the United States, France, etc. Most decisions applying 
lex situs fall into this category. 
In the case of movables, almost all systems agree in 
gathering them into one succession, whether determined 
by domicil or nationality of the decedent. What sense would 
this make, if the unity were to yield wholly to the lex situs 
for such important questions as title and possession? Is 
it not enough that the lex situs has final determination of 
the permissible kind of rights in re and the publicity required 
for their acquisition? 
This important question will have to be faced in the 
following discussions. 
INHERITANCE 
2. Transmission 
(a) Title. Apart from the case of coheirs, there is com-
plete universal agreement that the title of heir as successor 
depends upon the law governing succession, be it lex situs 
or lex domicilii or lex patriae. It is likewise certain that his 
ownership in the individual tangible and intangible assets is 
conditioned by the law of situs in the two respects that the 
local law defines what rights the deceased owned and 
whether they are susceptible of being transferred to the 
heir. Of course, also publicity measures, such as registra-
tion, may be needed in relation to third parties. 
But if under the law of succession the title vests in the 
court, should the situs ignore this and impose its own rule 
that the heir is owner; or vice versa? This question is 
fortunately quite generally answered in the negative. In 
many, not even published, cases it has been held, as a matter 
of course, on the Continent that during an English or 
American administration the beneficiaries were not owners, 
and, hence, not entitled to sue or apply for registration as 
proprietor of Italian land or a German automobile.8 When 
at the end of the first World War an Italian national, heir 
to an Austrian inheritance, had not yet accepted and received 
judicial authorization according to the Austrian law, he 
was not admitted to sue the Austrian state at the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.4 
On the other hand, an heir in a French, German, or 
Italian succession has often, though perhaps not always, 
3 This does not mean that a European universal legatee in an American 
succession is considered in all respects as nonowner. The question of the 
time when he owes death duties in France has been discussed in Cass. req. 
(Nov. 19, 1941) S. 1942.1.129 and learned note by BATIFFOL (from which 
I dissent, however) ; German courts grant him a certificate of heirship, infra 
Ch. 71. 
4 TAM. Italo-Austriaco, Norlenghi v. Austria, 7 Recueil dec. Trib. Arb. 
Mixt. 266. On a dissident theory that common law refers to the lex situs, 
infra Ch. 71. 
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been recognized by American or English courts as "having 
title to and right of possession of the assets vested im-
mediately" in him, as well as entitled to sue "on his own 
behalf and not in a representative capacity." 5 Or he has 
been appointed as ancillary administrator.6 Even though a 
beneficiary does not obtain full property, he may acquire a 
"fixed and vested" 7 hereditary right; it is elementary that 
this depends on the law governing succession. For this and 
other reasons it has been justly urged that American banks 
and corporation registrars ought not always to insist on 
the appointment of an ancillary administration for allow-
ing them to deliver deposits or transfer stock, respectively.8 
(b) Possession (seisin). 9 According to the French and 
other civil codes, certain heirs, 10 and under the German and 
other codes all heirs, 11 by force of law succeed by the death 
of the decedent to the possession he had. 
On this point, French and Italian opinions are clearly 
divided into two groups, one applying the law of the sue-
5 England: Re Achillopoulos [1928] Ch. 483. 
United States: New York: The Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian ( 1915) 213 
N.Y. 420, 108 N.E. 72 (Turkish law); Ullmann v. Ullmann (1928) 223 App. 
Div. 636, 229 N.Y.S. 176 (German law); Roques v. Grosjean (1946) 66 
N.Y.S. (2d) 348 (French law). California: Anglo-California Nat!. Bank of 
San Francisco v. Lazard (CCA 9, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 693, 698, involving 
Californian land, with precedents. 
6 ln/ra, Ch. 71. 
7 Rowe v. Cullen (1939) 177 Md. 357, 9 Atl. (2d) 585. 
8 OPToN, "Recognition of Foreign Heirship and Succession Rights to Per-
sonal Property in America," 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. ( 1950) 156, 163. In 
Roques v. Grosjean, supra n. 5, the demand for ancillary letters is called 
untenable. 
9 GIAMBATTISTA MAZZOLINI, L'apprensione dell'eredita nel DIP., (Pavia 
1930). 
10 E.g., France and Belgium: C.C. art. 724; Italy C.C. art. 458; Nether-
lands: C.C. art. 88o. 
11 E.g., Germany: BGB § 857; Switzerland: C.C. art. s6o; Venezuela: 
C.C. art. 99 5: very clearly in par. 2: If someone, not an heir takes possession 
of the hereditary assets, the heirs are considered ejected in fact, and may 
exercise all respective actions. 
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cession 12 and the other the lex situs.13 The latter and more 
recent view is based on the power of the territorial law to 
regulate the legal situation of property. Although a French 
decision of I 939, speaking of the indivisibility of seisin, 
recognized the last domicil as governing, 14 the highest court 
invoked in I94I the principle of territoriality.15 If this 
is true, a foreign succession can never create seisin in France, 
nor a French succession possession in any foreign country. 
French immovables, of course, are out of the question.16 
For the other cases, reconciliation of views has been sought 
by the requisite that the consent of the lex situs is needed 
in addition to the law of the succession 17 or, more specifi-
cally, the foreign inheritance law should be recognized in 
the cases where the French Civil Code grants seisin.18 Thus, 
a German testate heir could not claim seisin, while a German 
heir ab intestato could. 
The entire discussion suffers from a confusion. In the 
German doctrine, it is understood that § 857 BGB. states 
a "succession" of the heir or heirs to the possession in a 
strictly limited sense.19 It is the legal position of the de-
12 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 594, 605; 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT by VIALLETON 
ET MAURY 290 § 222; Trib. s~ine (Dec. 8, 1924)' Clunet 1925, 711, Revue 
192 5, 76; and NIBOYET, 4 Traite 864 f. against his former opinion. 
Italy: Cass. Firenze (Nov. 17, 1874) Annali Jan. 8, 483, La Legge 1875 
I 3; PACIFICI-MAZZONI, Instituzioni (ed. s, 1925) 509; STOLFI, r Dir. Civ. 
( 1919) 727 and n. 4· 
13 France: CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Successions 381, 384; PILLET, 2 Traite 386, 
586, 449 § 618: everything concerning possession is territorial; LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 409 § 362, § 363, § 370. 
Italy: FIORE, Elementi DIP. 526 and in Giur. Ital. 1901 IV 193 ff.; PACIFICI-
MAZZONI ib. (supra n. 9) ; FEDOZZI, 4 Digesto Italiano 836; DIENA 218; 
GIAMBATTISTA, supra n. 5, 10 calls it the majority opinion; CAVAGLIERI, 
Lezioni (ed. 2) 258. 
14 Trib. Seine (Jan. 4, 1939) D.1939·2.17. 
15 Cass. req. (Nov. 19, 1941) S.1942.1.129, cf., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
(ed. 6) 411, 2°. 
16 Cour Paris (Oct. 25, 1952) Gaz. Pal. 1953·1.190. 
17 BATIFFOL, Traite 674 § 671. 
18 ARMINJON, 3 Precis (ed. 2) 149 § 135. 
19 STROHAL, Erbrecht 63 ff., 96 ff.; M. WOLFF, Sachenrecht 121; STAUD-
INGER, Komm. § 857 II, 
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ceased at his death, based on his physical or constructive 
possession of the assets, that passes, not the possession of 
the particular assets as such. The heir has the actions for 
recovery acquired by the deceased in his lifetime; he may 
take possession and sue any one who takes possession of 
the assets without his consent; the tangible assets so taken 
are in the category of things "taken away" which cannot 
be purchased by third persons in good faith; that is, the 
purchaser does not acquire a good title, although he does 
acquire good possession. The heir also enjoys the easier 
role as defendant in law suits affecting property. But 
between seisin and possession in the meaning of property 
law is a neat difference. 
Some modern French civilists have admirably perceived 
a quite analogous distinction between saisine of a "natural 
hCritier" and physical possession of the assets, "although 
the contrary is often said." 20 The heir may take possession 
and may sue others who do so; he may especially bring 
possessory actions. His position rules the estate rather than 
the components, the particular assets.21 
From these facts it follows that the law of succession 
alone determines whether an heir has seisin. True, theo-
retically, consent by the lex situs is necessary to his protec-
tion; but why should it not be given? 
That French courts should require a German widow, 
though not children, to request envoi en possession 22 would 
be scarcely worthwhile; with better reason it has been pro-
posed to enlarge the scope of C.C. art. 724 to include all 
universal successors. Again, the law of the situs determines 
alone the cases of actual possession (ude fait"). 
It would seem that the above submitted distinction IS 
20 MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 262 § 196. 
21 BALLADORE PALLIERI, DIP. 176 f. 
22 Thus 4 FRANKENSTEIN 324, following the French doctrine. 
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suitable also to Anglo-American law, inasmuch as the per-
sonal representative (and in most American jurisdictions· 
the heir to land) acquires ipso jure-in the words of the 
British Administration Act-"the same right of action as 
the deceased would have had alive ... for any ... right in 
respect of his personal estate," 23 (or of his land) . 
(c) Specific Legacy 
Assuming that a Frenchman domiciled in New York is 
bequeathed by specific legacy a violin stored in a German 
safe, what law determines the nature of his interest? Ac-
cording to American law, a legatee has no right until the 
court order of distribution, and before this time his action 
at law needs the assent of the administrator; 24 under French 
law he is owner by the death (leg a tum vindicationis) ; 25 
German law grants him merely an obligatory claim against 
the heir.26 The prevailing opinion is that the effect of 
French law of succession is reduced in German territory 
to an obligation until some act of delivery intervenes. 21 
3· Acceptance and Repudiation 
The law of succession determines whether acceptance is 
required to complete the acquisition, or renunciation is 
needed to annul it. An heir or a next of kin in the narrow 
meaning of the common law cannot even disclaim his in-
heritance, although he may lose or part with his share by 
other events. Devisees and legatees may renounce, except 
in certain jurisdictions when their creditors would be de-
feated.28 Why the rule is different for descent by will 
2 3 Administration of Estates Act, I 92 s, sec. 26 ( I) • 
2 4 WOERNER § S6I, I9IO. 
25 France: C. C. art. I014. 
26 BGB. § 1974; on the interpretation of legacies so as to satisfy the lex 
situs, see NussBAUM 301 n. 3· Lex situs determines the content of the devised 
right, RG. (Oct. 2, 1931) IPRspr. 193I, 175 No. 88. 
21 BGB. § 2I74· 
2 8 ATKINSON, 3 Am. Property 629 ; § 14.1 s ; 26 C.J .S. 1073 § 64 and Supp. 
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is explained by historical arguments, but is maintained only 
because it exists. 29 Also in China and Japan, as in ancient 
Rome, for religious reasons the "necessary" heirs cannot 
disclaim. 
The inheritance law determines the time limits 30 and 
the address for express declarations 31 of acceptance or 
renunciation, as well as their form.32 
However, this application not infrequently encounters 
rather unsatisfactory local laws with presumptions for 
acceptance, short time periods, heavy sanctions for silence, 
which may burden beneficiaries in foreign jurisdictions even 
without their knowledge. American statutes ordinarily have 
no time limits or allow a reasonable time; but an evident 
hardship occurs for instance when a five-year period of 
escheat runs against foreign heirs without their knowl-
edge. 33 The case where a person became an heir by omitting 
renunciation and thereby incurred unlimited liability for 
debts has been noted in Germany. 
Illustration. A laborer domiciled in Hamburg died with-
out an estate; under the law of Hamburg the father in 
Holstein was ipso jure heir and could renounce only within 
six weeks, which elapsed. The father was sued by the 
guardian for alimony which his son promised to pay to an 
29 Bostian v. Milens ( 1946) 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W. (2d) 797, 170 
AL.R. 424. As the annotation on p. 439 observes, the rule against renuncia-
tion is not adopted in Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico. 
30 In civil law, PILLET, 2 Traite applies the law of succession to these 
"modalities of the option," as condition of the devolution. In the codes, the 
time periods are spelled out; at common law renunciation, where permitted, 
may be made in reasonable time, 4 PAGE 1408. 
31 Usually the court at the last domicil of the deceased. 
32 C/., 4 PAGE 1406. If it is sometimes said that the formalities are deter-
mined by the law of the place where the acts are done, e.g., SAVATII!R 308, 441, 
the meaning must be the same. 
33 In re Apostolopoulos' Est. (1926) 68 Utah 344, 250 Pac. 469, 253 Pac. 
III7, 48 A.L.R. 1322. Only where a treaty prescribes actual notice to con-
sular authorities, is there prevention. The Supreme Court declares public 
notice to be adequate. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey ( 1950) 341 U.S. 428, 
434· 
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illegitimate child. The court in Kiel held it "unthinkable 
that so long as the defendant, a subject of the forum, had 
not interfered with the inheritance or otherwise submitted 
to the foreign jurisdiction, he could be held liable for the 
debts." 34 
This decision followed precedents and a note by Bar.35 
It has been suggested that the law of succession in such 
matters should be entirely excluded in favor of the personal 
law of the beneficiary,36 but this would unduly disturb the 
system. Protection by public policy seems to be the only 
remedy so long as many inheritance laws are unmindful 
of the international complications. 
The Hague Draft following a different suggestion omitted 
acceptance and renunciation from the incidents controlled 
by the law of succession (art. 1) for the reason that these 
acts "may exercise influence on third persons." 37 This con-
fused idea, again, stems from the destructive belief in the 
lex situs as the great instrument of territorialism. 
Another example of the present discord is caused by the 
reasonable rule that renunciation should be sent to the 
authority at the last domicil of the deceased. In the case 
of a Dutch testator, domiciled in Germany, the difficulty 
arose that Dutch law, governing the succession, prescribed 
that the declaration be directed to the court of the last 
domicil, whereas the German courts, under another well-
meant principle, declined any jurisdiction in foreign-governed 
successions. 38 
Some discussion has turned around the French provision 
34 OLG. Kiel (Oct. 23, r884) 40 Seulf. Arch. (1885) 257, accord OLG. 
Hamburg (Dec. 17, 1889) I Z. int. R. 55, Clunet 1893, 197. 
35 2 BAR 343 n. 9: the decision of the Prussian Obertribunal erroneously 
cited by BAR and the courts probably is that of the Plenary, of Jan. 6, 185r, 
20 Entsch. OT ro, insisting on the knowledge of the beneficiary of the 
devolution. 
36 4 FRANKENSTEIN 535· 
37 Actes de la Sixieme Conference, 1928, p. So. 
38 RABEL, Fachgebiete 178 If. 
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that a minor heir may accept a share only under the benefit 
of inventory, i.e., limiting his liability for debts to the value 
of the estate inventory. It seems now agreed that the per-
sonal law fixes the time of full age, but that the French rule 
involves only French-governed successions.39 
A future Conference would do well to search for im-
plementation of the conflicts rules by international co-oper-
ation instead of cutting out an essential part of the subject. 
II. AGREEMENTS ON INHERITANCE RIGHTS 
I. Release to Ancestor 
Distribution 1 of the paternal estate among the sons 
( divisio paterna) 40 was a frequent event in ancient times 
when the father had reached the age of retirement. Entirely 
normal was the dismissal of a daughter from the house on 
marriage, a dowry replacing her share in the family prop-
erty. A subsequent usage was the analogous emancipation 
of male descendants. There exists still a special institution 
in some Latin systems allowing pacts between an ancestor 
and a descendant releasing the latter's expectancy; 41 such 
agreements are similarly recognized in most states of the 
United States, 42 although in some jurisdictions the expec-
39 For particulars see 10 Repertoire 514 no. 99; CHARRON 168; see also 
FISCHER, 64 Z. Schweiz. R. at 139-141. It has been concluded that a French 
minor cannot accept any foreign succession where the law governing it does 
not permit just this means of limiting liability; MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 
PLANIOL ET RIPERT 324 n. 3 § 240j contra ("absurd") 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 
256. 
4° For antiquity see RABEL, Elterliche Teilung, in Festschrift 49· Versamm-
lung deutscher Philologen (Basel 1907) ; for Italian history, VITTORIO PoLAcco, 
Divisione operata da Ascendenti fra Discendenti (Padova 1884). 
41 E.g., Venezuela: C. C. art. u26 ff. 
Spain: C.C. art. 833 in case of Mejora. 
The provisions of French C.C. arts. 1078-1o8o, "Pacte d'ascendant," are 
distinguishable. 
42 ATKINSON, 3 Am. Property 594 § 14.12 who notes that no cases are 
known relating to release by a collateral heir. 
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tancy cannot be released and the gift is treated as advance-
ment on account of the hereditary share.43 
These are exceptions either to the prohibition of agree-
ments of future inheritance or to the requirement of con-
sideration. In the German group, however, waiver of 
expectancy is allowed by transaction with any testator.u 
In the case of marriage settlements in England, a release 
declared to the ancestor seems to be regarded simply as 
part of the contract inter vivos and valid as such.45 Else-
where, however, permission or prohibition belongs to the 
law finally controlling the estate,46 which certainly is the 
correct characterization. An old Italian decision conformed 
to this conception in the face of the Italian prohibition, but 
emphasized that the daughter's release occurred in a mar-
riage contract made in Zara, Austria, between Austrian 
parties, and the will declared Austrian law applicable; 47 
perhaps for a daughter of Italian nationality the issue would 
have been different on grounds of public policy. 
2. Release of Expectancy in General 
In the late Roman law, pacta de hereditate futura were 
void in view of the exploitation of spendthrift heirs by 
speculators. This tradition was followed by Pothier. In 
the French revolution, renunciation of a future inheritance 
was prohibited as offending public honesty, and in the 
43 26 C.J.S. 1085 § 62. 
44 See infra n. 52. 
45 BRESLAUER So cites old cases. 
46 Cf., infra sub 2. 
47 Italy: C. C. ( 1865) art. 954; Cass. Firenze (Dec. 5, 1896) Lanza v. 
Purkardhofer, Sirey 1897-4-17, Clunet 1897, 503 (Fedozzi). Cf., (Senator) 
AuG. PIERANTONI, "La rinuncia alia successione nel DIP.," Rivista universale 
di Giurisprudenza e Dottrina, vol. 10, fasc. VII (Roma 1896) ; FEDOZZI, 22 
Digesto Ita!. IV 837 j CONTUZZI, Dir. ereditario 486. 
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Code 48 as a means to prevent renunciations by daughters 
or younger sons under moral duress and to maintain equality 
among the relatives. 49 Any contracts of third persons be-
tween themselves without 50 the assent of the testator are 
commonly disapproved. In Louisiana, a most radical vari-
ant prohibits all releases and agreements on future inherit-
ance even with the assent of the testator.51 Other statutes 
recognize the validity of releases and other anticipated dis-
positions of future shares, 52 contrary to the French group, 
provided that there is no usury or lesion evident. 
In the latter group, no obstacle exists to the application 
of the law of succession. 53 In the courts that consider an 
agreement of such sort not necessarily immoral, the decision 
should be the same. There seems not to be even a question 
on this point in the United States, as will appear presently. 
3· Promise of Testamentary Disposal 
In the larger part of the civil law, the Roman principle 
persists that ambulatoria enim est voluntas testatoris; the 
testator must be free, until the last moment of his capacity 
to make a will, to dispose of his property; the testament 
48 France: C.C. arts. 791, 1130 par. 2, 1600. 
Italy: C.C. (1865) art. 954; (1942) art. 458. 
Sweden: Law of April 25, 1930, with qualifications. 
Spain: C.C. art. 816, 655. 
49 LAURENT, 9 Droit civil 418 ff. 
50 Thus Switzerland, C.C. art. 636. 
51 La. C.C. arts. 978, 1887, 1017; Alexander v. Gray (La. App. I938) I8I 
So. 639. 
52 Austria: A BGB. 551 cf., §538; Germany: BGB. 2346, 2352; Switzer-
land: ZGB. art. 195. 
53 Czechoslovakia: IPL. 48 par. 2. 
Denmark: S.C. Copenhague (June 25, I902) Clunet I904, 436, IS Z. int. 
R. 6os, Revue I91o, so8. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 29, I883) 8 RGZ. I4S; OLG. Stuttgart (May I9, I893) 
4 Z. int. R. 567; 2 ZITELMANN 966, 17I; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 370; M. WOLFF, 
DIP. R. (ed. 3) 228 n. I. 
Switzerland: SCHNITZER 473· 
Transvaal: Berman v. Winrow ( I943) T.P.D. 2I3· 
INHERITANCE 
therefore is his "last will." In sharp contrast to this con-
ception, common law has opened a vast domain to contracts 
whereby a person undertakes to make or not to make certain 
testamentary provisions. 54 The action for breach of such a 
contract arising at the death of the promissor directly 
affects the distributary shares. The modern state statutes, 
however, eliminate at least oral promises of this kind, which 
raise doubt and litigation, if opposition to the old custom 
does not go further. These laws are now really in conflict. 
A recent case that went through all New York courts 55 
dealt with an oral promise of the testator not to change 
his will involving certain stock. The agreement was valid 
at the place of the alleged contracting in Florida, but was 
held invalid under c. 3 1, § 7, of the Personal Property Act 
of New York. With a former decision, the fundamental 
public policy of this statute to prohibit oral bindings that 
"threatened the security of estates" was stressed. However, 
New York was the state presiding over the estate. What 
was explicitly, but only secondarily stated by the Court 
of Appeals that the domicil was and had been for a long 
time in New York, should have been the decisive ground. 
With the present division of statutory rules in this country, 
there is not much room for intransigent policy. In addi-
tion, the Court used as a different approach the proposition 
that New York was the place "of performance" for the 
agreement not to change the will. Those mechanical con-
necting factors generate curious ideas I The contract may 
well be considered centered in New York for the reason 
that the testator had merely temporarily sojourned for 
recovery in Florida and both parties lived in New York. 
54 68 C.J. s6s ff. §§ 187 ff.; 17 C.J.S. 646 § 263. 
55 In re Rubin's Will, Rubin v. Irving Trust Co. (1953) 305 N.Y. 288, 
113 N.E. (2d) 424, affirming App. Div. 113 N.Y.S. (2d) 70; the decision pro-
vokes once more the question of the scope of the law of administration, see 
infra Ch. 73-
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In civil-law countries distinctions are made, as in a French 
case: 
Frederic Meyer, of Hamburg, lived in Bordeaux from 
I 8os to his death in I 878, but supposedly remained a non-
domiciled German, as also his son. When the latter mar-
ried, the father promised in the marriage settlement before 
a notary that he would not give any advantage to his other 
children to the detriment of his son. The Court of Cassa-
tion held the promise valid, because it conformed to the 
French principle of equality, even though it might be con-
sidered immoral in Germany. Hence the agreement pre-
vailed over the subsequent will that was governed by Ger-
man law.56 
This is exactly how an American court evaluates the 
breach of a joint reciprocal will in terms of damages.57 
As a result, it would seem that a valid contract binding 
the testator under its "proper law" should be respected even 
in courts taking a strict view of freedom of testation inso-
far as a reasonable construction of their statutes permits. 
III. Anv AN CEMENTS (collatio bonorum) 
Again, it is settled in principle that the law of the succes-
sion determines whether and by which method a gift made 
by the deceased in his lifetime to a beneficiary must be 
brought to account by him. 58 
In fact, the problem concerns the collection of the dis-
tributable estate and the access of the heirs to it. 
56 Cass. req. (Jan. 9, r88z) D. r88z.I.II9· 
57 Supra. 
58 France: Cass. req. (June z8, r88z) Clunet r88z, 415; WEISS, 4 Traite 
688; PILLET, 2 Traite 400 § 596; ARMINJON, 3 Precis (ed. 2) 160 § 144 and 
the great majority. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 24, r88z) Hans. GZ. r88z BBl. 33 Nr. 27. 
Italy: 4 FIORI! 457; CoNTUZZI, Dir. ered. 543· 
Hague Draft, art. 1. 
Montevideo Treaty, art. so par. r. 
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Of course, the law governing the gift-e.g., the law of 
the parent-child relation or of an obligatory contract-
imposes its own conditions for validity and effects; these 
may constitute a duty or a dispensation from a duty to 
account for the gift at the death of the donor. Therefore, 
the Hague drafts (I 929, art. 2) insist that where the gift 
was originally exempted from collation under its own law, 
it should not be considered an advance on the hereditary 
share, even though the law of the last domicil were to the 
contrary; but this unratified rule is not beyond doubt. 59 
The very elaborate but much divided statutory doctrine 
of advancement in the United States,60 apparently unknown 
outside this country, has taken no position in conflicts 
matters. It is evident only that, in the absence of statutes 
defining expressly what is to be considered an advancement, 
courts are inclined to look to the intention of the transferor 
at the time of making the transfer.61 
Correspondingly, it certainly may be said with the civilian 
doctrine that where a rule of the law governing a gift or 
an acknowledgeable intention of the donor implies a duty 
of adjustment, this is binding so long as the donor by his 
will, or the law of the succession in his place, does not 
change the situation. The law governing the succession has· 
the nearest claim to dominate 62 and the law of the transaction 
59 The case of French Cass. civ. (March 16, 188o) D. I88o.1.201, 
S. 188o.1.174, Clunet 188o, 195 contributing to this rule, involves the special 
case of the annexion of Savoy, an intertemporal problem independent of the 
donor's intention, and does not warrant broad generalizations. 
60 WoERNER (ed. 3) 1879; ATKINSON, 3 Am. Prop. 14.10j 26 C.J.S. u64 
93-IIS. 
61 28 C.J.S. § 98 n. 94· 
62 France: Cass. (Aug. 8, 1921) Clunet 1923, 108: An Alsatian wife having 
made gifts to her husband under the French Code died under the German 
Code; the latter, not imposing a duty of accounting, governed. 
Italy: Cass. Roma (Jan. 4, 1902) Foro Ital. 1902 I 558. A Turk made a 
gift to his son, but died as an Italian. The Italian law imposed accounting, 
despite the Turkish law. 
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inter 'Vi'Vos applies only in virtue of a renvoi to it.63 The 
same law determines how far the intention of the donor and 
testa tor is decisive. 64 
Courts do have some difficulty in reconciling the two 
laws, but the clue should lie in a reasonable interpretation 
of the law of succession. 
Illustration. In an old case, a Swiss widow, remarrying 
a Frenchman, obeyed a statute of the canton of Bern, and 
transferred a part of her property to her children. French 
law governed her estate, but because article 843 C. C. speaks 
only of "donations" to be brought to urapport," the Paris 
court denied the advancement, 65 a literal construction in-
stead of possibly better reasons. 
If, against the present usual method, the contribution to 
the estate must be made in nature, e.g., because of a stipula-
tion by the donor, the rights of third persons will be pro-
tected by the lex situs. 
Trouble starts when there is more than one law of suc-
cession, as in the United States in the case of land, when 
the land is made subject to adjustment at all.66 
IV. PARTITION 
I. Coheirship 
By the various systems, the several successors to a de-
cedent are made either co-owners of the assets pro di'Viso 
(pro rata parte) as for instance in Roman and French 
law with respect to debts due to the decedent (nomina sunt 
63 Such renvoi is assumed by PILLET, z Traite 381 under the theory of 
vested rights. 
64 This, of course, does not exclude the dictum of WEISS, Traite 688: only 
the giver's personal law at the time of the gift can control the interpretation 
of his intention, irrespective of the situs. 
65 Cour Paris (Jan. 7, 1870) S. 1870.2.97· 
66 Infra Ch. 72. 
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ipso jure divisa) ,67 or joint tenants as under German law 68 
and in certain cases in the United States, entitled or not 
to dispose each of his part in the estate as a whole or only 
by majority or unanimity. 
This structure of the shares is commonly considered a 
succession problem. 
The new French territoriality theory, however, subordi-
nates the question to the lex situs and a Report of the Sixth 
Hague Conference states that partition pertains to the law 
of succession covered by the draft only so far as it concerns 
the coheirs inter se. As an illustration, Basdevant invoked 
in the Hague Conference the much discussed agreement 
of coheirs respecting movables in France and Italy, that 
they should remain undivided through ten years; the then 
Italian Code (art. 984) permitted this period, the French 
( C.C. art. 815) only one of five years. 69 Why this case 
should prove the necessity of the lex situs for the relation-
ship among coheirs or for partition has never been demon-
strated.70 
Clearly, the law governing succession is indispensable for 
determining not only the distributive parts· but also the 
persons replacing the deceased in the ownership of the 
tangible and intangible assets and who can dispose of them 
between the decedent's departure and partition. Thus, with-
6 7 C.C. art. 1220; formerly it was thought that this article applies before 
partition and art. 883 (infra) afterward; now art. 1220 is referred to third 
persons and art. 883 to the internal relationship. 3 CoLIN ET CAPITANT (ed. 
9) 300 § 535; MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 754 § 655. 
68 BGB. §§ 2032 ff. 
69 Actes de Ia Sixieme Conference ( 1928) 88f. and Rapport de Ia Troisieme 
Commission p. 297; also Actes de Ia Cinquieme Conference, Rapport p. 271, 
no. r. 
7° Cf., 2 BAR 348. Trib. Seine (May 25, 1935) Clunet 1936, 875 and the 
older authors (WEISS, 4 Traite 683 and others) invoke public policy; in 10 
Repert. 101 No. II both lex situs and lex successionis are considered applied. 
BATIFFOL 683 contends that the French conception of undivided co-ownership 
(indivision) requires the limitation on its duration (just to five years?). 
BIBLIONI, Anteproyecto 252: "La divisione forzata es el disastro." 
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out hesitation, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals followed this 
law in order to ascertain the nationality of the persons 
entitled by it. 71 It is difficult to see why the old condition 
for a real right, namely, that it needs recognition, though 
not creation, by the lex situs, should not suffice again. 
Is this not also true of real subrogation? In France itself, 
the Court of Cassation in plenary session has held that 
where land or an estate is sold, the debt of the price replaces 
the land in the mass of the estate as an "effect of succes-
sion," for the purposes of jurisdiction and advancement.72 
Real subrogation in fact is a phenomenon of a law govern-
ing an estate, 73 whereas the lex situs claimed here 74 governs 
merely the individual objects. 
2. Partition 
(a) 17 oluntary partttton. The civil law systems dis-
tinguish three kinds of dissolution of a coheirship : by agree-
ment, by a nonlitigious judicial act, or by judgment in 
contentious proceedings. Division by contract is more usual 
in Central Europe than in the Latin countries. 
In a widely noted decision of 1932, the French Court of 
Cassation recognized freedom of party disposal for a 
voluntary partition among the heirs of the Duke of Bourbon 
concluded before the Grand Marshal of the Vienna Im-
perial Court with discrimination against the female sex and 
71 TAM. Franco-Austrian (Dec. 9, 1927) 7 Recueil dec. Trib. Arb. Mixt. 
659; Germano-Rumanian and Franco-German decisions, see infra n. 82, 
though with the former construction of French C.C. art. 1220. Thus far 
also the Italian writers, such as CAVAGLIERI, Lezioni ( ed. 2) 249; FEDOZZI 
(ed. 2) 632 seem to agree with the text against FUSINATO, Della Iegge 
regulatrice della divisione de beni ereditari situati in territorio straniero 
(Torino 1898). But see supra n. 10. 
72 Cass., Chambres Reunies (Dec. s, 1907) D. 1908.1.II3, S. 1908.1.1. 
'la Cf., 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT (1945) § II27 (d). It is integrated in a par-
ticular legal institution, LAURIOL, Subrogation reelle ( 1954) § 698, §§ 720 ff. 
74 PICARD in 3 PLANIOL ET RlPERT 50 j DENNER¥, Partage 54 j BATIFFOL 663. 
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including succession to the castle of Chambord in France. 75 
Despite much criticism respecting the various aspects of the 
case, it certainly has authority wherever a voluntary parti-
tion agrees with the law governing succession. This point 
was questionable in the case; but if no asset subject to the 
separate lex situs is included, the local situation as such has 
no claim for an exception. 
It has been noted that in this and another case the French 
courts characterized proceedings occurring in Vienna accord-
ing to the French distinction of judicial and voluntary 
partition. 76 
Private partition: Waiver of partition. Where adminis-
tration is not compulsory, private agreements are naturally 
allowed if all participants are adults or represent a minor 
with authorization.77 Nothing in principle prevents· them 
from disregarding the distribution provided by the will or 
the statute of distribution. 78 The same rules obtain even 
despite the difference of organization in the United States, 
provided the creditors are paid or not endangered. The 
beneficiaries may agree among themselves on a division 
without any probate. Most courts consider this method 
75 Cass. civ. (April 13, 1932) S. 1932.1.361; Clunet 1932, 997; AUDINET, 
Revue 1932, 549 j DENNERY, Partage 135· 
76 Trib. Seine (July 13, 1909) S. 1910.2.263, Cass. (Oct. 22, 1913) 
S. 1918.1.61, D. 1921.1.219, Rev. 1914, 139; TRONCHON, Le partage successoral 
en DIP. (1938) 40: here a voluntary partition approved by a tribunal was 
assimilated to a judgment. 
77 France: 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT (1945) 606 § 1173. 
Germany: 4 FRANKENSTEIN 562. 
Italy: App. Napoli (Jan. 23, 1924) Giur. Ital. 1924 I 2: 175 C.C. (1942) 
art. 713. 
Spain: S. T. (Feb. 10, 1826) 87 Coli. Leg. 466 at 509. 
78 Trib. Rabat (April 24, 1918) Revue Algerienne, 1922/23 II 142 held 
valid a division concluded in Algiers by parties subject to French law, 
whereby they adopted Jewish law. AuDINET, Note ibid. criticizes the decision 
only because the women did not understand to what impairment they con-
sented. 
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which saves the costs and loss of time of an official inter-
vention valid and the agreement enforceable/9 
While the lex fori governs a court's proceeding, what law 
governs such voluntary act? The Hague Draft, article I, 
enumerates upartage" among the incidents of the law of 
succession, and this presents certainly the prevailing civil 
law view. The French delegate, Basdevant, protested against 
adoption of a law different from that governing the relation-
ship of the heirs until division, which in his opinion is the 
lex situs. But although the latter opinion is shared by other 
French scholars, we have just insisted on its fragility. 
(b) Effect. Another much discussed difference concerns 
the effect of partition. In France and other states, the as·sets 
finally assigned to a coheir are deemed retroactively to 
have been his property from the decedent's death.80 This 
"declaratory" effect, originally intended to avoid double 
enfeoffment, is favored as a protection against detrimental 
dispositions by other coheirs during indivision. In the 
German system, no such danger exists and partition is 
traditionally construed as mutual transfer of the shares 
pro indiviso so as to complete full ownership in the specific 
assets assigned; a coheir who inherited one third, receives 
the two thirds missing in his asset from his two coheirs. 81 
An instructive contribution to the required criticism of 
the "declaratory effect" in the international field was once 
79 ATKINSON, Wills (ed. 2) 565 § 103 j 3 BBALB 144 § 4654. 
Contrarily, a few courts declare that the testator's wishes ought not to be 
frustrated. Taylor v. Hoyt ( 1932) 207 Wis. uo, 242 N.W. 141; Cochran 
v. Zachery (1908) 137 Iowa 584, ns N.W. 486 (an heir and trustee may not 
give up his duties as trustee even though before probate they are merely 
moral). 
80 E.g., France: C.C. art. 883; Italy: C.C. (1865) art. 1034, (1942) art. 
757i Chile: C.A. (May 20, 1931) 29 Rev. Der. (1932) II 70: Where a co-
heir sold his share in the estate, and another coheir in the partition receives 
the asset in litigation, the seller never had any title to it. 
81 BGB, § 2048 ; partition must be followed by conveyance. 
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delivered in the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals of the 1920's. 
The Tribunals repeatedly encountered cases where the 
coheirs were of different nationality and attempted to profit 
by the declaratory effect of partition under the French, or 
Belgian, or Rumanian law governing the succession; they 
assigned shares, bank deposits, etc., to the participant pro-
tected against the seizure of enemy property. 
The tribunals, 82 as well as a Belgian decision, 83 used 
various shades of embarrassed arguments in their effort 
to eliminate such declaratory effect on the right of liquida-
tion under the Treaties. In simpler form, it was stated that 
a private partition could not affect the official clearing pro-
cedure between states. 84 
However, if the "declaratory effect" is set aside where it 
is disagreeable to a state, what role should it have in inter-
national relations in general? In fact, it is recognized that 
it has no extraterritorial effect, 85 nor effect in relation to 
third persons. The difficulty of its application is noticeable 
in a long discussion of French writers. Opinions have been 
divided between the law of succession 86 and the law of the 
situation; 87 middle solutions have also been sought.88 But 
the need in this case to distinguish the cause for acquiring 
title in tangible objects and its acquisition is evident; the 
first must be governed by the law of succession. 
82 TAM. Franco-German (Aprilz6, 1927) De Lyrot v. Mendelssohn & Cie., 
7 Recueil dec. TAM., 587; TAM. Franco-Austrian (Dec. 9, 1927) Gold-
wasser v. Merkurbank, id. 656; Goldwasser v. Banque des Pays de !'Europe 
Centrale, id. 659; Germano-Belgian (Oct. 22, 1929) De Molinari v. Deutsche 
Bank, 9 id. 661; Germano-Rumanian (April 8, 1930) s Z. ausl. PR. (1931) 
202; cf., RABEL ibid. DENNERY 84 thinks that some of these decisions have 
not "seen the problem of qualification;" this is beside my point. 
83 67 Trib. Liege (March 12, 1921), Clunet 1922, 1033. 
84 TAM. Germano-Belge, 9 Rec. 661, supra n. I. 
85 PLAISANT 266. 
86 PILLET, 2 Traite 404 § 597; NIBoYET, Manuel 733· 
87 BROCHER 439 § 136; 7 LAURENT 52; 2 ROLIN § 769; DESPAGNET § 370; 
CHAMPCOMMUNAL 412; MAURY ET VIALLETON, 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT § 640; 
IO Repert. 197 No. 73; FEDOZZI (ed. 2) 633 f. 
88 ARMINJON, 3 Precis (ed. 2) 155 § 141 bases the effect of the partition 
on the law of succession but restricts it to the assets situated in territories 
recognizing the same effect. 
CHAPTER 72 
Plurality of Succession 
I. THE PROBLEM 
(a) Occurrence. As appeared from the survey of con-
flicts systems relating to inheritance, immovables are sep-
arately treated and submitted to the law of the situation 
in the Anglo-American and at least thirteen more juris-
dictions. In other states, lex situs extends to movables, 
or to domestic immovables, alongside another law con-
trolling the rest of the estate. In addition to these primary 
rules, public policy, or renvoi, or deference to foreign 
conflict rules may produce a scission into segregated estates. 
Another source of a split arises in the positive conflict 
of conflicts rules, such as at the death of an Italian domiciled 
in Massachusetts, a Frenchman domiciled in Brazil, or a 
German domiciled in Switzerland. The laws of both states 
involved claim his inheritance, and what happens usually 
is that each state distributes the assets it can get hold of 
according to its own law, with no small confusion, especially 
in the liability for debts. Suppose that a testator was 
formerly domiciled in Maryland and at his death in New 
Jersey, and that he leaves his widow domiciled in Cali-
fornia, and movables in California, Mississippi, and Mary-
land, as well as land in Illinois. There are five laws of suc-
cession-not only of administration-within the one country 
of the United States. 
The United States, of course, is the largest proving-
ground for trying these problems. The only (meager) 
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legislative attempt to cope with them has been made in 
the Treaty of Montevideo, in which consequences had to 
be drawn from its complete dismemberment of estates by 
unlimited application of lex situs to all assets. Again, some 
scientific exploration solely occurs in France, and there 
mainly in the case of French immovables in an otherwise 
foreign-governed inheritance. The Parliament of Paris 
had urged the unitary application of the last domicil to liabil-
ity for debts.1 Under the influence of the Romanistic universal 
succession of the heirs to the deceased's position, this view 
was popular around the turn of the century, often in favor 
of the national law of the deceased. 2 More recently, a 
veering toward territorialism has reanimated the customary 
principle of tot hereditates quot territoria, enforcing the 
plurality in most respects.3 
(b) Scope. The cleavage operated in an estate by the 
two-fold conflicts rule of a state or the opposite conflicts 
rules of two states goes to the very bottom of all incidents. 
It affects the limits and order of intestate succession, espe-
cially of the extremely varied benefits of a surviving spouse 
or collateral relatives; the form and intrinsic validity of 
wills; their construction; the forced shares; adjustment of 
shares by election and advancements; acquisition; partition; 
and liability for claims. 
Accordingly, the Montevideo Treaty enumerates as per-
taining to the laws of the situation of each asset: capacity 
to inherit, validity and effect of the will, rights in the in-
heritance, existence and shares of intestate heirs, existence 
and amount of the "assets available," and everything relat-
ing to forced portions and testamentary inheritance. 
1 LAINil, 2 Introduction 307. 
2 2 RoLIN § 766; LAURENT, 7 Dr. civ. int. § 42 p. 71 ff. 
3 BouHIER, Obs. Bourgogne Ch. 2r n. 212-:215; 2 DE VAREILLES-SOMMIERES 
passim j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 6) § 363 j cf., ARMIN JON, 3 Precis 122 
§ II4• 
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From the beginning, it is unfortunately evident that 
enormous incongruities and hardships are involved and the 
present legal situation in the world offers but scanty 
remedies. There is some help when federal principles 
step in; creditors of a divided estate enjoy equality in the 
United States, provided they are American citizens. But 
the generally avowed principle that all, domestic and for-
eign creditors, should enjoy equality, is riddled with ex-
ceptions. 
Uniformity either of the substantive or of the conflicts 
rules or of their effect on a plurality of succession is a goal 
of the future. The following pages shall merely describe 
the status controversiae. In this sorry corner, clearly no 
theory helps when action is missing. 
The position of the creditors of the decedent is deferred 
(chapter 72) until some account of the Anglo-American 
system of administration can be furnished (chapter 71). 
II. DISTRIBUTION 
1. Intestate Rules 
Each law governing a part of the estate designates the 
order of intestate succession with all its conditions and 
effects.4 Thus Spanish law governing movables allowed 
heirs only up to the sixth degree, while French law for the 
immovables went to the twelfth degree .. 5 A widow has 
dower rights 6 or usufruct 7 in one succession but not in the 
other. 
4 E.g., England: Brown v. Gregson [19zo] A.C. 86o. 
Turkey: BERKI 49: the return of paterna paternis (ila fente) applies to 
movables left by a Frenchman domiciled in Turkey, but not to his Turkish 
land. 
5 Trib. Bayonne (March 31, 1904) Revue 1905, 745: C.C. art. 705 (old). 
6 FALCONBRIDGE 45 8. 
7 Trib. civ. Seine (April z6, 1907) Clunet 1907, II3Z; Trib. Nice (July 9, 
1917) Clunet 1917, 179z. 
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2. Requirements of Wills 
The formal 8 and substantive 9 requirements of wills, 
agreements on expectancies or containing last disposals, and 
their construction 10 are governed by each law separately. 
The options left for the formal validity of wills have a 
moderating influence, as also references to the law of the 
last domicil in matters of construction 11 and election 12 act 
against the rigor of total consequences. 
Another remarkable correction has been attained where 
a gift was valid under the law of the domicil and invalid 
at the situs of land; the domiciliary court adjusts the por-
tions, increasing the impaired shares at the cost of the 
enriched ones.13 In conformity, the Restatement states a 
compensation in the inverse case where land and movables 
in X and land in Y are left to B, C, D, each a third, but 
the will is invalid in Y and the land in Y falls entirely to 
B : C and D should receive in X as much as their shares 
in Y were worth, before the rest is distribut~d in three 
equal parts.14 This amounts to a noteworthy though un-
usual construction of a unitary will. No such helpful idea 
was discussed when in a French court a residuary legatee 
was charged with gifts of money to uncertainly described 
beneficiaries and the clause was considered valid as to 
movables in Italy but invalid as to immovables in France.15 
Forced shares are due from each fragment of the succes-
8 Germany: KG. (May 15, 1912) JKG. 42A: 141, 145; OLG. Karlsruhe 
(Dec. 12, 1919) 40 ROLG. 159 (German land of a New Yorker). 
9 France: Trib. civ. Seine (July 7, 1899) Clunet 1900, 148; LEWALD, 
Questions II7 speaks of a special kind of nullity. 
10 OLG. Karlsruhe (Jan. 31, 1930) Recht 1930 No. 587: appointment of 
heir for the German immovable part of a foreign succession is not an appoint-
ment to a pars pro indiviso of the total estate. 
11 Supra 334 ff. 
12 Supra 349 ff. 
13 In re Lawrence's will ( 1919) 93 Vt. 424, 108 At!. 387. 
14 Restatement§ 252, illustration; GooDRICH 513 n. 52. 
15 Trib. Seine (July 7, 1899) Clunet 1906, 148. 
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sion according to its own law.16 Hence, under the law of 
the domicil governing only succession to movables, foreign 
immovables are not included in the estate.17 The testator, 
hence, may avoid leaving assets in the state where his dis-
posing power is restricted; on the other hand, he may have 
amply provided for the legitime portions in one country 
and legacies in another must be sharply reduced for their 
sake. 
III. ACQUISITION 
I. Option 
Choice between acceptance and repudiation is separate 
in the several successions. In the· United States, this leads 
to a considerable extension of the doctrine of election.18 
A release of expectancy may operate partially.19 
In France, a problem concerns the provision that a minor 
heir may only accept under the benefice of the inventory, 
i.e., with restriction of his liability for debts. With two 
different calls his age may be differently considered, and 
there may be no restriction in the foreign succession. 20 
16 Johns Hopkins University v. Uhrig ( 1924) 145 Md. 114, us Atl. 
6r6: Maryland law applies to assets in the forum, California restrictions on 
charitable bequests are left "to determination by the California courts." 
The principle was ignored by Trib. civ. Nice (May 3, 1905) Clunet 
I9II, 278. 
17 England: Wills Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet., c. 114. 
France: Cass. (April 4, 1857) D. 1857.I.102i {Jan. r, 1892) D. 1892.1.497• 
S. 1892.1.76; Trib. Seine (May 21, 1879) Clunet 1879, 549 (not to violate 
the statute real) ; SAvATIER, Cours 304 § 436. 
Switzerland: BG. {June 29, 1928) 54 BGE.I.216. American domiciled in 
Switzerland. American real property is left out of accounting for forced 
shares. The nonbarrable share of children in Switzerland of ~. in Germany 
of ~ of their intestate portion is counted separately. 
18 4 PAGE 729 If., § 1651. 
19 4 FRANKENSTEIN 380 n. IIO. 
20 Supra Ch. 71 n. 36. The inventory must include ali foreign assets, Cass. 
(July II, 1865) S. 1865.1.406. 
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2. Advancement 
As seen before, it is primarily though not exclusively a 
matter of the inheritance law to decide whether premortuary 
gifts made by the testator to a beneficiary of his inheritance 
ought to be accounted in his share. In the concurrence of 
two laws of succession, notably the French courts have con-
firmed the total scission. 
Lady Fairbairn, claiming the legal usufruct of half in 
French land, under French C.C., article 767, paragraph 
2, was not held to deduct the value of the gift she had 
received in England.21 The rule was definitely announced 
in one of the law suits involving the succession of the 
Spanish Queen Marie-Christine, which comprised land in 
France and a Spanish estate. The Tribunal Civil de la 
Seine stated that the inventory of the French inheritance 
consisted in the proceeds from the sale of French land-
a subrogation preserving French jurisdiction 22 and in-
heritance law-but had to exclude immovables and mov-
ables received by the French beneficiary in Spain.23 
The European authors almost unanimously endorse this 
solution as the inevitable product of the scission adopted 
by the courts.24 Any gift considered an advancement is 
referred to the aggregate from which it was taken, inde-
pendent of the assets of another succession. Sometimes 
such tracing is impossible.25 Generally, fortuitous chance 
rules this "unjust and absurd" procedure.26 Two persons 
21 Trib. Bayonne (Aug. 11, 1902), Fairbairn v. Wailes, Clunet 1903, 179. 
22 Cour Paris (Dec. 31, 1889), S. 1891.2.186, Clunet 1890, 121. 
23 Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 27, 1906) Del Drago v. S. M. Alphonse XIII of 
Bourbon, Clunet 1907, 770, Rev. 1907, 398. 
24 France: CHAMPCOMMUNAL 418; MAURY ET VIALLETON in PLANIOL ET 
RIPERT §§ 623 f.; DENNERY 127; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 6) 411; 
ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) 3 Precis 160 § 145; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 873 § 1352. 
Germany: RAAPE 687; LEWALD, Questions 83. 
25 4 FRANKENSTEIN 566; against his proposals in this case ZEUGE 71. 
2 6 ARMIN JON, I.e.,· NIBOYET, I.e. 
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having received at the same time equal gifts, one may have 
to account for it, the other not. Yet the timid attempts to 
avoid these hardships 27 were necessarily rejected. 
The Montevideo Treaty, article so, affirms this source-
theory but makes an exception for gifts of money; the 
amount should be distributed among the territories in the 
proportion of the benefits drawn from each of them. Any 
such solution is possible in a multilateral treaty. But how 
can it work? 
A similar situation was apt to arise even within one state 
in the United States when the probate court restricted to 
personalty could not reach land given by advancement. 
Despite some remaining difficulties, this case is largely 
cleared away, as most though not all probate courts have the 
power to include the land in the adjustment, or an action 
in equity is available.28 If, however, land is under foreign 
administration, the ordinary jurisdictional conflicts occur 
which are the subject of the next chapter. 
3· Prerogatives of Domestic Beneficiaries 
The various provisions upholding the domestic inheritance 
law against a recognized foreign inheritance law reach a 
climax where a domestic succession opens at the same time. 
But it may be conceded that not much can be added to the 
crude results of the French or Argentine court practice 
even though only one, foreign, succession is in the picture. 
A French national is entitled to what French inheritance 
law would give him, if that law were to govern, not only in 
the meaning of what he would receive out of the assets 
situated in France, but to the effect that he be awarded 
27 NAST, Revue 1907, 406, expounding two theories, but consenting to the 
prevailing doctrine. 
28 ATKINSON, 3 Am. Prop. 499 f. 
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everything he would obtain if the foreign movables of 
the foreign succession were located in France. Of course, 
the French assets are the maximum fund of enforcement. 29 
An Argentine decision is in the same vein. The decedent, 
a Spanish national domiciled in Spain, in addition to leav-
ing movables and immovables in Spain, was creditor of a 
deposit with an Argentine bank. A domiciliary of Argentina 
received indemnification out of this asset for loss of the 
share he would have had under Argentine inheritance law, 
although the law of succession was Spanish under both 
conflicts laws.30 
4· Partition 
It seems safe to state that courts are restricted by the 
territorial limits of their jurisdiction in a noncontentious 
judicial division of inheritance. This is a matter of course 
in the Anglo-American organization, distinguishing per-
sonal remedies in equity. It is also settled in France that 
a judicial partition cannot include foreign immovables, 31 
and this may be presumed where the procedural statutes 
are silent on the question.32 
On the other hand, freedom of agreement between the 
beneficiaries helps to eliminate the disturbances caused by 
plurality of governing laws.33 
29 DENNERY 146 explains that the equality emphasized by the law of 1819 
did not refer to distribution but to devolution, in the old language called 
partage de droit, but concedes, p. 149, with MAURY ET VIALLETON, 4 PLANIOL-
RIPERT § 36 f., that the so-called equality is nothing but the French law of 
descent. 
3° Cam. civ. 2a Cap. (June 22, 1925) 57 Gac. del Foro 98. 
81 Trib. Seine (Jan. 21, 1950) Nouv. Rev. 1949-1950, 214; Cass. (July 5, 
1933) Nouv. Rev. 1934, 75; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 561, n. 82. Controversial in 
Italy, see CAVAGLIERI, Lezioni (ed. 2) 358; MoNAco, Efficacia 89 n. 1. 
3 2 E.g., in Chile, see BALMACEDO CARDOSO 167. 
33 Supra Ch. 69; even the narrowest definition of party autonomy in 
France allows submission to one of the several laws of succession "provided 
that lex situs permits it," LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIRRI! (ed. 6) 415 § 363. 
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IV. ADMINISTRATION 
Privity of administration, despite large exceptions, is a 
principle in the United States even in the case of a unitary 
succession of movables. In the civil-law countries, the same 
conception is connected with plurality of successions. Ac-
cordingly, where a testamentary executor was appointed 
by a French testator, his powers were construed by the 
German court under German law with respect to the im-
movables left in Germany, although the same person had 
different powers regarding the movables.34 
34 KG. (May 13, 1912) 4Z ]KG. 141 No. 29. 
CHAPTER 73 
Administrators and Courts 
I. MuNICIPAL ORGANIZATION oF DEcEDENT's EsTATE 
ALTHOUGH conflicts law is a rather minor part of 
.r1_ the law of administration, it cannot be avoided in 
this survey; to understand its role, at least some 
account must be devoted to a legal situation that would 
frustrate even a research of several extensive volumes. 
Indeed, no true comparative study exists of the international 
relations in treating inheritances. Useful introductions to 
the several national laws and books advising practitioners 
about steps they may take, abound. But not one author has 
ever dared to probe the core of the international disorder. 
Nor can it be done here, for reasons that will become 
obvious to the reader. Within the United States, gratify-
ingly, some fruitful or at least promising attempts have 
been made to bring coherence into the interstate chaos. 
I. Common Law 
At common law, compulsory administration of decedents' 
estates was restricted to the personal estate, and the execu-
tor or administrator is therefore called a personal repre-
sentative. In England and a few American states, admin-
istration now extends to real property. In most American 
jurisdictions, the independence of the heir's title to land 
has been preserved, but the personal representative exercises 
certain powers over the land, such as taking possession and 
sale, if necessary. 
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In modern Great Britain with its unitary court structure, 
and, excepting Scotch land, the full inclusion of immovables, 
there are still minor differences, but the system, though 
costly and potentially cumbersome, works out smoothly, at 
least within the present United Kingdom; the system of 
"resealing" probate judgments sets its courts in close 
reciprocity with dominions and colonies.1 In the United 
States, the state statutes not only differ on many funda-
mental or formal points; they are often ambiguous and the 
local peculiarities are sometimes strongly stressed. Only 
a long and painful development, far from total achieve-
ment, offers a homogeneous scheme conquering the old self-
confinement. 
This survey is exclusively interested in the interstate and 
international effects of probate judgments and of the ap-
pointment of fiduciaries. These effects, however, depend 
basically on those which probate and letters of administra-
tion possess within the forum of the probate court itself. 
(a) Jurisdiction. The main principle of the common 
law treatment of estates is territorialism. It is still much 
in view in the United States. Any court in whose territory 
assets of the inheritance are situated has exclusive juris-
diction to administer them; and the jurisdiction of each 
court is strictly limited to these assets. A few statutes have 
literally claimed authority over foreign executors or ad-
ministrators as if they were appointed locally. The courts, 
not to assume that these statutes undertook to violate the 
Constitution, construed them as referring only to property 
located in the state.2 Despite the law of the succession 
which includes all movables and chattels real irrespective of 
1 Administration of Estates Act, 1925, s. 168; Judiciary Act, 1925, s. 165; 
Colonial Probate Act, 1892, and Orders in Council. 
2 Thornton v. Curling (1824) 8 Sim. 310; Re Grassi [1905] I Ch. 584; 
DICEY ( ed. 6) 828. 
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their situs, they are separated by their situs in matters of 
administration. Thus, the axiom retains its force that the 
law of the domicil governs distribution but the law of the 
state appointing the fiduciary governs administration. Ac-
cordingly, there is no privity between the fiduciaries of 
different states. Even if the same individual is appointed 
in these states, he acts in a separate capacity in each state.3 
Usually most of a decedent's movables are situated at his 
domicil, and since its law governs distribution, the first-
"original"-and "principal" probate is sought there. Even 
though no assets are found at the forum of the domicil, 
it is now settled by a British statute as well as in the United 
States that the domiciliary court has jurisdiction for probate 
and letters of administration.4 Nevertheless, it is still one 
of the few certain rules in the majority of the American 
statutes that a will may be brought to original probate 
wherever there are assets. 5 A conforming statute has been 
adopted in New Jersey, where, to the contrary, no ancillary 
administration was granted if the domicil rejected probate.6 
In some other states, no ancillary probate at all is given, 
the parties being referred to the court of the last domicil. 7 
It has also been said that the will of a person resident 
where he was domiciled should be probated originally only 
at that place.8 
For succession to land, the original probate, accord-
s England: Cook v. Gregson ( 1854) 2 Drew 286. 
United States: Restatement§ 466, comment a. 
4 England: Administration of Justice Act, 1932, sec. 2. 
United States: Restatement § 467; see comment c for the purposes of such 
grant. 
5 United States: Restatement § 469; this is the "better view," 3 BEALE 1464, 
§ 469.2. 
6 
"Rule of Chadwick's Case," So N.J. Eq. 471; see In re Dodge ( 1918) 
89 N.J. Eq. 525, 104 At!. 646; superseded by L. 1942, c. 335, p. u86, § 1, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. Supp. 3:2-45. 
7 CAREY, in CARNAHAN, Cases 979 ff. 
8 WOERNER § 226. 
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ing to the old rule, must be at the situs. Statutes, however. 
derogate from this rule. 
(b) Effect of probate within the forum. In Great 
Britain, a probate in "common form" is granted in uncon-
tested cases by the court of the domicil if the court is con-
vinced of the formal validity, the mental capacity of the 
testator, and absence of error and fraud. This judgment 
has force until attack. Then a litigated probate "in solemn 
form" has full effect, as it is "in rem," i.e., erga omnes, 
and only open to revocation on one of several grounds 
stated by successive decisions. 9 Thus, probate of a will is 
said to prove the nature of an instrument as a will, its 
formal validity, the mental capacity of the testator, the 
appointment of an executor, the contents ("what the will 
is"), so as to replace the original instrument until correc-
tion by the Probate Division and the vesting of title in 
land, though not a disposition of property.10 But the 
effect is limited to the territory, except between the parties 
to the suit. 
Where the deceased was domiciled abroad, an English 
probate indicates that the will of a British subject has 
been duly executed under Lord Kingsdown's Act but does 
not validate the will if incapacity, material invalidity, or 
illegality appear under the law of the domicil.11 
In the United States, a probate decree, whether in 
common form or solemn form, with or without notice to 
all beneficiaries (depending on the various statutes), pro-
vided it is not "directly" attacked, is not challengeable by 
"collateral" attack with respect to those matters, as cautious 
language runs, which it purports to decide. What matters 
are these? This turns out to be a delicate question. 
II See RANKING sz ff. 
10 WILLIAMS, I Executors u8 § r8o; PARRY, Wills no. 
11 DICEY ( ed. 6) 828 j WILLIAMS ib. 
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Statutes, 12 courts, and writers use varying language. They 
all seem to agree that collateral attack is excluded on the 
ground that the will is formally insufficient, or that the 
instrument is not genuine. But the formulations extend 
this effect to one or more of the following matters: in-
capacity, undue influence, fraud and duress/3 outright 
illegality, 14 invalidity/5 construction/6 and effect.11 Atkin-
son states that probate is conclusive as to genuineness, due 
execution, testamentary capacity, and absence of revoca-
tion.18 I think that this formulation is really supported by 
the cases in general, although the language of the statutes 
md courts is often broader.19 
Within the state, of course, also a decree refusing probate 
on one of these grounds is conclusive.20 
Letters of administration, except those with the will 
annexed, are conclusive in the same manner for the absence 
of a will and the legal shares of the beneficiaries. 
2. Civil Law 
Ordinarily the court at the place of the deceased's last 
domicil has jurisdiction over his estate, excepting foreign 
assets under the control of foreign law. 21 Compulsory ad-
12 They were collected in Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of 
the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, I9I4, I72, but never again 
completely to my knowledge, and grouped by SIMES, Model Probate Code 
306 f. 
13 BANCROFT § I63. 
14 3 BEALE I463 § 469. I and n. 4· 
15 3 BEALl! I466; BANCROFT 355; GoODRICH § I72• 
16 CAREY (supra n. 7) §§ IOOI-I005, but see HENRY§ 596; ATKINSON, Wills 
(ed. 2) 499 f. 
11 I69 A.L.R. ss6 cites four state statutes. 18 ATKINSON, Wills (ed. 2) 499 § 96, somewhat different from (ed. 1) 
445 § I84. Similar, Model Probate Code § So (a), § 8 I. 19 By far the majority of the cases cited by the authors involve nothing 
but formal validity and very few undue influence or mental capacity. But 
I am unable to check all the cases referred to in sometimes wild lists. 
20 Matter of Goldsticker (I9o8) 192 N.Y. 35· 
21 See, for instance, supra Ch. 70 n. 31. 
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ministration, comparable to that in common law countries, 
has been preserved in Austria where a regulation of 1854 
has been only somewhat amended 22 and in the Scandinavian 
countries.23 The purpose of these organizations is frankly 
patriarchal as well as fiscal, the latter aspect being now 
prominent also in the United States. 
In the great majority of civil law countries a testator 
may appoint one or more testamentary executors, defining 
their powers up to a certain limit, or request the court to 
appoint one, but apart from this, the heir or heirs take 
custody of the assets, satisfy the creditors, carry out the 
last will, and distribute the residue. To some extent, 
officials such as public notaries, are frequently employed, 
and in some countries necessary. The jurisdiction of the 
court concerns protective measures, receipt of acceptance 
and renunciation from beneficiaries, care for the interests 
of minors, and noncontentious intervention on request. Some 
codes go farther than others in attributing functions to 
judicial assistance. Nothing, however, approaches the com-
plete substitution at common law of officials for the heirs. 
It is noteworthy that the German courts, against a 
strong current in the literature, constantly refuse to take 
jurisdiction for more than protective measures whenever 
the succession is governed by a foreign law. The measures 
they allow themselves involve affixing of seals, taking of 
inventory, delivery of a will from official deposit, and 
appointment of a trustee for a presumptive heir or a claim 
against the estate. They refrain, for instance, from dis-
charging the testamentary executor of a foreign testator. 
Their reasoning is partly based on the ground that the 
scope of their activity is defined by international private 
22 Austria: Kais. Patent of August 9, 1854, amended by Fed. Law of 
Dec. 21, 1923, BG. 1923 No. 636, §§ 22-25, 137-140. 
2 3 SIEBECK, 6 Rechtsvergl. Hdw. 563. 
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law 24 and partly by the inconvenience of meddling with 
interests of foreign heirs and a foreign law and the prob-
able absence of recognition in the foreign country.25 
Equally, in Austria, the official administration there pre-
scribed does not in principle take place where a foreign 
national leaves movables in the forum. When administra-
tion occurs, it follows Austrian inheritance law. This hap-
pens also, by exception, if by unanimous consent all appear-
ing parties concerned submit the estate to the Austrian 
law.26 
Similar provisions that the parties may choose the in-
heritance law of the forum occur in some Latin-American 
codes. 
Bilateral treaties regulating consular intervention need 
only be mentioned. 
3· Situs 
In the Anglo-American system and all others that assign 
primary importance to the territory in which the assets of 
the estate are located, the question of the method of locali-
zation obtains particular relevance. But it is also pertinent 
everywhere in matters of procedure, taxation, escheat, and 
granting of certificates. Different approaches to this subject 
lead to. the conflict of concurrent jurisdictions and some-
times to negative conflicts. Particulars transcend the frame-
work of the present investigation. However, two observa-
tions may be added. 
First, it is to be borne in mind that the situs for the 
purpose of administration is not necessarily identical with 
24 KG. (Feb. 4, 1937) Jur. Woch. 1937, 1728; IPRspr. 1937 Nr. 72, Clunet 
1937, 832, 
25 KG. (July n, 1911) 41 Jahrb. KG. 6z; in accord RAAPE D.IPR 276; 
ScHLEGELBERGER, Komm. Freiw. Gerichtsbarkeit § 73, n. z; § 74 n. 4; contra 
NIEMEYER, 13 Z. int. R. Zl; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 627; LEWALD 329. 
26 Law of 1854 (supra n. zz) §§ 23, 24, 140. 
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that for such purposes as civil procedure, seizure, garnish-
ment, or taxation. 
Second, in the United States there has been a develop-
ment with respect to negotiable instruments. The American 
cases present, in Beale's words, a "blurred picture." 27 In a 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 
administration was founded on the view that any debt is 
located at the domicil of the debtor, but the old doctrine of 
the ecclesiastical courts on mercantile specialty debts was 
adopted by the same Court in I9I8.29 Accordingly, the 
possession of an instrument by an administrator, though not 
its mere presence, 30 entitles him to administer the claim 
embodied in the instrument. Despite the insecure cases, the 
Restatement suggests that possession of a negotiable bill 
of lading or ·warehouse receipt determines jurisdiction. 31 
Bills, notes, and bonds payable to order are practically 
subject to the same treatment; the Restatement says that 
they are exclusively administered by the administrator in 
possession. 32 
Shares of a corporation issued in states following the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act,33 are represented by certifi-
cates, although shares subject to the traditional method of 
transfer through the company books are localized at the 
place of the corporation.34 Bills, notes, and bonds payable 
to bearer are treated like tangibles.35 
21 3 BEALE 1480 § 471.8. 
28 In re Wyman ( 1884) 109 U.S. 654. 
29 Iowa v. Slimmer ( 1918) 248 U.S. ns. 
30 HOPKINS, "Conflict of Laws in Administration of Decedent's Intangibles," 
28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 613, correcting 2 BEALE 1481. 
31 Restatement §§ 471, 476, 509. 
32 Restatement § 479· 
33 /d. § 477, cf., supra Vol. II, p. 75 and especially p. 76. 
34 /d. § 478; Vol. II, p. 75· 
35 STUMBERG (ed. 2) 448 n. 36, denying that the desirable proposition of 
the Restatement that the administrator at the situs is treated as the owner, 
is borne out by the cases. 
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4· Law Governing Administration 
Whatever is substantive law in the operation of execu-
tors and courts at civil law is determined by the law of 
succession. Proceedings, of course, whether in litigious or 
in noncontentious matters, follow the lex fori, save for 
contrary positive rules. 
Common law does not so distinguish. Lex fori controls 
everything, and since every court administers the assets 
situated in its territory, lex fori is identical with lex situs. 
But considering certain exceptions, the ordinary formula 
says that it is the law of the court appointing the adminis-
trator that controls administration.36 
This rule was attacked recently, probably for the first 
time, with special regard to the case where administration 
of a decedent's estate is followed by trust operation.37 
Courts submitting the administration of a testamentary 
trust to the law intended by the testator feel the in-
convenience of having all orders during the estate adminis-
tration issued by the domicilary court, and often by several 
other courts competent solely because of the physical pres-
ence of assets.38 Similar awkwardness may be experienced 
when ancillary courts give directions without contact with 
the principal court. As we shall see, dealing with the out-
standing problem of this topic, the claims of creditors, 
difficulties are increased by the protection of local interests 
and alleged public policy. 
What role, however, has the law of the place where an 
asset is claimed as part of the estate, irrespective of such 
special rules of territorial administration? It has been 
86 Restatement § 468. 
87 ]AMES A. MOORE, "Estate Administration and the Conflict of Laws," 35 
Va. L. Rev. (1949) 316. 
38 Will of Risher (1938) 227 Wis. 104, 277 N.W. 160, 115 A.L.R. 790; 
In re Keeler's Estate (Surr. 1944) 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 592. 
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contended by the neo-territorialistic writers in France that 
the lex situs is of primary importance for the legal situation 
of all property, prevailing over the law of succession,39 or 
at least that the movables are subject to the lex situs in 
the first place because of the "public credit," which is safe-
guarded by the lex situs. 40 In the rightly dominating 
opinion, it is only true that a beneficiary, executor, or 
creditor demanding an asset must comply with the respec-
tive local rules of procedure and property law on acquisition 
of title, but the content of his cause of action is primarily 
determined by the law governing succession. 
Nevertheless, in the common law doctrine an analogous 
problem can be discovered, if only in a few sporadic appli-
cations. Thus, Dicey and Beale have been understood as 
including the transfer of title in "administration"; it was 
concluded that movables left in Germany by an English-
man domiciled in England pass to the English universal 
legatee directly because German law would govern the 
transmission of the title as heir.41 However, the Restate-
ment § 300 declares that the title to chattels passes at the 
death of the owner "to the executor or administrator ap-
pointed by the court of the state in which the chattels are 
habitually kept." This is of no consequence for civil law 
countries, and the general assumption is still good that the 
English legatee or the English administrator may be treated 
in Germany as entitled to recognition not on the basis of 
German law but by reasonable adjustment on the basis of 
English law. 
The validity of a gift inter vivos, conditional on survival 
of the 'donee, was classified as an incident of administration 
39 BARTIN, 3 Principes § 450 f.; see contra NIBOYET, 4 Traite 911 § 1366. 
40 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIE:RE (ed. 6) §§ 361-363 who corrects his result by 
introducing the French system of a liability proportional to the values re-
ceived (413), infra 433· 
41 BRESLAUER 245, 247 n. 2. 
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in In re Craven's Estate/2 and likewise a promise not to 
change a will was conceived as pertaining to administration in 
In re Rubin's Estate.43 The Restatement, however, in accord 
with many writers, characterizes rules pertaining to ad-
ministration as "primarily designed to facilitate the quick, 
effective and inexpensive settlement of the estate of the 
deceased" ( § 300, comment b), and it enumerates spe-
cifically such questions as the following: "accounting, 
post a bond, invest money, sell chattels, pay debts, ascertain 
priorities and similar questions" ( § 468, comment a) .44 
Administration, thus, concerns short range matters, whereas 
transfer of title, validity of gifts, and the permissibility of 
agreements on testamentary dispositions involve devolution 
of rights by death. It would be very strange and unsound 
simply to leave the rules affecting persons and assets par-
ticipating in the succession to the pleasure of foreign laws 
and a host of courts of administration. 
II. ExTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT oF PROBATE 
r. Common Law Countries 
(a) Assets in the forum. A probate decree primarily 
involves only the assets situated in the forum, and whether 
it is recognized as conclusive outside the state even with 
respect to these assets, is a question not universally answered 
in the same sense. 
However, since a British probate in common form does 
not and a probate in solemn form does have force erga 
omnes, it may be treated everywhere under the principles 
relating to foreign judgments. 
42 Supra Ch. 68 n. x. 
43 Supra Ch. 69 n. x. 
44 Compare the relatively innocuous cases described by DICEY (ed. 6) 813 
as lying on the borderline of succession and administration, 
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Within the United States, a probate has the same effect 
as it has within the forum in the sister states with respect 
to the assets found in its own territory. To this extent, the 
probate is endowed with full faith and credit.45 
(b) Assets in other jurisdictions. 
England. In connection with the principle that succession 
to personalty is governed by the law of the last domicil 
of the deceased, an English court of probate, as a rule, 
will adopt the decision of the probate court of a foreign 
country where the last domicil was and grant probate in 
its turn. This is "established practice." 46 Yet in every 
case, the court "exercises its own discretion and judg-
ment." 47 
United States. Once, in a generous attempt, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court held that an American probate 
judgment, as directed in rem, was effective in any sister 
state. "The court here can only inquire as to the sufficiency 
of authentication, jurisdiction of the court, existence of 
estate upon which the will may act, and perhaps fraud." 48 
This tradition is followed by the courts of that state.49 
A similar tradition in Montana stems from a decision 
where the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal 
Constitution was again expressly invoked. 50 
However, the Supreme Court of the United States, long 
ago, refrained from such construction of the clause and, 
on the contrary, announced the full independence of the 
45 Tilt v. Kelsey ( 1907) zo7 U.S. 43, 53· 
46 Per Sir J. Hannan in Miller v. James [187z] L.R. 3 P. & D. 4, s; In the 
goods of Malaver (18z8) 1 Hagg. Ecc. 498. 
41 In the goods of Kaufman [195Z] P. 3ZS. 
48 Mass: C. J. Shaw in Crippen v. Dexter (1859) 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 330. 
49 Slocomb v. Slocomb (1866) 95 Mass. 38 (immovables); Mass. Ann. L. 
(1933) § 19Z.Io; HoPKINS, 53 Yale L.J. at ZZ9-Z3J. 
50 Montana: State ex rei. Ruef v. District Court ( 1906) 34 Mont. 96, 85 
Pac. 866 ff.; HOPKINS, ib. Z3S ff. 
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states respecting their local assets. 51 On the ground of this 
"power policy," mutual consideration depends upon the 
local conflicts rules, except where identity of parties and 
litigated object allows a resort to the doctrine of res 
judicata. 52 
"Letters testamentary and of administration have no 
legal force or effect beyond the territorial limits within 
which the authority of the state or country granting them, 
is recognized as law." 53 
Every American statute book contains provisions facili-
tating the extension of foreign probate to personalty, or 
even to all assets situated in the enacting state. They allow 
either the grant of an ancillary probate or a simple record-
ing of the foreign decree. 
Unfortunately, the language of these statutory digres-
sions from the common law is extremely varied and pre-
vailingly uncertain. Moreover, the courts often cling to the 
traditional lack of privity between the probate adminis-
trations. 
With the threefold restriction, to the personal estate, 
to the domiciliary probate, and to the decree of a sister 
state, courts more or less generally recognize the probate 
decrees in the full measure in which they operate at home. 
But even in this narrow limitation, cautious investigation 
into the practice of the particular court would be opportune. 
The broad language of many statutes suggests that also 
a probate by a nondomiciliary court suffices, but this does 
not seem to agree with widespread practice.54 That foreign 
51 See in the last instance in re Barries' Estate ( 1949) 338 U.S. 815, 881; 
Note, DAVENPORT, U. of III. L. Forum (1950) 129, 131. 
52 Iowa v. Slimmer (1918) 248 U.S. us, 121; Riley v. New York Trust 
Co. (1942) 315 U.S. 3431 349· HOPKINS, 53 Yale L. J. at 256; ATKINSON, 
3 Am. Prop. 752 § 14-45. 
53 WoERNER § 157; Restatement § 436. 
54 CAREY 988: "Courts do not attach larger and wider constitutional validity 
to domiciliary probates." 
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countries are included in the recognition is expressly stated 
in some statutes, 55 but presumably is not the general con-
struction of the provisions. And although it appears certain 
that recognition of a foreign probate includes most matters 
for which it is conclusive where it originates, the doubtful 
question whether it extends to the construction of the will 
makes itself more conspicuous in this application. 56 
Finally, the common law principle that foreign probate 
is totally inconclusive at the situs of real property has firm 
roots to this day. Yet so many exceptions to this principle 
by statutes or judicial ruling are existent that an absolutely 
negative attitude is to be observed in only a few states.57 
The distinct trend of the development is marked by many 
decisions, the efforts of the leading writers, and the uni-
form drafts.58 Though different in particulars, they con-
verge in the proposition that a probate obtained at the 
last domicil of the deceased should be conclusive to the 
full extent, as at its origin, certainly with respect to mov-
ables, but since "there is no sacrosanctity about reality," 59 
also regarding immovables. 
(c) Effect of ancillary probate. When, after the end 
of appropriate proceedings-subject to the procedural law 
of the court-a foreign probate is "resealed," "confirmed," 
recorded, or adopted by a local probate, it seems to be a 
general rule that-apart from nullity of an irregular grant 
-only the original probate at its own place may be attacked 
55 E.g., Indiana, Burns' Stat. (1933) §57 p. 119; §7 p. 415, 416; HENRY 
§ 598. 
66 CAREY§§ IOOI-1005; Contra HENRY§ 595· 
57 For particulars, see GooDRICH §§ 173, 174; ATKINSON, 3 Am. Prop. 751. 
58 The Restatement § 470( r) ; 2 BEALE § 469.1, 3 id. 1466 and some authors 
take too much for actual law. But their result is strongly supported by the 
postulates of GooDRICH (ed. 3) 525 § 172; HoPKINS, 53 Yale L.J. at 249, 258; 
Note 169 A.L.R. 8r, 93, and especially CHEATHAM, 44 Col. L. Rev. at 559; 
Uniform Foreign Probate Act, withdrawn 1943, but adopted by Ill., La., 
Nev., Tenn., Wyo.; Uniform Probate of Wills Act, 1950, § r. 
59 ATKINSON I.e. with HOPKINS I.e. 253. 
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by the means permitted at the same place.60 An independent 
ancillary probate, however, may be treated differently, and 
some exceptional statutes establish their own rules on 
remedies even though a foreign probate was followed. 61 
Indeed, the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws crit-
icized, as early as I 9 I 4, the tendency to diminish the pro-
tection of local interests and proposed that remedies should 
be allowed against the ancillary grant.62 
Clearly, however, a slow process is in the making to 
elevate the domicil to a determinative factor also in these 
matters and to subordinate the ancillary to the domiciliary 
fiduciary. In the same development, immovables are being 
increasingly brought within the powers of the administrator 
of personalty. And the fact that every fiduciary is answer-
able to his own appointing court, acquired a limited appre-
ciation in other courts, leaving him more freedom from 
their supervision. 
As an illustration of the transition of a jurisdiction, 
known for adherence to "power policy" respecting succes-
sion to land, to a liberal policy, a I 946 decision of the 
Illinois Supreme Court may be singled out which sketches 
the whole picture of contesting a domestic probate and then 
describes the effect of a foreign domiciliary probate on 
land in Illinois: everything involving the land depends on 
the Illinois law. The statute modifies the common law (i.e., 
absence of privity) only insofar as foreign wills are ad-
mitted, if they are (executed according to the law of the 
domicil or the law of the place of execution or) admitted 
to probate in a foreign state, Ill. Rev. St. I945, Ch. J, 
§ 237. If so admitted, the will is "valid for all purposes, 
unless set aside in a suit brought to contest it. It cannot 
60 BANCROFT 394 § 163; Sternberg v. St. Louis, infra n. 63. 
61 See, e.g., BANCROFT § 163. 
62 Proceedings of the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, 1914, 172. 
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be collaterally attacked in any other proceeding." But it 
can be attacked like a domiciliary will.63 
2. Recognition in Civil Law Countries 
From the European point of view, English and American 
probate judgments have not often been given attention, 
except with respect to the powers of administrators which 
will be discussed later. But a thorough Italian study has 
demonstrated that by its nature such probate of a will 
includes an official acknowledgment of the validity of the 
will-which is true within the limits mentioned above-
and as a judicial instrument enjoys public credit also in 
foreign countries.64 The Italian Supreme Court, already 
on the way to this thesis, was entirely convinced by the 
study. In consequence, an uncontested probate judgment 
is considered to be an act of voluntary jurisdiction, accept-
able as a public attestation without the necessity of pro-
ceedings for enforcement of foreign judgment ( deliba-
zione). 65 In addition, it was stated that the regular court 
in the United States was exclusively competent for a suit 
to contest a probate in common form rendered by an 
American court. 
In other countries the official character of probate de-
crees is likewise recognized, but proceedings for examining 
uncontested foreign probates are usual and, e.g., in France 
necessary. 
63 Sternberg v. St. Louis ( I946) 394 Ill. 459, 68 N.E. (2d) 892, I69 A.L.R. 
545; on other kinds of statutes the not very satisfactory note ibid. at 567. 
64 GIUSEPPE P ALLICCIA, "Testamento e probate nei paesi anglosassoni, con 
speciale reguardo a! D.I.P. e ai beni italiani," Giur. Ita!. I93S IV II3. 
65 Italy: Cass. Civ. (May 12, 1937) Giur. Ita!. 1937 I 667; cf., also 
DE MARTINO, 7 Giur. Comp. Dir. Civ. 86 No. Io6; Trib. Bari (Feb. 4, 1949) 
Foro Ita!. 1949 I I I I4. 
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3· The German Certificate of Heirship 
Among the official certificates acknowledging the title 
of heir or other beneficiary, issued in the various juris-
dictions and frequently required by courts, other state 
agencies, and banks, the German "Erbschein" is particularly 
elaborate and the nearest analogy to letters testamentary. 
If the succession is controlled by a foreign law, the 
universal successor-in the case of an American estate, the 
heir, or statutory or testamentary residuary beneficiary-
may obtain a certificate, limited to the assets situated in 
Germany and based on the foreign inheritance law (BGB. 
§ 23 69). At least a limited certificate is also given respect-
ing real property under German law in the cases where a 
foreign inheritance law governs and refrains from including 
German immovables, as Anglo-American law does. 66 
The German Erbschein is an instrument endowed with 
public faith; its content is presumed to be correct and third 
persons dealing in good faith with its holder are protected. 
But this effect is, as a rule, limited to transactions effected in 
Germany.67 
Analogous rules provide for a limited certificate to be 
granted to a testamentary executor ( § 2368). They are 
also applied to a foreign intestate administrator. 
The presumption attached to these documents is ex-
tended to a few other countries by the respective treaties. 
III. ExTRATERRITORIAL PowERS OF FmuciARIES 
I. Extraterritorial Scope of Appointment 
(a) Common law countries. To enable an executor 
or administrator to act in a foreign territory, his powers 
66 ScHWENN, "Die Anwendung der §§ 2369 und 2368 BGB. auf Erbanfall 
mit englischen oder amerikanischem Erbstatut," N. Jur. Woch. 1952, III3. 
67 NUSSBAUM 369 n. 4· 
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must not be rigidly confined by his appointment itself to the 
forum in which he was appointed. The English doctrine 
satisfies this need. Although the court has only a territorially 
limited jurisdiction, the English grant extends to property 
no matter where situated.68 He is charged with collecting 
all assets of which he can get hold; the assets in his hands 
are accountable to the English court and liable to all debts 
whether incurred in England or abroad.69 This conception 
permits the personal representative to receive voluntary 
payments by debtors abroad and even to appear in for-
eign courts, provided this is agreeable to the latter. He 
may appropriate all chattels and claims as allowed by the 
lex situs/ 0 and transfer them to England. Assets, however, 
possessed by a foreign administrator and brought to Eng-
land, remain accountable to the foreign court. 71 
Occasionally, the one relevant difference 72 that continues 
between an executor and an administrator in the narrow 
sense, despite their large assimilation, may be noticeable: 
"Since an executor derives his title from the will and the 
property of the testator vests in him on the latter's death, 
he is able to do any act of his office with the sole excep-
tion of pursuing an action in court. He may even com-
mence proceedings until he has to prove his title which 
can only be done by probate." 73 
An executor, hence, may sell, assign, or pledge any por-
tion of the personal estate. It has been held that the sale of 
land, if executed according to the lex situs, cannot be 
attacked by the purchaser on the ground that probate was 
68 CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 514. 
69DICEY (ed. 6) 811. 
70 WESTLAKE 167 ff. j DICEY (ed. S) rules 85, 87, 131. 
71 DICEY (ed. 6) 811 ff. 
72 For another, practically superseded difference, see infra 438. 
73 PARRY 47 ff. j RANKING 140. 
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not granted to him. 74 By the same consequence of his 
position, an executor may be sued by creditors or bene-
ficiaries even before probate.75 
The American position is basically similar, 76 but as the 
several states are to be viewed as both the forum and a 
foreign jurisdiction, emphasis lies on the powers of a 
foreign representative of whom we have to speak presently. 
(b) Civil law countries. Testamentary executors are 
permitted in all systems, but they are never the owners at 
law of the estate. Their powers are limited by the statutes 
to a varying maximum, always less extensive than at com-
mon law. Within these limits, the testator may define the 
authority of the executor. The radius of the executors is 
never restricted territorially. 
2. Recognition of Foreign Fiduciaries 
(a) Common law countries. In England, to exercise 
full powers, a foreign representative must apply for ap-
pointment as ancillary administrator. In England, whether 
the inheritance law is British or foreign will not make a 
difference in normal situations. 77 The foreign fiduciary is 
accepted as ancillary administrator ordinarily, though not 
necessarily, according to the discretion of the court, 78 and 
he is subject to its directions. 
In the United States, sometimes a foreign fiduciary is 
considered in the older manner as lacking title in the 
assets; but prevailingly he can at present, without auxiliary 
probate, take possession, remove and administer a chattel 
74 National Trust Co. Ltd. v. Mendelson (Ont. H.Ct., 1941) 1942 I D.L.R. 
438. 
75 Mohamidu Mohideen Hadjar v. Pitchey [1894] A.C. 437· 
76 Restatement § 474; GooDRICH § 182 (highly informative). 
77 In re Kehr, Martin v. Foges [1952] Ch. 26. 
78 Court of Probate Act 1857, s. 73; In the goods of Brieseman [1894] 
P. z6o; in the goods of Earl [1867] L.R. I P.D. 450. 
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as well as receive payment of and assign claims, until a local 
administrator is appointed or, in another version, until he 
knows of such appointment. 79 At the same time he remains 
generally unable to sue on behalf of the estate, though some 
statutes do allow it, at least where no interested local party 
requests an ancillary administration. 80 
A variety of other concessions to foreign fiduciaries in-
clude the possibility to have an assignee sue 81 or to sue in 
his own name rather than on behalf of the estate,82 which 
"artificial" distinction has been used for further liberaliza-
tion of the principle.83 
Nevertheless, the basic principle remains lack of privity 
between the territorial administrations; it shows itself 
strikingly when the same person appears in several states 
in the name of the estate in the same cause, and the judg-
ments are devoid of effect except where they are rendered. 84 
Where the domicil of the testator was in a civil law 
country and his testamentary executor possesses sufficient 
powers under the law of that domicil, he (or his local at-
torney) will ordinarily be accepted as ancillary administrator 
according to the same rules. If, however, the heirs are 
authorized to act and present themselves, a common law 
court is correct in considering that such heirs-as I would 
put it-unite in their persons the functions of beneficiaries 
79 United States: Restatement §§ 474, 481; 2 BEALE 1533 ff.; HOPKINS, /.c. 
635 cites three statutes. See the new survey of the topic by OPTON, "Recog-
nition etc." 19 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 156, 165-167. 
80 0PTON, ibid. concludes that in the prevailing view the title of the 
foreign fiduciary is recognized although he is barred from suing for the 
estate. C/., GooDRICH § 182 n. 69. 
81 Peterson v. Chemical Bank ( 1865) 32 N.Y. 21. 
82 Thus Turner v. Alten Banking & Trust Co. (C.C. 8, 1948) 166 F. (2d) 
305. 
88 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Wilkins v. Ellett ( 1883) ro8 U.S. 256; Kruskel 
v. United States (1949) 178 F. (2d) 738; CHEATHAM, supra, 44 Col. L. Rev. 
at 549· 
84 Restatement § 468. See the exceptions to the principles infra 437-438. 
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and managers of the estate. The court in England, in fact, 
will either appoint them as ancillary administrators or order 
an ancillary administrator to surrender the surplus to the 
heirs.85 
American practice emphasizes rather the discretion of 
the court as exercised under statutory directions.86 
The foreign representative appointed in an ancillary 
administration has to follow the local law and court 
orders and to account to the court that appointed him. 
Some courts even require a bond from a nonresident execu-
tor relieved from giving security in the will. 87 
(b) Civil law countries. Almost unanimous consent 
advances the conflicts rule that the law of succession deter-
mines the requirements and effects of a testamentary ap-
pointment of executor.88 A divergent opinion of a few 
French writers in favor of the lex situs has remained 
isola ted. 89 
The inheritance law controls in particular capacity and 
power of fiduciaries, also when that law entrusts them with 
larger activities than the forum. The literature is practically 
unanimous on this point,90 decisive for the recognition of 
85 In re Achillopoulos [1928] Ch. 433; Laneuville v. Anderson ( 186o) 
2 Sw. & Tr. 24; In the goods of Dost Aly Khan (1887) 6 P.D. 6. 
86 BEALE 1417. 
87 New York: GRANGE 117. 
88 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 8, 1924) Clunet 1925, 711; Cour Paris 
(June 28, 1941) Rev. crit. 1946, 243; Cass. req. (Nov. 19, 1941) S. 1942.1.129; 
WEISS, 4 Traite 594; JoussELIN 76 ff.; 10 Repert. Successions no. 90; NIBOYET, 
4 Traite 863; DELAUME ET FLATTEL, 90 J. Trib. (1951) 11 6. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 25, 1888) 6 BoLZE 4 no. 11; (April 21, 1890) 26 
RGZ. 38o; (Nov. 5, 1928) Jur. Woch. 1928, 3139; KG. (July 16, 1925) Jur. 
Woch. 1925, 2142; 2 BAR 338; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 485. 
89 CHAMPCOMMUNAL 384. 
9° France: Despagnet ( ed. 5) II 16 § 380; LAURENT, 7 Dr. civ. § 109; WEISS, 
4 Traite 671; NAST, BATIFFOL AND MAURY in notes to Cass. Crim. (June 4, 
1941), see infra n. 96; BATIFFOL, Traite 673 § 668. 
Germany: 4 FRANKENSTEIN 488; LEWALD 338; WOLFF, D.IPR. (ed. 3) 229; 
NussBAUM, D.I.P.R., 352, n. 4; SCHWENN, N. Jur. Woch. 1952, 1113, 1116 II. 
Italy: FEDOZZI in 22 Dig. Ita). at 833; FEDOZZI 593; PALLICCIA, Rivista 
1932, 347· 
ADMINISTRATORS AND COURTS 427 
Anglo-American executors and administrators exercising 
powers by far more extensive than any known at civil law. 
Accordingly, the German courts, aware of the diversity 
of the authority with which administrators of decedents' 
estates are endowed in the various laws, recognize without 
hesitation the foreign-derived powers and especially the 
ample task of Anglo-American fiduciaries. 91 The Reichs-
gericht, like the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
even exaggerated the principle; they concluded that the 
British nationality of a personal representative, as dis-
tinguished from the beneficiaries, sufficed for admitting a 
claim to the clearing-procedure between England and Ger-
many.92 The same basic approach is taken in Italy, Spain, 
and Cuba.93 
In France, after older decisions, 94 a decision of the 
Seine Tribunal 95 was widely noted which recognized Span-
ish testamentary executors and liquidators with larger 
powers than French executors; they would continue the per-
sonalty of the testatrix, receive funds, and create a new 
foundation (the validity of which was thus rescued). 
91 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. I, I887) Hans. Ger. Z. I887 HBe. 
289 no. I24 (English executor); RG. (April 25, I932) 86 Seuff. 27I No. I52, 
IPRspr. I932; 6 No. I; KG. (May Ig, I9I2) 42 Jahrb. KG. I4I; supra 
Ch. 69 n. go; (July 2, I925) Jur. Woch., I925, 2I42-
92 RG. (Feb. I8, I926) Jur. Woch. I926, I788, invoking as support Anglo-
German TAM. (Feb. 4, I924) 4 Recueil Trib. Arb. Mixt., Klingenstein v. 
Maier, see the just criticism by ERNST WoLFF, Jur. Woch. I.e. 
93 Italy: Cass. Roma (Feb. 2I, I899) Foro Ita!. I899 I 333, Giur. Ita!. 
I899 I I, 2I6 I: powers of a trustee did not offend Italian public policy; 
Cass. (July 9, I94I) Foro Ita!. Mass. I94I, 511 No. 2062: Swiss executor. 
Spain: Trib. Sup. (Feb. I, I9IO) also in Revue I911, 77I: the testatrix was 
a subject of Catalonia; therefore Catalonian law governed the powers of 
the executors. 
Cuba: Trib. Sup. (Jan. I6, 1908) also in Revue I9II, Igi: the American 
personal representative had authority to sue and collect as provided by the 
Pennsylvania law of succession, the national law of the testator. 
94 Cass. req. (Apr. I9, I859) D. I859.1.277; Trib. Seine (April 20, I898) 
J.C. I899, 765; (July I3, I9IO) Clunet I911, 9I2. 95 (Dec. 8, I924) Gaz. Pal. I926.I.293; Revue I925, 76, Affirmed on other 
grounds Paris (July I, I926) Revue I926, 540. 
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Finally, the criminal section of the Court of Cassation 
adopted the proposition that a fiduciary appointed in a 
common law court acts in France in his own name though on 
account of the estate.96 
From this recognition must be distinguished the per-
mission to undertake certain activities in the territory. Al-
though not in Italy, in Belgium and France a formal judg-
ment of exequatur, enforcing the original appointment 97 
and in Germany a certificate of authority 98 are needed for 
certain purposes, although merely advisable for others. 
Although the usual practice, analogous to the Anglo-
American, requires a foreign executor to follow the local 
law, the German courts, in consistency with their concep-
tion that they only assist foreign law governing a succession, 
apply that law in case they intervene. 99 
96 Cass. Crim. Section (June 41 1941) D. 1942 C. 4, S. 1944·1.1331 Juris 
Classeur 1942.11 2017: the testator may give the executor saisine under C.C. 
art. 1026. 
97 Belgium: Rb. Brugge (March 10, 1939) Rechtskund W. 1939 c. 105: 
a Michigan administrator in intestate succession is authorized to demand re-
covery of a debt, but needs an exequatur. 
France: Trib. Seine (July 23, 1920) Clunet 1920, 684. 
98 Testamentsvollstrecker-Zeugnis, BGB. §§ 2368 f. 
99 0LG. Frankfurt (July 11, 1898) 33 Frankfurter Rundschau (1899) 88 
(sworn inventory) ; RG. (Nov. s, 1928) Jur. Woch. 1929, 434, IPRspr. 
1929, No. 1 (accounting). 
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Claims 
I. SINGLE LAw oF SuccESSION 
r. The Question of Liability 
F IRST attention is due to the case where one law governs the entire inheritance but the assets are 
scattered through several territories. Suppose that 
an American citizen domiciled in Cuba leaves shares of an 
American corporation deposited in a New York bank. His 
succession is governed by Cuban law under the conflicts law 
of New York and, presumably, also by renvoi in Cuba. 
What approach have the American or Cuban creditors to 
take when seeking payment out of those shares? 
The inherent difficulties of the international problem are 
enhanced by the contrast of the conflicts principles. Where 
unity of succession is established, irrespective of the situa-
tion of the assets, should the foreign part of the assets 
simply be included in the account, even though at the place 
of the situation local assets are submitted to a separate 
administration? Common law lawyers, on the other hand, 
often consider "liability" for claims as a matter of adminis-
tration; does this mean that no regard is taken to the con-
flicts rule of the situs? Some French writers suggest that 
the lex situs, more or less replacing the law of succession, 
should be looked to in the relationship between the estate 
and the creditors. 
To start answering these questions, it should be clear 
for all systems whatsoever that the transmission of the 
debts of the deceased to a successor in any sense is a neces-
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sary part of the law of succession, 1 quite as the transfer of 
the deceased's property is. Only enforcement is a separate 
activity at common law, subject to traditional dependence 
on territorial principles, and everywhere, of course, pro-
cedural incidents follow the lex fori. 
The term "liability" should indicate who is the passive 
subject of the debt and what can be demanded. Common 
law segregates the question what distinction may be made 
among the funds out of which the creditor seeks to be paid. 
Three main systems of liability for the claim against the 
estate, apart from the claims created after death, may be 
distinguished. 
Universal succession in the Romanistic doctrine commits 
the heir to unlimited responsibility with the means of the 
estate and all his own means, except where certain measures 
are taken for limiting his burden. Such measures are 
especially acceptance under the beneficium inventarii, re-
stricting the liability of the accepting heir to the value of 
the assets to be listed in the inventory (pro viribus hered-
itatis 2 ), and separatio bonorum, segregation of the in-
heritance from the heir's assets, on the request of an 
interested person. This is unlimited or limited personal 
liability. 
The Germanic, agreeing with the general archaic, con-
ception regards the debts of the deceased as burdening 
1 United States: ATKINSON, Am. Property Law 641 § 14.20: "Liability is 
independent of Administration." 
England: DICEY (ed. 6) 811. 
France: CHAMPCOMMUNAL 414; 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WAHL (ed. 3) 
463 § 3094 f.; WEISS, 4 Traite 599 f.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 914 § 1368, 921 
§ 1371; BATIFFOL, Traite 676 § 573· 
Germany: 2 BAR 350; 2 ZITELMANN 976; LEWALD 389; NUSSBAUM 359; 
WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 228. 
Netherlands: KosTERS 627; MEI]ERS, Weekblaad 349 5, IX. 
Switzerland: VoUMARD, Transmission 83 ff. 
2 See, e.g., for Argentina: C.C. art. 3363; MOLINA, 12 Rev. Ciencias Jur. 
Santa Fe ( 1950) 151. 
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the ancestral home and property. Whoever takes the 
assets responds for the debts so far as the assets go (liability 
cum viribus hereditatis) . This is the foundation of the 
Anglo-American liability restriction to the assets of the 
inheritance, from which the feudal ties detracted the 
land. 
A third group has looked for a modern method of limit-
ing responsibility and found them close to common law 
methods. The German and Swiss Codes resort to official 
administration on request. 
2. Civil Law 
The law of succession determines whether liability is 
imposed on persons-the heirs, devisees, universal legatees, 
universal or residuary legatees, or under certain circum-
stances, a special legatee or donee-or whether it rests 
upon the assets. It determines whether liability is unlimited, 
or limited to the assets composing the estate, or to their 
value, and what steps are needed for any limitation. 
An obvious consequence involves the recourse of a pay-
ing beneficiary against those persons charged by the in-
heritance law with primary liability.3 
Under the nationality principle, this means that the 
rights of the creditors are subject to the law of the country 
whose national the deceased was. That in this application 
the national law is particularly improper, has been some-
times noted! An involuntary avowal of this fact is con-
tained in a provision of the German Civil Code which 
calls for the national law of the deceased but permits the 
3 Trib. Seine, Clunet 1895, n8; TREBAUT, IO Repert. Succession § 46; on 
this point BATIFFOL 677 states an old tradition and unanimity in France. 
4 KAHN, 2 Abhandl. z86 perceived that "the interest of the creditors of an 
estate demands another contact than the national law," although his own 
suggestions were inacceptable. 
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heirs of a German who was domiciled abroad to invoke 
the limitation granted by the law of the domicil.5 Indeed, 
the Scandinavian Convention on Inheritance and Succession, 
deviating from its usual combination of tests, resorts to 
the decedent's domiciliary law for determining liability for 
debts; only the effect of public summons to the creditors, 
issued at the domicil, on creditors in other countries is 
qualified by appropriate conditions. 6 The place where the 
debtor lived and carried on his business, is rightly supposed 
to have influenced the credit extended to him. Its law, of 
course, should not operate for the exclusive benefit of the 
heir. 
Law of the debt. It stands to reason that the debt trans-
ferred to new debtors retains the character imprinted on it 
during the lifetime of the deceased. The claim may from 
its inception be indivisible or joint, and stays so. 7 At civil 
law the question who may sue or be sued also is a part of 
the substantive order; hence, if English law governs the 
succession, not the beneficiary but the administrator has 
been allowed in a French court to sue a debtor, 8 and the 
analogous solution may be expected in the case of claims 
against the estate. However, the complicated rules of the 
common law relating to extraterritorial situations, espe-
cially when a creditor of the estate sues the administrator 
outside the state of his appointment, disturb the problem-
which, in the opinion of this writer, has not yet been 
mastered.9 
5 EG. BGB. art. 24 par. 2; OLG. Hamburg (March 8, 1911) 28 R. OLG. 
59; KAHN, x Abhandl. 465; RAAPE, Komm. 6ss ff. 
6 Scandinavian Convention of Nov. 19, 1934 (supra Vol. I, 33 n. 8s), arts. 
17, 18, 25 j cf., PLAISANT 253· 
7 MAURY ET YIALLETON in PLANIOL ET RIPERT, 4 Traite 499 § 400j NIBOYET, 
4 Traite 913 § 1368. 
8 Cour Paris (April 2, 1896} Clunet 1897, 465; otherwise if French law 
governs, App. Grenoble (March 31, 1908} Revue 1908, 609. 
9 See for the analogous question of the person qualified for receiving an 
appointment as ancillary administrator or a certificate of heirship, supra. 
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Enforcement. In the traditional Continental doctrine, 
the law of succession extends to enforcement by action, 
with the sole exception of pure procedural questions. This 
law dictates, in particular, the measures giving the bene-
ficiary time for considering his attitude in the face of claims, 
the calling up of the creditors for filing their claims, and 
the cases in which separation of the inheritance may be 
requested, although assistance by foreign authorities may 
be needed, and may often be unavailable, to implement 
such measures. 
According to this prevailing theory, where a French 
testator, domiciled in France, leaves movables in Italy, 
a French court applies French inheritance law to all mov-
ables and makes all heirs liable in proportion to their 
shares (Code Civil, article 7 3 2) with all assets remaining 
obligated to all creditors as they were in the lifetime of 
the deceased (article 2092) .10 
Lex situs. Opposition by the neo-territorialistic theore-
ticians, 11 in France gives the law of the place where the 
assets are situated and seized for enforcement the primary 
role, either on the strength of a principle valid for all 
assets 12 or by submitting enforcement upon movables to 
the lex situs because of the "public credit" affected.13 The 
prevailing opinion rejects these obscure reasonings. Dis-
crimination according to territorially divided objects is in-
consistent with the leading ideas of the Continental systems. 
1 0 WEiss, 4 Traite 6o1. 
11 See the citations in the critical surveys by TREBAUT, 10 Repert. 516 No. 
112 ff.; VOUMARD, Transmission u6 ff.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 904 § 1364 ff.; 
also BEVILAQUA (ed. 3), 401 n. 12, citing PILLET, Principes § 179 inclines to 
lex situs for claims of creditors, because of the "public credit." 
12 BARTIN, 3 Principes § 450 f.; contra NIBOYET, 4 Traite 91I § 1366. 
13 PILLET, 2 Traite 414 § 602; NIBOYET, Manuel § 536; LEREBOURS-PIGEON-
NIERE (ed. 6) 4II f., who, however, corrects the result by introducing the 
French rule of a liability proportional to the value inherited. See the con-
vincing refutation of the "credit public" theory by MAURY ET VIALLETON 
in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 491 f.; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 919 ff. § 1370 f. 
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Under the Treaty of Montevideo, the law is different, 
but it constitutes always a plurality of successions when 
the assets are in different states. 
3· Common Law 
England. If it is said that the assets in the hands of an 
English administrator are liable for all debts whether in-
curred in England or aBroad/4 it is to be understood that 
the law of succession determines what debt of the deceased 
passes and against whom. On the other hand, proof of the 
claim and order of priority are subject to English law as 
lex fori with the exception of assets under foreign adminis-
tration and removed to England.15 
Among the numerous particulars of this doctrine which 
cannot be explored here, the old case of Aldrich v. Cooper 16 
is interesting. A mortgagee may proceed against freehold 
and copyhold, but if he exhausts the personal estate, a 
simple creditor may take his place; accordingly, where 
claimant A has a real security in two funds, X and Y, and 
B only in X, A may satisfy his claim at his option, but when 
he chooses the fund X, B is subrogated in A's right in Y. 
United States. The law of the place of administration 
certainly does not control the existence of a debt or deter-
mine who should pay it after distribution of the assets. But 
it fixes the time within which a claim must be proved,11 the 
manner in which it may be proved, 18 the modalities of pay-
ment, and the preferences of classes of creditors.19 These 
14 DICEY (ed. 5) Appendix Note 25, p. 971 If.; (ed. 6) 8u. 
15 DICEY (ed. 6) 812. 
16 Lord Eldon in Aldrich v. Cooper ( 1808) 8 Ves. 382, 32 Eng. R. 402; 
WILLIAMS (ed. 12) § 812. 
17 Restatement § 498. 
18 Restatement § 499· 
19 Restatement §§ 500-503; STORY §524 f.; WOERNER§ 166; 3 BEALE§ 497.1; 
§ 501.1. 
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questions are independent of the domiciliary law of the 
deceased or of the creditors. 20 
The principle of equality. A basic idea, similar to that 
of the civil law, was once announced by the Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts: the assets, wherever situated, should 
be available to all creditors of the same class without dis-
crimination.21 But since it was predicated that each state has 
independent power over the assets situated in its terri-
tory,22 the general doctrine isolates the local property of 
each state from all other assets. The right to be satisfied 
out of this property belongs to those creditors who bring 
and prove their claims before the local court. 
The Restatement expresses this rule in an explicit manner: 
§ 49 5 • ••• "all creditors regardless of where they are 
domiciled can prove their claims in any state in which 
administration proceedings have been instituted." 
§ 497· "All creditors of a decedent who have proved 
their claims in a competent court in which there are 
administration proceedings of the estate of that decedent 
are entitled to share pro rata in any application of the 
assets of the local administrator to the payment of 
claims, irrespective of the source of such assets or of the 
residence, place of business, domicil or citizenship of the 
creditors, except 
(a) where there are valid claims against specific 
funds, or 
(b) where there are valid preferences given by local 
statute to creditors of a particular class." 
Although the Restatement left the question open whether 
preferences could constitutionally be given to resident non-
citizens, there is certainly a difference to the effect that the 
20 Baker v. Baker ( 1917) 242 U.S. 394; Wilson v. Hartford ( 1908) 164 
Fed. 817; Duehay v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. ( 1939) 105 F. (2d) 768. 
21 Dawes v. Head ( 1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 127, per C. J. Parker. 
22 STORY § 420; Bostwick v. Carr (1914) 165 App. Div. ss, 151 N.Y.S. 74· 
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Privileges and Immunity Clause of the Federal Constitution 
assures equality to citizens only; therefore the formulation 
of the Restatement exceeds somewhat the actual law in 
generosity. 
The standard by which preferences may be granted by 
statute to local creditors in a solvent estate has recently been 
defined. Citizens must have "reasonable and adequate access 
to the courts" for filing their claims. They need not neces-
sarily enjoy all technical and precisely similar rights con-
ferred upon the local claimants. 23 
Insolvent estates. If an estate is known to be insolvent, 
it is settled in theory that equality of all creditors ought 
to outweigh convenience of local distribution. The creditors 
having proved their claims receive only a pro rata per-
centage corresponding to the dividend that is likely to result 
from all assets and debts of the entire estate.24 It has 
been held, however, that the local creditors may receive this 
quota before the others. 25 Nevertheless, it has become 
obvious that multiple administration must lead to "conflicts 
and confusion." 26 It demands a very difficult interstate 
cooperation. Receivership in the case of insolvent corpora-
tions has been reformed for analogous reasons by Con-
23 3 BEALE §§ 466, 510.1, 512.1; Canadian Northern Railway Comp. v. 
Eggen ( 1920) 252 U.S. 553, 562; Duehay v. Acacia (supra. n. 19) at 776, 
where a statute of the District of Columbia was construed so as to conform 
with the Constitution. See also In re Torrington ( 1934) 70 F. (2d) 949· 
24 Blake v. McClung (1898) 172 U.S. 239; In re Hanreddy's Estate (1922) 
176 Wis. 570, 186 N.W. 744, LoRENZEN, Cases 967; In re Hirsch's Estate 
(1946) 146 Ohio St. 393, 66 N.E. (2d) 636, ann. 164 A.L.R. 761, 765. Similar 
for receivership, Restatement §§ 559, 560. 
25 In re Estate of Brauns ( 1936) 276 Mich. 598, 268 N.W. 893; see in 
general Note, 164 A.L.R. 768; 21 Am. Jur. 863 § 878 n. II. 
In Owsley v. Bowden (Ga. 1926) 132 S.E. 70, the creditors filed in Georgia 
received sufficient payment "to discharge these debts," which seems to be full 
payment, because they had not filed in time in Alabama, the domiciliary state, 
and were barred there. 
26 Report on Uniform Ancillary Administration of Estate Act, Handbook 
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1934, 365. See, as early as 
1840, Goodall v. Marshall, II N.H. 88, 98, 101. 
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gressional action 27 and purposeful policy of the United 
States Supreme Court. 28 Concentration on the domiciliary 
administration as in the case of receivership has been justly 
advocated in the whole field of the administration of de-
cedent's estates.29 Where the estate is insolvent, however, 
the most efficient and adequate measure would be the exten-
sion of the national Bankruptcy Act to the estate adminis-
tration, matching the legislation of all other significant 
countries. 30 
Effect of Judgments. The Supreme Court of the United 
States as early as I 841 stabilized the doctrine that in con-
sequence of the territorial limits of his powers an adminis-
trator cannot bind the estate outside of the state in which 
he is appointed. 31 Even a judgment rendered in the state 
of his appointment has no binding effect upon another 
administration.32 The judgment against him as repre-
sentative is merely regarded as an order to pay out funds 
committed to his care just in the same jurisdiction. As the 
Supreme Court expressed it: "While a judgment against a 
party may be conclusive not merely against him but also 
those in privity with him, there is no privity between two 
administrators appointed in different states"; hence a judg-
ment obtained against the ancillary administrator with the 
will annexed in Massachusetts has no effect against an 
executor at the testator's domicil in Michigan.33 It has 
2 7 Bankruptcy Act, chapter X. 
28 CHEATHAM, "The Statutory Successor, The Receiver and the Executor 
in the Conflict of Laws," 44 Col. L. Rev. ( I944) 549· 
29 HOPKINS, 53 Yale L.J. 221, 634; and especially CHEATHAM, [.c. 
30 See NADELMANN, "Insolvent Decedents' Estates," 49 Mich. L. Rev. ( I9S1) 
II29, u61 f. and (cited by him) SIMES, "Some Lessons from a Comparative 
Study of American Probate Legislation," Proceedings, Section of Real Prop-
erty and Trust Laws, Am. Bar Ass. ( 1949) 42, 48. 
31 Vaughan v. Northrup (1841) IS Pet. I. 
32 Stacy v. Thrasher ( 1845) 6 Howard 44, 6o f. See also Low v. Bartlett 
( 1864) 8 All (Mass.) 259· 
33 Brown v. Fletcher's Estate ( 1907) 210 U.S. 82. 
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equally remained constant practice that a judgment against 
a domiciliary administrator has no effect on assets in an 
ancillary state, 34 or one against a foreign executor outside 
the state of his appointment on the entire estate.35 It does 
not even make a difference that the same person is the ad-
ministrator in both courts or the executor in one and admin-
istrator in the other.36 
An exception was once made by the Supreme Court 
when the same person was executor in both states, because 
his support by the will of the testator unified his position; 
the judgment was given full faith and credit.37 Yet, despite 
the alleged privity in such case, such a judgment was sub-
sequently merely considered prima facie evidence of the 
debt 38 (which in itself is also an exceptional favor). 
It follows that any creditor may present a claim in any 
jurisdiction 39 where assets are found 40 and at the domicil.41 
If the claim is rejected, he may prove it elsewhere. If it is 
allowed, this is not even an evidence of the existence of 
the claim in other jurisdictions.42 Limitation of action in 
one state has no importance in the others; 43 in the kindred 
English view, a surplus reached in the ancillary English 
administration was surrendered to the local beneficiaries 
without regard to American creditors barred by the Eng-
34 Johnson v. Powers ( 1890) 139 U.S. 156; Wilson v. Hartford ( 1908) 
164 Fed. 817; Green v. Martin (193z) Z39 N.W. 870. 
35 Learned Hand J., in Burrowes v. Goodman (1931) 50 F. (zd) 9Z; see 
also Feldman v. Gross ( 195Z) 106 F. Supp. 308. 
36 Restatement § so6, comment a. STORY § szza was doubtful. 
37 Carpenter v. Strange ( 1891) 141 U.S. 87, 104. 
38 Hill v. Tucker ( 1851) 13 Howard 458. 
so Restatement § so6 (z). 
40 WoERNER § 17z; GooDRICH 570 and citations. Cf., 3 A.L.R. 64. 
41 Goodall v. Marshall (1840) II N.H. 88, 98. 
42 Green v. Martin ( 193z) Z39 N.W. 870; Restatement § 495 comment b. 
In Johnson v. Powers ( 1890) 139 U.S. 156, the same result follows naturally 
in the absence of identity of res and persona. 
43WiJson v. Hartford (1908) 164 Fed. 817. 
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lish statute of limitation though not by the statute of the 
American domicil.44 
Disposition of Ancillary Funds. The American courts, 
like the English, claim discretionary power to dispose of 
the assets or the surplus. Where no special reasons demand 
attention, the most usual proceedings are the following: 
If no locally domiciled creditors exist from the beginning 
in an ancillary court, transfer of the funds to the domiciliary 
administrator is ordered.45 Likewise, if all locally appear-
ing creditors are paid, the remaining balance of the personal 
estate is transferred to the principal administrator; the 
Restatement favors this.46 An exception has been made, 
for instance, where expedience, costs, and other reasons 
advised the contrary 41 or there was no assurance that an 
administrator "is or will be appointed" at the domicil in 
Argentina. 48 
Conflict of Systems. In a hundred-years-old English 
case, it was held that a foreign personal representative, 
having taken heirship according to foreign law without 
benefit of inventory, is personally liable in England, not as 
an administrator of English movables but as a debtor.48 
Hence, while the administration in England, governed by 
English law, is accountable for the assets only, in addition 
English proceedings make the successors accountable ac-
cording to foreign inheritance law. This is one way to 
adjust the English system to the recognition that the suc-
cession is governed by a foreign law determining also the 
scope of liability for debts. 
This example may inspire solutions in many other situa-
44 In re Lorillard (1922) 2 Ch. 638. 
45 Dow v. Lillie ( 1914) 144 N.W. 1082; Restatement § 496. 
46 Restatement § 522. 
47 Burman v. Lenkin Construction Co. ( 1945) 149 F. (2d) 827. 
48 In re Bokkelen (N.Y. 1935) ISS Misc. 289. 
48 Beaven v. Lord Hastings (1856) K. & J. 724. 
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tions where the systems clash. In accordance, it has been 
stated in the Netherlands that the creditors of an English-
man who died domiciled in England cannot sue the bene-
ficiaries personally in Holland as they would be entitled to 
under Dutch law.50 
II. SEVERAL LAws oF SuccEssiON 
1. Lack of Privity 
Realistic understanding on the Continent faces the scission 
of inheritance laws, if nothing corrects it, with the same 
awe and displeasure as common law lawyers realize the 
splitting up of the assets in multiple administration. The 
several independent systems, indeed, in the case of their 
international segregation, result in the incoherent existence 
also of several systems of liability and enforcement. An 
heir may, with deliberate planning, accept one succession 
and repudiate the other, so as to become liable to the claims 
against the first but not to those against the second, which 
are higher. The law of state X may hold land liable only 
to mortgagees or claims otherwise arising in connection 
with land, and the beneficiary leaves the small assets in 
Y to the pleasure of all other creditors. On the other hand, 
if there happens to be total responsibility of all estates to 
all creditors, they may exhaust the funds left to one suc-
cessor under the law of X to the advantage of the successor 
called by the law of Y. Moreover, an absolute lack of 
correlation deprives the payor of any recourse for con-
tribution. 
When in England movables alone were attachable by 
creditors of the estate (and the case is the same where at 
present a Scotch heir to an immovable is liable only in a 
50 MEIJERS, Weekblaad No. 3495, IX; GHEEL GILDEMEESTER, Vererwing 
( 1948) 134. 
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subsidiary order), the paying heir was granted recourse in 
England.51 In international relations nothing similar IS 
assured. 
That mortgages and other security rights can, and in 
the case of land charges not supported by an underlying 
personal obligation must, be enforced in their totality 
against the assets affected, is settled.52 But an old French 
doctrine construed a category of udettes immobilieres," 
including mine royalties, that would be restricted to the 
territory of the land, whereas the movables had to support 
the great majority of the claims. 5 3 
In the prevailing opinion, the principle is certain: all 
assets are liable to all creditors, but each asset only accord-
ing to the law of succession recognized in the country 
where it is situated. No privity exists among the several 
laws of succession so followed.54 
2. Equalization 
Correction of this sad outlook has been sought in various 
ways. An influential doctrine postulates proportional 
division of the assets among the creditors of the various 
systems, conforming to the value of the assets situated in 
the several territories. 55 However, not only is it very 
difficult to assemble the facts for such evaluation, but no 
pertinent rule can be founded in the absence of federation 
or treaty. The Montevideo Treaty in fact provides a liabil-
51 WESTLAKE§ 118; DICEY (ed. 5) 973j (ed. 6) 813. 
52 VOUMARD 86, 144. 
53 For extension of this category, JouSSELIN, (These, 1899) 105; contra 
PLANIOL ET RIPERT § 906 f. j NIBOYET, 4 Traite 905 § 1364. 
54 France: NIBOYET, Traite 916 § 1370; SAVATIER, Cours 304 § 436. 
Germany: NussBAUM 359· 
55 France: MAURY ET VIALLETON in 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT 489 j LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 412. 
Germany: 2 BAR 3 so. 
Switzerland: VouMARD 89. 
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ity merely proportional to the part obtained by the local 
assets in the entire inheritance, but gives the local claims 
preference for total satisfaction.56 The very idea of pre-
venting a creditor from requesting full payment of his claim 
is unsound and disastrous to personal credit. Credit is 
usually granted in reliance on the entire possessions of the 
debtor, which may be true even of a mortgagee. Therefore, 
in another view, all assets must be available to every 
creditor. 57 At present, this responds of course to the prin-
ciples of most countries, though not all; but the result of 
applying the divergent modalities of limitation and enforce-
ment has never been studied. One difficulty has been over-
come in France; an heir claiming benefit of inventory must 
extend the inventory to the entire inheritance. 58 
In the internal relationship between the beneficiaries of 
the separate successions, an obligation of contribution is as 
desirable as it is far from recognition. It has been suggested 
that joint debtors with recourse proportional to the values 
received by them, 59 provided that the construction of a will 
does not involve a different regulation. This rule, not of 
conflict of laws but a uniform substantive rule, deserves to 
be carefully worked out. It is not a part of any present law. 
56 Treaty of Montevideo, arts. 46-48. 
57 M. WoLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 227; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 359; BATIFFOL, 
Traite 676 f. § 673 (making no difference whether there is one or several 
laws of succession. 
58 Cass. req. (April 23, r866) S. 1866.1.290; C. Paris (Dec. u, 1886) 
S. 1886.2.42; TREBAUT, 10 Repert., Successions No. 118. 
59 WoLFF and NussBAUM, supra n. 55; RAAPE, Kommentar 688; 4 FRANK-
ENSTEIN 580 develops a different proposal which is impractical. 
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CHAPTER 75 
Trusts 
I. TRUST IN GENERAL 
I ·F there should be any part of the conflict of laws free from "confusion," it is not the treatment of trusts. 
According to Bates it is "highly uncertain." 1 Griswold 
states that in that great maze which we know as conflict 
of laws, there are few fields more uncertain in the cases 
and difficult in principle than trusts. 2 Cavers describes the 
numerous hazards for the creation of trusts which even 
may shift in the perhaps long period during which a trust 
should run.3 Beale's attempt to mold the liquid case 
material into firm rules 4 had too little support in the de-
cisions and not enough practical appeal. It would seem that 
the very territorial principles of the law of property from 
which Beale started, appear unsatisfactory to the courts. 
Curiously enough, in view of the scarce and not too 
reliable authority in England,-"scanty and often mis-
leading"-writers look for enlightenment to the American 
cases.5 
However, no new examination of the decisions would 
1 BATES, "Common Law Express Trusts in French Law," 40 Yale L.J. 
( 1926) 34· 
2 GRISWOLD, Book Review, 55 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1947) 163. 
3 CAVERS, Book Review, 20 North Car. L. Rev. (1947) 231. 
4 BEALE, "Living Trusts of Movables in the Conflict of Laws," 45 Harv. 
L. Rev. ( 1932) 969; 2 BEALE and Restatement §§ 241-244, 294-299; BEALE, 
"Development in the Law of Conflict of Laws ( 1935-1936) ," so Harv. L. 
Rev. ( 1937) 1156 f. 
5 CROUCHER, "Trust of Movables in Private International Law," Mod. L. 
Rev. (1940) III. 
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help. In the words of Chief Justice Layton of Delaware 
speaking of the "vexed question" of trusts inter vivos, the 
diversities are "such that no useful purpose will be served 
by an attempted analysis of the decisions." 6 The profound 
uneasiness these tentative efforts of the judiciary evoke 
is caused by a struggle against mechanical rules without 
resolute acceptance of the hints given by the prominent 
writers on this subject. 
1. Municipal Systems 
Trust, the most typical and most advertised institution of 
the Anglo-American law, has engendered numerous special-
ized applications which have grown into autonomous types. 
In its general form, apt to serve almost any purpose of 
property transactions, the trust survives; but its particularly 
brilliant employment in recent periods lies in certain func-
tions among which in the United States long term disposi-
tions of wealth take the foreground. 
In the civil law sphere, identical factors have been active 
since the very earliest times, to build up new types of trans-
actions by the medium of fiduciary transfers of persons 
and property. As a final result, however, the compact 
civil codes laid down the specific fruits of this development 
but ignored the oldest and central institution. This was 
not done by oversight but was felt as a necessity. 
The reasons have been thoroughly investigated by recent 
scholars. Those who protest against introduction of the 
Anglo-American trust believe that this institution violates 
6 Wilmington v. Wilmington (1942) 27 Del. 243, 24 At!. (2d) 309. See 
also Note, 139 A.L.R. ( 1942) 1129 on the "near impossibility of deducing 
a uniform rule." 
Every feasible analysis has been made at their times by CAVI!RS, "Trusts 
Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws," 44 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1930) 161-202, 
and in the special monograph by WALTI!R LAND, Trusts in the Conflict of 
Laws ( 1940). 
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the principle-itself contested in many jurisdictions-that 
the number of property rights is closed, and if not this, at 
any rate, that it is incompatible with sure and neat definition 
of jura in re, since the right of cestui que trust defies any 
clear classification of proprietary and obligatory interests. 
Furthermore, the assets constituting the res are inalienable 
through normal transfer, although a widespread axiom de-
clares ineffectual in principle, or even without exception, 
restraint on alienation by contract or any private trans-
action. Finally, the group of codes, led by the Code 
Napoleon, prohibiting fideicommissary substitutions, is more 
or less hostile to fiduciary transfers of rights with obliga-
tion to ulterior transmissions under condition or terms of 
time.7 
Thoughtful opposition to these arguments has been ex-
pounded with equally learned historical, logical, and eco-
nomical reasons. 8 
Whatever the merits of these considerations have been 
in the past and present stage of the main European systems, 
there is a distinct tendency to lower the defenses against 
the trust. Louisiana and Quebec, partly by statute and 
greatly by practice, have emulated their common law 
surroundings. 9 An increasing and already long series of 
Latin-American statutes, since Alfaro's Panamanian statute, 
7 See in particular MoTULSKI, "De l'impossibilite juridique de constituer 
un 'Trust' anglo saxon sous !'empire de Ia loi fran~aise." Rev. crit. 1948, 
451-468; GARRIGUES, "Law of Trusts," 2 Am. ]. Comp. L. ( 1953) 25. 
8 Especially LEPAULLE, Traite theorique et pratique des trusts ( 1932) 
(extracts by CHAFFEE, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 535); id., "La notion du trust et 
ses applications dans les divers systemes juridiques," 2 Actes du Congres Int. 
de Droit Prive (Rome 1951) 197; VERA BoLGAR, "Why No Trusts in the Civil 
Law?" 2 Am. J. Comp. L. (1953) 204. 
9 Louisiana: Trust Estate Act, L. 8r of 1938; cf., F. F. STONE, "Trusts in 
Louisiana," I Int. Comp. L. Q. (1952) 368. 
Quebec: C.C. r866, arts. 98r-98rn; cf., MIGNAULT, "La Fiducie dans Ia 
Province de Quebec," Sem. Int. de Droit (Paris 1937). 
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have incorporated either in part 10 or in principle the 
trust, 11 as a legal institution, and a very vivid discussion 
continues in the Spanish-speaking countries.12 Continental 
Europe offers little prospect for wholesale conquest, but 
it is more acutely than ever remembered that the Roman-
istic system retained, in addition to all the special devices 
for acting by an intermediary, (I) the fiduciary disposition 
of property rights, from which source German practice, 
immediately after the Civil Code came into force, took 
inspiration for a vast development of transfer of title for 
security purposes, and ( 2) fiduciary agency in the agent's 
own name, used in varied fields, often under the very term 
of trustee (Treuhander ). Especially have German business 
and judicial practice and German science devoted a high 
degree of attention to these transactions and institutions, 
but a number of similar efforts are noticeable everywhere. 
This is not the place to go into the municipal legisla-
tive problems. We may, however, for the benefit of under-
standing the conflicts problems, draw from the recent 
animated debates a two-fold inference. 
On the one hand, the main argument against the plain 
adoption of the trust in civilian systems is neither the 
lack of kinship nor the lack of an adequate place in the 
statute book. It is rather the fulfillment of most of the 
10 ALFARO, Adaptacion del trust del derecho anglo-saj6n al derecho civil, 
1 Cursos Monograficos, Acad. Interamer. ( 1948) 67; id., "The Trust in the 
Civil Law with Special Reference to Panama," 33, Ser. 3, J. Comp. Leg. 
part III/IV, 25·31. 
11 Panama: L. Jan. 6, 1925, amend. L. No. 17, Feb. 20, 1941. 
Puerto Rico: L. April 23, 1928. SANCHEZ VILLELAS, "The Problem of Trust 
Legislation in Civil Law Jurisdictions; The Law of Trusts in Puerto Rico," 
19 Tulane L. Rev. ( 1945) 374· 
Mexico: Ley General de lost. de Credito etc. 1926h932h941. 
12 See PATION, "Trust Systems in the Western Hemisphere," 19 Tul. L. 
Rev. 398; id., "The Nature of the Beneficiary Interest in a Trust," ( 1949) 
lnteramer. Bar Ass. S. IV Sixth Conf. with rich documentation; PoMPEYO 
CLARET Y MARTI, "De Ia Fiducia y del Trust," Estudio de Der. Comp. 
(Barcelona 1946). 
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salutary functions of trusts by special devices that make 
a revolutionary change of existing sets of rules less im-
perative. 
On the other hand, experience has shown that by a 
really skillful new statute, though not without it, trust can 
be integrated in a civilian body of legislation. At the same 
time, in my opinion, a close analysis of the individual 
incidents of Anglo-American law would show a much 
greater approximation to the Continental thought than is 
commonly supposed by the opponents. 
Hence, being well aware of the fundamental differences 
of approach, we ought to avoid, once more, the rash im-
pression of an irreconcilable contrast.13 This observation 
should facilitate at least the unreserved recognition of 
rights and duties arising from common law trusts in the 
countries of civil law. 
2. Categories in Conflicts Law 
(a) Testamentary and inter 'Vi'Vos trust. Evidently, a 
fundamental distinction between the sources creating a trust 
has always been believed natural, on the assumption that 
creation by a will is a part of inheritance law and belongs 
to the jurisdiction of the probate court, whereas creation 
by settlement is subject to the law of contract and juris-
diction is taken by some undefined court in personam, or 
on the ground of the situation of the assets. It is worth-
while to recall these assumptions, apparently long forgotten 
by some courts and writers. To bring them to recollection 
means to reveal their patent inconvenience under present 
circumstances, which explains the inconsistency of their 
13 A cautious advance of the French to the English idea of administration 
is stated by BATIFFOL, "The Trust Problems as Seen by a French Lawyer," 
33, ser. 3, J. Comp. Leg. III/IV x8, 24. 
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application. With such basic principles, the courts labor 
in vacillating efforts. 
(b) Trust of land and trust of movables. The Restate-
ment superimposes on the just-mentioned distinction between 
testamentary and living trusts the division of trusts accord-
ing to their object. The matter, therefore, is· created as a 
part of property law. By further subdivisions, the scheme 
respecting "creation" of trusts results as follows: 
Creation inter vivos: for chattels: lex situs ( § 294 par. 
I?) 
for chases in action: lex loci ( § 294 
par. 2) 
for land: lex situs ( § 24 I ) 
by will: of land: lex situs ( § 24 I ) 
of movables: lex domicilii ( § 29 5) 
The "Corpus Juris" supposes a different system to exist 
in fact. In general the law of the domicil of the settlor would 
control trusts of tangible movables, which in the case of 
wills would be the domicil at the time of death; intangibles 
would be governed by the law intended by the settlor and 
only in the absence of an intention his domiciliary law.a 
The distinctive treatment of intangibles in both systems 
seems to be prompted by the awkward primary tests for 
tangibles. Narrow territorial and materialistic connections 
are utilized to support the lex situs in this application; 
only a merely mechanical extension of the adage, mobilia 
sequuntur personam, can justify a principle that trusts 
are dependent on the settlor's domicil. 
That a fiduciary transaction comprehending an entire 
estate should be recognized and nevertheless torn asunder 
because of the local situation of its components, is the hard 
core of the principal difficulties experienced in the matter. 
(c) Creation and administration. The prevailing opinion 
a IS C.J.S. 936, § 18 g. 
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divorces creation and administration of trusts. In the case 
of a testamentary trust, the main rule of jurisdiction is 
taken from the law of decedents' estates; the law of the 
state of the testator's domicil at his death governs adminis-
tration also of the testamentary trusts. The Restatement, 
repeating this rule ( § 29 8), however, grants an exception 
if "the will shows an intention that the trust should be 
administered in another state" ( § 297). A trust of mov-
ables created inter vivos is administered at the place located 
by the trust deed. A trust of land is always administered 
under "the law of the state where the land is and can be 
supervised by the courts of that state only" ( § 243). This, 
again, is a system built up by a sense of geometry rather 
than wisdom. 
In contrast to this formulation, "American Jurisprudence" 
states that the courts gradually are subjecting trusts of 
movables to the law of the place of administration and 
scrutinize every hint of intention in the fixing of this place.15 
(d) Voluntary and legally-implied trusts. Conflicts dis-
cussions ordinarily do not include statutory and constructive 
trusts which in fact belong in the vicinity of extracontractual 
obligations. They seldom refer to resulting trusts/6 which 
certainly are not typical of the chief problems. 
With this negative exception, however, the great variety 
of trust purposes has not provoked any attempt to differ-
entiate the conflicts rules. Yet we may take it that the 
field of these rules is and must be restricted to the current 
main use of trust, that is, dispositions of wealth for long 
periods for the benefit of the settlor's family and charitable 
corporations. They have no connection, for instance, with 
representation of shareholders or bondholders by a trustee 
15 u Am. J. 38z § 95; 139 A.L.R. 1129, 1134· 
16 ln re Smith's Will (Surr. 1947) 67 N.Y.S. (zd) 330 contains a very 
short mention. 
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appointed in accordance with the bylaws of a corporation 
or by a bond deed, with bankruptcy trustees, Massachusetts 
business trusts, and so forth. 
Nor are the incidents included in the law of trusts differ-
entiated for conflicts treatment (with the exception of two 
marginal questions) .17 
3· Judicial Favor 
Although no exception to the prohibitory statutes of the 
situs of land seems to have been allowed/8 a common 
phenomenon of American judicial attitude to trusts of 
movables is the favor shown by the courts in upholding 
their validity. Charitable testamentary trusts have most 
often been so privileged, but courts have expressly extended 
their benevolence further .19 
Thus, a regular conflicts rule is adopted, and prohibitions 
contained in the statutes so invoked are the cause for 
choosing a different statute. The New York courts, but not 
they alone, by recognizing a foreign governing law validate 
the creation of trusts that would have been invalid under 
the law of the forum. This practice eliminates the adverse 
effect of the domestic rules against remoteness of vesting 
interests 20 when no such obstacle is raised by the presum-
able situs of the funds, against accumulation of income when 
the law of the place of administration is more favorable, 21 
and against indefiniteness of beneficiaries in gifts to chari-
ties. 22 As the courts state, the purpose is to uphold the 
17 Infra n. 56. 
18 LAND§ 12. 
19 Lanius v. Fletcher ( 1907) 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076; Hope v. Brewer 
(x8g2) I36 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. ss8; LAND 57§ 17. 
2° Chamberlain v. Chamberlain ( x87x) 43 N.Y. 424. 
21 Man ice v. Manice ( 1871) 43 N.Y. 303, 388, erroneously also speaking 
of the place of the beneficiary, 4 PAGE 725 n. 5· 
22 Hope v. Brewer (1892) supra n. 19. 
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trust rather than to support the trust corporations of New 
Y ark; the New Y ark courts have attempted it was said, 23 
"wherever possible to uphold the validity even of charitable 
testamentary trusts which were to be administered in an-
other state." 
This practice does not think highly either of the tradi-
tional restrictions on free disposal or of the traditional 
conflicts rules on trust creation. In the first regard, "in 
the age of endowment campaigns and trust advertising 
the spectre of the dead hand no longer troubles the judge 
or legislator." 24 In the second aspect, the usual excuse 
is the implied intention of the testator or settlor, which, 
however, in these cases is more fictitious than ever, since 
it is the court that after the event compares the two or 
more statutes possibly in question and does the choosing. 
Indeed, the courts are dissatisfied with their own substantive 
statutes as well as with their own conflicts rules. 
How the courts help themselves, however, is one more 
instance in the list of situations where exceptional liberal 
conflicts rules are gradually invented to obviate antiquated 
difficulties for interstate transactions. 25 The conclusion 
must be the same as we submitted earlier, that the excep-
tions are unfit for international use. 
4· Changes of Contact 
The law governing creation is naturally invariable, but 
also the court supervising the administration under its own 
lex fori is ordinarily not deemed to lose jurisdiction because 
of supervening events. Even the transfer of the funds to 
a diffe.rent location has been held no ground for a change 
23 Hutchison v. Ross. (1933) 262 N.Y. 381, 394, 187 N.E. 65. 
24 CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at 167, 168 n. 24; LAND 74· 
25 Usury contracts, Vol. II, pp. 408-412, 427 ff.; Sunday contracts, Vol. I, 
p. 564 ff.; liquor sales, Vol. III, p. 177; Statute of frauds, Vol. III, p. 54 (c). 
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of law, unless the settlor has reserved the right to change 
the place of administration.26 
II. TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS 
Where a trust is set up by a will, it is obvious that the 
formal requisites of this will must be observed. The lex 
fori is of no importance, but the conflicts rule of the forum 
tells whether the inheritance law of the last domicil or 
nationality or that of the place of execution or of the situs, 
or any one of them, validates the testament. Natural as 
this solution is, the effects may not always satisfy, particularly 
in the international field, because even with respect to formal 
validity a will and a trust are different things. 
This is more evident if we think of material validity. 
The American doctrine has generally assumed that in-
trinsic validity is governed by the law of the situs of im-
movables and by the law of the last domicil of the decedent 
respecting movables. 27 In numerous cases, however ,-Land 
estimates one-fourth 28-the American decisions have devi-
ated from this principle. Mostly it has been done in favor 
of the validity of the trust. But the New York leading case, 
Hutchison v. Ross/9 marked in 1933 the formal repudia-
tion of the rule of domicil in the field of living trusts and 
affected its application to testamentary trusts from whence 
the rule came. Technically the application of a non-
domiciliary law was based on statutory construction re-
stricting domestic prohibitions to domestic wills, or on the 
intention of the testator, which in the usual manner is 
described either as his real, presumed, or assumed intention. 
It is assumed where the will determines a place other than 
26 LAND § 26.1. 
21 Restatement §§ 241, 295; FALCON BRIDGE 560; LAND §§ 9, 17. 
28 LAND § 17. 
29 Supra n. 23; BEALE, so Harv. L. Rev. at us6. 
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his domicil for the administration of the trust, and-for 
the sake of upholding a trust-especially where the trust 
would be invalid at the domicil but valid at the place of 
administration. The Massachusetts court reviewed the 
problem with this result in 1949 when a testator domiciled 
in New York left personal property in trust in the forum; 
in this individual case under Massachusetts law, invalidity 
followed for an appointment to a remainder and the funds 
reverted, by "capture," to the first appointee for life. 30 
Some decisions use the familiar argument that the testator 
is supposed to have chosen a law validating his will.31 The 
New York practice described above leads to the domicil 
against the place of administration, although the latter is 
in New York, 32 or to the place of administration against 
New York law.33 
The process of veering away from the last domicil is so 
well-advanced that it has been observed that the domicil 
is no longer determinative of the applicable law, if it stands 
alone in the congeries of elements pointing to other con-
tacts.34 More radically, the very function of the law of the 
domicil has been explained by the "theory that such trust 
is to be administered at testator's domicil" so that the 
intention of the testator now would be the uniform test.35 
But on the other hand, no case seems to recognize even 
the express choice of law in a will unless some "substantial 
connection" with the selected place is noted. 36 
30 Amerige v. Att. Gen. (1949) 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E. (2d) 126. Note, 
63 Harv. L. Rev. (1950) 699; so Col. L. Rev. (1950) 239· 
81 Lanius v. Fletcher (1871) 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076; cf., 4 PAGE 
731 § 1647· 
82 Cross v. United States Trust Co. (1892) 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125; 
Dammert v. Osborn (1893) 140 N.Y. 30, 35 N.E. 407· 
83 Supra n. 19-2 z. 34 SWABENLAND, "The Conftict of Laws in Administration of Express Trusts 
of Personal Property," 45 Yale L.J. ( 1936) 438. 35 4 PAGE 722 and n. 8. 
3 6 SWABENLAND, 45 Yale L.J. at 450. 
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Rationale. It is remarkable what progress the American 
courts have made without any sure guidance by principles, 
merely weighing the traditional contacts such as the testa-
tor's domicil at the time of his death, his intention-both 
taken from inheritance law-and the doctrine of prevail-
ing elements-taken from the law of contracts; thirteen 
such elements have been counted in the decisions.37 How-
ever, only a few scholars have pointed to a role of the 
place of administration superior to the rest of the 
"elements." 38 
J7 alidity and administration. Is it a conception suitable 
to a sound treatment of testamentary trusts, that the stipu-
lations producing it are exactly like any other postmortuary 
disposition? 
A will regulates the order of the beneficiaries; a trust 
ties down the assets for satisfying the beneficiaries. The 
rules of succession attach to the death of the testator; even 
fideicommissary substitutions as such are related in some 
manner to the time of death. Trust rules serve the ulterior 
fate of the estate and have nothing to do with the personal 
relations of the deceased; they are impersonal. Adminis-
tration of a decedent's estate is a short-range management 
to liquidate and distribute assets after payment of the 
debts; administration of a trust fund is a matter mostly of 
decades under the economic requirements of care during 
a life time. The further time advances, the more the one-
time domicil of the testator falls back into remote memory. 
That its law should be the cornerstone of validity and 
effect for this entire period, is no matter of course. 
Confirmation of this difference has always been afforded 
by the language distinguishing executor and trustee, al-
though the executor is a trustee himself, and substantially 
37 LAND 210. 
38 Especially GOODRICH and CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 190. 
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by the scope of trust administration, as it has developed. 
Whereas the field of estate administration is occasionally 
exaggerated, as observed earlier, 39 it never reaches the 
width of the attributes of trust courts and trustees. The 
law of the place of administration is said to govern the 
questions: to whom the trustee may pay income or capital; 
whether the interest of the beneficiary is assignable; and 
the power of creditors to reach the trust res or its income.40 
Finally, but not least, the difference in the nature of ordi-
nary and trust dispositions is demonstrated by the fact that 
trusts of movables are supervised by one court alone; "no 
other court can discharge a trustee and no other courts 
will give him instructions." 41 
Hence, the mere circumstance that our law permits a 
person to establish a trust not only by deed among living 
persons but also by will, ought not to cause rational con-
flicts rules to assimilate just in the latter case the source 
of the trust with the will. The German doctrine has de-
veloped an instructive terminology. A man may change the 
beneficiary of a life insurance in his will without declaration 
to the insurer; he may appoint a testamentary executor or 
a guardian for his minor children in a pact on his succes-
sion.42 However, these acts may be done in the instrument; 
they are not done as parts of testamentary disposition, or 
binding pact, respectively. The testament provides the 
form, nothing else. It seems to me that this is exactly 
the situation also of testamentary trusts. Apart from 
formal requirements, they should share the law applicable 
to living trusts. 
39 Supra Ch. 71. 
40 3 BEALE 1024 § 297.2. 
41 Restatement § 299; 2 BEALE § 299.1. 
42 BGB. § 332; § 2278 par. 2: only devices and bequests can be made by a 
binding successoral pact, but other unilateral dispositions may be inserted in 
the document, n6 RGZ. 32. 
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What rule? If the foregoing exposition is correct, the 
answer to the questions of what importance the intention 
of the testator has and whether the place of administration 
is the most adequate localization, must be deferred until 
living trusts are discussed. It is of outstanding interest to 
ascertain whether the courts which empirically experiment 
are right in substituting a kind of party autonomy to the 
traditional law of domicil. This question depends on gen-
eral conceptions. It should be recognized, indeed, that 
creating a trust, at least in the Anglo-American orbit, is 
permitted as an attribute of personal freedom of trans-
acting. The territorial limits of this freedom, if some exist 
and whatever they contain, are certainly not a particular 
problem of testamentary trusts. 
III. TRUST INTER VIVOS 
1. England 
Although the English decisions are limited to trusts 
created in marriage settlements, their criteria are so varied 
that the underlying principle could only be found in the 
search for the proper law.43 Thus the intention of the 
settlor is sought through the evaluation of all factors. 
Also, as in contracts, usually English law is found to have 
been in the settlor's mind. No limitations upon free choice 
are known. Accordingly, it is held in Canada that a mar-
riage contract made in Quebec may prescribe that the deed 
and stipulations as well as administration and disposal of 
the funds shall be construed and governed by the law of 
England.44 
48 CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at 185 f.; CROUCHER, "Trust of Movables in 
Private International Law," 4 Mod. L. Rev. (1940) 111. 
44 In re Jutra's Est. (Sask. App. 1932) 2 W.W.R. 533, 536; 3 JOHNSON 389. 
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2. United States 
Former decisions, in varying choice of law, preferred to 
take either the domicil of the settlor or the place where 
the deed was delivered, as the decisive criterion. The 
domicil, however, has been demoted, especially since 1933,45 
to one of many elements for the search of the allegedly 
intended law. Lex loci contractus, favored by Beale for 
intangibles/6 has been sometimes adopted, when the funds 
were delivered simultaneously with the execution of the 
contract.47 More important, the "situs" of the trust, that 
is, the place where the funds are located at the time of the 
delivery of the trust deed, or where they are intended to 
be brought, enjoys attention. Factors are also the resi-
dence or establishment of the trustee, the domicil of the 
beneficiaries, and others.48 The group of living trusts, thus, 
has been more clearly than trusts by will brought under the 
dominance of choice of law from case to case, according to 
express or assumed intention, the equivalent of the English 
proper law, but with better emphasis on the objective evalu-
ation of the closest connection of the case with a statute. 
This doctrine is unambiguously adopted in such decisions 
as in New York by Shannon v. Irving Trust Co. (1937),49 
in Illinois by Riggs v. Barrett (1941),50 and in Delaware 
by Wilmington v. Wilmington (1942). 51 
It is true, neither is this yet a rule recognized throughout 
45 Hutchison v. Ross (1933) 262 N.Y. 381, 394, 187 N.E. 65. 
46 Hutchinson v. Hutchinson (1941) 48 Cal. App. (2d) 12, 119 Pac. (2d) 
.n4 invokes lex loci contractus (Illinois) for illegality, but all factors of the 
transaction were in Illinois. 
47 139 A.L.R. ( 1942) 129 ff. no. 4· 
48 LAND § 37.1: eight "elements." 
49 Shannon v. Irving Trust Co. ( 1937) 275 N.Y. 95· 
50 Riggs v. Barrett ( 1941) 308 III. App. 549, 32 N.E. (2d) 382. 
51 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Soc. of the Fine Arts ( 1942) supra 
n. 6; cf., GooDRICH, 32 Va. L. Rev. 323; ann. 30 Geo. L.J. 788. 
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the country nor is the scope of this rule clarified. It does 
not seem to have been extended to trusts of land. 
Creation and Administration. Writers and courts are 
still accustomed to distinguish also in living trusts the 
questions of the birth of the trust and of its management. 
Thus, it is commonly stated that the rules on perpetuity 
and accumulation pertain to administration because they 
restrict the holding in trust rather than the giving.52 I 
respectfully disagree. The grant in trust is restricted quite 
as it is altogether prohibited in other countries; there is 
a difference only in degree. So far as a trust fails, there 
is nothing to administer by the appointed trustee. Other 
incidents, as seen before, attributed regularly to the law 
of administration, affect likewise the substance, the object 
of the creation. 
This difficult tracing of the borderline is eliminated if 
both phases are placed under the same law. Such unique 
law, of course, can only be the law of the place of adminis-
tration, already controlling most of the really significant 
causes of litigation. 53 
This place is determined, in the actual opinion of many 
courts and writers, by the intention of the settlor. This is 
the huh of the entire problem. If the intention of the 
settlor inter vivos as well as of the testator is decisive, it 
cannot go to two places; and, again, it cannot be supposed 
to dwell on a temporary place of domicil rather than on the 
locality where he wants the trust to live, at the place of its 
management. 
IV. CoNCLUSIONS 
This writer continues to recommend the largest latitude 
for parties to a contract, to select the law applicable to 
52 CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at n64 and n. 13. 
sa Supra, Vol. II p. 14. 
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their transaction. Creation of a trust ought to be an 
analogous subject. But the situation is not quite the same 
as with business contracts. 
A trust of the kinds here in question rests on a gift, a 
liberality, which may be useful but never is necessary in 
the sense business is needed. Indeed, it is alien to a great 
number of legal systems, and even repugnant to numerous 
civilians. Above all other considerations, there is no other 
party to the transaction whose confidence in the contract or 
testament would deserve protection. Therefore, the great 
principle of freedom of transacting is more likely to suffer 
restrictions, if a subject of one state creates a trust in an-
other state, than when he sells merchandise in that other 
state. Restrictions may be of two sorts. Although it is a 
rather empty requirement in the law of contracts that party 
choice of the applicable law should have a "substantial con-
nection" with the chosen law, a similar requirement may 
perhaps make sense here in certain cases. And, reaching 
deeper, it is possible to argue that in view of the opposed 
principles of the systems the subject of one country has not 
always unlimited freedom to create a trust in another 
country. 
If English courts tend to apply simply English law to 
trusts on English soil, if New York courts simply acknowl-
edge the validity of a living trust created by a Cuban or 
Frenchman, domiciled in his native country, wishing to have 
the trust administered in New York and the res is there, 
a problem is raised that does acutely exist in the face of the 
various but essentially kindred American or common law 
rules against restraint of disposal and suspension of owner-
ship. On the international plane, neither indifference to 
the foreign brand of prohibitions nor favor of validity can 
stand unchallenged without qualification. 
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This is a new problem and it can only tentatively be 
solved. To be true to the accepted standards of private 
international law, a division is probably inevitable. Prop-
erty law depends on the lex situs, personal law on domicil 
or nationality. Under the rules of lex situs, a Frenchman 
may, in fact, dispose of assets situated in New York, accord-
ing to the law of New York. This is energetically ques-
tioned in France, as we shall see; in some decisions the 
creation of trusts is considered a part of personal law. But 
from the internationally prevailing view, there is no doubt, 
and the New York courts are correct so far. 
Nevertheless, if the French national is domiciled in 
France, under the American principles themselves his 
marital and family relations and, when he dies, his movable 
succession are governed by French law. It is true that a 
provision of the New York Decedents' Law allows him 
to declare for New York inheritance law, but this is a 
very anomalous rule, while we are looking for principles. 
In no case can he evade French marital property law nor 
the legitimate shares-/a reserve-of his forced heirs.54 
The conflict appearing in Hutchison v. Ross with the 
marital property law of Quebec may be recalled.55 
Within the United States, in the stupendous growth of 
trust business, the new development of unbarrable shares 
has been widely neglected. In the case of succession, this 
omission may be repaired to a degree, but trusts inter 
54 CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 198 assumes the contrary. A different case 
was that of the decision in Prince de Bearn v. Winans (1909) 111 Md. 434, 
where a resident of Maryland executed a trust in Paris, in contemplation 
of the marriage of his daughter to a Frenchman, granting her a power of 
appointment. She appointed, by will, her husband in trust of her entire 
estate. After her death, against contrary advice received by the widower in 
Paris and Baltimore, the court held that the French reseroe for their children 
was inapplicable; Maryland rather than French law applied to the execu-
tion of the power of appointment under a trust deed made by a resident of 
Maryland where also the funds were situated. 
55 Supra Vol. I, p. 369. 
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vivos make a fait accompli and do not even seem easily 
vulnerable to attacks on the ground of violated forced 
heirship. Filling this gap needs more than a conflicts rule. 
It should not be expected, however, that foreign courts will 
agree to the present treatment. 
That American trust corporations are rather unwilling 
to administer trusts established by foreigners, is well justi-
fied under these circumstances. 
Party autonomy, finally, has no place where all relevant 
facts are united in one jurisdiction. This case forms a 
natural exception quite as in the matter of contracts.56 As 
there, only one decision deals with such a situation. All 
elements were in New York: the securities and the cash, 
their delivery, the bank; nevertheless the deed declared for 
Tennessee law in considering the violated perpetuity rules 
of New York.57 No foreign element was in cause. 
By standard forms and also judicial opinion, the appli-
cation of a law other than that of the place of administra-
tion is qualified by an exception; the latter law applies 
normally to the commission of the trustee and to suits for 
termination of the trust. 58 
With a license claimed by all writers on this subject, the 
American conflicts law on trusts may optimistically be re-
sumed in the following assumptions. 
Testamentary trusts are formally valid, if the form of 
their documentation complies with one of the laws on the 
execution of wills recognized by the law of the forum. 
Validity and effect of all trusts and the formal require-
ments of living trusts are governed by the law of the place 
of administration. The administration is conducted at 
one place for all movables, which is determined by express 
56 Supra Vol. II, p. 400 (b), case of 44 RGZ. 300. 
57 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cheek (1935) 93 N.Y.L.J. 2941. 
58 LAND§ 36-4-
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or tacit statement of the settlor. In the absence of his 
ascertainable intention, the trust is administered at the place 
that has the most characteristic connection with its manage-
ment; a bank carrying on trust administration, of course, 
presents such connection. 59 
v. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN TRUSTS 
1. Common Law Countries 
English courts have recognized Italian restrictions on 
the creation of future interests, 60 and a Scotch trust against 
the English restraint on anticipation.61 The invalidity of an 
English trust in Argentina was taken into account.62 Juris-
diction in personam is taken in order to fulfill an obligation 
to create a trust abroad.63 
American courts show their benevolence also to foreign 
trusts under correct reservations for foreign jurisdiction. 
Where real and personal property was situated in Canada, 
the surrogate judge in New York left the determination 
of the validity of the trust to the court in Canada,6~ and 
when a trust was to be administered in New South Wales, 
as was said: if the trust is valid there, it will be upheld in 
New York.65 
That objection of public policy contrary to validity has 
been singularly reduced in New York and other-though 
not all-courts, has been mentioned before. In Louisiana, 
59 CAVERS, 44 Harv. L. Rev. at 164 n. 12. 
60 In re Piercy [1895] I Ch. 83, with respect to the part of the land in 
Sardinia not yet sold by the trustees, Italian law governs (without any con-
sideration to the question of renvoi), evidently as lex fori. 
61 In re Fitzgerald [1904] II Ch. 573· 
62 Brown v. Gregson [1920] A.C. 86o H.L. 
63 KEETON, Law of Trusts (ed. 5, 1950) 13 j HALSBURY-HAILSHAM, Vol. 13, 
p. 79 § 75; Vol. 6, p. 224 § 273. 
6~InreSmith'sWill (1947) 67N.Y.S. (2d) 330. 
65 In re Grant's Will (1950) zoo Misc. 35, IOI N.Y.S. (2d) 423. 
TRUSTS 
long before the trust was introduced into legislation, a trust 
valid in another state was approved.66 
2. Civil Law Countries 
(a) In general. A national of a country where trusts are 
unknown and which follows the nationality principle, would 
perhaps not find agreement in his national courts, if he 
established a trust abroad, and certainly not, if he attempts 
it within his country. But authority is scarce. There is no 
case in Germany deciding the question in general.67 
In France, foreign-created trusts have sometimes been 
recognized. The Court of Cassation, Criminal Section, held 
in 1941 that the validity of a testamentary trust of the 
common law type is governed by the law of the sucession.68 
Prevailing opinion concludes that estates under French 
inheritance law are inaccessible to administration as trust 
funds. 69 On the other hand, where an English or American 
national dies domiciled in a common law jurisdiction, mov-
ables left him in France may be possessed by his trustees, 
though only on authorization.70 
Two older decisions of French tribunals sanctioned trusts. 
In one case, the widow of the sewing machine manufacturer 
Singer, about to be remarried and wanting to act in the 
spirit of a trust deed of the deceased, gave her shares in 
the family concern in trust for the benefit of her children. 
The Tribunal de la Seine recognized this living trust on 
the ground that she was then an American citizen and 
domiciled in England, hence living under English law.71 
66 Heirs of Hullin v. Faure (r86o) IS La. Ann. 622. 
61 Professor Makarov has kindly confirmed his corresponding negative 
result. 
68 Cass. Crim. (June 4, 1941) D.I942·I·4, S.I944·1.133, J.C.P. 1942 11.2017. 
69 MoTULSKI, supra n. 7 at 467 § 19 and citations. 
70 BATIFFOL, Traite 673 § 668. 
11 Trib. civ. Seine (May r6, 1906), Clunet 1910, 1229. 
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In the other case, included in a testamentary trust was a 
villa in Beaulieu on the French Riviera. The Tribunal of 
Nice construed the will to the effect that the beneficiary 
should be absolute owner, avoiding thus unconformity with 
French law.72 
From these fragmentary and often criticized pieces, no 
comprehensive picture can be drawn. Especially, that a 
Frenchman could create a living trust in New York with 
French recognition as has been believed in this country, has 
been, until now, an unwarranted assertion. The courts have 
taken great pains, it is true, to demonstrate that trusts do 
not offend the French prohibitions on fideicommissary 
substitution : the assets do not go first to the trustee as 
owner; he is only a "mandatory," and the beneficiary is 
vested at the time of death; nor of agreements on future 
inheritance nor of donations mortis causa.13 Yet, the em-
phasis on the nationality of the settlor or on his domicil has 
sometimes been climaxed by classifying the creation of 
trust under the personallaw.74 
Italian and Belgian views seem to coincide with the 
French attitude. 75 The climate is certainly more favorable 
than it was, but the development has only started. 
(b) Powers of trustee. Although the substantive rules 
involving the powers of trustees of a bond issue are a special 
72 Trib. Nice (May 5, 1905) Clunet 19n, 278. 
73 Trib. Seine (May 16, 1906) Clunet 1910, 1229; (Dec. 19, 1916) Clunet 
1917, 1069. 
74 Same decisions; see for older cases the digest in Clunet 19n, 134-139. 
75 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Nov. 27, 1947) Pas. Beige 1948, 3.51; 
Evans v. Evans, although the settlor, an Englishman, was domiciled in Bel-
gium and the immovables situated there: critized by MoTULSKI (supra n. 4) 
458. 
Italy: see P ALLICCIA, "Trusts testamentari inglesi riferentisi a beni situati 
in Italia," Rivista 1932, 347; FEDOZZI, D.I.P. 593 ff. citing old decisions; the 
judge in re Piercy ( 1895) supra n. 6o, stated on the basis of the expert 
witness reports that the English trust, so far as the Italian land was sold by 
the English trustee, was not opposed by Italian law which recognized the 
power of the trustees to sell and the use of the proceeds. 
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matter not here in discussion, the procedural right to appear 
in court on behalf of the bondholders is usually assimilated 
to the right of trustees in general to represent the beneficial 
interests in court: as in the case of bond trustees, 76 now 
very widely known to the municipal statutes, it may be taken 
as commonly recognized that a trustee of the Anglo-
American type can exercise his powers in civilian territory.77 
It is a useless speculation whether he should be considered 
as an owner under restriction or an agent or a composite 
of depositary and mandatory (which is the Scotch trans-
lation into the domestic system). 78 Scientific interest, aroused 
by such debates, has submitted the nature of the rights of 
trustee and beneficiary to penetrating analysis. There is 
no easy way beyond Maitland's resigned judgment: the 
beneficiary's right may appear as obligatory, but for many 
practical purposes of great importance it has been treated 
as if it were in rem. 79 
It is the practical aspect that dominates the question of 
exercise of the rights of both the trustee and the beneficiary 
in foreign jurisdictions. No real difficulties involving this 
exercise have turned up, with one exception to be discussed 
presently. 
76 Cuba: Trib. Sup. (Feb. 19, 1938): trustees of a New York bond issue 
are entitled to appear in court in Cuba. 
France: Cass. civ. (Feb. 19, 1908) infra n. 75· 
77 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 10, 188o) Clunet 1881, 439; (June 28, 1901) 
Clunet 1901, 812, affirmed Cour Paris (Jan. 27, 1904) D. 1905.2.356; Cass. 
civ. (July 29, 1901) Clunet 1901, 971 (semble); Cass. civ. (Feb. 19, 1908), 
KERR, Clunet 1912, 243; LEPAULLE, Traite des trusts 363,409. 
Italy: Cass. Roma (Feb. 21, 1899) Foro Ita!. 1899.I 332, Giur. Ita!. 1899 I 
1.216. 
Germany: constant practice in unpublished decisions of the probate courts 
(Nachlassgerichte). 
Netherlands: KOSTERS 631; VAN BRAKEL 186 § 142 and n. 4· 
Scotland: Croskery v. Gilmoour Trustees ( 1897) 17 Session Cas. 697. 
78 Seen. 77· 
79 MAITLAND, 3 Collected Papers at 26, 25 Griinhuts Zschr. 32, also cited for 
final analysis by SIEBERT, Das rechtsgeschaftliche Treuhandverhiiltnis 98. 
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(c) Inalienability of the fund. A considerable space in 
the arguments against recognition of trusts in civilian 
countries is taken up by the incapacity of trustees and 
beneficiaries to dispose of the property tied up in a trust. 
This feature of the trust institution has often been presented 
as incompatible with systems where the establishment by 
private transaction of restraints on free circulation is either 
exceptional or totally prohibited, as by the German Code, 
§ 137· Some French authors, less negative, point to the 
situations where French law does prescribe inalienability, 
as for dower, substitutions in favor of children during 
the life of the first beneficiary, and contract clauses in cer-
tain judicially excepted cases. 80 Batiffol contends that the 
lex situs may allow or disallow the common law restraint 
on alienation.81 Commonly it is felt that French law, i.e., 
lex situs, raises no objection against the inclusion of French 
assets in a foreign trust as such but objects to the lack of 
protection enjoyed by purchasers who in good faith acquire 
the property in French territory. This is a popular argu-
ment occasioned by a decision of 1901. 
Illustration. The fourth Baronet Sir Robert Paul sold 
paintings out of the family trust fund to a dealer in Paris 
for 90,000 francs. The trustees sued for annulment of the 
sale. The Tribunal de la Seine and the Court of Paris 
dismissed the suit. Considering the trustees as mere man-
dataries, the seller was held to have been the true owner 
and the sale valid. Moreover, prohibition of alienation is 
against public order. 82 
When English trustees, sued by creditors of the bene-
ficiary, opposed the inadmissability of disposing of capital 
80 PICARD in PLANIOL ET RIPERT (ed. 2, 1952) §§ 222 ff. 
81 Traite 644 § 645. 
82 Trib. Seine (June 28, 1901) Clunet 1901, 812, affirmed Paris (Jan. 27, 
1904) D.I905.2.356. 
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or income by anticipation, as well as of seizing these in-
terests, two sections of the Tribunal de la Seine split. One 
division accepted this plea and lifted the seizure.83 The 
other rejected it, since such an absolute restriction offends 
public order and lacks the publicity provided by the local 
law of property.84 The Appeal Court of Paris reversed 
the first decision. It recognized an English marriage settle-
ment including a trust but held that capital and income when 
brought to France entered into free commerce.85 The 
annotation repeats the necessity of protecting the public 
against invisible fetters. 
Why all these authors and judges have believed it neces-
sary to set up a barrier against the application of English 
law is difficult to understand. In the common law countries, 
respect for the law of the situation of property has always 
been very high. English trust law is inherently modified 
by the conflicts rules on lex situs. But moreover, in Eng-
land and the United States themselves, a bona fide pur-
chaser of trust property is treated no worse than ordinarily. 
In New York, for instance, the principles have been laid 
down since I 8 2 3. 86 Of course, a trustee cannot sell trust 
property or allow its seizure without a court order. Neither 
can a French husband dispose of the dower. Hence, the 
objects can be recovered from a purchaser knowing the 
nature of the property. Yet, "equity will not aid a cestui 
que trust against a bona fide purchaser (from a trustee) 
without notice of the trust." 87 The seller is estopped and the 
beneficiaries have only an equitable interest against which 
"the transferee is entitled to hold the property free of the 
83 Trib. Seine (Dec. :u, 1926) Revue 1927, 70. 
84 Trib. Seine (Feb. 23, 1927) Revue 1927, 263. 
85 Cour Paris (April 18, 1929), Bear v. Humphries, Rev. crit. 1935, 149· 
86 Galatian v. Erwin (Ch. N.Y. 1823) 1 Hopk. Ch. 48, aff. 8 Cow. 301. 
87 Petrie v. Myers ( 1877) 54 How. Prac. 513, 516. 
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trust and is under no liability to the beneficiaries." 88 The 
doctrine of bona fide purchase is also applicable to persons 
taking the property from the first purchaser.89 
In Germany, it would seem questionable whether the 
prohibition of contractual restraints on alienation ( BGB. 
§ 137) is a part of unyielding public policy or only ap-
plicable to German-governed contracts and to property on 
German soil. Before introducing trusts into the German 
system, § 137, of course, would have to disappear.90 But 
the courts deny protection also to foreign trust property, 
when a trustee alienates assets in breach of trust. 91 This 
practice, again, can be justified so far as the property is 
dealt with in the German territory. 
The law of the new situation, according to the general 
rule, governs property transactions.92 
88 ScoTT, 2 Trusts 1573 § 284. 
89 Id. 1595 § 287. 
90 SIEBERT, Das rechtsgeschaftliche Treuhandverhaltnis 420. 
91 RG. (Feb. 19, 1937) 153 RGZ. 370; WuRDINGER, "The German Trust," 
33 ser. 3 J. Comp. L. part 111/IV, 31, 34· 
92 Supra Ch. 56. 
PART FIFTEEN 
APPLICATION 
OF FOREIGN LAW 
CHAPTER 76 
Ascertainment of Foreign Law 1 
)\ N international discussion involving almost every 
1"1. country has been directed to the following ques-
tions: 
I. Is the foreign law a fact, or is it at least to be evi-
denced as a fact? Or is the court entitled to investigate 
it on its own motion? Or is this a duty of the court? 
II. Is the application or nonapplication of foreign law 
reviewable on appeal? 
III. What methods of evidence are admitted? 
IV. What effect has the absence of proof of the foreign 
law? 
The debates have been so comprehensive that little can 
be added. The third question concerns exclusively, the 
others greatly, the rules of procedure, which are not 
here considered. But a summary is advisable with the 
accent upon the evolution in court practice and legislation. 
Reporting on this topic in the United States and in certain 
countries is sometimes anachronistic. 
I. JuDICIAL NoTICE OF FoREIGN LAw 
I. Mere Party Evidence 
(a) Foreign Law is a fact. At common law the treat-
ment of foreign law has been connected with the idea that 
only domestic law is law, hence foreign law must be proved 
1 NussBAUM, "Proof of Foreign Law," so Yale L.J. ( 1941) 1018; I d., 
Grundziige des internationalen Privatrechts (1952) 235; RUDOLF B. 
ScHLESINGER, Comparative Law Cases and Materials ( 1950) 32-139. 
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as a fact. 2 A party basing a claim or defense on a foreign 
rule must plead and prove it as "any other fact," that is, 
in the same manner and time; as such, it goes to the jury, 
if there is any in the case. Thus taught, following older 
Continental authors, Story,3 and his disciple Foelix in 
France,' as well as Calvo in internationallaw.5 On paper, 
this doctrine remains the accepted dogma in the British and 
most American jurisdictions and sometimes abroad. 6 
The British aloofness from "foreign law" has gone so 
far that English executors have been held justified in ignor-
ing Scotch law when distributing inheritance assets to the 
wrong beneficiary. 7 And the Restatement asserts that if 
the court disbelieves the evidence offered by a party, it 
cannot resort to evidence refuting the allegation.8 
However, this belief has been thoroughly shaken. Many 
writers practically everywhere have protested. Compro-
mises have been sought in various forms, as when it is said 
that foreign law is to be regarded on one side as fact and 
on the other side as law. Some scholars and courts have 
resorted to the theory of "material" or "formal reception" 
or the "local law theory" whereby the foreign law is deemed 
2 DICEY (ed. 6) S66, rule 194; 3 BEALE 1664 §62J.J; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 
176; on the old cases see NuSSBAUM, Grundziige 246. 
3 LESSON A, Rev. Droit Int. (Bruxelles) 1905, 547· 
4 STORY § 637; FOELIX § IS. 
5 CALVO, 2 D. Int. § S86. 
6 United States: see 67 L.R.A. 33; GooDRICH § S3; NussBAUM, so Yale L.J. 
lOIS. 
France: e.g., BATIFFOL, Traite 352 § 332. 
Spain: long series of decisions from 18So to 1926, see YANGUAS 308; T.S. 
(Dec. 4, 1935) Clunet 1936, 671. 
Chile: C.C. art. 13 and note of VELEZ SARSFIELD; Trib. Sup. (Nov. 12, 
1926), 24 Rev. Der. I 289; ALBONICO 152. 
Colombia: RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 232 § 1923 seem to refer to the common 
view, criticizing it. 
7 Re Hellmann's Will ( 1S66) L.R. 2 Eq. 363. 
8 Restatement § 621 comment b; contra NussBAUM, Grundziige 244 n. 40. 
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incorporated into the law of the forum; 9 these immediately 
come to the directly opposed result that foreign law is 
within the rule jura novit curia.10 But we know that foreign 
law applies not by reception but "as such and because 
such." 11 
Italian and Dutch courts have largely abandoned the old 
conception.12 In the United States, the axiom has been con-
demned by such scholars as Thayer and Wigmore; 13 the 
difficult transition may be gathered from the thoughtful 
argument with which the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire overruled its former adherence to the fact theory: 
" ... But as grave and serious doubts of the propriety of 
the treatment of foreign law as an ordinary question of 
fact have presented themselves, the rule has been re-
examined and consideration given its standing. Its logical 
support and its practical merits are so open to objection 
and inviting to criticism that the rule of stare decisis is 
not strong enough to close the door to the consideration . 
. . . Conceding that foreign law is a matter of fact, yet it 
also is law in every true sense ... it is a fact as domestic 
law is." 14 
In the end, the court found that judicial notice must be 
taken. 
The Commissioners of Uniform state laws have drafted 
9 Supra Vol. I, p. 6z f.; see most recently YNTEMA, Festschrift fiir Rabel 
( 1954) 535 f. against W. W. CooK's local law theory. 
10 Trib. Milano (June ro, 1949) Foro Padovano 1949 I 676. 
11 CERETI, 14 Riv. Dir. Proc. (1936) II roo, 107 n. r: "non come recetticio 
rna come tale e perche tale." 
12 Italy formerly: Cass., (May 13, 1937) 7 Giur. Comp. D.I.P. z8r; (July 9, 
1941) ro Riv. Dir. Proc. 135 with many precedents. MoNACO, L'efficacia 87 
in 195Z considers this still as the dominant practice; but see infra n. 33· 
Netherlands: formerly H.R. (April zr, 1876) W. 3989; now: infra n. 31. 
13 THAYER, "Judicial Notice and the Law of Evidence," 3 Harv. L. Rev. 
( 1890) z85; id. "Law and Fact in Jury Trials," 4 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1891) 17Z; 
WIGMORE, ro System of Evidence ( ed. 3, 1940) SZ9; GooDRICH zzz: both 
the fact theory and the submission to the jury "does not evoke admiration." 
14 Allen, J. in Saloshin v. Houle (1931) 85 N.H. 126, 155 At!. 47; of 
course, the court could have gone to the logical end, Note, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 
( 193Z) 753 f. 
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their law on judicial notice "to correct two outworn rules 
of the common law," namely, that the law of a sister state 
is a fact and the decision is for the jury, an "inheritance 
from the insular common law of England of two centuries 
ago" when all foreign countries spoke foreign languages 
and had alien systems. ~5 
(b) Like a fact. Under the leadership of such writers 
as Fiore and Diena, continental doctrine has abandoned 
the "fact" cliche, but retained its main practical results 
with a changed justification. The maxim, jura novit curia, 
is considered inconvenient for application. It is inappro-
priate to a law not promulgated in the forum and therefore 
difficult to know. Foreign law exceeds the ordinary range 
of knowledge expected of the judiciary. As it was said, 
long ago, in England: 
"With foreign laws an English judge cannot be familiar; 
there are many of which he must be totally ignorant; there 
is in every case of foreign law an absence of all the accumu-
lated knowledge and ready association which assist him 
in the consideration of what is the English law ... " 16 
Hence, the party must plead and prove the foreign rules 
on which he bases his contention. This opinion has been 
adopted throughout the world and now governs in most 
countries.17 
15 9 U.L.A. (19SI) 399· 
16 Nelson v. Bridport ( 184s) 8 Beav. S271 S34, so Eng. Rep. 207, 210. 
1 7 In addition to the citations above n. 6 : 
United States: Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473; IS C.J.S. 
840 n. 67 (speaking of avoiding the danger that the "hospitality'' of the 
courts be stressed) • 
Belgium: POULLET §§ 336 f. 
France: Cass. req. (Oct. 31, 1923) Revue 1934, 140; Cass. civ. (May 2S, 
1948) S. 1949·•· 21, Rev. Crit. 1950, 663; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 
232 § 212. 
Greece: see the reports by TENEKIDES, Clunet 1932, 589, S93 ; FRAGISTAS, 
10 z. ausl. PR. ( 1936) S35; MARIDAKIS, I PIL. § 22; GOFAS, 6 Rev. Hell. 
( 1953) 78-
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Numerous writers, it is true, have found this combina-
tion of assumptions trying. If foreign law is law, some 
conclude that it must be treated like domestic law. Others 
revert to the characterization as fact, because the party 
has the burden of proof-non sequitur-or because the 
court has to take the ready-made law from the foreign 
source instead of examining its logical and social back-
ground.18 But again, the latter argument is open to doubt. 
Neither is a judge in any country entirely free to create 
municipal law, nor is he bound to receive the presentation 
of foreign rules like an automaton. There are certainly 
degrees of freedom in the two situations, but the origin of 
the doctrine has caused an exaggerated emphasis on de-
pendence on the foreign sources. 
However, there is no doubt that the present doctrine is 
based on real or fancied convenience. So much as possible, 
the judge should be spared research in systems alien to 
him and the hazards of decision. Even so, in dealing with 
foreign law, he cannot be dispensed from the typical judicial 
operations which are not applicable in examining facts. 
Thus, it is plainly settled that the court has the right 
and duty to weigh the evidence offered by the parties in its 
Italy: former prevailing opinion, supported in C. Proc. Civ. art. 294; 
Cass. (May 23, I930) Rivista I93I, 90, Foro Ita!. I930.1.968; (Dec. I, I930) 
Clunet I93I, 76o; (July 8, I931) Giur. Ita!. I932 I I, 74I, Rivista I93I, 
28o; (March 9, 1935) Rivista I935, 405; (Dec. 19, I933) Revue crit. 1935, 
360; (Jan. 29, 1936) ib. 1936, 290 j see UDINA, Rev. crit. I935, 359 j PERASSI, 
Lezioni 8; MoRELLI, Elementi DIP. ( I946) I6. 
Portugal: C. Proc. Civ. art. 52 I. 
Spain: Trib. Sup. (May 28, I88o); id. (Nov. 7, 1896); id. (Nov. IS, 
1898) j 0RUE 492. 
Argentina: C.C. art. I3j I ALCORTA II9, 137 f. cf., 3 Z. ausl. PR. (I929) 
594i Cam. Cio. (July 7, I952) J.A. 1953, 5212. 
Brazil: C. Proc. Civ. art. 212 and the writers on procedural law; Sup. 
Ct. (Nov. 12, 1926) 24 Rev. Der. I 289, but see infra n. 30. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. u. 
Guatemala: Law on Jurisdiction (1936) art. XXVI. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VII. 18 BATIFFOL, Traite 352 § 332. 
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judicial capacity, not as a trier of fact. 19 Although the 
German supreme court goes farther than other courts in 
reserving a place for its own research, its practice should 
be followed, holding that the judge in construing a foreign 
contract-where no formal canons of interpretation inter-
fere-is not bound to foreign interpretations.20 
Most manifestly, the legal nature of the task is recog-
nized in 'common law jurisdictions by transferring the 
decision from the jury to the court,21 as concerns the law 
of a foreign country.22 
Judicial notice is taken, of course, of treaties to which 
the state of the forum is a party, provided that these are 
applied as domestic law. 23 
2. Discretionary Right of the Court to Investigate 
In Brazil, article 14 (Int. C.C.), permits the judge to 
require a party to prove the text and validity of an enact-
ment which he pleads. This is a partial legislative accept-
ance of a faculty which is either conceded as an enlargement 
of the court's power beyond passive waiting for the party 
evidence 24 or borrowed from the principle of judicial 
19 England: CHESHIRE (ed. 4) 130. 
United States: I BEALE§ 54; 3 id. § 682. 
France: Cass. req. (July 29, 1929) D.H. 1929, 457, Clunet 1930, 68o. 
Spain: Trib. Sup. (July 12, 1904). 
20 RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) Jur. Woch. 1930, I8SS· I. 
21 England: J udic. ( Consol.) Act, 192 s, sec. 102; Lazard Broth. & Co. v. 
Midland Bank [1933] A.C. 289, 298. 
United States: Note, 30 Mich. L. Rev. (1932) 749; Uniform Jud. Not. 
of For. L. Act, § 3· 
New York: C. Civ. Prac. § 344 a, B. 
22 United States: Uniform Act, cited, § s; Leary v. Gledhill (1951) 8 
N.J. 260, 84 At!. (2d) 725. 
23 Argentina: C. C. art. 13. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 25, 1904) 57 RGZ. 142: The Bern Railway Con-
vention is irrevisible when offered as Austrian law; cf., MELCHIOR § 292. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VII and other codes. 
Spain: CASTILLO, 4 Rev. Espan. D. Int. ( 1951) 409, 447· 
24 Thus also in France: Cour Paris (March 14, 1952) Rev. Crit. 1952, 
325; BATIFFOL, note ibid. understands that even judicial notice is taken. 
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notice.25 This right may also directly follow from the 
modern conception that the court is responsible for the 
course of the proceedings and has to advise the parties of 
failures to complete their activity.26 
The American Uniform Act expressly states: 
§ 2. The court may inform itself of such law in such 
manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call 
upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. 
What is here in discussion, is a mere right of the court 
which is not reviewable on appeal. There is a difference 
according as theories unfavorable or favorable to judicial 
notice of foreign law are taken as a starting-point. The 
New York rule, as well as the provision of the Uniform 
Act and similar statutes, has been commonly construed to 
the effect that the court would only act when a party has 
pleaded the foreign law. The statute, it has been held, 
removes the necessity of proof but not that of pleading, or, 
at least, of drawing the attention of the court to the foreign 
rule.27 
On the basis of the broadly drafted New York statute 
of 1943, which literally would allow any spontaneous re-
search by the court, thus far the Court of Appeals has only 
once disapproved this position.28 This decision still leaves 
25 Italy: Cass. (May 12, 1937) 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 281; (March 28, 1938) 
ib. 327· 
Netherlands: H.R. (June 28, 1937) W. 1938 No. 1. 
26 German C. Civ. Proc. § 137, as generally interpreted; ib. § 293 (infra 
n. 3) had originally just this meeting. 
21 E.g., Strout v. Burgess {Me. 1949) 68 Atl. (2d) 241, 12 A.L.R. (2d) 
939; Scott v. Scott ( 1951) 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W. (2d) 627, 23 A.L.R. (2d) 
1431; Bergman v. Lax (1951) 107 N.Y.S. (2d) 266; Allen v. Saccomanno 
(Wash. 1952) 242 P. (2d) 747· 
28 Plleuger v. Plleuger ( 1952) 304 N.Y. 148, 106 N.E. (2d) 495; on the 
recent New York practice, see NussBAUM, "Proving the Law of Foreign 
Countries," 3 Am. J. Comp. L. ( 1954) 6o. 
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intervention to the discretion of the judge, 29 but it ruled 
that any court of original jurisdiction can cure the failure 
of the party to specify the foreign rule relied upon by taking 
notice ex officio. Moreover, the court stated that the dis-
cretion of the court ought to be exercised with respect to 
the statute of a sister state. 
If this stage is reached, it is more certain than before 
that judges may use their private knowledge in evaluating 
party evidence. It is not probable, however, in this con-
nection that a court may, on its own motion, introduce a 
foreign law that was not pleaded into the suit otherwise 
than by questioning the parties. 
3. Duty to Take Judicial Notice 
Is there a duty of the court to insert into the procedural 
matter (a) the question of the applicable law, (b) the 
materials to solve this question, (c) the solution of this 
question? So far no provision seems to have stated an 
absolute duty of this kind. The duty in question is always 
tempered by some measure of discretion, obliging judges 
to make appropriate efforts rather than to achieve results. 
However, such a provision definitively changes judicial 
passivity into active responsibility. 
Common law procedure has not encouraged such enter-
prise. Central European judges could be charged with 
more linguistic aptitude and familiarity with the basic 
Romanistic ideas of the surrounding countries. The great-
est influence, however, has come from the writers who 
since Savigny infer from the position of the national laws 
vithin the international community the dignity of a true 
29 The Appellate Division states that it may, according to its discretion, 
!ake judicial notice of the law of a sister state or a foreign country, or 
m the absence of actual proof indulge in presumptions of similarity. In re 
McDougald's Est. (1947) 27'1. App. Div. 176, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 200. 
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law of conflicts and the equality of the laws before the 
judge.30 
The German Code of Civil Procedure provides : 
The law in force in a foreign country, the customary 
law and the local enactments need proof only insofar as 
they are unknown to the court. In ascertaining such law 
the court is not limited to the evidence adduced by the 
parties; it is entitled to use other sources of knowledge 
and to issue orders for providing what is necessary to such 
use.31 
While the New York statute has been construed nar-
rowly as an effect of judicial prerogative, the German pro-
vision, which verbally expresses just this conception, is 
recognized as establishing a formal duty.32 The court finds 
ex officio what law is applicable to the case and, if it knows 
its content, has to apply it; otherwise it must ask the 
parties to supply information. 
A number of other countries have joined this group; 
in particular, as mentioned before, Italy and the Nether-
30 E.g., United States: HARTWIG, "Construction and Enactment of Uniform 
Judicial Notice," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (I940) I74 advocates a federal provision 
on taking judicial notice. 
France: WEISS, 4 Traite ..• ; PILLET, Principes 84. 
Germany: common opinion from I ZITELMANN 287 f. 
Greece: STREIT-VALLINDAS § I4 j MARIDAKIS D.I.P. § 22 and many others. 
Italy: FEDOZZI 442 f.; MoRELLI, Lezioni (ed. 2, I943) 46 §IS (more 
determined than in D. Proc. Civ. Int. ( I938) 54 f.) 
Spain: YANGUAS MESSIA, I D.I.P. 303. 
Argentina: A. ALCORTA. 
Brazil: 2 MACHADO VILLELA 256 j BALMACEDA CARDOSO I79; Institute of 
International Law, II Annuaire ( I892) 330. 
Colombia: CAICEDO CASTILLA I3S ff. 
81 ZPO. § 293· 
82 RG. (March 23, I897) 39 RGZ. 37I, 376; (June I8, I900) Jur. Woch. 
I900, sSs; (Nov. II, I9II) Jur. Woch. I9I2, I96; (Oct. 24, I9I2) So RGZ. 
262; (Nov. s, I928) Jur. Woch. I929, I434; and constantly. MELCHIOR 4ZI 
§ 284 j NUSSBAUM 96. 
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lands have veered to the principle of taking judicial notice.33 
The Latin-American treaties have adopted it.34 
In the United States, the Uniform Act and the New York 
statute are formulated in agreement with this doctrine, 35 
although the courts hesitate to give it full effect. The clear-
est expression is found in the Massachusetts statute: 
The courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the 
United States or of any state, territory or dependency 
thereof or of a foreign country whenever the same shall 
be material.36 
This sounds imperative, and foreign countries are included. 
Under this approach, there is no burden of proof nor of 
pleading. 37 The party has an interest to aid in procuring 
the means of persuasion, and in practice the party takes the 
33 Austria: ZPO. § 273; OGH. GlU No. 394, 2473, 65u, etc.; WALKER 
244; WAHLE, Schweiz. Jur. Zeit. I932, I88. 
Greece: isolated decisions: Trib. civ. Rhodos ( I948 and I949) s Rev. Hell. 
(I95I) ZZI; Trib. civ. Athens No. zz6o/I95I, 6 Rev. Hell. (I952) 77, note 
GoFAS. 
Hungary: C.C. Proc. of June 6, I952, §zoo, I9 Z. ausl. PR. (I954) I50· 
Italy: Cass. (June z8, I940) Rivista I942, 242, 8 Giur. Comp. D.I.P. 232; 
(July 3I, I94I) Foro Ita!. I942 I 9, IO Giur. Comp. D.I.P. 73; (Aug. I2, 
I946) Foro Padovano I947 I 285 (including foreign conflicts law); DE 
NovA, Rev. Crit. I95I, I74· 
Netherlands: foreign law is law: H.R. (June 4, I9I5) W. 987I; (March zo, 
I93I) W. 12287, N.J. I93I, 89o; to state ex officio; Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 9, 
I9I8) W. I0355i Rb. Amsterdam (March 9, I9I8) W. II593, N.J. I925, 
86I; VAN BRAKEL 48 § 27. 
Switzerland: to the partial effect that the courts determine ex officio 
whether foreign or Swiss law applies. BG. (Nov. 3, I900) 26 BGE. II 719; 
(Nov. 24, I933) 6o BGE. II 433; (May I6, I95o) 76 BGE. III 6o. 
ScHNITZER I72. But cantonal restrictions of judicial inquiry are maintained 
by the Federal Tribunal, as NIEDERER, Allg. Lehren 346 notes. 
Hungary: DE MAGYARY, Clunet I924, 590, 600. 
Poland: IPL. art. 39 par. I. 
Chile: Sup. Trib., I5 Rev. Der. I 253; I6 ib. II 7o; 25 ib. I 544; 
ALBONICO I5. 
Soviet Ukraine; C. Proc. Civ. art. 8; MAKAROV, Precis Ioo. 
34 Treaty of Montevideo, art. z and Prot. Add. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 408-410. 
35 9 U.L.A. 399 ff. sec. I; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act§ 344a, A. 
36 Mass. Stat. I926 c. 168; Ann. L. 195I, c.233 § 70; but see Note 32 Mass. 
L,Q, ( 1947) 20 j SCHLESINGER supra n. I, 
37 RG. (June 2, 19I8) Warn Rspr. I918 No. I47· 
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initiative. The system tends rather to cooperation than to 
revolutionary intervention of judges. 
For the American federal courts, the rule has been that 
they should take judicial notice of federal law and all 
state laws.38 Consequently, in diverse citizenship cases, 
they are not limited to the state laws of which the state 
takes judicial notice.39 
In matters of "voluntary jurisdiction" (noncontentious 
judicial decisions), unlimited judicial responsibility for ap-
plication of the competent law is prescribed in Germany.40 
Where administrative authorities decide, they require every-
where full evidence by the petitioner. 
Also within this group, the statutes and their interpreta-
tion are at variance in defining the intensity of purpose. 
The German Reichsgericht insists that the court is charged 
with the duty of examination, even though counsel present 
concordant statements on the foreign law,41 but this is 
rarely observed anywhere. Great influence must be accorded 
to the procedural law of the court. Where, for instance, 
the rules of procedure require the plaintiff to indicate not 
only his cause of action in terms of fact but also the legal 
rule on which he relies, judicial initiative is somewhat re-
stricted.42 The nature of the individual case and of the 
foreign law involved has varying significance. For under-
standable reasons, many courts are reluctant to use their 
power of examination, especially when the attorneys are 
38 Restatement § 324. Cf., Australia: State and Territorial Laws and 
Records Recognition Act I90I-I950. 
39 Thus since the Erie RR. v. Tompkins case, GooDRICH 234 n. 27; Wagge-
man v. Gen. Fin. Co. of Philadelphia (I940) II6 F. (2d) 254. 
40 SCHLEGELBERGER, I Kommentar zum Gesetz iiber freiwillige Gerichts-
barkeit (ed. 4) §27 n. 26; MELCHIOR 422 n. 4; KG. (June 24, I937) Jur. 
Woch. I937, 2827 over-ruling its former decisions; LG. Saarbriicken (Oct. 20, 
I949) IPRspr. I945-49, No. I. 
41 See infra, IV. 
42 Colombia: RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 238 § I950. 
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negligent. On the other hand, it is wrong to speak of a 
danger in the administration of justice when a judge invokes 
a foreign law ignored by the parties. Surprise, of course, 
must be avoided by a party in relation to the adverse party, 
as the New York statute realizes, and quite equally by 
the court in relation to both parties; they must be timely 
invited to take position. That even the broadest mandate 
to the court can result only in a restricted response when 
libraries, experience, and funds for consultation are de-
ficient, is too trite a truth not to be borne in mind by all 
legislators. 
4· Sources of Foreign Law 
There are no more lawyers, we hope, who believe that 
any foreign code exhausts the legal system of the country. 
Decisions must be explored also for civil law countries.43 
Contrary to former errors,44 again, a foreign rule is given 
the construction adopted by the foreign courts, even though 
the same text, derived from the same model or borrowed 
from the forum, may be construed differently by the court 
itsel£.45 This is by no means a limitation on the creative 
intelligence of a judge; he acts simply as the foreign judge 
supposedly would do; American judges are very familiar 
with this operation. 
43 Permanent Court of Int. Justice (July u, I929) Publications, Ser. A 
No. 2o/2I. 
England: Lazard Broth. v. Midland Bank [I933] supra n. 2I. 
France: Cass. req. (Nov. IS, I924) Gaz. Pal. I92S.I.ISO. 
Germany: RG. (March 12, I906) Jur. Woch. I906, 297. 
Italy: Cass. (Dec. I9, I933) Revue crit. I93S, 360. 
Anglo-German T.A.M. The Thames & Mersey v. Allianz, 8 Recueil Trib. 
Arb. Mixtes 68. 
44 See NussBAUM 99 n. 2; id., Grundziige 234. 
45 United States: Los Angeles Inv. Sec. Corp. v. Joslyn (I939) 12 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 370, 379· 
France: Ap. Douai (March & May 7, 190I) Clunet 1901, I8o. 
Germany: RG. (March 12, 1906} Jur. Woch. 1906, 297. 
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One should not, however, forget the literature, at least 
as represented by the leading handbooks. Case law as well 
as statutes may lead foreign observers to strange con-
clusions. 
Some writers hold that an American statute may be sub-
jected in a foreign court to judicial review of its constitution-
ality as might occur at home.46 This is a queer contention. 
Not only would such a supervision be delicate, 47 but it is 
totally unfounded. It would be tantamount to anticipating 
the overruling of a decision of a foreign supreme court 
which, in a system of stare decisis, binds the lower courts. 
II. REVIEW ON APPEAL 48 
1. Review of Conflicts Law 
(a) No review. If foreign law is earnestly considered 
to be a fact "like other facts," review is excluded where 
new facts are barred in appellate courts and where review 
is barred on questions of fact. 49 Not even an error in apply-
ing Spanish conflicts law has been held reviewable by the 
Spanish supreme court. 50 
An impediment of another kind exists in English and 
American procedure, where the all important evidence by 
expert witnesses on foreign law can only be offered to a 
trial court. However, the upper court has various oppor-
tunities of evaluation and reversal, and statutory innovations 
46 NIBOYET, 3 Traite §§ 970 f.; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 966. 
47 PONTES DE MIRANDA, I Trat. (I93S) 365 § 7; BATIFFOL, Traite 355 § 334· 
4 8 LEWALD, "Le control des cours supremes sur )'application des lois 
etrangeres," 57 Recueil ( I936 III) 205; id., "Kollisionsfrage und revisio in 
jure," in Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft, Heft IS (Basel I942) 205; 
RIEZLER, Internat. Zivilprozessrecht soo ff. 
4 9 Spain: Trib. Sup. (Nov. 19, 1904). 
Colombia: RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1968. 
110 Spain: Trib. Sup. (June 7, 1875) despite art. I6o2 Cod. de Enjuiciamento; 
likewise as to decisions of the Direcci6n dos Registros (Dec. 26, r 89 r). 
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have permitted appellate courts to take judicial notice. 51 
The principal question, in the general opinion, concerns 
supervision by the highest tribunal. 
(b) Review of written conflicts law. The French Court 
of Cassation, following its charter of I796, reviews judicial 
errors only in the application of "la loi," the written legal 
rules. 52 Hence, all the conflicts rules, ingeniously developed 
on the scanty ground of article 3 of the Code Civil, would 
fall outside the scope of revision. This limitation was ob-
served for a long time and is still respected in Belgium and 
the Nether lands. 53 The French Court, however, usually 
circumvents the obstacle by citing article 3 or some sub-
stantive code provision as violated, and thereby virtually 
has passed into the following group. 54 
(c) Violation of conflicts law. The system reached by 
the French highest court is that most used in civil law 
countries. In Germany it was predicated by Waechter in 
I 84 I and adopted by the Commercial Court of Appeals 
in I 8 7 5. 55 The list of the jurisdictions in the note 56 is not 
exhaustive. 
5 1 E.g., New York, Civ. Prac. Act, sec. 244 a, D. 
5 2 Decree of Nov. 27, I790. 
53 Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 2I, I907) and (March I9, I93I) Clunet I93I, 
735 and constant practice; POULLET § 339; Cass. (March 26, I9S3) Clunet 
I9S4. 42I. 
Netherlands: H.R. (June 2, I937) W. I938 No. I; (Jan. 8, I943) W. 
I943, No. 202; KosTERS 125, constant practice. GARDE CASTILLO, "Los problemas 
del recurso de casacion en D.I.P.," 4 Rev. esp. D. Int. ( 1951) 409, 453, 447, 
and RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1977 advocate the same principle for Spain and 
Colombia respectively. 
54 France: Cass. civ. (April 13, 1932) D. I932.I.89, S. 1932.1.36I; Cass. 
req. (March 15, I933) S. I934.1.393; Cass. Civ. (March 22, I944) D.C. I944 
J. I66; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) § 212. 
55 WACHTER, 21 Arch. Civ. Prax. (184I) 3IO; ROHG. (March 2, I875) 17 
ROHGE. 167. 
56 Austria: ZPO. § 503; OGH. constant practice, WALKER 244. 
Germany: ZPO. §549 par. I; RG. (Oct. 30, I907) 19 Z. int. R. (1909) 
838; (June 26, 19I9) Jur. Woch. 1920, 40, SI; (May I3, I929) IPRspr. 1929 
No. 3; MELCHIOR 425 §§ 286 f. 
Greece: STREIT, Recueil 1927 V 7I. 
Italy: Cass. (June 8, I93I) Rivista I93I, 28o; (Aug. 12, I946) Foro 
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The effect of this system is to control the application of 
the entire set of domestic rules of conflict. The supreme 
court watches how "the principle of the connection with 
foreign law" 57 operates, without touching the use made 
by the lower court of a foreign law. What does this 
mean? 
The court does examine whether domestic substantive 
law ought to apply instead of foreign law, or the latter 
instead of the former. The Reichsgericht also usually 
criticizes a judgment not precisely stating which law applies, 
even though the end result seems to be the same whatever 
contact of the case is held decisive. 58 
Whether, however, the subordinate court erred in ad-
mitting the existence or nonexistence of a specific foreign 
rule, be it substantive or conflictual, is not reviewed. The 
question has arisen whether an exception should be made 
when the application of the domestic law depends on renvoi 
from a foreign conflicts rule. The German court answers 
in the affirmative.59 In a 1932 case, an American couple 
had married in Chicago, established their first domicil in 
St. Louis, and later transferred their residence to Hamburg, 
where the husband sued for divorce. The proceedings 
Padovano 1947 I 2S5; MoRELLI, Lezioni § rS; DE NovA, Rev. crit. 1951, 170. 
Cf., infra n. 70. 
Netherlands: expressly excluding review of foreign law: H.R. (June 22, 
192S) W. 11S57, N.J. 192S, 14S6; (May 29, 1933) W. u661, N.J. 1934, 
529; (June 26, 1937) W. 93S No. r; (April IZ, 1942) W. 1942 No. 4S; 
VAN DER FLIER, Clunet 1936, 116. 
Rumania: Cass. (March 21, 1932) Revue 1935. s6; PLASTARA, 7 Repert., 
Roumanie No. 139. 
Spain: ORUE, Manual § 363; but contra GARDE CASTILLO (supra n. 51). 
Switzerland: BG. (Feb. IS, 1910) 36 BGE. II 35; (March 17, 1926) 52 
BGE. II 97· 
Chile: divided authority; to the effect described above Trib. Sup. (Sept. 7, 
1923) Rev. Der. 1923.1·39S; ALBONICO, esp. p. 22 and n. 47, against others. 
Colombia: 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ§ 1974• 
57 LERI!BOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 6) 23 I § 211. 
58 RG. from (Oct. 30, 1907) 19 Z. int. R. 33S constant practice, MELCHIOR 
§ 2S3; (July 7, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 15, Revue crit. 1935, 447, Clunet 
1935. 1190. 
59 55 RGZ. 24S; 59 id. z6; 7S id. 234; 91 id. 41; (June 2, 1932) 136 
RGZ. 361; (July 7, 1934) supra n. 56; RAAPE, Komm. 47; id. D.I.P.R. 
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turned on the question of renvoi effect which should be 
ascribed to American conflicts law on the law governing 
divorce of American spouses domiciled in Germany. The 
Reichsgericht explained that here the content of the Ameri-
can law is only an incident to the problem whether German 
divorce law is applicable. From the formulation in the 
decided cases, it has been concluded that this exception is 
not allowed when the reference goes to a third law.80 But 
since not only the substantive law of the forum but 
also its conflicts law is controlled, this limitation is un-
founded. 
Switzerland accepts the same exception; 61 other countries 
reject it,62 doubtless contrary to the purpose of conflicts law. 
Analogous exceptional appraisal of foreign laws has been 
justly urged in certain other situations. 5 3 
(d) Indirect review of foreign law. Strangely enough, 
in the same breath in which foreign law is branded as an 
intolerable burden on appellate courts, "indirect," irregular 
control is admitted in France 64 as well as in Germany, 65 
while the highest court of the Netherlands allows review 
in cases of public policy, 66 probably everywhere an official 
concern. The particulars are of slight interest, except 
that the breach of allegedly necessary restrictions in the 
oo LEWALD, Recueil 1936 III 255. 
61 Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 27, 1918) 44 BGE. II 453· 
62 Belgium: Cass. (March 9, 1882) Pas. Belg. 188z.1.6z. 
France: Cass. civ. (March 7, 1938) Revue crit. 1938, 47z; for many other 
cases see MAURY, Recueil 1936 III 405. 
Netherlands: H.R. (Jan. 8, 1943) W. 1943 no. 2oz; VAN PRAAG, Rechterliche 
Organisatie 583, 907; VAN BRAKEL 50-5:1 § 30. 
63 DoLLE, "Betrachtungen zum ausliindischen, internationalen und inter-
lokalen Privatrecht," Festschrift fiir Leo Raape ( 1948) 149, 153· 
64 BATIFFOL 363 § 343 discusses the control of qualifications, notably in the 
matter of registration and (§ 344) the "controle des motifs" and the theory 
of "denaturation." 
65 MELCHIOR 432 § Z95, cf., 513 f. § 373• 
66 H.R. (March 13, 1936) W. z8o, z81; (April z8, 1939) W. 895; VAN 
BRAKEL SO n. 3• 
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leading countries demonstrates the shortcomings of the 
principle. 
2. Review of Foreign Law 
In the doctrine just described, the ultimate review re-
frains from any opinion on the correctness of lower court 
findings on what the foreign law is. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, which at the same time must abstain from cantonal 
law, has been forced to set up an entire jurisdictional sys-
tem, full of hedges.67 
Authors of many nations are dissatisfied with the pre-
vailing usage,68 which has been abandoned in a number of 
jurisdictions, 69 including most I tali an decisions. 70 
No equivalent difficulty has ever been felt in common 
law courts. In the framework of access permitted to the 
highest state courts, no difference is made between domestic 
and foreign law. The federal Supreme Court, on appeal 
from the federal courts, takes judicial notice of the law of 
all American states, and on appeal from a state court "of 
67 See the complications in BG. (Sept. zo, I950) 76 BGE. II Z47, Praxis 
I950 No. I46, Schw. Jahrb. Int. R. I9SI, 3IO. The Court recalls that even 
though Swiss law was applied as foreign law against the construction of the 
Federal Tribunal by a Swiss court, review is excluded. 
68 See in particular I BAR I43; ZITELMANN z88; I FRANKENSTEIN Z93 and 
NEUBECKER 369 (both for the present Jaw); I PONTES DE MIRANDA 369; 
GARDE CASTILLO 460; DoLLE, in Festschrift fiir Raape (supra n. 63) I53· 
69 Austria: ZPO. § 503; WALKER Z44; POLLACK, z Ziv. Proz. Recht. ( ed. z) 
6o8. 
Belgium: Cass. (July 4, I949) Pas. I949 I 5z2; (March z6, I953) Clunet 
I954. 421. 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia: see LEWALD, Recueil 8936 III 288. 
Finland: Int. Family L. § 56. 
Greece: divided authority; see MARIDAKIS, P.I.L. 276. 
Portugal: Trib. Sup. (Feb. 4, 1918) cited by MACHADO VILLELA, 2 Trat. 
D.I.P. ( I9ZZ) 264. 
Siam: P.I.L. art. 8. 
Soviet Russia: MAKAROV, Precis 103; MAURACH, 47 Z. int. R. ( I932) I9. 
70 Italy: Cass. Roma (Nov. 10, 1917) Giur. Ita!. I918 I I, z4; Cass. 
(July 8, I931) Rivista I93I, 28o (with history); (Dec. 29, 1937) Foro Ita!. 
I938 II I58, I2 Rivista I938, 289; (June 12, I938) 7 Giur. Comp. D.I.P. :J3I; 
(Aug. 12, I946) Foro Padovano 1947 I 285, 22 Giur. Cass. Sez. Civ. I946 
II 6r9; DE NovA, Rev. crit. 195I, 170. 
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all law of which the state court takes judicial notice." 71 
Theoretically, not a shred of an argument can be made 
for the exclusion of foreign law from review. The authors 
justly regard the assimilation of foreign and domestic law 
in the courts of appeal as a simple consequence of a true 
law of conflicts. The only real issue is procurement of the 
means for easy and practical perusal of foreign documen-
tation. On this point, the idea to entrust only the lower 
tribunals with the final decision on the entire law of the 
world has been rightly ridiculed. 
III. METHODS OF PROOF 
Since the Sussex Peerage Case of I 844,72 it has become 
the English rule that foreign law is proved by expert wit-
nesses.73 The particulars constitute a complicated network, 
especially in the United States. 74 Statutes and decisions are 
normally offered but commented upon by experts. The 
usual American rule calls for such documents or experts 
or both.75 Also the English Court of Appeal does not 
require the latter without exception; if statutes are pre-
sented and sufficient experts are not available, the court 
must "apply its own mind." 76 American practice is "more 
liberal" 77 also in other respects, and the New York legisla-
tion has perfected development by allowing the courts to 
"consider any testimony, document, information or argu-
71 RESTATEMENT § 625, comment a. 
72 SoMMERICH AND BuscH, "The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign 
Law," 38 Corn. L.Q. (1951) 125; MELCHIOR 431. 73 7 WIGMORE, Evidence § 209oa. 
74 See 2 WIGMORE, Evidence §§ 566, 664; 3 id. § 690 and §§ 1217, 1697. 
1953· 75 Where nevertheless the evidence of an English rule left doubt, the 
ascertainment was left to the jury; Electric Welding Co. v. Prince ( 1909) 
200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947· 
76 Rouger Guillet & Cie. v. Rouger Guillet & Co. Ltd. [1948] 1949 All 
E.R. 244; Clunet 1950, 642. 
77 2 WIGMORE § 664. 
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ment on the subject." 78 A recent English statute on a 
special matter is similarly broad.79 
Although in Continental procedure all means of evidence 
allowed by the court are admitted,80 proposals to alleviate 
the perplexity concerning foreign law that often exists, 
have been devised in literature, congresses, and some 
treaties; it is recommended that information be made avail-
able by diplomatic correspondence, authentic opinion of 
foreign courts, or domestic or foreign Justice Depart-
ments.81 In fact, most courts and administrative agencies 
for good reasons refuse to give advice. What comes forth 
through consulates is frequently of no use. All available 
and reliable channels of information are certainly worth 
cultivating. Experience, however, shows the pitfalls in 
the testimony of witnesses unilaterally appointed by one 
party, and those not infrequently occurring in official com-
munications concerning particular litigious points. 82 Judges, 
parties, and experts must fully cooperate. But it is not 
least in the interest of a trustworthy source of information 
for the courts that I have not ceased to demand the creation 
of fully adapted independent research institutes for foreign 
and international private law. Where they do exist, in 
very few cases will the search end in the vacuum presently 
to be discussed. 
78 Civ. Prac. Act§ 344a-C. 79 Foreign Compensation Act 1950, 14 Geo. VI c. 12, rule 4, see Int. L.Q. 
1951, 361, 364. 80 E.g., Argentina: Cam. Fed. Ia, Jur. Arg. 1944 IV 2II, 8 Rev. Arg. Der. 
Int. (1945) 378. 81 For an admirable report on the entire question see HARRY LEROY }ONES, 
"International Judicial Assistance, Procedural Chaos and a Program for 
Reform," 62 Yale, L.J. (1953) 515-562. 82 Example: the Kammergericht of Berlin (June 24, 1937) Jur. Woch. 
1937, 2827. H.R.R. 1937, 1376, had to refute with the help of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Foreign and Internat. Priv. Law official documents 
issued by a probate court in New Jersey, which asserted that the N.J. 
statute of March 17, 1926, concerning intestate succession by a surviving 
spouse. referred also to foreign immovables. The statute, of course, laid 
down mternal and not conflicts law. 
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It is the scientific approach that is generally missing, 
supplanted by a mechanical routine operation. If Lord 
Dennan in the Sussex Peerage Case and Coleridge in Baron 
de Bode's Case are still rigorously followed and the court 
is admonished not to construe the foreign code but "make 
the best of the witnesses," a sterility, long forgotten in other 
legal operations, is prescribed. Words neither of statutes 
nor of decisions are a gospel. Foreign law is not a fact. 
Its spirit and appraisal of values and interests must decide. 
IV. ABSENCE OF PROOF 
1. Rejection of the Claim 
Taking conflicts law seriously and having determined in 
a particular case that a foreign law governs a claim or a 
defense, a court may feel impelled by logical considerations 
to hold that the issue depends exclusively on the commands 
of that law. Nothing entitles a judge to exchange the 
governing law against any other. If then the contents 
of the foreign law cannot be ascertained, eminent authority 
believes it to be unavoidable that the claim or defense 
should fail. 88 
Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the Supreme 
Court of the United States, held in Cuba Railroad Co. v. 
Crosby 84 that Cuban law concerning the liability of em-
ployers for accidental injury of the employees not having 
been evidenced, the suit was to be dismissed. Against the 
objection that this involved a hardship on the plaintiff 
he stated: "The only just ground for complaint would be 
88 I ZITELMANN 289, 293 ; NIEMEYER, Vorschliige 77; HELLWIG, 1 Zivilproz. 
R. 577; ANZILOTTI, Rivista 1906, 271; MORELLI, D. Proc. Civ. Int. ( 1938) 
SO ff.; DE NOVA, Rev. crit. 1951, 125 n. 4; BALMACEDA CARDOSO 186; RESTREPO 
HERNANDEZ 237 § 1944 ("just and logical," citing MACHADO VILLELA). 
84 Cuba RR. Co. v. Crosby ( 1912) 222 U.S. 473· 
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if rights and liabilities, when enforced by our courts should 
be measured by a different rule from that under which the 
parties dealt." 85 Similar views have been taken in other 
American 86 and foreign cases. 87 Whether the individual 
issues justified these results, is a separate question. 88 
Nevertheless, as a logical conclusion of general validity, 
the proposition is convincing only so long as foreign law is 
thought to be an ordinary element of the cause of action. 
Uncertainty of an essential fact must be fatal in a law 
suit; normally it leads to dismissal not only without prejudice 
( ab instantia) but with full force of res judicata. 
Foreign law, however, is not a fact. Neither is it entirely 
equal to domestic law whose incertitude is not allowed to 
prevent a positive holding, because otherwise the court 
would commit a denial of justice. Failure to know a foreign 
law creates a particular problem, not necessarily subject to 
the treatment either of facts or of the municipal law of 
the forum. 
Indeed, the courts have in most cases found both con-
ceptions unsatisfactory. But expediency has suggested ex-
perimental rather than methodical rulings. 
2. Presumptions for Similarity 
The great majority of American authorities have re-
sorted to the law of the forum by presuming that the 
8 S Jd., 480. 
86 Christie v. Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. (1926) 214 App. Div. zzo, 2JJ 
N.Y.S. 143 and cited cases; Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp. ( 1927) 245 N.Y. 152, 
156 N.E. 617; Arams v. Arams (1943) 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 251. 
87 Germany: ROHG. (April 20) 25 ROHGE. 53; RG. 51 Seuff. A. No. 85 
Reichsober. HG. (April 28, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 13, 53· 
88 NussBAUM, so Yale L. Jour. at 1042 criticizes the Cuba R.R. decision 
because the railroad would certainly have been able to produce evidence of 
the Cuban law if it had been favorable. 
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foreign law is the same as the law of the court.89 This 
device was also once traditional in Europe 90 but has almost 
vanished there. 
(a) Common law courts have presumed that the com-
mon law of another state is identical with their own.91 Yet, 
whereas European analogous assumptions were less scrupu-
lous, American courts since the Cuba Railroad Case have 
become conscious that rules of civil law cannot be submitted 
to such identification. 92 
(b) The presumption has been extended by special pro-
visions to the statutory law of the forum. 93 
(c) German courts, failing to verify American law, have 
resorted to English decisions 94 or substituted French law 
for that of Belgium or Luxemburg.95 Such replacements 
within a close family of laws are better than to introduce 
the municipal law of the court, but advisable only if the 
foreign court itself, as in less developed countries, may be 
supposed to look to another authoritative system. 
89 3 BEALE r68o; rs C.J.S. 847; Peterson v. Chicago Great Western Ry. 
Co. (1943) 138 F. (2d) 8o4; the domestic law determines also the burden 
of proof, Menard v. Goltra ( 1931) 328 Mo 368., 383, 40 S.W. (2d) ros3, 
rosS. 
90 Germany: ROHGE. II 39; II 44: VII 61; VIII 12; 1 BAR 133 n. 4, 136f. 
Italy: App. Venezia (July 31, 1906) Rivista 1906, 271; (March 8, 1932) 
Riv. Italiana (FEDOZZI) 1932, 170. Contra FEnozzr, D.I.P. 482; MORELLI I.e. 
91 Restatement §622; 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) (1911) 261; KALES, "Presumption 
of Foreign Law," 19 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1906) 40; STORY § 272; WESTLAKE § 3S3; 
e.g., Read v. Lehigh Valley R.T. (1940) 284 N.H. 43S, 31 N.E. (2d) 891; 
Miller v. Vanderlip (1941) 28s N.Y. 116, 33 N.E. (2d) sr; Smith v. Kent 
Oil Co. ( I9S3, Colo.) 261 P. (2d) 149 (no presumption for Colorado 
statutory law) ; Associates Discount Corp. v. Main St. Motors Inc. ( 1953) 
157 Ohio St. 488, ros N.E. (2d) 878; Michigan law not evidenced, presumed 
similar to Ohio law concerning the question whether a chattel mortgage 
creates a legal or an equitable title. 
9 2 Supra n. So ad 82 and older cases. 
93 Long list of cases in 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 133 and Supp. I9S4 also 
covering this extension; GoODRICH § 83 n. 31 names four statutes. To the 
same effect, the procedural codes of Zurich § roo and of some other Swiss 
Cantons. 
94 OLG. Hamburg (April 4, 1929) IPRspr. 1929 No. 63. 
95 KG. (March 3, 1922) Jur. Woch. 1922, 1122. 
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How defectively the use of presumptions works is a 
known topic of criticism. Workable where similarity ts 
probable, they have been used far beyond this limit.96 
3· Subsidiary Law 
(a) Without employing presumptions of similarity or 
at least without taking them seriously, the law of the forum 
has been applied, sometimes by contending that the parties 
tacitly submit to the local law or that the local law is the 
only one at the judge's elbow.97 
That lex fori should be an auxiliary source of decision 
has also been explained on the theory of a vast function of 
the municipal law of the court.98 It is described as an all 
comprehensive, fully potent order, which automatically pre-
sents itself when the conflicts law is frustrated. Some pres-
ent writers assert that foreign law is an exceptional source; 
the normal rule is exclusively the domestic law, to which the 
court for many reasons resorts. Or the reference to foreign 
law is conceived as conditional, one condition being that it 
can be proved.99 
Such nostalgic reminiscences of comity ideas and ter-
ritorialism can be avoided. The law of the forum enters, 
if at all, as an emergency substitute rather than as an 
96 BIGELOW in STORY (ed. 8) § 853a; VON MOSCHZISKER, "Presumptions as 
to Foreign Law," II Minn. L. Rev. I (I926). 
97 See KALES, "Presumption of Foreign Law," I9 Harv. L. Rev. ( I906) 40I; 
GooDRICH 234; MORELLI, I D. Proc. Civ. Int. 57§ 36 and cit. 
Finland: Int. Fam. L. § 56. 
Germany: ROHG. (June 28, I872) 7 ROHGE. I6; I BAR I37j RAAPE, 
D.IPR. 82, III. 
Greece: MARIDAKIS PIL. 275· 
Hungary: Draft I.P.L. § I7. 
Poland: I.P.L. art. 39 par. 2. 
Portugal: Draft C.C. I9SI, art. S· 
Switzerland: BG. (June zo, I9I4) 40 BGE. 480; (Sept. 23, I94I) 67 BGE. 
2IS; {June IS, I943) 69 BGE. II 309, 31I. 
98 Most efficiently presented by BATIFFOL, Traite 368 ff. 
99 FIORE §§ 270, 272 j ROLIN § 520. 
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ubiquitous force happily released from its odious chains. 
This role is necessitated by the present defective inter-
national order. But it is not true that if the foreign law is 
not provable the domestic law has a natural vocation to 
govern. 
(b) Another line has been taken by some European 
writers and followed by the German Reichsgericht since 
18 8 5 100 and identically by a Massachusetts decision of 
1911.101 In 1912 Mr. Justice Holmes directed attention to 
it by an obiter remark that, 
"in dealing with rudimentary contracts or torts made or 
committed abroad, such as promises to pay money for goods 
or services, or battery of the person or conversion of goods, 
courts would assume a liability to exist if nothing to the 
contrary appeared." 102 
A few remarkable decisions have heeded this suggestion.103 
Some scholars have advocated this approach, because no 
one national law in reality is available under the premises.104 
Contra, it has been urged that a law exists and is merely 
of unknown content.105 The leading idea still seems to be 
that the law of the forum is employed as representing 
fundamental principles of civilized nations. 
The vagueness of this idea, however, is illustrated by the 
observation that Holmes used conversion as an obvious 
example of this kind of jus gentium, while the New York 
100 Germany: RG. (Sept. 28, 1885) 16 RGZ. 337; (March 24, 1909) 71 
RGZ. 9; (July 11, 1919) 96 RGZ. 230. 
101 Parrot v. Mexican Central Railway Co. (1911) 207 Mass. 184, 192, 93 
N.E. 590, citing older Mass. decisions (p. 194). 
1°2 Cuba R.R. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473· 
103 Esp. Arams v. Arams, infra n. 104; trial court in Riley v. Pierce Oil 
Co., supra n. 85; Crane, J., dissenting vote; trial court in Leary v. Gledhill, 
infra n. 108; Industrial Export and Import Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai 
Banking Corp ( 1947) 191 Misc. 493, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 541, aff'd. 302 N.Y. 342, 
96 N.E. (2d) 466 (ban on repayment by the Chinese Central Bank under 
~he laws of China). 
104 FIORE § 272; ALCORTA 145· 
105 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ § 1965. 
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Court of Appeals has ruled out its application in the case 
of a conversion allegedly committed in Mexico, 106 although 
more recently a lower court has applied it to conversion 
committed in Switzerland and other places.107 In one case, 
the same court reversed itself on the question whether a 
seaman injured in the course of his duty on a Panamanian 
ship and claiming damages for failure of the ship's officers 
to furnish prompt and proper medical care, could be heard 
under the presumption of the law of civilized countries.108 
Nevertheless there is a future in a device emphasizing 
international thought in international relations. 
4· Distinction of Situations 
Recent writers have hinted at the differences of the 
cases in which the search for a foreign rule lacks success.109 
The foreign law may be more or less alien or exotic; the 
procedural matter may be more or less closely tied to the 
foreign origin; and the just result of the conflicts problem 
may be more or less securely felt. Assuming such circum-
stances, a choice is open among several methods. Their 
number, however, does not include the usual presumptions 
of similarity. Whatever reasons once supported them have 
lost their usefulness. Not even the former community of 
common law has retained significance beyond elementary 
truth. 
(a) Acquiescence in the law of the forum. Courts 
readily accept an agreement of counsel either on the con-
tents of a foreign law or on application of the domestic 
1°6 Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., supra n. 85. 
107 Arams v. Arams ( 1943) 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 251 attempts to distinguish the 
Riley case by distinctions not made in that case. 
108 Sonneson v. Panama Transport Co. ( 1947) 272 App. Div. 948, 72 
N.Y.S. (2d) 153, ending after complicated proceedings, 278 N.Y. 262, 82 
N.E. (2d) 569, cert. den. 337 U.S. 919, 961. 
109 NussBAUM, so Yale L.J. at 1041; GooDRICH ( ed. 3) 236. 
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law.110 The individual procedural law of the court must 
decide whether such agreement is acceptable; generally, it 
does not seem to be contrary. Yet the conditions for a 
true agreement on the applicable law often are not given 
and such agreements are totally excluded in suits on family 
and status matters. Nevertheless, they have been recently 
recommended 111 and in a recent case preferred by Chief 
Justice Vanderbilt to the presumption of civilized laws/12 
Their nature should he defined. A contract, although not 
a contract of international private law, is required in my 
opinion, viz. a procedural contract, valid on the basis of 
procedural authorization and only for the purpose of the 
law suit. Hence, the court should not he satisfied with 
silence on the foreign law, possibly due to ignorance of the 
conflicts problem, but inquire whether there is a binding 
understanding. 
(h) Dismissal. Complaints have been rightly dismissed 
when a claim was brought by an alleged beneficiary in an 
estate or his creditor, annulment of a marriage was sought, 
or damages for wrongful death depended, on statutes not 
proved.113 This group is very much larger. It needs ex-
amination to state exactly the individual causes of action 
which cannot he separated from their accrual under a 
foreign law. 
(c) uCivilized Laws." The resort to the law of civilized 
nations is known as vague and uncertain and scarcely able 
to support more than elementary principles. But it has 
110 Supra Vol. II, p. 386. The Swiss Federal Tribunal {August 31, 1953) 
79 BGE. II 295, applied in So BGE. II 51, has overruled its practice (re-
ferred to in my cited note and still professed in 77 BGE. II 87) ; the court 
now simply recognizes an agreement expressed by counsel of the parties on 
the law applicable to the litigious contract. 
111 NUSSBAUM, 50 Yale L.J. at 1040. 
112 Leary v. Gledhill (1951) 8 N.J. 26o, 269, 84 Atl. (zd) 725; SOMMERICH 
AND BuscH, supra n. 72 at 143. 
113 NuSSBAUM, so Yale L.J. at 1041. 
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some features of the "general principles," which in one 
sense or another are considered the subsidiary source of 
public international law. Also this approach may gain a 
firmer shape by closer analysis. Comparative research 
teaches us what is common in closer and wider families of 
legal systems. There is no need to guess that a loan must 
be repayable under French law, as being a civilized law.114 
If a glimpse into any French textbook is really too much 
to ask, even half-civilized peoples do not deny the rule; 
it is a notorious fact. With progressive knowledge much 
more than platitudes did and will result. For instance, the 
dissident vote in Riley v. Pierce Oil Corporation inferred 
from the facts that the defendent company must be liable 
for the contract of its dummy (the Mexican subsidiary 
company) "and pay for the oil taken." 115 But if the case 
was not to be decided under American law (because both 
parties were American corporations, a questionable ground), 
it could not be based without evidence, as the dissenting 
vote implied, on a nonexistent universal rule of piercing the 
corporate veil nor on a universal liability of an undisclosed 
principal. The claim, however, probably could well be 
justified on the ground of unjust enrichment, a doctrine of 
Romanistic heritage, at least now slowly being rediscovered 
also in Latin-American countries.116 
(d) Lex fori. Application of the municipal law of the 
forum apart from similarity presumptions ought not to ap-
pear so satisfactory to the courts as they believe it to be. At 
best, the results are approximately correct. As an unavoid-
able last resort, it must be accepted. 
114 Trial court in Leary v. Gledhill, supra n. 111. 
115 Crane, J., dissenting in the Riley case, supra n. Ss; "Against Holmes 
and Crane," RuSSELL, "Presumption of Similarity," 5 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. ( 1928) 
29, 34· 
116 DAWSON, Unjust Enrichment 107. 
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Had the trial court in the Cuba Railroad Case investi-
gated Mexican law, or had the Supreme Court remanded 
the case for such examination, the decision would have done 
justice to the claim, instead of dismissing it without know-
ing the merits and probably with prejudice. 
PART SIXTEEN 
INTERTEMPORAL RELATIONS 
CHAPTER 77 
Transitory Relations of Conflicts Law 
I. CHANGE OF FoREIGN LAw 1 
Change of the applicable substantive law. When the 
foreign law invoked by a conflicts rule has been altered, 
the question arises whether the former or the more recent 
foreign rule applies. The primary solution is commonly 
taken from the transitory rule of the applicable legal sys-
tem itself.2 This is so evidently correct that the insistence 
of many writers on a broad exception in the name of public 
policy of the forum appears exaggerated. Frequently the 
new rule rather than the change is what may disturb the 
sensitivity of a court. If state X bans miscegenetic mar-
riages and makes the prohibition retroactive, the court in 
1 Special literature in addition to the major works, mostly comparative: 
ZITELMANN, "Das Verhiiltnis der iirtlichen und zeitlichen Anwendungsnormen 
zu einander," 42 Jh. Jahrb. (I900) I!t9; FRANZ KAHN, 43 Jh. Jb. (190I) 
299, I Abhandl. 363-479; KARL NEUMEYER, "Die zeitliche Geltung der 
Kollisionsnormen," IZ Z. int. R. ( I903) 39- so; ANZILOTTI, La questione della 
retroattivita (I90S) us, u8; MARIN, Essai sur )'application dans le temps 
des regles de conftit dans l'espace (Paris I928) ; PAUL RoUBIER, "Les conftits 
de lois dans le temps en D.I.P.," Revue I93 I, 3 8; BALDONI, "La Successione 
nel tempo delle norme di D.I.P.," 24 Rivista ( 1932) Nr. 1-2; Full bibliography 
on transitory law is given by PACE, II diritto transitorio (Studi di diritto 
privato italiano e straniero, ser. II, vol. II, 1944). 
2 France: Cass. req. (Nov. 18, I9t2) S. I9I4.I.258, Revue 19I3, 492, follows 
art. 2 of the Italian Civil Code of x86s and therefore applies the provisions 
of the former Codice Albertino on natural children. 
Germany: ROHG. (June 28, 1878) 24 ROHGE. 170, 190; KG. (June 14, 
1913); 27 ROHGE. to!t; RG. (July 2, 1925) Jur. Woch. 1925, 2142; MEL-
CHIOR 68 § 43· 
Hungary: Draft PIL. (1947) § 127. 
Italy: DIENA, Clunet 1900, 925; id., 10 Z. int. R. ( 1900) 383; 2 Principii 
90; BALLADORE-PALLIERI, D.I.P. 55· 
Switzerland: 1 SCHNITZER IPR. 176. 
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Y, finding the prohibition repugnant, will probably reject 
it entirely, irrespective of the date of the marriage in 
question. Of course, a foreign marriage valid at the time 
and place of its celebration is considered valid in any case 
by the normal conflicts rule.3 
If the applicable law is silent on the question of retro-
activity, the general principle seems to favor the new rule. 
Thus, in a famous decision, the court of Bordeaux 4 held 
that a marriage celebrated in religious form in Mexico 
during a period when such form was prohibited, was 
validated by a subsequent decree of the Emperor Maximil-
ian. That the victorious republicans, again retroactively, 
reinstated the prior rule nullifying ecclesiastic marriages, 
and that the French court refused application of the later 
enactment, in favor either of marriage or of a French 
national, involved in the cause, transcends the matter of 
retroactivity. 
Although obligations once regularly acquired are assured 
against impairment by the new law if not by the constitution, 
it has been submitted earlier that current foreign-governed 
contracts are subject to the latest formulation of the ap-
plicable law, unless a preceding contrary party agree-
ment, is ascertainable and permitted by the law of the 
forum.5 
As is well-known, no change of private law is assumed 
as an automatic effect of annexation, cession, or merger 
of territories. 
Change of foreign conflicts rules. The answer is the 
3 Supra. Vol. I, p. 273 f. and n. I32. 
4 App. Bordeaux (Feb. 5, I883) S. I883.2.I37, Clunet I883, 621; con-
troversial comments by BARTIN, I Principes 299, ROUBIER, Revue I93I, 38 ff.; 
I PONTES DE MIRANDA 339· 
5 Supra Vol. II, pp. 546-548. The discussion on the 7th Hague Conference, 
I9SI, Actes 78-SI, produced different opinions and a prevailing tendency to 
leave the questions involved to the interpretation of the contract by the court. 
But judges need guidance. 
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same when a foreign conflicts law to which the forum re-
sorts in the course of renvoi is modified during the relation-
ship subject to it.6 
II. CHANGE oF THE CoNFLICTs RuLE OF THE FoRUM 
Occurrence. Much more serious is the difficulty inherent 
in the rivalry of older and newer rules in the applicable law 
of the forum itself. Previously recognized, 7 this question 
was explored in numerous decisions and a massive literature 
when, on January I, I900, the German Introductory Law 
to the Civil Code replaced the international private laws 
of the particular German territories by a unified, funda-
mentally different regulation. The theories developed on 
this occasion in the German and international literature 
continue in the center of discussion. Analogous problems 
were raised by the Hague Conventions on private inter-
national law, and again by the termination of membership 
in them and by the statutes and codes appearing in consider-
able number in the recent decades. The Introductory Law 
of Brazil of I 942, changing from national law to the 
domiciliary principle, provides an interesting counterpart 
to the inverse German reform of I 896. However, neither 
of these events has been given much attention. 
The problem ought to be the same for other than 
statutory amendments, for instance, when a court passes 
from lex loci contractus to lex loci solutionis or from lex 
domicilii to lex situs. But judicial decisions seem rarely to 
be regarded as involving the creation of new conflicts rules. 
No one has ever thought of excepting former legal situa-
tions after the Supreme Court of the United States took 
6 I FRANKENSTEIN 241; MELCHIOR 45· 
7 J. C. MEYER, Principes sur les questions transitoires intertemporels, nouv. 
ed. par A. A. De Pinto (Leyde x8s8) 36-42, stating differences and analogies 
between intertemporal and international private law. 
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the momentous step from federal conflicts law to state 
law in diversity of citizenship cases. 
Because the questions raised by these changes are of 
only temporary importance, the remarkable fact that no 
convincing solution has been discovered in an abundance 
of learned proposals is partly explained by short-lived prac-
tical interest. Repeated attempts to deduce positive transi-
tory rules, that is, a division of application among successive 
sets of rules, from the "nature" of private international 
law naturally have been futile. 
I. Court Decisions 
The judicial materials include very few reports other 
than German of the decade after the Civil Code came into 
force. The courts in Germany resorted without hesitation 
to the copious intertemporal rules included in the Intro-
ductory Law, following articles 7-3 I, which deal with private 
international law. These rules were first applied as if they 
were also intended for conflicts law. When the writers 
noted that the "laws thus far in force" (die bisherigen 
Gesetze), which were to be continued in effect, meant only 
the substantive rules, the weight of authority, both judicial 
and theoretical, turned to analogous application. The re-
sult was much the same, since cases where such analogies 
could be refuted rarely materialized in litigation. 
Out of a considerable series of cases, 8 the following may 
illustrate the method used. 
Illustrations. (I) In a suit decided in 1906 in Hamburg,9 
the testator Schiegel, a naturalized American citizen, had 
married in Bremen under the local unlimited community 
8 MELCHIOR 64 ff.; ROUBII!R, Revue I93 I, 79· 
9 0LG. Hamburg (June IS, I906) 18 Z. int. R. (I908) 146; accord: OLG. 
Miinchen (Feb. 17, I909) ZI ROLG. Z33 (former immutability of marital 
property upheld); KG. (Sept. 30, I9IS) 34 ROLG. 3Z (first marital domicil 
decisive). 
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property system. Before I 900 the conflicts rule of the courts 
in Hamburg referred to the first matrimonial domicil, which 
was Bremen. The new rule of the Introductory Law, E.G., 
article I 5, invokes primarily the national, American, law 
of the husband. But since article 200 maintains the marital 
property system that existed on December 3 I, I 899, this 
provision takes precedence, including the consequence that 
the old conflicts rule of the court in Hamburg still points 
to the law of the first matrimonial domicil, Bremen. 
In this case, Bremen was the first domicil of the spouses, 
a German territory whose substantive marital property 
law after I 899 was expressly continued by article 200 of 
the Introductory Law. The new conflicts rule of article I 5 
E.G. is held superseded by this article 200, from which 
it is concluded that the former conflicts rule referring to 
Bremen as the first matrimonial domicil is also maintained. 
To allow an immediate word of criticism: why is the old 
conflicts rule of the court of Hamburg held competent 
instead of that of Bremen, which would have the same 
result? And what would have happened if the court of 
Baden, which applied the national law also under the older 
system, had to decide? Could it not be that article 200, 
irrespective of any conflicts rule, was destined to salvage 
any marital property system based on the law of any 
German territory? However, the courts did not decide 
otherwise even though the parties at the time of the mar-
riage were domiciled abroad. 
(II) A married couple of Bavarian nationality were first 
domiciled in Corfu, where since I 8 56 the Roman-Greek 
dowry system, involving separation of property estates, had 
obtained. The court of Nuremberg, Bavaria, in I909 ex-
cluded the application of the Bavarian transitory provisions 
because the parties had never lived in Bavaria. It applied 
its own former conflicts rule of the Pandectistic system lead-
ing to the Corfu law. This, however, contained an excep-
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tional conflicts rule for foreigners to the effect that the 
national law of the husband should govern marital prop-
erty; this renvoi would have led to the former community 
property system of the city of Nuremberg. But since the 
court followed the Pendectists rejecting renvoi, the reason-
ing ended with the dowry system.10 
Thus, an artful combination of artificial principles suc-
ceeded in avoiding the identical result which the conflicts 
rules of the national German law, article I5, paragraph I, 
E.G., and of the domiciliary law, the Greek Code of I 8 56, 
would have reached. 
(III) An illegitimate child was granted a decree of 
legitimation in Czarist Russia after the father's death. The 
former conflicts rule of the lower court was that the father's 
domicil governs legitimacy. But there was an obscure renvoi 
and uncertainty where the domicil as of the decisive time 
should be located. The Reichsgericht went to great pains 
on both questions and after reviewing a series of possible 
connections wound up with the ruling that Russian law ap-
plied and the legitimation was void. 11 
The same result could have been reached by the simple 
statement that a foreign public act must be valid under its 
own law before being recognized elsewhere. 
In France, Bartin noted with approval 12 that the French 
courts believe it is "natural" that the principle of nonretro-
activity of laws covers conflicts law. But since the three 
main decisions commonly cited deal with changes of sub-
stantive law,13 authority to support such a rule is very thin. 
While a French tribunal, as well as the Franco-German 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, have treated events affecting 
marriage or marital property occurring before France de-
10 OLG. Niirnberg (Jan. 22, I909) 20 Z. int. R. ( I9IO) 548. 
11 RG. (Nov. u, I9o6} I8 Z. int. R. ( I9o8} I6s. 
12 BARTIN, I Principes 286 No. u7, criticized by I PoNTES DE MIRANDA 336. 
13 Supra notes 2 and 4· 
TRANSITORY RELATIONS OF CONFLICTS 509 
nounced the Hague Conventions on these matters, in accord-
ance with the Conventions, 14 this follows better than from 
a general principle from the special conflicts rules used 
everywhere in marital matters. 
2. Theories 
(a) Applying the substantive intertemporal rules of the 
forum. The German practice of the early century is not 
only favored by most German writers 15 but also by leading 
authors elsewhere. Thus, Batiffol, rejecting all other doc-
trines, writes: "If the internal transitory law subjects a 
marriage or a contract to the law in force at that date (of 
the act), there is a priori no reason to exclude from this 
law the conflicts rules on marriage or contracts." 16 
However, it is recognized since Zitelmann's article that 
the sections of the German Introductory Law, stating in 
detail what provisions of the new code are inapplicable to 
previously created legal relations, do not include conflicts 
problems; allegedly they apply by analogy, but reasons for 
analogy may fail to exist,17 and the analogy itself has often 
been attacked with good reasons. 
On the other hand, though the "former laws" maintained 
do not encompass conflicts law, they do include in the 
dominant German opinion foreign substantive laws.18 Hence, 
it is commonly taught that where laws conflict simultaneously 
in space and in time, the intertemporal problem must be 
solved before the international one. A case belonging to the 
former substantive law is subject also to the former con-
flicts rule of the court seized with the case. 
14 Trib. St. Etienne (Jan. I92I, I9I4) 583; TAM. Franco-Allemand 
(Feb. I2, I927) 6 Rec. Trib. Arb. Mixtes 922. 
15 ZITELMANN, Jh. Jb. I900, I89; NEUMEYER, I2 Z. int. R. No, I4; MELCHIOR 
64 ff.; LEWALD 4; WOLFF, D. IPR. (ed. 3) 2. 
16 BATIFFOL, Traite 339 § 3I6; ARMIN JON, I Precis (ed. 3) 30I j SCHNITZER 
I76. 
17 ZITELMANN, supra n, I. 
1 8 NEUMEYER, 12 Z. int. R. at 48. 
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The Brazilian Introductory Law of 1942 has a short 
article 6 at the end of the general provisions preceding the 
conHicts rules in articles 7-18, which states that laws have 
immediate effect with the exception of legal situations 
definitively constituted and the execution of acts legally 
perfected. This provision, like the German transitory 
articles, 19 again leaves in doubt whether it extends to con-
Hicts laws. 
(b) Distinguishing foreign cases. In one of his most 
penetrating, though not entirely happy studies, Franz Kahn 
opposed two main theses to the view just described. He 
observed that private international law is essentially differ-
ent from substantive law and ought to have its own transi-
tory rules.20 As a rigid positivist, he coupled this statement 
with the assertion that this transitory system must be estab-
lished under the isolated viewpoint of a determinate 
national legislation.21 Kahn himself began the elaboration 
of special intertemporal rules in this sense. Much more 
attention has been devoted to his second proposition en-
visaging cases that had no connection with the German law 
until the code came into force; these should not be treated 
under the old German conHicts rules. 22 A marriage of two 
foreigners domiciled abroad and lacking assets in Germany, 
having nothing to do with the former German law, would 
be subject to the new conHicts law. 
These conceptions have often been criticized, especially 
because of the vacuum they leave and the uncertainty of the 
ties that the case should have with the forum. As Neu-
meyer objected, the sway of a conHicts rule cannot depend 
on the time when a relationship is brought before the court of 
19 KAHN, I Abh. 367 f. 
20 lb. 385, followed by NEUMEYER 39 If. and others. 
21 lb. 394 If., followed by ZITELMANN, NEUMEYER, ANZILOTTI, and others. 
22 Contra NEUMEYER, ib. 4Z If.; other polemics against KAHN, e.g., 
MELCHIOR § 40; ROUBIER 69-73. 
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the forum instead of the time of its origin or modification. 
Raape attempts to combine the prevailing doctrine with 
Kahn's view, which he improves. According to him, the 
provisions of the uEinfuhrungsgesetz" do extend to con-
flicts law, but only where the relationship was "imprinted" 
with the law of the forum during the former legislation. 
He seems to require a substantial connection of the parties 
with Germany before 1900. Thus, the marital property 
system is subject to the old, mostly domiciliary criterion 
when the parties before 1900 had German nationality or 
domicil. If neither, the application of the old rules is 
"outright senseless." 28 
(c) Establishing general transitory rules. Some scholars 
look for general principles valid for the change of con-
flictual as well as municipal law. In France and Brazil, 
this approach has been strengthened by invoking the con-
stitutional maxim that new laws do not have retroactive 
effect on facta praeterita but only on facta pendentia; they 
may not impair existent contracts.24 
These writers, however, join Kahn in recognizing that 
the new conflicts rule may state that it operates retro-
actively and such effect may be presumed in a number of 
situations. This is the case when public policy at the forum 
changes; thus the Spanish courts after 1936 have refused 
to recognize foreign divorces that they would have recog-
nized in 1934; or the rules of the forum on evidence, quali-
fied as substantive law, are altered, e.g., the means of 
proving illegitimate paternity.25 
(d) Applying the new conflicts rules. All theories pre-
23 RAAPE, Komm. 3 so. 
24 ROUBIER 79; PONTES DE MIRANDA 335; DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, Der. Civil 
de Espana, Vol. I ( 1949) 6 51 ff. contrasts legal transactions with suspended 
situations; similarly MACHADO VILLELA, DIP. 479; BALMACEDA 220. 
25 See the various proposals by KAHN 394 ff.; ROUBIER 678; DE CASTRO, 
supra n. 24, 646; YANGUAS, D.I.P. 221. 
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serving in principle the former conflicts rules of the forum 
in order to connect old events with a certain legal system 
are opposed by the contrary principle that new conflicts 
rules immediately reach all cases. An early attempt by 
Niedner to deduct retroactivity from the nature of conflicts 
law as an alleged branch of public law 26 has been unani-
mously rejected. But Anzilotti has had an important 
following, particularly in Italy, when, instead of connecting 
the problem with the intertemporal rules of the forum, he 
attributed it to the intertemporal rules of the legal system 
to which the new conflicts rules refer.27 
While, he argues, situations entirely liquidated belong to 
the old set of rules and future situations are reserved for 
the new rules, the remaining problems consist simply in the 
replacement of one substantive law (viz. that invoked by 
the old conflicts norm) by another substantive law (viz. 
the law referred to by the new conflicts norm), a problem to 
be solved by the transitory law of the newly invoked system. 
This is an astonishing mistake of a great scholar, illus-
trating the enormous difficulty of the matter. Criticizing 
with mastery all the other solutions, Anzilotti directly vio-
lates the thesis defended by himself following Kahn that 
substantive and conflicts rules follow heterogeneous prin-
ciples, the latter being merely formal. What the foreign 
system thinks of a sequence of its own substantive rules 
would not even afford a model for the change of its own 
conflict rules and must be completely immaterial to the 
application of the forum's conflicts law. The impracti-
26 NIEDNER, "Kollision der ortlichen und zeitlichen Kollisionsfragen," in 
Das Recht I900, 250. Inversely, I FRANKENSTEIN 24I ff. advocates retroactivity 
as principle. 
27 ANZILOTTI, supra n. I, 2 Rivista n5, 126, followed by AGO, Teoria I78 
ff.; ARMIN JON, I Precis I88; MONACO, Efficacia; PACCHIONI, Elementi 245 ff. 
The partial opposition by BALDONI (supra n. I) § 7 rests on his theory on the 
nature of conflicts law; against him AGO, Teoria I79 n. I, I84; BATIFFOL, I.e. 
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cability of this theory is, of course, manifest when the for-
eign system has never been changed and has no transitory 
rules at all. 
Eliminating this theory, opposition to the transitory rules 
of the forum results in the principle that the new conflicts 
rules apply, subject to some exceptions, particularly on the 
ground of public policy.28 
Pace, the author of a voluminous new treatise on the 
general subject of transitory law, rightly places emphasis 
on what he calls the structure, and what we call the con-
struction, of the new rule. 29 Conflicts rules are not included, 
and the author's insistence on the adaptability of his 
formula tempus regit factum has deviated too much atten-
tion from the details of the matter. Nevertheless, his ex-
tended polemics and his starting point in the new law seem 
closely to associate his effort to the spirit of Kahn's search 
for specialized rules, which despite all its defects is still 
the best method of approaching the desperate problem. 
An original and enlightening idea has been expressed by 
E. M. Meijers and the Benelux draft. In principle, the 
present rules apply; by exception foreign legal relations are 
recognized as they were determined by the conflicts laws-
all of them-of the countries essentially connected with 
these relations at the time of origin or extinction.80 
III. RATIONALE 
The divergent theses of the leading writers arrive at 
the application of four different sets of rules, existing or 
planned: 
( 1 ) The substantive transitory rules of the forum, 
either by direct application or by analogy; 
2s Thus, YANGUAS 217 f. 
29 PACE, supra n. 1, and a summary in Rivista dir. com. 1947, 256-267. 
30 Benelux draft, art. 25 par. 2; cf., MAKAROV, 18 Z. ausl. PR. (1953) 218 f. 
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( 2) An inceptive system of transitory rules of the forum, 
either for the special purpose of conflicts law, or 
involving the change of both substantive and con-
flicts rules; 
(3) The substantive transitory rules of the applicable 
system; or perhaps certain parts of this law; 
( 4) The present conflicts rules of the forum as retro-
active with exceptional cases of nonretroactivity. 
I am unable to subscribe in full measure to any of the 
doctrines suggesting these solutions. Each has some merits 
and some severe drawbacks. In my opinion, the following 
considerations are decisive. 
I. With Kahn and Raape, we must deny by all means 
the influence of a former conflicts rule on a relationship 
which had no connection with this rule during its time. If 
two Spaniards domiciled in France had married there, the 
intrinsic requirements were subjected, respectively, by the 
old German and the new Brazilian conflicts law to the law 
of the domicil and by the new German and the old Brazilian 
conflicts law to the national law. Who would dare to say 
that the old or the new conflicts rule is "right," just, ade-
quate, and better protects the interest of the parties than 
the other? Naively, it has been presumed that the law of 
the former time was preferable because the parties trusted 
it-a very strange idea that these Spaniards should confide 
in a conflicts law of whose existence they never knew. It 
is likewise rather absurd to discriminate foreign-governed 
family relations according to the deadlines of January I, 
1900, of Germany or 1942 of Brazil. Contrary to Kahn 
and Raape, however, this is not only true when the parties 
never had a domicil and never brought an action in the 
forum; it is always true in foreign-governed relationships. 
The German transitory rules themselves were adequate 
only for such legal situations as would have been governed 
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by the new Civil Code, if it were applied retroactively. In 
these cases, it could possibly-inconvincingly as we have 
seen-have been argued also that the former conflicts rules 
pointing to the relevant particular territorial laws had to 
be preserved. But if French spouses fixed their first matri-
monial domicil in I 899 in a German town in which separa-
tion of property obtained, a French court would tend to 
presume that the parties agreed on the French community 
system. Could they be presumed instead in Germany or in 
a third country to have "trusted" the local system so that 
this system must be perpetuated after I 900? 
Even considering the relationships with which they were 
connected in a drastic way, is there any "expectation of the 
parties" to protect when their transaction is void under 
the law applicable under the old conflicts rule? Moreover, 
expectation of laymen based on conflicts law is a fantastic 
invention; if the parties did not care to agree on an ap-
plicable legal system, there must be another solid ground 
for exempting the case from the conflicts law in force. 
lllus tration: In a case decided in I 907 by the Reichs-
gericht a married woman signed a release to her husband 
in I 896 in Wiesbaden, where under German common law 
the domicil, namely, Baden, determined the validity of 
contracts. Nevertheless, as the question whether the wife 
had made a valid gift between spouses belonged to marital 
property law according to the conflicts rule of Baden, the 
national law seemed to apply. This would have been the 
law of Mark Brandenburg and "subsidiarily the Prussian 
Landrecht." According to the "more recent practice" of 
the court, however, further reference would be made from 
Prussian to Baden law whose article I096 allowed revoca-
tion.81 
What law, we may ask again, did the parties trust? 
31 RG. (Oct. u, 1907) 19 Z. int. R. ( 1909) 222, Schall v. Schall. 
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The right solution, therefore, cannot lie in simply going 
back to the old conflicts rules, for the only reason that im-
portant elements of the case happened to appear in the 
past, or even some substantial connections with the forum 
thet;t existed. 
2. On the other hand, "respect for the past" has always 
been paid to what was called jura adquisita, vested rights, 
wohlerworbene Rechte. Despite Pillet, Dicey, and Beale, 
this category has lost its charm. It is also settled that 
conflicts law itself never creates any indefeasible right, only 
to be constituted "by the just meaning of the competent 
legislation." 32 Unfortunately, the misused and demolished 
vested rights doctrines have left a vacuum to this day. In 
the intertemporal field, at this time, merely two assumptions 
seem assured : 
(a) A foreign judgment recognized as res judicata by a 
decision of the forum at the time of its previous conflicts 
rules remains binding, although this recognition required 
that a conflicts rule of the forum, now repealed, was ob-
served by the foreign court. We re-enter the problem, how-
ever, where no recognition was sought at the time of the old 
conflicts rule. 
(b) An obligation fulfilled, a marriage dissolved, an 
inheritance right won or lost by the death of the decedent, 
in short, a legal relationship finished under the old set of 
rules remains liquidated. 
(c) While these propositions are confined to the forum's 
own conflicts rules, there is clearly a need for a broader 
respect for the past, as in the "immemorial" prescription 
of the Pandectists. A few suggestions have been made 
32 ANZILOTTI, 2 Rivista at 131. The "vested right" of a natural child, born 
in the period when Austrians were considered German nationals, assumed 
in German decisions 1950 and later (16 Z. ausl. PR. 509) eliminates EG. 
art. 212, but is based on substantive law. 
TRANSITORY RELATIONS OF CONFLICTS 517 
recently to fill some gaps left by the disappearance of the 
vested rights category. Thus, the Benelux draft preserves 
the relations recognized by the conflicts laws of "the laws" 
with which they are connected, 33 and Niederer proposes 
to allow the court's discretion for maintaining exceptionally 
the products of a legal system that would not be competent 
under the court's normal conflicts rules.34 On these ques-
tions, transcending by far the field of private international 
law, further discussions are highly desirable. 
3· In a series of existing conflicts rules, reference is made 
to the law of a specific time, and in particular that of a 
past event. When the form of marriage, a contract, a con-
veyance, a will is governed by the law of the place of cele-
bration or execution, also the law of the time is meant 
The first matrimonial domicil or the nationality of the 
husband or the spouses refers primarily to the initial stage 
of the marriage. The status of a child is determined accord-
ing to the moment of its birth or legitimation. Tort is 
subject to the law of the place where, at the time when, 
the harm is done. Possession and property comes into 
existence at a certain time under the law of this time. Con-
struction of agreements and wills must take into consider-
ation the law of the time of execution. 
These and other references to the past, developed within 
the framework of the conflicts rules of one system, should 
be greatly and consistently enlarged, especially in the in-
terest of the validity of transactions. They serve better 
than transitory rules when they concede optional applica-
tion in favor of validity or when the transaction depends on 
a future event, as a testamentary will does. 
33 Supra n. 30. 
34 NIEDERER, Einfiihrung in die Allgemeinen Lehren des int. Privatrechts 
( 1954) 320. 
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/llus trations: (I) Suppose a German when domiciled in 
Brazil executed in I94I in Cuba a will in German holo-
graphic form and died domiciled in Cuba in I953· The 
will was valid in the eyes of a Brazilian judge when his 
old conflicts rule referred to the national, German, law 
of formal requisites. Under the new domiciliary approach, 
a Brazilian court would regard the will as invalid if no help 
were forthcoming. The transitory rule of the I942 Law 
does not help.35 But the rule, locus regit actum, would, 
provided that we suppose that the Brazilian law has merely 
forgotten to mention it 36 and, moreover, that the unsound 
rejection of renvoi in article I 6 were relaxed to permit 
further reference from Cuban to German law. 
(II) Suppose a seventeen-year-old I tali an boy, domiciled 
in Florida, made there a will in I 94 I, then moved to Eng-
land where he died in I944· Capacity to execute a will is 
given in Italy at I 6, in Florida at I 8, and in England at 2 I 
years, and must exist in Italy at the time of execution and 
in Florida and England at the time of death. A Brazilian 
court formerly looked to Italian law and held the will 
valid. Now it must find capacity at the time of execution 
missing and at the time of death still missing. Any transi-
tory law depends on the time of the death. But if Brazil 
were to recognize validity of a foreign will also in a case 
where the testator had capacity by his national law at the 
time of execution, conflicts law would take care of the 
situation. 
4· That the contacts preferred by a new determination 
of choice of law should generally yield to the abandoned 
standards without appropriate direction by the lawmaker 
is not a very attractive idea. It has been a strange idea 
when the new rules substituted a congeries of dubious pro-
vincial case laws, as in the German, Polish and other 
legislations. Even elsewhere there is not much substance 
35 Supra sro. 
36 Supra 511· 
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to suggest a presumption for the old setup, nor, it is true, 
for any other a priori considerations. Discovering in-
dividual solutions needs much more detailed studies than 
have been afforded thus far. To resume the principal ex-
perience of this work in a caveat as used in the Restate-
ments, our last word may call once again for prudent 
research. 
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Benelux Convention on Interna-
tional Private Law, 265, 
306. 
Berlin Convention on Copyrights, 
of Igo8, 6g. 
Bern Conventions. See Table of 
Statutes. 
Biens incorporels, 66. See also 
Intangibles. 
Bill of Exchange. See also Bills 
and Notes; Cambial Obliga-
tions. 
acceding contracts, I 50-I 5 I. 
independence, I 50-I 5 I, 
I69-I72. 
original contract, 149-150. 
principle of the basic bill, 149-
150, I69-I72, 207. 
Billet a ordre, I32, 240. 
Bills and Notes. See also Bill of 
Exchange; Cambial Obliga-
tions ; Checks. 
Anglo-American and Conti-
nentallaws, I32-I33· 
circulation, Chapter 61. 
conflicts rules, 238-24I. 
creation, I 39· 
formal requirements, Chapter 
59· 
principles, Chapter 58. 
special and general rules, I 33-
I35· 
terminology, I34-I35· 
theories underlying the law of, 
I35-I47· 
validity in general, Chapter 
6o. 
Bills of lading, 55-58. See also 
Documents of Title 
Bona fide Holder. See Holders. 
Bona vacantia, 37I-374· See 
also Succession. 
Bremer v. Freeman, 289-29I. 
Brussels Convention for the U ni-
fication of Certain Rules of 
Law relating to Maritime 
Mortgages, and Liens, of 
April 10, Ig26, 106, I 10, 
III, II4, II5. 
Bufnoir, 35. 
Bullenois, I 7. 
Bustamante Code. See Table of 
Statutes. 
Calvo, 474· 
Cambial Obligations. See also 
Bill of Exchange; Bills and 
Notes. 
concept, I37-I38. 
enforcement, I46-I47· 
extracambial, I34-I35· 
place of creation, I58-I68. 
principle of independence, I6g-
I72, I86-20I, 207, 208, 
222-223, 240. 
underlying relationships, I 39-
I42. 
Camhiale, I32. 
Gammell v. Sewell, 76. 
Capacity 
bills and notes, I 7 3- I 77. 
corporations, I 7 5. 
drawee of check, 230-232. 
drawer of check, 229-230. 
foreigners, 45· 
lunatics, 44· 
married women, 44· 
minors, 44, 45 n. 10. 
testamentary, 3 I9-322. 
beneficiaries, 358-360. 
Cavers, 445· 
Celsus, 35· 
Chalmers, I 55. 
Change of Conflicts Rules. See 
Intertemporal Relations. 
INDEX 6I3 
Characterization 
debt secured by mortgage, 2D-
22. 
equitable conversion, 20, 25. 
fixtures, 25. 
hypothec, 2o-22. 
leaseholds, 18-20, 24. 
liens, 64-66. 
mortgage, 2o-22. 
movable or immovable, 276-
277. 
right of stoppage in transitu, 
40. 
Charges, 58-6o. 
Chattels. See also Security Inter-
ests: Res in Transitu,· Ves-
sels. 
ambulatory, Chapter 57. 
removal, Chapter 57· 
acquisition of right, 7o-81. 
acts in the second territory, 
76-78. 
adverse possession, 97-99· 
conditional sale, 94-96. 
public policy, 81-83. 
without creditor's con-
sent, 92-94· 
Checks. See also Bills and Notes. 
capacity of drawee, 23o-232. 
capacity of drawer, 229-230. 
certification, 233. 
character of, 224-227. 
conflicts rules, 226-229. 
cover, 232-233. 
creation of, 229-232. 
form of, 229. 
restrictive clauses, 235-236. 
stop-payment, 233-235. 
time for action, 236-237. 
Cheshire, 31, 35, 41. 
Circulation, Chapter 6I. See also 
Bills and Notes. 
Claims, Chapter 73· 
single law of succession 
civil law, 43I-434· 
common law, 434-440. 
effect of judgments, 437-
439· 
enforcement of, 433· 
equality of, 435-436. 
insolvent estates, 436-437. 
liability for 
definition, 429-430. 
limitation, 43D-43 I. 
preferences, 435-437· 
multiple laws of succession 
equalization, 441-442. 
Claims under Foreign Law. See 
Foreign Law: proof. 
Clause de dessaisine saisine, 35. 
Coheirship, 391-393. See also 
Partition. 
Collation. See Advancements. 
Commorientes, 359-36o. 
Confession of ] udgment, I 4 7. 
Co-ownership, 39· 
Constitutum possessorium, 50, 
I6I. 
Constitutum simplex, 35. 
Contuzzi, 305. 
Cook, 45· 
Coke, 19. 
Conditional Sales. See Chattels; 
Security Interests; Transfer 
of Property. 
Conflicts Law. See also Inter-
temporal Relations. 
Conversion, 52-53· 
Copyright, 66-69. See also In-
tangibles. 
Counterclaims, real actions, 54-
55· 
Cover, I37, 144-146, 232-233. 
Craven's Estate, In re, 367, 416. 
Cretio, 376. 
Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 
492-493, 494, 500. 
Damages, in Recourse, 20D-20I. 
Default of Carrier, I 18. 
Delatio (hereditatis), 376. 
Delegation of Debt, I37-IJ8. 
INDEX 
Delibazione, 421. 
Delivery. See also Bills and 
Notes. 
constructive, 161. 
function, 159-168. 
place, I62. 
Dettes immobilieres, 44I. 
Devolution. See Inheritance. 
Detinue, 53· 
Documents of Title 
effects of issue and endorse-
ment, 55-57· 
incorporation of right in docu-
ment, 56. 
subsequent transfers, 57-58. 
Dicey, I45, I49, 4I5, 5I6. 
Diena, I63, I66, 476. 
Dispossession, 52. 
Divisio paterna, 385. 
Donatio mortis causa 
Characterization, 366-370. 
Drawee of Check:, Capacity, 23o-
232. 
Drawer of Check:, Capacity, 229-
230. 
Dumoulin, I 7. 
Distribution, 354, 399-40I. 
Distributive Share, 325-326. 
Droit d' aubaine, 262. 
Easements, 58-6o. 
Edgerly v. Bush, 81. 
Effets de complaisance, I8I n. 
42. See also Accommoda-
tion paper. 
Eigentumsvorbehalt, 9I. 
Einert, I39· 
Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian 
Bank, I92. 
Encumbrances, 6o-66. 
Enforcement 
cambial obligations, I46-I47· 
claims against the estate, 433. 
Enrichment. See Unjust Enrich-
ment. 
Enterprises, commercial, 69. 
Envoi en possession, 381. 
Erbe, 245· 
Erbschein, 422. 
Estoppel, 22o-22 I. 
Eviction de la loi hrangere, 263. 
Exceptio doli, I40. 
Exceptio pacti, I40. 
Exequatur, 428. 
Falcon bridge, 297, 368. 
Fedozzi, 309, n. 78. 
Feller, 227. 
Fideicommissa, 33 I -333. 
family 256. 
Fideicommissary Substitutions, 
447, 466. See also Fideicom-
missa ; Trusts. 
Fiduciaries. See also Adminis-
tration of Decedents' Es-
tates. 
extraterritorial scope of ap-
pointment, 422-424. 
recognition of foreign fiduci-
aries, 424-428. 
Fiduciary Relations. See Trusts. 
Fiore, 476. 
Foelix, 474· 
Fixtures, characterization of, 25. 
Fluvial navigation, 105. 
Fonds de commerce, 277· 
Foreign Law. See also Intertem-
poral Relations. 
absence of proof, 492-493. 
application, Part Fifteen. 
ascertainment 
by judicial notice, 478-484. 
by party evidence, 473-478. 
presumption, 493-495. 
methods, 49o-492. 
review 
conflicts law, 485-488. 
constitutionality, 485. 
sources, 484-485. 
subsidiary law, 495-500. 
theory of reception, 474-475. 
Forged instruments, 206. See 
also Signature. 
Fortune de mer, 113. 
INDEX 
Fraus legi facta, 273. 
French Draft on Private Inter-
national Law, Art. 52, 65. 
Gage, 65. 
Gemma, 309, n. 78. 
Geneva Conventions. See Table 
of Statutes. 
Gestio, Pro herede, 376. 
Goodrich, 82. 
Goods in Transit. See Res zn 
Transitu. 
Griswold, 3I3, 445· 
Grundwechsel, I50. 
Guaranty Trust v. Hannay, I56. 
Gutteridge, I66. 
Hague Conventions. See Table 
of Statutes. 
Hague Drafts on Succession, 264 
n. I37, 265, 273, 374 n. 89, 
377, 384, 389 n. 58, 390, 
395· 
Heir 
definition, 245· 
forced, 324. 
unworthiness, 365. 
Here des extranei, 376. 
Heredes, Sui, 376. 
Heres, 245· 
Heritier, 245. 
Hibernia National Bank v. La-
combe, 226. 
Holders 
due course, I39, I6I, I62, I63, 
I65, I66, I78, I89-I90, 
24I. 
good faith, I85. 
negotiable instruments, rights 
of, I83-20I. 
Holders. See also Recourse. 
Holmes, 113, 492, 496. 
Hooper v. Gumm, I03. 
Hupka, I75· 
Hutchison v. Ross, 454, 462. 
Hypothec. See also Maritime 
Hypothec. 
characterization in French law, 
2o-2 I ; in German law, 22. 
Incomplete Instrument, I 57. 
Indorsee, rights of. See Holders. 
after maturity, I99-200. 
after protest, I99-200. 
conditional, I78-I79· 
effect of clause "not to order," 
I96-I99· 
functions, I83-I86. 
Indorsement 
negotiability, I96. 
partial, I87. 
Industrial property, 66-69. 
Inglis v. Usherwood, 4I, 75· 
Inheritance. See also Claims; 
Succession ; Wills. 
acceptance and repudiation, 
382-385. 
acquisition of inheritance 
rights, Chapter 70. 
advancements, 389-39I. 
agreement on inheritance 
rights, 266-267, 385-389. 
classification of conflicts sys-
tems, 25I-267. 
conflicts rules, Chapter 64. 
sources, 246-25 I. 
devolution, 375-377· 
partition, 39I-396. 
terminology, 245-246. 
transmission of possession, 
379-382. 
transmission of title, 378-379. 
Injury, on Board Ship, I I8. 
L' inscription au registre vaut 
titre, I24 n. I IO. 
Institute of International Law, 
Madrid, I910, 62 n. 108. 
I nstrumenta guarantigiata, I 46. 
Insurance, Life, 370-371. 
Intangibles, 66-69. 
Intention of Testator. See Wills. 
Interest 
rate, 200. 
stipulations, I 78-1 79· 
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Interpersonal Law, 168. 
Interpretation of Wills. See 
Wills. 
Intertemporal Relations 
change of conflicts law of the 
forum, 505-513. 
change of foreign conflicts law, 
504-505. 
change of foreign substantive 
law, 503-504. 
criticism and suggestions, 513-
519. 
theories, 509-513. 
Intervention, 182. 
Intellectual Property, 66-69. 
Joint Wills, 3I5-318. 
Judgments. See Claims; Probate 
Judgments. 
Jura adquisita, 5 I 6. See also In-
tertemporal Relations. 
Jura in rem. See Real Rights. 
lura novit curia, 475, 476. See 
also Foreign Law. 
Jus albinagii, 262. 
Kahn, 26, 250, 3I8, 51D-5I4· 
Kohler, 35. 
Korvine's Trust, 366. 
Land, 454· 
Latin America. See Table of 
Statutes for individual coun-
tries. 
Law 
personality of, 8. 
territoriality of, 7-8. 
Law Governing Succession, 319-
321, 324-327, 342, 360-
364, 370, 392-393, 4I4, 
431. 
Law of Civilized Nations, 498-
499· See also Foreign Law: 
proof. 
Law of the Domicil. See Lex 
domicilii. 
Law of the Forum. See Lex 
fori. 
Law of Nationality. See Lex 
patriae. 
Law of the Place of Contract. 
See Lex loci contractus. 
Law of the Place of Indorse-
ment, 187-I96, 20D-20I. 
Law of the Place of Issue, 236-
237· See also Bills and 
Notes. 
Law of the place of Payment. 
See Lex loci solutionis. 
Law of the Place of Situation. 
See Lex situs. 
Leary, 96. 
Leaseholds, characterization, I8-
20, 24. 
Legacy, Specific, 382. 
Legataire universe!, 245. 
"Legatee," 245. 
Legatum vindicationis, 382. 
Legitimate Share 
forced heirs, 462-463. 
requirement of will, 400-401. 
succession, 324, 330. 
Lehman, I35, n. 14· 
Letters of Administration, 410. 
See also Probate Judgments. 
Lettre de change, I32. 
Lex causae, 305-3I I. 
Lex commissoria, 63-64. 
Lex fori, 26-29, 495-496, 499· 
Lex loci contractus, I96-2oo. 
Lex domicilii, 251-252, 257-258, 
268-26g. 
Lex loci solutionis, 2oo-20I, 
228-229, 239-24I. 
Lex patriae, 255-253, 258-26o. 
Lex rei sitae. See Lex situs. 
Lex situs, I5-I8, 30-42, 49-50, 
5I-66, 253-257, 282-286, 
3I I, 433. 
scope of, Chapter 55· 
Liability for Claims against the 
Estate. See also Claims. 
cum viribus hereditatis, 43 I. 
INDEX 
definition, 429-430. 
limitation, 43o-43 1. 
pro viribus hereditatis, 430. 
Liens, 64-66. See also Maritime 
Liens. 
characterization, 64-66. 
Limitation of Actions 
law of bills and notes, 22 I-
223, 236--237· 
Letteralita, 135, I49· 
Local law theory, 474-475. 
Locus regit actum, 46, 47, I58-
I68, I6g-I72. 
Locus verus v. locus scriptus, 
I62, I67. 
"Loi de police et de surete/' 3I. 
Lorenzen, I32, I38, I50, 152, 
I88, n. I8, Ig8, 211, 2I7, 
297· 
Maitland, 467. 
Mancini, 268, 280. 
Marital Property, 365-366. 
Maritime Hypothec, 103, I I I-
II 2. See also Vessels. 
Maritime Liens, I 13-122. 
foreign-created, II 5-II g. 
nature, II3-II4. 
priority, I I9-I22. 
recognition, I IS-I I7. 
Marsden, I I3. 
Maturity, time of, 204-205. 
Meijers, 280, 5I3. 
Mobilia sequuntur personam, 8, 
450. 
basis of rule, 8-g. 
origin of rule, 8. 
scope of rule, 9-I5. 
Montevideo Conventions. See 
Table of Statutes. 
Moratory Laws, 2I9-220. 
Le mort saisit le vif, 376. 
Moulis v. Owen, I77. 
"Movables follow the person." 
See Mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam. 
N acherben, 364. 
N acherbschaft, 343· 
N achvermiichtnis, 343· 
Negotiable Instruments. See also 
Bills and Notes. 
situs of, administration of de-
cedents' estates, 4I3. 
Negotiability 
accessory contracts, Ig6. 
determination, Ig6--Igg. 
effect of clause "not to order," 
Ig6--Igg. 
Neumeyer, 5 10. 
Niboyet, 26, 27, 32, n. I 10, 45, 
IIO, 306. 
Niederer, 5 I 7. 
Niedner, 5I2. 
Nolde, I I7, n. 77· 
Notice of Default. See also Re-
course. 
form, 2 I 2-2 I 4· 
necessity, 207-2I2. 
sufficiency, 2I4. 
Obligations. See also Cambial 
Obligations. 
"cambial," I34-I35· 
extracambial, I34-I35· 
"written," I35· 
Obligation and Property in a 
Negotiable Instrument, 
I67-I68, I84-I86. 
Option 
law of succession, 40I. 
Pace, 5I3. 
Pacta de hereditate futura, 386. 
Pactum de cambiando, I37· 
Paghero, I32. 
Partition, 39I-396, 404. See 
also Inheritance. 
Patent Rights, 66--6g. See also 
Intangibles. 
Perassi, 282. 
Payment, 202-205. 
action, 223. 
discharge by, 205-206. 
INDEX 
excuses for nonpayment, 205-
206. 
impossibility, 2I9-220. 
modalities, 204. 
part, 205. 
place, 203-204. 
stop-payment order, 233-235· 
time, 204-205. 
Payment and Recourse, Chapter 
62. 
Perpetuities, 33 I-333· See also 
Fideicommissa; Future In-
terests. 
Personal Law. See also Lex 
domicilii,· Lex patriae. 
of beneficiary, 36I-364. 
of deceased, 303-305. 
Personal Law of the Ship, 109. 
"Personalty has no locality," 8. 
Petition of Recovery. See Rei 
vindicatio. 
Phillimore, 290. 
Pillet, 360, 5I6. 
Place of Publication, 68. 
Planes. See Aircraft. 
Pledge, 6I-62. See also Security 
Interests. 
Plurality of Succession, Chapter 
7I. 
Possession, right to, 5 I-52. 
Possessory Actions, 5 I. 
Portio debita, 327. 
Pothier, I37, I5I, I62, 386. 
Precarium, 35· 
Preferences. See Claims. 
Prelevement, 262-266, 325. 
Presentment. See also Recourse. 
mode, 2 I 2-2 I 4· 
necessity, 207-2 I 2. 
time, 2I4-217. 
waiver, 218. 
Privileges. See Liens. 
Professio juris, 274. 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
436. 
Probate Judgments. See also Ad-
ministrations of Decedents' 
Estates. 
ancillary, 4I9-42I. 
collateral attack against, 409-
410. 
effect of, in forum, 409-410. 
extraterritorial effect, 4I6-422. 
jurisdictional principles, 407-
409. 
Promissory notes. See Bills and 
Notes. 
Property. See also Intangibles: 
Real Rights; Transfer of 
Property. 
movable or immovable, I 5-26. 
tangible, Chapter 54· 
Proprietary Rights. See Real 
Rights. 
Protest. See also Recourse. 
form, 2I2-2I4. 
necessity, 207-2I2. 
time, 2I4-2I7. 
waiver, 2I8. 
Provision. See Cover. 
Public Policy 
foreign trusts, 464, 469. 
lex situs, 255-256. 
removal of chattels, 8I-83. 
security rights in movables, 
88-89. 
succession, 364-365, 384. 
Raape, 3II, 5II, 514· 
Real Actions, 5I-55· 
counterclaims to, 54-55· 
Real Rights 
concept, 3-5. 
creation by transaction, 43-5 I. 
determination of structure, 49-
50. 
distinguished from obligatory 
rights, 3-5. 
foreign judgments, 5D--5I. 
form, 46-48. 
object, 5-7. 
violations, and remedies, 5 I-
55· 
INDEX 619 
Reasonable Time, 215-217. See 
also Presentment; Protest. 
Rechtsscheintheorie, 137. 
Recourse. See also Notice of De-
fault; Presentment; Protest. 
acts necessary to preserve, 207-
212. 
duties of holder, 207-208. 
exemptions from duties of 
holder, 2 I 7-22 I. 
time for suing for, 221-223. 
Rei vindicatio, 53-54· 
Relacion subjacente, 134 n. 12. 
Relationships in a negotiable in-
strument, 134-135. 
See also Cambial Obligations. 
Remedies. See Real Actions; 
Real Rights. 
Renvoi 
bills and notes 
capacity, 174-175· 
sufficiency of notice, 2 I 4· 
maritime liens, II6-II7. 
transactions respecting land 
capacity, 45· 
form, 47· 
Res in Transitu, IOD--102. See 
also Vessels. 
right of stoppage, 4o--42. 
Reserve, 462. See also Legiti-
mate Share. 
Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws, 31, 245, 363. 
administration of decedents' 
estates, § 467, 408 n. 4; 
§ 468, 414 n. 36, 416, 425 
n. 84; § 471, 413 n. 31; 
§ 474; 424 n. 76, 425 n. 
79; § 476; 413 n. 31; 
§ 477, 413 n. 33; § 478, 
413 n. 34; § 479, 413 n. 
32; § 481, 425 n. 79; § 
490, 342 n. 39; § 506, 438 
ns. 36, 39; § 509, 413 n. 
31; § 522, 439 n. 46. 
claims, § 495, 435, 438 n. 
42 ; § 496, 439 n. 45 ; § 
497, 435; § 498, 434 n. 
I 7 ; § 499, 434 n. I 8 ; 
§§ 50Q-503, 434 n. 19; 
§§ 559-560, 436 n. 24. 
probate, § 469, 408 n. 5· 
probate judgments, § 470, 
419 n. s8. 
surviving spouse, § 461, 326 
n. 34, 328 n. 48. 
adoption, §§ 142-143, 361 n. 
37· 
contracts, § 312, 159 n. 26; 
§ 314, r6o n. 32; § 332, 
217 n. 88; § 336, rg8. 
foreign law, § 621, 474 n. 8; 
§ 622, 494 n. 91; § 624, 
483 n. 38; § 625, 490 n. 7 I. 
judgments, § 436, 418 n. 53· 
property 
classification, § 208, 19 n. 
66, 20 n. 67. 
immovable 
acquisition, § 2 14, 49 n. 
36; § 216, 43 n. r; 
§ 217, 46 n. r6, n. 22; 
§ 218, 49, n. 37; § 221, 
49 n. 35; § 222, 53 n. 
53, s8, 59 n. 85; § 234, 
352 n. gr. 
mortgages, § 225, 23 n. 
86, 44 n. 8, 6r n. 93; 
§ 226, 62 n. 94; § 227, 
63 n. IOI ; § 228, 62 n. 
96, 63 n. IOI; § 229, 
62 n. 97; § 230, 61 n. 
91; § 231, 6o n. 86, 
61 n. gr. 
succession, § 245, 2 I n. 
75; § 249, 289 n. 4, 
319 n. 2, 358 n. rg; 
§ 250, 345 n. 48, 346 
n. 51;§ 251, 340, 341; 
§ 252, 349 n. 68, 400 
n. 14; § 253, 349 n. 70. 
INDEX 
trusts, § 24I, 445 n. 4, 
450, 454 n. 27; § 242, 
445 n. 4; § 243, 445 n. 
4, 45I; § 244, 445 n. 4· 
movable 
acquisition, § 255, 43 n. 
2, 6I n. 93; § 256, 46 
n. I6; § 258, 49 n. 35; 
§ 259, 97 n. 108, n. 
IIO; § 26I, 56 n. 70. 
jurisdiction, § 49, 83 n. 
48, 92 n. 95· 
liens, § 265, 6I n. 93; § 
272, 85 n. 58; § 275, 
82 n. 47, 92 n. 95 ; 
§ 276, 86 n. 66, 93 n. 
96, § 279, 6I n. 93, 
64 n. 106; § 280, 85 
n. 58. 
removal, § 268, 82 n. 47, 
92 n. 95; § 269, 86 n. 
66, 93 n. 96. 
renvoi, § 8, 47 n. 23, 284 
n. 56. 
succession, § 300, 4I5-
4I6; § 30I, 326 n. 34; 
§ 302, 328 n. 48; § 
306, 289 n. 4, 320 n. 3, 
358 n. 20; § 307, 345 
n. 48, 346 n. 52 ; § 
308, 34I· 
trusts, § 294, 445 n. 4, 
450; § 295, 445 n. 4, 
450, 454 n. 27; § 296, 
445 n. 4; §§ 297-298, 
445 n. 4, 45I; § 299, 
445 n. 4, 457 n. 41. 
public policy, § 6I2, 265. 
real actions,§ 6I3, 5I n. 49· 
Restraints 
on alienation of trust funds, 
468-470. 
on power to dispose by will, 
324-333· 
Retention, right of. See Liens. 
Retroactivity of Conflicts Law. 
See Intertemporal Relations. 
Revocation, order of payment, 
233-235· 
Ricard, 35· 
Riley v. Pierce Oil Corporation, 
499· 
Le roi est mort, vive le roi, 376. 
Rome Copyright Convention of 
I928, 69. 
Rubin's Will, In re, 388, 4I6. 
Sachhaftung, I I3. 
Sachsenspiegel, 268. 
Saisine, 38I. 
Sauser-Hall, 269, 283. 
Savigny, I3, 34, IOO, 270, 480. 
Schneider, In re, 248, 285. 
Schwabenspiegel, 268. 
Scope of Lex Situs, Chapter 55· 
Securities 
stolen, 83-84. 
Security Interests. See also Re-
moval of Chattels. 
creation of, 84-88. 
effect of public policy of the 
forum, 88-89. 
effect of recordation, 89-92. 
in conditional sale, 94-96. 
in ships, I ID-I I2. 
Separatio bonorum, 430. 
Servitudes, 58-6o. 
Settlor, Intention of, 458-464. 
See also Autonomy of the 
Party. 
Signature. See also Bills and 
Notes. 
by unauthorized agent, I95· 
forged, I9D-I95· 
function in the civil law, I62-
I66, I67. 
place of, I62-I64. 
stop-payment, 233-235. 
Spouse, surviving 
statutory allowance, 328. 
Statuta mixta, I6. 
Statuta personalia, 8, I6. 
Statuta realia, 8, I6. 
Statutist doctrine, 7, 45. 
INDEX 62I 
Stipulatio doli, I40. 
Stobbe, 26. 
Stoppage of Goods in Transitu, 
4(}-42. 
Story, I2, 25, 43, 202, 255, 474· 
Stumberg, 95, I99· 
Substitutio pupillaris, 35 I. 
Substitutions. See Fideicommis-
sary Substitutions. 
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